WPCC 2BJZ Courier#|x2x6X@`7X@HP LaserJet 4 Room 6326HPLA4MP0HPLAS4.PRSx  @\coX@26 ZF #|xHP LaserJet 4 Room 6326HPLA4MP0HPLAS4.PRSx  @\co@CourierCourier Bold(2XFZAl?xxx,2x6X@`7X@?xxx,)x `7XlR&HHH,,H6X@`7h@R&HHH,)M,H `7h ?< $//Amend pt. 63, service outage reports, AD 71494, Rlsd 8194$// $//FCC 94189 $// h0For Record only { ԃ  ?< X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:8U ?` <ԍ NYNEX comments at 16.>  ?<  ?x<  <  11. 30,000 Customer Threshold Discussion: All parties  ?@<  x<essentially agree with the reasoning of the Notice on this issue,   h<and we will adopt the change as proposed. Carriers have been filing   <reports voluntarily in accordance with the 30,000 customers   <threshold, and we have found that these reports provide the   0<Commission with valuable additional information on network   <reliability. In particular, lowering the threshold triples the number of central offices that are subject to reporting.  ? <  ? <  <  12. Reporting Times Background and Comments : All parties   <commenting on the issue of reporting times support the limits  ?<  <proposed in the Notice for filing initial and final reports: 120   <minutes for outages that potentially affect 50,000 customers or   x<special facilities, three days for 30,000 to 50,000 customers and   <for all reportable firerelated incidents, and 30 days for all   <final reports. Many commenters contend that the extended times for   <filing initial outage reports will allow more complete reports and   <will allow technicians to spend more time correcting the outages  ?<they are reporting.x8U ?<  <ԍ See, e.g., AT&T comments at 2 and UTC's comments at 3. While   <supporting these time limits, Sprint, Pacific and NYNEX caution   h<that more complete outage information should not always be expected   x<in initial reports, despite the additional time allowed for their   x<submission, since discovery of the root causes of an outage often   x<requires extensive investigation. They also note that significant   x<additional information often is not discovered between 90 and 120   <minutes after commencement of an outage. Sprint further suggests   x<that the Commission allow supplementary reports to be filed after   <30 days in cases where root cause analysis can not be completed in time for final reports.  ?<  ?<  <  13. Reporting Times Discussion: We continue to encourage   <carriers to report outages as soon as possible. Nonetheless, the   <additional 30 minutes provided as an outside limit for filing   <initial reports in the event of a major outage will allow carriers   x<experiencing an outage to devote additional time at the outset to"0*(("   <the essential task of restoring network services. In addition,   <although we recognize that two hours will usually not provide   <sufficient time to complete an investigation, we expect that the  ?X<  <additional time proposed in the Notice will result in far fewer   <cursory initial reports. To date, we have not penalized carriers   <that have missed the 90 minute filing period. We intend to enforce   <filing requirements more strictly in the future. The three days   <allowed for initial reports of outages at the 30,000 customers   <level will limit the burden of that new threshold significantly.   <Our experience with the process to date has been that outages in   <this range do not warrant immediate reporting as do large scale  ?<  h<events. We, therefore, adopt these reporting times: initial reports   x<shall be filed with the Commission within 120 minutes for outages   <affecting 50,000 or more customers; 3 days for outages affecting   <30,000 to 50,000 customers; 3 days for reportable firerelated   <outages, as defined below, affecting fewer than 50,000 customers   <but at least 1000 lines. All final reports shall be filed with the  ?H <Commission within 30 days.  ?<  ?<  "<  14.  Methods of Determining Thresholds for IXCs Background: IXC   <switches, like LEC tandems, do not directly terminate specific   <subscriber lines, as do LEC central offices. IXCs, therefore, have   <used blocked calls as the basis for determining when reporting   x<thresholds are reached. Because customers normally redial 3 times  ?<  <when their calling attempts are frustrated,8U ?<  <ԍ Report of the Threshold Reporting Group of the Network Reliability Council, (April 20, 1992) p. 8. IXCs divide the number   <of blocked calls by a factor of 3 to determine the number of  ?P<  <affected customers. The Notice proposed to permit IXCs to continue   <to use blocked calls in this way to determine whether an outage meets a reporting threshold.  ?<  ?p<  !< 15.  Methods of Determining Thresholds for IXCs Comments: Only   h<Pacific opposes allowing IXCs to use blocked calls to calculate the   <number of customers potentially affected by an outage. Pacific   h<argues that the methods used by CAPs, LECs and IXCs for determining   x<whether reporting thresholds have been reached should be the same   h<because reports will be used to compare the reliability performance   <of different carriers and competition between these different   <carriers is increasing. Pacific states that it is unclear how an   <IXC should calculate actual blocked calls on a fiber cable or   <digital crossconnect system (DCS), and there is no way for an IXC   x<to measure calls destined for its network but that are blocked in   <the originating LEC. Pacific contends that the impact of a failure   <as measured by its proposed trunkbased method may be greater than   h<that that would be measured using the blockedcalls method. Pacific   h<states that the blockedcalls method may distort the ability of the   <FCC to obtain an accurate measure of reliability. Pacific contends   h<that its method calculates the impact of an outage by its effect on   <elements common to different types of networks and could,"$ 0*((,"   <therefore, be applied easily to CAPs, LECs and IXCs. Specifically,   <Pacific suggests that carriers report when service is disrupted in   <an end office serving 30,000 lines or more, a tandem serving 3,000   <trunks or more, a DCS system serving the equivalent of 4.5 DS3s   <(message trunks) or 45 DS3 (nontrunks) or a cable/facility   <carrying the equivalent of 125 T1s (message trunks) or 1,250 T1s   <(nontrunks). Where possible, carriers should examine failed   <network elements to determine the potential impact on customers   h<using the formula: number of message trunks times 10 plus number of  ?<nonmessage trunk circuits = potential customers affected.c8U ?` <ԍ See Pacific comments at 23 and reply comments at 3.c  ?<  K< 16. MCI and Bell Atlantic oppose Pacific's suggested reporting   <method. MCI states that LECs and IXCs are dissimilar, and a common   <methodology should not be applied to both. MCI rejects as   h<irrelevant Pacific's argument that IXCs are not aware of outages in   h<the LEC network that prevent IXC calls, since the LEC, not the IXC,  ? <  <would report such outages.C X8U ?h<ԍ MCI reply comments at 68.C Bell Atlantic states that Pacific's   0<method would sacrifice a goal of the reporting requirement   <(knowledge of the impact of outages on customers) for  ?<administrative convenience.K8U ?P<ԍ Bell Atlantic reply comments at 3.K  ?h<  < 17. Ameritech, AT&T, BellSouth, Bell Atlantic, GSA, Southwestern   x<and Sprint agree that use of blockedcall counts by IXCs and LECs   <for tandem offices when calculating reporting thresholds will  ?<  <provide consistent, accurate data .x8U ?<  <ԍ See, e.g., AT&T reply comments at 4, BellSouth reply comments at 2. AT&T argues that the Commission  ?<should require all carriers to use the blocked calls method.S8U ?<ԍ AT&T comments at 67, reply comments at 4.S  ?<  ,< 18. In reply, Pacific concedes that IXC use of the blocked calls   @<method would be acceptable for determining the number of   x<potentially affected customers, provided LECs were allowed to use   h<either the same blocked calls method or the historical usage method   h<suggested as part of the TRG Guidelines for tandem offices. Pacific   <states that this would be preferable to the use of diverse methods   h<under the Commission's proposal. Pacific asserts, however, that the   <blocked calls and historical methods would only determine probable   <impact on customers, whereas the method suggested by Pacific would   <calculate potential customer impact based on a specified number of   <network elements, not on estimates about probable use of those   h<elements at the time of an outage. Pacific contends that its method" ` 0*((#"  ?<would provide a uniform standard for all carriers.G8U ?X<ԍ Pacific reply comments at 13.G  ?<  < 19.  Methods of Determining Thresholds for IXCs Discussion:   x<Among our primary objectives in requiring outage reporting are to   <become informed quickly of major disruptions and to gather,   <analyze, and share information useful to ensure network   h<reliability. Carriers' networks differ not only in their capacities   <and functions, but also in the public interest consequences of   <failures. Because we were not certain that we had selected the   x<proper methods for identifying reportable outages, we charged the   <Network Reliability Council with recommending changes. The Council   h<represents diverse interests and its deliberations in several areas   @<were contentious, particularly those involving reporting   h<requirements. Its recommendations represent a consensus, and we are   <generally inclined to adopt its proposals, although we are not  ? <required to do so. X8U ?<  <ԍ In analogous situations involving advisory committees formed   <under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, agencies are required   <to use consensus recommendations to the maximum extent possible   <consistent with the legal obligations of the agency. 5 U.S.C. Section 583(a)(7).  ?H <  K< 20. Pacific's proposal, while rigorous and objective, does not   <account for differences among the LECs and IXCs, and it is not   <endorsed by other commenters. Our experience and the experience of   @<the NRC with the use of realtime blocked call counts in   <identifying reportable IXC outages has demonstrated that this   <method adequately serves the purposes of the rule. We will,   <therefore, adopt the blocked calls method for IXCs as described in   <proposed Section 63.100(g). To promote consistency in the event   <that reliability comparisons are made, we will require IXCs to use   x<blocked calls, where technically feasible. Where use of realtime   <blocked call counts is not possible, we will allow IXCs to use   <historical data to estimate, in good faith, the probable number of  ?<  .<customers affected by an outage in an IXC switch or facility.8U ?@<  <ԍ We may, of course, revisit this issue if, for example, the   <method eventually developed by ATIS T1 subcommittee T1A1.2,   h<referred to above, promises to provide a more rigorous and accurate   <way of determining the potential impact of outages on customers than the methods we adopt in the present Order.    <Where historical data are used to estimate the number of calls   x<normally attempted during a comparable nonoutage calling period,   <we note that IXCs should not divide the number of blocked calls by   <three to determine the number of customers potentially affected by an outage.  ? <  [< 21. Methods of Determining Thresholds in LEC Tandems  "  0*((!"  ?<  M< Background: For the past two years LECs generally have been   x<reporting outages to end offices where the number of lines served   <by that office exceeded the threshold number. LEC tandem offices   x<aggregate traffic from end offices, and do not directly terminate  ? <  <specific lines. The TRG suggested to local exchange carriers that,   <under the two thresholds, they report tandem outages only if the   h<outages occur at a time when the tandems normally process 30,000 or  ?x<  <50,000 calls per half hour.Xx8U ?<  .<ԍ See Suggested Guidelines for FCC Reportable Outages for  ?<  <Local Exchange Carriers, (TRG Guidelines) Report to the Nation, Section I, Attachment 1 at p. 3. The Notice proposed, instead, that the   <number of customers potentially affected by a LEC tandem outage   <should equal the actual number of lines connected to switches   <directly homing on the tandem, regardless of the traffic usually  ?<  <passing through that tandem at any hour of the day.I8U ?<ԍ Report and Order at n. 28.I The Notice specifically requested comments on this issue.  ? < 22.  Methods of Determining Thresholds in LEC Tandems Comments:  ? <  < Only TCA explicitly supports the method proposed in the Notice for   <determining reportable LEC tandem outages. TCA prefers this method   h<because it is simple to administer and errs, if at all, on the side  ?<of being overinclusive.;x8U ?<ԍ TCA comments at 5.;  ?<  < 23. Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Sprint, and  ?h<  h<Southwestern oppose the linecounting method proposed in the Notice   <for determining LEC tandem outages. Bell Atlantic, among others,   <argues that this method will overstate substantially the impact of   <outages since tandems, though they normally serve 30,000 or more  ?<  <lines, rarely handle calling volumes of that magnitude.G8U ? <ԍ Bell Atlantic comments at 67.G BellSouth   <and others note that many tandems are part of an architecture   h<involving alternate tandems and routes, that some tandems also tend   h<independent company switches and that CAPs may home on LEC tandems,   h<making determination of the number of lines actually dependent upon  ?p<  <any given tandem very difficult.Bp8U ?!<ԍ BellSouth comments at 3.B Many of these commenters also   <challenge TCA's apparent view that some inaccuracy in reporting by   h<virtue of overinclusiveness or for the sake of administrative ease  ?<might be acceptable._( 8U ?%<ԍ See, e.g., BellSouth reply comments at 2._  ?<  ?X<  < 24. NYNEX supports the method for LEC tandems suggested in the   <TRG Guidelines on the grounds that it will promote accuracy and"  0*((!"   h<fairness. The TRG Guidelines suggest reporting total tandem outages   <lasting 30 minutes or more in offices with 5,000 or more trunks   <(assuming each trunk can carry 10 customer calls per half hour) if   <the failure occurs during the time when the tandem normally   <processes 50,000 or more calls per half hour. NYNEX asserts this   <method would yield the most accurate determination of affected   h<customers. NYNEX states that rare distortions of historical calling   <volumes such as those produced by natural disasters should not   <cause the Commission to reject this otherwise highly reliable   <method. NYNEX further argues that the TRG Guidelines method is   <presently employed by LECs and has led to LEC reports for the majority of outages.  ?( <  < 25. If the Guidelines method is not used, NYNEX recommends that   <LECs be allowed to use the blocked calls method approved for IXCs.   <NYNEX agrees that use of the same method by IXCs and LECs would  ? <  <promote competitive fairness. In the Notice, the Commission   <justified use of blocked calls by IXCs on the grounds that the   <proposed lower reporting threshold (30,000 customers) would detect   <any significant outages that might otherwise go unreported as a  ?<  <result of the use of that method.B8U ?<ԍ Notice at para. 19.B NYNEX notes that, since LECs,   <like IXCs, will be subject to the lower threshold, the blocked   h<calls method will similarly make it likely that all significant LEC   x<service disruptions will be reported. In addition, NYNEX observes  ?<  h<that the Notice justified the use of blocked calls to determine the   h<reporting threshold for IXCs, in part, on the basis that other IXCs  ?P<were available to carry traffic. PX8U ?8<  <ԍ See NYNEX comments at 49 and reply comments at 35. See  ?<also Ameritech comments at 3.  ?<  ?<  < 26. For many of the foregoing reasons, Ameritech, AT&T,   <BellSouth, Bell Atlantic, GSA, Southwestern and Sprint all support   <use of blocked call counts by LECs as well as IXCs to calculate  ?8<  <reporting thresholds. !88U ?x<  <ԍ See, e.g., BellSouth reply comments at 2 and GSA reply comments at 5. MCI agrees that, if a uniform reporting   h<method were needed, LECs should be allowed to use the blocked calls  ?<  <method for outages in tandems, which are similar to IXC switches.A"8U ?`"<ԍ MCI reply comments at 7.A   <Ameritech states that LECs could determine blocked calls as   <accurately as IXCs and, along with Bell Atlantic, suggests that   h<LECs be allowed to use either blocked calls or good faith estimates  ?<of usage based on comparable historical data.#8U ?'<  <ԍ Ameritech comments at 3, reply comments at 1; Bell Atlantic comments at 7. " #0*((""Ԍ ?<  [< ę 27.  Methods of Determining Thresholds in LEC Tandems  ?<  <Discussion: The alternatives discussed above for determining   h<thresholds for reportable LEC tandem outages include the linebased  ?X<  <method suggested in the Notice, the method developed by Pacific,   <the method suggested in the TRG Guidelines and favored by NYNEX,   <and the blockedcalls method. In determining the suitability of   <these methods for LECs and whether the preferable method(s) should   <be mandated, we recognize the need for consistency, simplicity and   @<accuracy in carrier estimates of the number of customers   x<potentially affected by an outage. We repeat, in this connection,   x<that the purpose of setting numerical thresholds is to ensure the  ?<  <reporting of all "significant outages."W$8U ? <ԍ Report and Order at paragraphs 3 and 11.W The phrase "potentially   <affects ... customers," as used in our rules, is intended to   <provide for the reporting of outages in cases where the carrier  ? <  x<"should reasonably expect that at least ... [the threshold number   <of customers] will be deprived of telephone service," even when  ? <  <customer impact cannot be determined with certainty.Z% X8U ?h<ԍ Report and Order at para. 11 (ital. added).Z The number   x<of customers potentially affected by an outage should, therefore,   <represent the most accurate estimate of the number that might actually have been affected.  ?<  ?h<  < 28. We agree with Bell Atlantic and others that relying entirely   h<on the number of lines or trunks served by an affected tandem would   <often tend to overstate the effect of an outage. This approach   x<ignores the availability of alternative routing and the fact that   <tandems are designed to handle the expected peak periods of usage,   <which may not coincide with the outage period. We also note that   <these static methods for calculating the customer impact of LEC   <tandem outages, combined with certain architectures (a larger   h<number of tandems, for example, that serve just under 30,000 lines)   <could diminish the number of tandem outages reported by a LEC even   <as the reliability of the LEC's network deteriorated. The outage   <reports that a carrier is required to submit for tandem outages should be related to the number of customers affected.  ?X<  ,< 29. We believe, as we stated above, that blocked call counts have   <proven to be effective in keeping the Commission informed of   h<significant IXC outages. This method also provides a representative   <means of tracking causes of service outages. It is now often   <possible to measure calls blocked in LEC tandems as well as IXC  ?@<  <switches on a real time basis.&@8U ?$<  .<ԍ We agree with MCI that LEC tandems are similar to IXC switches. MCI reply comments at 7. Therefore, we will approve the same   <blocked calls method for determining thresholds in LEC tandem" @&0*((p&"  ?<outages that we have approved for IXC outages.A'8U ?X<ԍ See note 24 above.A  ?<  < 30. To promote greater consistency, we will make the use of real  <time blocked call counts in determining thresholds, where   h<technically feasible, mandatory for LEC tandem outages. In the case   P<of outages where realtime blocked call counts are not   <technologically feasible, we will allow threshold determination  ?x<  <based on historical experience as suggested in the TRG Guidelines,(XxX8U ?` <  <ԍ Pacific, in its comments at 4, asks that the method to be   <used by CAPs to determine thresholds be specified. The method we have adopted for LECs and IXCs, we also adopt for CAPs. with one exception.  ?<  < 31. When a historical measure of blocked calls is used, carriers   <may not use the historical data method described in the TRG   <Guidelines that would require reporting tandem outages only when  ?( <  <they occur "during the time when the tandem normally processes >   <50K [or 30K] calls per half hour." As interpreted in some of the   <outage reports recently filed with the FCC, this would greatly   <understate the effect of some outages. When blocked calls are   <calculated to determine the number of customers potentially   <affected by an outage, the number to be calculated is the number  ?<  w<affected throughout the period of the outage, whether under a real  <time count or as estimated using applicable historical data. Where   x<historical data are used to estimate the number of calls normally   h<attempted during a comparable nonoutage calling period, the number   <estimated should not be divided in determining the number of customers potentially affected by an outage.  ?P<  !< 32. Special Facilities é (911 and Major Airports) Background:  ?<  <The Notice proposed requiring reports to the Commission of all   x<outages lasting 30 or more minutes and affecting certain "special   <offices and facilities," regardless of the number of customers   <affected, because outages affecting these facilities could be of   <grave concern even where relatively few communications were   x<interrupted. "Special offices and facilities" include 911 tandems   <and major airports as well as major military installations, key   0<government facilities, and nuclear power plants. Under the   <proposal, carriers would report outages affecting 911 facilities  ? <  0<and major airports directly to the FCC. Carriers have been   <voluntarily reporting 911 and major airportaffecting outages to   x<the FCC for the last two years pursuant to recommendations of the Network Reliability Council.  ? <  I <  33. Special Facilities é (911) Comments: Commenters generally" x(0*((p&"  ?<  <support the proposed special facilities reporting requirements.)X8U ?X<  <ԍ See, e.g., AT&T comments at 3; BellSouth comments at 2; GSA   <comments at 3; Sprint comments at 3; Southwestern Bell comments at 2: TCA comments at 4.   x<Some, however, offer suggestions for restricting the scope of the   <requirements to eliminate reports they regard as unnecessary.   x<Pacific states that 911affecting outages are local in nature and   <that it is already required to report such outages to the   <California Public Utilities Commission. Therefore, Pacific argues,   <there is no reason for the FCC to collect information on outages  ?x<that affect only 911.A*x8U ? <ԍ Pacific comments at 78.A  ?<  < !34. NENA, an organization that supports the implementation of a   <universal emergency telephone number system, contends that all 911   <outages are significant and ought to be reported. NENA denies   <Pacific's claim that 911 services are exclusively intrastate and   <argues that California's 911 reporting requirement shows that   <compliance with the federal rule will not create a significant   h<additional burden. NENA recommends that the Commission adopt a more   <precise definition or listing of the types of emergency services  ?H <  <embraced by the special facilities rule.E+H x8U ?P<ԍ NENA reply comments at 23. E NENA also suggests that   <the Commission consider requiring carriers to issue warnings of an   <outage to emergency communications officials. Because rerouting of   h<911 traffic is not always automatic, Public Service Answering Point   <(PSAP) officials must be aware of an actual or potential outage in  ?0<  <order to implement rerouting procedures.8,08U ?<ԍ Id. at 4.8 NENA also argues that   <cellular and satellite carriers are as important to emergency   x<services as CAPs and the Commission should either require them to   h<report or clarify the reason for their distinct treatment under the  ?P<reporting requirements.;-P8U ?x<ԍ Id. at 56. ;  ?<  u!< "35. Special Facilities (911) Discussion: We reject suggestions   <that the reliability and efficiency of 911 systems are not of   <Commission interest. The Council's 911 Focus Report stated: "It is   h<no exaggeration to say the American public depends on 911 service  ?<  <in its emergencies."Q.( 8U ?$<ԍ Report to the Nation, Section F at p. 1.Q The reliability of 911 service is integrally   x<related to our responsibilities under Section 1 of the Act, which   x<include "promoting safety of life and property through the use of" .0*(("  ?<  <wire and radio communication.";/8U ?X<ԍ 47 U.S.C. 151.; Accordingly, the Commission will   <continue to collect data on 911 outages and will incorporate the   <proposed reporting requirement into our rules. However, the   <Commission staff has discovered that, as a result of the phrase   <"911 tandems" in the TRG Report and the examples of reportable 911   <outages offered by the TRG in the attachments to its report, there   <is considerable carrier confusion about the proper criteria for   h<reporting 911 outages. We will, therefore, revise our proposed rule   x<to specifically require reports of 911 special facilities outages   <only when an outage disrupts more than 25% of the lines to any   h<PSAP, without providing automatic rerouting to an alternative PSAP.   <We will also require carriers to indicate, when specifying the   <types of services affected by any reportable outage, when 911 is   <one of those services, to indicate whether or not more than 25% of   <the lines to any PSAP were disrupted and there was no automatic   <rerouting to an alternate PSAP. The Commission's staff is now   h<examining, in the course of its routine followup investigations of   h<911 service outages, carrier practices relating to 911 services. We   <have found that carriers generally alert PSAP officials of outages   x<affecting them. To ensure consistency in this regard, however, we   <will adopt NENA's proposal that we require notification of these officials.  ?<  {< #36. We reject NENA's request regarding the definition of   h<emergency services. The identification of 911 emergency services by   <the very number used to call them is specific and will be known to   <every carrier. 911 services are the only emergency services   <implicated in the special facilities reporting rule. Therefore, no   <revisions to the definition of emergency services are warranted at  ?<this time.00 X8U ?<  <ԍ We have asked the Network Reliability Council to consider   <the extent to which essential services are compromised during   <network outages and to suggest guidelines for assuring these services are kept operational.0  ?8<  < $37. Finally , the record developed in this proceeding does not   h<clearly establish whether satellite and terrestrial mobile carriers   <should be subject to the 911 outage reporting requirements. In the  ?<  <Notice at para. 26, the Commission reasoned that the potential for   0<growth of CAPs in the provision of services to all special   <facilities, not just 911, and the increasing possibility that an   <outage of CAP facilities could reach the 30,000 potentially   x<affected customers threshold justified the CAP's inclusion in the   <outage reporting requirement. Many satellite communications   x<carriers, as NENA concedes, have little or nothing to do with the   <everyday business of telephony and thus need not be subject to the" @00*((p&"  ?<  <reporting requirements.18U ?X<  <ԍ NENA reply comments at note 7; see also the Report and Order at para. 24. Satellite carriers, however, have proposed   <a variety of new services using new technologies and frequency  ?<  .<bands.2 8U ?@<  <ԍ See In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission's Rules to   <Establish Rules and Policies Pertaining to a Mobile Satellite   <Service in the 16101626.5/2483.52500 MHz Frequency Bands, Notice  ?<  <of Proposed Rulemaking (Released February 18, 1994); see also   x<Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. Application File Nos. 3/4DSSP/LA94. In addition, the NRC's 911 Focus Team recognized "that   <there are major unresolved issues in providing 911 service for  ? <  <wireless and cellular customers"O3 8U ?H <ԍ Report to the Nation, Section F, p. 4.O that it did not examine in its   <study. Therefore, we refer the question of whether to expand the   x<911 and other special facilities outage reporting requirements to   h<include terrestrial wireless and satellite carriers. We ask that it   x<report on whether these and other providers of telecommunications   x<services should report special facility service outages affecting   <911 facilities to the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Section 63.100.  ?( <  < %38. Special Facilities (Major Airports) Comments: Several   <commenters suggested that unnecessary reports of outages affecting   <major airports would be filed if the proposed requirement were not   h<modified. Pacific states that it has no way of knowing if an outage   <affects air traffic control links unless an airport informs the   <LEC. Pacific suggests that major airports affected by an outage   <should be required to contact a designated agency and that this   <agency should handle any necessary reporting, with assistance from   <the service provider, so that carriers could avoid reporting   <outages affecting airports only in trivial ways, e.g., affecting  ?<  <only pay phones at airports.@4( 8U ?<ԍ Pacific comments at 9. @ AT&T suggested that an airport outage   <report should only be required if 50% or more of the air traffic   <control links or other FAA communications links to any major   h<airport are affected. AT&T notes that this is the present voluntary  ?<  <practice and has not been found inadequate.<5 8U ?`"<ԍ AT&T comments at 3.< US West recommends  ?<  <that only missionaffecting outages be reported.6XH 8U ?$<  <ԍ AT&T reply comments at 45 and Pacific reply comments at 4,   x<referring to US West comments at 3. (Pacific also supports AT&T's suggestion, as an alternative). MCI agrees with  ?<  x< AT&T, since FAA communications links for major airports are fully   <redundant and loss of 50% of the links alone would not cause any"ph60*(( "   h<loss of service. MCI states that such reporting would be consistent  ?<  <with the NRC Steering Committee's understanding.@78U ? <ԍ MCI reply comment at 5.@ Bell Atlantic  ?<  <supports Pacific's position.K8X8U ?x<ԍ Bell Atlantic reply comments at 4.K Southwestern Bell finds the   <suggestions of AT&T, Pacific and US West all acceptable in this  ? <regard.O9 8U ?<ԍ Southwestern Bell reply comments at 3.O  ?<  !< &39. Special Facilities (Major Airports) Discussion: Under the   x<voluntary system of outage reporting that has been in place since   x<June 1, 1992, the FCC has received reports of outages that affect   P<major airports. Until recently, AT&T has had principal   <responsibility for air traffic control telecommunications at   <airports under its contract with the FAA. AT&T has interpreted the   <voluntary reporting guidelines to require reports for outages   x<affecting major airports under the 50% criterion described above.   `<In addition to outages affecting major airport tower   <communications, AT&T has reported Air Route Traffic Control Center   <(ARTCC) outages. The ARTCCs in the FAA system handle intertower   x<traffic above 10,000 feet. AT&T, under its FAA contract, provided   x<telecommunications services for 19 of the 21 centers. In addition   x<to outages affecting 50% of the FAA ARTCC circuits, AT&T reported   <to the FCC: any outage that caused an ARTCC or major airport to   x<lose its radar; any ARTCC or major airport outage that was likely   h<to be publicized; any outage that caused a loss of both primary and   <backup facilities at any ARTCC or major airport; and any outage to   <an ARTCC or major airport that is deemed important by the FAA as   <indicated by FAA inquiry to the carrier management personnel   x<assigned to the FAA region in which the outage occurred. All AT&T   <major airportaffecting outages appear to have been reported under these criteria.  ?p<  < '40. Pacific's suggestion, on the other hand, is untested.   <Moreover, NCS states that the national security/emergency   <preparedness (NS/EP) concerns that warrant the submission of   P<reports on outages that affect government and military   x<installations and nuclear power plants to the NCS do not apply to  ?X<  <airports.A:Xx8U ?`"<ԍ NCS reply comments at 2.A US West's concerns seem to be addressed by AT&T's 50%   x<criterion, which is designed to exclude outages that would not be   <missionaffecting. The 50% criterion should also help eliminate   <unnecessary reports the FCC has received from LECs contracted to   <provide service to small radar and radio facilities dispersed   <throughout each ARTCC area. These facilities are usually redundant   <and not considered crucial to major airport operations. Reports of   <outages at these facilities as "major airportaffecting" are" :0*((`'"   <usually discovered upon FCC followup to have been thought too   x<insignificant to require additional investigation or reporting by  ?<  <the FAA,;8U ?<  <ԍ See, e.g., US West report for southwestern Colorado, April 16, 1993. which operates its own extensive monitoring system.   h<Moreover, MCI is completing construction of the LINCs system, which   P<will be used in the future for FAA air traffic control   x<telecommunications. Because this system will contain even greater   <redundancy than the current AT&T System, we conclude that AT&T's   x<proposed standard, which MCI fully supports, is a sound approach.   h<Therefore, we reject Pacific's and US West's suggestions and accept   <AT&T's proposal. We will apply the 50% criterion to our major   <airportaffecting outage reporting requirement. We will also   <require carriers to adopt the other standards, described above,   <that AT&T has used to determine reportable outages affecting major airports.  ? <  < (41. Special Facilities é (NS/EP Facilities) Background: The  ? <  <Notice proposed that any missionaffecting telecommunications   x<outage at a nuclear power plant, a major military installation or   x<a key government facility be reported by the affected facility to  ?<  <the NCS,<  8U ?<  <ԍ NCS, operating under the direction of the Secretary of   <Defense, coordinates planning for NS/EP telecommunications needs among its twentythree member federal departments and entities.  which will: 1) forward an initial (120 minute) and final   <(30 day) written report of the outage to the Commission, supplying   <information required by  63.100 of the rules for all special   <facilities outages; 2) forward an edited version; or 3) retain the   h<report at the NCS, depending on the degree to which notification of   <the outage might affect NS/EP concerns. Outages at nuclear power   <plants, major military installations and key government facilities   <have been reported voluntarily under these procedures to the FCC for the past 18 months.  ?<  "< )42. Special Facilities (NS/EP Facilities) Comments: Though most   <commenters agreed with our proposed procedures for reporting these   <special facilities outages through the NCS, several commenters   <suggested changes or clarifications. NYNEX asked the Commission to   x<clarify whether initial special facilities reports made under the   h<auspices of the NCS are to be made by NCS or the carrier. If by the   h<NCS, NYNEX requests the carrier be required to consult with the NCS   <and, if not, the NCS should be required to report to the carrier   <that an outage has been reported so that the carrier can provide a   <final written report to the NCS for filing with the FCC. NYNEX   <suggests that the carrier be required to submit final report   x<information within 20 days of the outage so that the NCS can meet"@<0*((%"  ?<  <the 30 day deadline.>=8U ?X<ԍ NYNEX comments at 19.> Pacific asks the Commission to clarify that   <all nuclear power plants are considered to be special facilities   <and that a member agency of the NCS will determine if there has   h<been a missionaffecting outage. Pacific argues that the NCS should   <provide the carriers with a list of special offices and facilities   x<or at least the criteria used to designate the facilities subject   h<to this reporting requirement in order to assist LECs in reporting,  ?x<  <diversity planning and reliability decisions.@>xX8U ?` <ԍ Pacific comments at 10.@ Pacific states that   h<a 20 day limit for carriers to provide outage reports to the NCS is   h<unnecessarily short since NCS will not amend those reports. Pacific  ?<  <suggests a 28 day limit.E?8U ?H <ԍ Pacific reply comments at 4.E AT&T agrees that clarification regarding  ?<  <NCS/Carrier cooperation as requested by NYNEX would be helpful.C@x8U ?<ԍAT&T reply comments at 45.C   <UTC suggests that the NCS provide a report to the special facility   <affected by outage to allow the affected facility to inform  ? <carriers of service inadequacies or to change carriers.;A 8U ?<ԍ UTC comments at 5.;  ? <  << *43. In its comments, NCS accepts the arrangements and its role   <under the proposed rule for reporting special facilities outages   <insofar as they reflect its own current practice and that of the  ?<  ><carriers.;B8U ?<ԍ NCS comments at 3.; NCS suggests, however, that the Commission modify  ?<  <proposed Subsections 63.100(e)(2) and (3).UC( 8U ?X<ԍ See Report and Order Appendix A.U NCS asks that   <Subsection (2) allow an oral report within 120 minutes with a   x<written report to follow the next business day, because sometimes  ?<  <a full written report within 120 minutes will not be feasible.;D 8U ?@<ԍ NCS comments at 3.; NCS   <contends that Subsection (3) of the current rule should permit the   <NCS to edit or hold back final reports, even if initial reports   <have been forwarded to the Commission, when NS/EP concerns are  ?<  <affected by elements of the final reports.8EH 8U ?#<ԍ Id. at 4.8 NCS understands that,   <under the proposed rules, outages affecting nuclear power plants   x<are to be reported through NCS as special facilities outages. NCS   h<disagrees with Pacific's suggestion that a list of or the method of   <determining special facilities be given to the carriers. Such a"0E0*(("   P<list would be unnecessary and would contain classified  ?<  <information.AF8U ?X<ԍ NCS reply comments at 3.A NCS denies the need to provide a report to the   x<affected special facility since the affected facility will be the   x<entity reporting to the NCS and the facility has more information  ? <  <about the outage than the NCS.8G 8U ?@<ԍ Id. at 5.8 The NCS, with the assistance of the   <service provider, currently prepares the initial report to the   0<Commission on the basis of the information provided by the   <facility. The NCS does not believe that firm rules need to be   h<established to ensure carrier cooperation, since cooperation during  ?<the voluntary reporting period has been satisfactory.2H 8U ? <ԍ Id.2  ?<  < +44.   Special Facilities (NS/EP) Discussion: The NCS is   <comprised of various executive departments and agencies and   <operates under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to ensure   <the NS/EP needs of the federal government as well as state and  ? <  <local governments.@I 8U ?<ԍ NCS comments at note 1.@ Whether NS/EP concerns implicated in outages   <make it inappropriate for outage reports to be received and   x<analyzed as other outage reports is a matter that must be decided   h<on a case by case basis. The suggestions of the NCS for procedures   h<to determine whether outage reports should be submitted to the FCC,   x<where those suggestions are grounded in NS/EP concerns and do not   0<prevent the FCC from fulfilling its duty to ensure network reliability, will, therefore, be adopted.  ?<  < ,45.    Subsection 63.100(e)(3) will be modified as requested. We   <reject Pacific's suggestion that a list of or the method for   @<determining special facilities be given to the carriers.   h<Additionally, Subsection 63.100(e)(2) will be modified as requested   x<to provide additional time that may be required for consultations   <between the NCS, the affected facility and the implicated carrier.   <NCS, in consultation with the service provider, prepares the   <initial report to the FCC. Our proposed rules do not explicitly   <require a written initial report to be prepared by the carrier for   <submission to the NCS. This accords with present practice and   <allows time for the accommodation of NS/EP concerns that may   <otherwise be compromised. To ensure continued cooperation, we will   <modify the proposed rule to require carriers to consult with the   h<NCS when outages to be reported by the NCS occur on their networks.   <If the NCS determines that a report to the FCC is appropriate, our  ?x<  <proposed rules require the carrier to send to the NCS a written   h<final report containing all information otherwise required in final   <reports to the FCC. But the proposed rules recognize that   <additional time may be needed by the NCS to review and edit the   <information received for inclusion in its final report to the FCC."!@I0*((P("   <We agree that it would be useful to specify that carriers are   h<required to submit their final reports to the NCS within 28 days of   x<the outage, leaving the NCS two days to determine the contents of   <final reports to the FCC. We will adopt the two day deadline because the NCS has not indicated that additional time is needed.  ?<  < -46. Nuclear power plants are special facilities and outages   <affecting them have significant NS/EP implications. Such outages   <will, therefore, be reported through the NCS. The determination as   <to whether an outage affecting telecommunications at a nuclear   <power plant is missionaffecting and should be reported to the NCS   h<is made, as a matter of present practice, by the Nuclear Regulatory   <Commission. For the reasons stated by NCS and summarized above,   <there is no need for the NCS to report an outage to the affected special facility.  ? <  w< .47. Special Facilities (TSP) Background: In the Report and  ?H <  <Order, the Commission declined to add Telecommunication Service   0<Priority System (TSP)related information to the reporting  ?<  <requirement.LJ8U ?0<ԍ Report and Order at para. 29.L TSP is the system used to authorize common carriers   0<to provide or restore on a priority basis certain services  ?h<  <designated as important for reasons of NS/EP.GKhX8U ?P<ԍ See 47 C.F.R. Section 64.401.G The issue was not  ?0<  x<revisited either by the NRC or in the Notice in determining which   <facilities would be designated "special" for purposes of reporting outages.  ?P<  I < /48. Special Facilities (TSP) Comments: UTC suggests that the   <term "special offices and facilities" be defined to include   <circuits with TSP designations because outages affecting these   h<circuits could have a major impact on the public. UTC contends that   <reports on outages affecting TSP circuits would provide a more  ?8<  <complete reliability picture.;L88U ?<ԍ UTC comments at 4.; UTC suggests that the NCS procedures   <be applied to TSPassigned circuit outages. The NCS should relay   h<outage reports to the affected special facility, even if the outage   <has not been reported to the FCC so that the facility can demand   h<improved service or redundant circuits or opt for a second carrier.   h<The FCC should also adopt a procedure whereby a facility can demand   h<that a carrier file a report to the NCS within 30 days of an outage  ?<affecting service to a circuit qualifying for a TSP assignment.8Mx8U ?$<ԍ Id. at 6.8  ?@<  < 049. Southwestern opposes UTC's suggestion that TSP outages be   <included in special facilities reporting. Southwestern states that   <the Commission already rejected a similar suggestion by UTC in the " M0*((`'"  ?<  <Report and Order and that it would be enormously time consuming to   x<search through the hierarchy from facility level to circuit level  ?<  <to identify the outages that affected TSP circuits.JN8U ?<ԍ Southwestern reply comments at 3.J AT&T asserts   <that the TSP system governs restoration priorities in national   0<emergencies. In nonemergency situations the failure of an   <individual TSP circuit does not indicate that anything of public   <importance has occurred or even that users lack any communications  ?x<  <capabilities.AOxX8U ?` <ԍ AT&T reply comments 56.A Pacific also disagrees with UTC's proposal that TSP   <circuits be included as special facilities, since minor outages on   x<these circuits have no effect on national network reliability and  ?<  <significant TSP outages will be reported under the thresholds.EP8U ?H <ԍ Pacific reply comments at 5.E MCI   <states that there are many TSP circuits not serving special   <facilities and that additional NCS follow up of TSPaffecting  ?( <  <outages is unnecessary.AQ( x8U ?0<ԍ MCI reply comments at 2.A NYNEX states that present TSP reporting  ? <  <procedures capture all needed information.DR 8U ?<ԍ NYNEX reply comments at 10.D NCS claims that public   <reports of TSP circuit outages could jeopardize the national  ? <  .<interest.*S 8U ?<  <ԍ NCS reply comments at 4. NCS has revised its opinion, stated  ?p<  h<in the Report and Order at para. 28, that FCC outage reports should   <track the effectiveness of the TSP system. NCS reasons that the   <procedures addressing NS/EP matters recommended by the NRC,   <incorporated in our proposed rules and adopted here sufficiently  ?<address the concerns NCS expressed in the Report and Order.* BellSouth points out that TSP circuits already have   <priority treatment and are routinely provisioned with backup   <facilities. Outage events affecting them are already subject to   0<review by the TSP Oversight Committee which reports to the  ?<Commission and the NCS.GT8U ?@<ԍ BellSouth reply comments at 4.G  ?0<  v < 150. Special Facilities (TSP) Discussion: None of the reasons   <offered by UTC justifies adding significantly to the reporting   <burdens of either the carriers or the NCS. Requiring reports of   <TSPqualified circuit failures would substantially increase the  ?P<  h<costs of the TSP system. In the Report and Order, we rejected UTC's   x<suggestion because of the costs of reporting actual TSP failures.   h<The NCS is closely involved in the administration of the TSP system  ?<  <that is intended to provide for NS/EP telecommunications needs.RU8U ?'<ԍ See 47 C.F.R. Part 64, Appendix A.R"0U0*((0"   <For these reasons, we are especially concerned that in the view of   x<NCS the public reporting of TSP circuit failures could jeopardize   x<the national interest. We continue to believe, as we indicated in  ?X<  h<the Report and Order, that the better course is to leave the matter  ? <to the TSP System Oversight CommitteejV  8U ?x<  ^<ԍ The TSP System Oversight Committee is a committee   x<established and assisted by the Executive Office of the President   x<to identify and review any problems developing in the TSP System.  ?<See Appendix A to Part 64 of the rules at Section 6(b)(2)(j).j for any necessary changes.FW 8U ?` <ԍ Report and Order at 29.F  ?<  < 251.  Reporting of Firerelated Incidents Background: The  ?x<  <Notice did not propose adoption of the NRC Fire Prevention Focus  ?@<  x<Team's recommendation that all firerelated incidents that affect   <service to 100 or more service lines for a period of 30 minutes or   <longer be reported within twenty four hours to ATIS for study.  ?<  <Instead, the Notice proposed a modified version of the Team's   <recommendation. The suggested changes include requirements that   x<carriers experiencing such outages notify the Commission and file the initial report within three days.  ? <  v < 352.  Reporting of Firerelated Incidents Comments: Numerous   x<commenters oppose the proposed requirement. Ameritech and Pacific   <state that individual firerelated incidents should only be   h<reported to ATIS, as recommended by the Fire Prevention Focus Team.   x<They claim that the periodic analyses that ATIS would be required   0<to forward to the Commission will be adequate to serve the   x<Commission's needs and that significant firerelated outages will   <be reported in any event directly to the Commission under the  ?<  ><numerical reporting thresholds._X@8U ?<ԍ Pacific comments at 10; Ameritech reply comments at 2._ Pacific states that if ATIS   <analyses show a need for reports to be submitted directly to the  ?P<  <Commission, the Commission can revisit the issue.@YP8U ?<ԍ Pacific comments at 11.@ AT&T agrees with   <the Fire Team's recommendation, stating that the Commission must  ?<  <not overburden itself or industry by micromanaging.<Z` 8U ? <ԍ AT&T comments at 5.< AT&T argues   x<that the numerous comments opposing the reporting of firerelated   <incidents show that various issues need to be resolved before a   <practical and useful reporting requirement can be adopted. AT&T   <suggests that the Network Reliability Steering Committee study the   <issues and develop appropriate limitations on the scope of fire  h<reporting. In the meantime, AT&T argues that the NRC recommendation  ?X<  <for reporting to ATIS should be adopted.D[X 8U ?'<ԍ AT&T reply comments at 23.D Bell Atlantic and"X [0*(( "   <BellSouth agree that the Fire Team's recommendation should be   <followed because ATIS is in the best position to analyze the  ?<  <information received in firerelated reports.v\8U ?<  <ԍ Bell Atlantic reply comments at 4; BellSouth reply comments at 3.v NYNEX agrees that   <an initial fireincident report should be submitted to ATIS but   <suggests that final reports should be sent by the carrier to the  ?<  ><Commission and should reflect ATIS' analysis.>] 8U ?<ԍ NYNEX comments at 18.> In its reply   <comments, NYNEX argues, instead, that the Fire Team's   <recommendation is preferable because ATIS is better able to handle   <the administrative burden than the Commission and because avoiding   <the appearance of the incident on the public record will prevent   <unjustified reliability concerns and encourage the free flow of  ?<  <ideas.C^8U ?<ԍ NYNEX reply comments at 9.C MCI states that the industry is already voluntarily   <reporting firerelated incidents to ATIS and a requirement to that  ?( <effect would be superfluous.B_( @8U ?<ԍ MCI reply comments at 10.B  ? <  < 453. Bell Atlantic also objects that the NRC's definition of   <"firerelated incident" is overly broad in that it would include   <short circuits that caused some smoke as well as small outages   <caused by fires entirely outside carrier control in adjacent   <property. Such reports would not meaningfully contribute to   x<determining the role that fires play in network outages but would   <prove burdensome, and the explanations of a fire's cause would   <often be secondhand. Bell Atlantic suggests defining "firerelated   <incident" to include only outages in which visible flames in a   h<central office or controlled environmental vault are the root cause  ?<  .<or triggering event leading to the outage.F`8U ?<ԍ Bell Atlantic comments at 10.F Sprint states that   <under the present definition the number of outage reports received   <by the Commission would be drastically increased and suggests that   <the issue of a narrower definition for reporting fires to the   <Commission be referred to an industry group. Sprint would redefine   x<"firerelated incident" to include only fires at central offices,   h<POPs, regenerator sites, satellite earth stations and other network  ?<  <"nodes."@a` 8U ?#<ԍ Sprint comments at 67.@ BellSouth and GSA would include, in a similar   h<redefinition, fires occurring in central offices, repeater stations   x<and controlled environmental vaults and exclude reports of damage   <to external equipment by fires the prevention of which is not"X a0*(( "  ?<  <within the control of the carrier.Zb8U ?X<ԍ BellSouth comments at 4; GSA reply comments at 6.Z Southwestern Bell would include  ?<tandems in the list of facilities covered by the rule.BcX8U ?<ԍ Southwestern Bell at 12.B  ?X<  ;< 554. US West would require reports of firerelated incidents only   <in switching and interoffice facilities, since fires external to   <such facilities may often not be technically or economically  ?<  <preventable.?d8U ?( <ԍ US West comments at 4.? Rochester suggests reporting only firerelated   <incidents affecting 10,000 lines and occurring in central offices,   <repeater stations, controlled environmental vaults and similar   <facilities, so that only information about fires that affect   <service significantly is generated. BellSouth contends, along with   h<NYNEX, that, since virtually all firerelated incidents will affect   <at least 100 lines, this 100line nominal threshold can be dropped  ?( <  i<from the rule for administrative simplicity.\e( x8U ?0<ԍ BellSouth comments at 4; NYNEX reply comments at 7.\ NYNEX acknowledges   h<that fire reporting under the rule as presently proposed will cover   h<areas over which carriers have no control, but states that the data   <the reports provide will be of value because network equipment   x<resides on customer locations and trends that develop with regard   <to this equipment's reliability should be known. NYNEX also   <believes that smoke incidents can produce acid that affects   x<reliability, so that limiting reporting to visible flames as Bell  ?h<Atlantic suggests is not advisable.8fh8U ?<ԍ Id. at 7.8  ?0<  ?<  + < 655.  Reporting of Firerelated Incidents Discussion: In its   <final recommendations to the Commission, the NRC's Fire Prevention   x<Team determined that, although firerelated outages rarely occur,   <"on those few occasions when a fire has struck a critical   h<communications facility, the result has been devastating." The Team   <also estimated that serviceaffecting fires could be reduced by as   <much as 25%, depending upon the information received under its  ?p<  i<reporting recommendation.Pgp8U ?!<ԍ Report to the Nation, Section G, p. 28.P The Team also estimated that 20 to 30   x<serviceaffecting firerelated outages per year would be reported  ?<  <to ATIS under its recommended reporting standard.<h( 8U ?$<ԍ Id. at p. 27.< Only the   <accuracy of the last of these statements is disputed in the comments.  ? <  << 756.    We note that since the beginning of voluntary reporting at"  h0*((!"   <the 30,000affected customers threshold only three firerelated   <incidents have been reported, but those incidents potentially  ?<  <affected nearly a million customers.iX8U ?<  <ԍ See Reports of August 31, 1993, September 26, 1993 and   h<March 15, 1994 outages, available at FCC offices in room 6010, 2025 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554 We believe that, in view of   <the absence of significant and varied firerelated data at the   <30,000 customer threshold level and the potential seriousness of   x<firerelated incidents when they do occur, a much lower threshold   x<for reporting firerelated incidents is necessary. We agree that,   <even if this standard results in reports of incidents over which   x<carriers have no control, data provided in such reports may be of   x<value because network equipment resides on customer locations and this equipment's reliability should be known.  ?` <  \< 857.    We also note that smoke damage associated with fire in   0<central offices is more severe than thermal damage in most  ? <  Y<instances.Uj 8U ?h<ԍ Report to the Nation, Section G, page 1519.U We believe, however, that the suggestions for limiting   h<the number of reportable incidents have merit. We agree that use of   x<a legally mandated 100lines threshold may lead to an inordinate number of unnecessary reports.  ?<  < 958. Therefore, we will modify the requirement for reporting fire  x<related incidents to include only those that affect 1,000 or more   <lines and otherwise adopt the rule as proposed. Specifically, we   h<will require that all firerelated incidents that affect fewer than   h<50,000 customers but at least 1000 or more lines be reported to the   <Commission within 3 days, with final reports due in 30 days. We do   0<not intend by this rule that the industry abandon the Fire   x<Prevention Focus Team's recommendation for voluntary reporting of   <firerelated events to ATIS, with periodic analyses forwarded to   <the FCC. Rather, we expect our fire reporting rule will facilitate analyses by ATIS.  ?8<   < :59.  Contents of Reports Background: The Notice proposed that   <each final outage report to the Commission specifically detail the   <root cause of the outage and list and evaluate the effectiveness   <and application in the immediate case of any best practices or   0<industry standards identified by the Council as helpful in  ? <eliminating or ameliorating outages of the reported type.   ?<  ?<  v < ;60.  Contents of Reports Comments: Sprint states that in some   x<instances a root cause analysis may take longer than thirty days,   <especially if tests performed by outside vendors are necessary.   <Sprint proposes that carriers be allowed to file supplementary   x<reports after the thirty day limit when necessary to complete the" xj0*((`'"  ?<  Y<investigation of root causes.>k8U ?X<ԍ Sprint comments at 7.> Most other commenters supported the  ?<  <root cause reporting requirement without modification.RlX8U ?<ԍ See, e.g., GSA comments at 6.R Many   x<commenters, however, state that best practice analysis should not   h<be required. NYNEX points out that there are 277 NRC best practices   <and claims that their use does not really measure a carrier's   0<commitment to providing reliable service, especially since  ?<  <technology may make the current best practices obsolete.Am8U ?( <ԍ NYNEX comments at 1012.A NYNEX   <feels that carriers should not have to explain why they did not   <follow a practice because business judgements involving risk   <assessments and cost comparisons made prior to an outage may be  ?<  i<subject to unfair criticism in hindsight.Gnx8U ?<ԍ BellSouth reply comments at 6.G NYNEX claims that the   h<factual analysis in reports will adequately allow for an assessment  ?` <  <of reliability trends without best practice discussion.xo` 8U ?<  <ԍ NYNEX reply comments at 11; see also BellSouth reply comments at 6.x   <Southwestern Bell and BellSouth ask the Commission to state on the   <record that a failure to follow a voluntary industry practice or  ? <  Y<standard need not be discussed in final outage reports.tp ` 8U ?<  i<ԍ BellSouth reply comments at 5; Southwestern Bell comments at 5.t Ameritech   <and US West, citing specific examples, claim that the cost of   <employing best practices in many cases may constitute "gold  <plating." US West contends that if carriers are to report best   <practices, they should be allowed to show that in particular  ?<  Y<circumstances the costs of a best practice outweigh the benefits.^q 8U ?<ԍ Ameritech reply comments at 3; US West comments at 7.^   x<TCG claims that both root cause analysis and analysis of relevant   <best practices in public documents could prove harmful to  ?<competition or even be used by terrorists.=rH 8U ? <ԍ TCG comments at 34.=  ?P<  < <61. TCA, GSA and UTC agree with the proposed best practices   <reporting requirement, claiming that these analyses will allow the   <Commission to identify and promote development of solutions for  ?<  <recurring problems.ss8U ?'<  Y<ԍ GSA comments at 8; UTC comments at 6; TCA reply comments at 2.s TCA points out that inclusion of best"0s0*((0"   <practices analysis does not impose absolute requirements on   <carriers. TCA claims that best practice analysis would not be a   h<burden in the case of a reliable carrier because there would be few   x<outage reports, and in the case of a unreliable carrier with many   <outage reports the absence of best practice procedures should be  ?<explained.Ct8U ?@<ԍ TCA reply comments at 34.C  ?x<  < =62.  Contents of Reports Discussion: We believe the public   h<interest in avoiding or mitigating the effects of telephone service   0<outages is best served by adopting the root cause and best   <practices analysis modifications to our rules. However, we agree   h<that carriers should be allowed to file supplementary reports after   x<the thirty day limit when necessary to identify root causes. This   x<does not affect our requirement that "all available information,"  ? <will be included in the 30 day reports.u X8U ?<  i<ԍ The phrase "all available information" has been variously   x<interpreted by different carriers. Some final reports received by   <the Commission include intermediate times of partial service   <restoration; others indicate only the time when full service   <capacity is restored. Where such intermediate restoral times are   <available, they should be included in final reports. Carriers   h<should include in final reports the times, if known, when 25%, 50%,   <75% and 100% of disrupted traffic is restored through alternate   <routing or physical repair. Carriers should also state, in their   <description of the type of equipment involved, the manufacturer and, if applicable, the software generic.  ?H <  K< >63. While we understand that a carrier's adoption of the NRC's   x<best practices will not enhance reliability in all circumstances,   <they do represent the consensus of the industry regarding the best   <procedures to follow in a wide variety of outages. Where a carrier   <has not implemented a seemingly applicable best practice, the   <Commission recognizes that the carrier may, nevertheless, have   <acted reasonably and that the implementation of best practices may   <be subject to economic constraints. Our interest in knowing the   <carrier's reasons for not employing industry best practices does   <not constitute an accusation. We believe, however, that best   x<practice identification and analysis strongly encourages carriers   x<and their onlocation technical personnel to become familiar with   <and implement those practices that are appropriate. Reports   0<containing such identification and analyses will allow the   <Commission and the telecommunications industry to monitor the   <success of the NRC's recommendations and assess the need for   <modifications and further recommendations. Finally, the  ?<  <Commission's confidentiality rulesKv 8U ?'<ԍ See 47 C.F.R. Section 0.459.K and the procedure discussed"H v0*(("   <above for reporting outages involving NS/EP will protect against   <the dangers of disclosure mentioned by TCG. We will, therefore,   <adopt the proposed requirements that carriers in their final   h<reports identify their use of or failure to use best practices with   h<respect to the facilities or procedures identified in their reports   P<as the cause of an outage. Carriers should analyze the   <effectiveness of any best practices relevant to the reported outage.  ?<  "< ?64.  Thresholds/Best Practices as Standards Background: Although  ?<  <the Notice did not propose using either the number of reported   <outages or best practice implementation as standards for assessing   h<penalties for poor carrier reliability, it did reserve the right to   <take any action within the Commission's authority to ensure   <efficient telecommunications service and indicated that additional   <rulemakings were likely if it appeared that carriers were not observing appropriate best practices.  ?<  ;< @65.  Thresholds/Best Practices as Standards Comments: All   x<parties who addressed the issue opposed present use of either the   x<numerical thresholds or best practices as standards for assessing   x<penalties. AT&T claims that using reporting thresholds as a basis   h<for levying forfeitures would discourage reporting, as noted in the  ?<  Y<Report to the Nation.w8U ?P<  i<ԍ AT&T comments at 78, referring to Report to the Nation, TRG Report, Section I, p. 12. AT&T states that the Commission already has   x<sufficient enforcement authority to deal with unacceptable levels   <of service quality. Ameritech argues that best practices were   <intended to stimulate creativity in carrier determinations about   <reliability, not to be made mandatory, and that the Commission   <should not readily conclude that failure to follow a best practice  ?<  i<constitutes a case of malfeasance.Gx 8U ?X<ԍ Ameritech reply comments at 2.G BellSouth claims that use of  ?p<  <best practices as de facto legal standards will prevent the  ?8<  y<industry from reaching consensus about them in the future.Gy88U ?x<ԍ BellSouth reply comments at 6.G US   x<West and Pacific argue that best practices should not be mandated   h<because carriers must have flexibility in responding to reliability  ?<concerns.\z@8U ?`"<ԍ US West comments at 8; Pacific reply comments at 7.\  ? <  k< A66. Sprint agrees and states that due process requires the   x<Commission to undertake a rulemaking to establish clear rules and   <definite standards before enforcement actions are taken against  ?x<  Y<carriers for inadequate reliability performance.>{x8U ?'<ԍ Sprint comments at 5.> Rochester states"x` {0*(($"   <that use of best practices as standards for forfeitures would only   <lead to accusations among carriers, vendors, contractors and   h<manufacturers as parties attempted to exculpate themselves and that   <many reported outages under the proposed rule will be minor and   <could not fairly be used to show that a carrier was providing   <unsafe or inadequate services even where best practices were not  ?<  i<followed.I|8U ?<ԍ Rochester reply comments at 35.I Southwestern Bell asks the Commission to clarify that   <a failure to follow a voluntary industry practice or standard does  ?@<not impose liability.H}@X8U ?( <ԍ Southwestern Bell comments 35.H  ?<  ;< B67. TCA, while agreeing that minimum performance levels are not   <presently warranted, asserts that the Commission should monitor   x<reports to identify carriers with inferior reliability records or   h<carriers who do not observe best practices and take remedial action   <including adoption of enforcement orders against particular   <carriers. If general network reliability concerns increase, the   x<Commission should then initiate a rulemaking to develop mandatory  ?H <minimum standards.;~H 8U ?<ԍ TCA comments at 6.;  ?<  I < C68.  Thresholds/Best Practices as Standards Discussion: One   <reason for including best practice analysis in our reporting   x<requirement, as indicated above, is to assist the Commission and   <the industry in investigating the effectiveness of the best   <practices recommended by the NRC. While we do not adopt best   h<practices identified by the NRC as legal requirements at this time,   <we expect that carriers will continue to implement rapidly the   <NRC's best practices, recognizing that particular circumstances   <must be taken into account. It is premature at this time to   <determine whether and how we might require reliability measures to   <be taken by an individual carrier with an inferior reliability  ?p<  x<record. As we stated in the Notice, however, we reserve the right   <to take any action within our authority to ensure efficient  ?<  i<telecommunications service.Bx8U ? <ԍ Notice at para. 21.B We recognize, as stated above, that   <the NRC's best practices are not a uniformly appropriate set of   <instructions for enhancing reliability in all circumstances.   <Nonetheless, we emphasize that we are prepared, if necessary, to propose additional regulations to ensure reliability.  ?<  < D69.   Mandatory Mutual Aid Background: The NRC's Mutual Aid and   <Restoration Focus Team developed a compendium, described in the  ?@<  <Notice,<@8U ?'<ԍ Notice n. 10.< that outlined the various types of agreements, both"@0*((%"   <formal and informal, that exist for mutual aid among carriers,   <other industry members and customers. The Team's report also   x<discussed the advantages and disadvantages of each of the various   <types of agreements according to different circumstances, provided   <contact lists, considered strategies for public education on   x<finding alternative service during an outage, and suggested other   <ways to facilitate mutual aid when called for. This document is periodically updated by the National Communications System.  ?<  -< E70.   Mandatory Mutual Aid Comments: TCA proposes that the   h<Commission seek comment on mutual aid and restoration requirements.   <TCA states that the ability to minimize the effect of outages   <through mutual aid between carriers and vendors increases as the   0<number of providers increases but rivalry may prevent full   <cooperation. Alternatively, TCA asks the Commission to specify   x<that it is an unreasonable practice in violation of 201(b) of the   <Act not to participate in mutual aid and restoration agreements.   <TCA also suggests that the Commission establish a deadline for  ?<carriers to certify that they have taken such steps.;8U ?h<ԍ TCA comments at 7.;  ?h<  ;< F71. AT&T, Southwestern Bell and BellSouth disagree, arguing that   <mutual aid agreements should be left to the private efforts of   x<carriers, and declaring that present voluntary cooperation during   <emergencies is excellent, as shown by the report of the NRC's  ?<  i<Mutual Aid Focus Team.X8U ?p<  <ԍ BellSouth reply comments at 5; Southwestern Bell reply   <comments at 4 and AT&T reply comments at 7, referring to Report to  ?<  h<the Nation, Section H, page 17 and the Report and Order at para. 16   x<(where the Commission indicated that the NOF was the proper forum for solving carrier cooperation issues.) Pacific argues that there is no need for   <the Commission to declare that failure to enter into specified   <types of agreements is a violation of Section 201(b) of the Act.   <Pacific contends that the Network Operations Forum (NOF) of ATIS   <has provided a comprehensive framework for mutual aid and   <restoration, including information sharing guidelines, software   <validation guidelines, Signalling System 7 (SS7) baseline security   <guidelines, database maintenance, power routines, link diversity   @<validation, emergency communication, and planned network  ?<  <maintenance notification.G8U ?(#<ԍ Pacific reply comments at 78.G MCI states that TCA's proposal for  ?X<requiring mutual aid would deny carriers necessary flexibility.AX8U ?%<ԍ MCI reply comments at 9.A  ?<  !< G72.  Mandatory Mutual Aid Discussion: Carriers have consistently   x<maintained, both in this record and in proceedings of the Network" ( 0*((#"   h<Reliability Council, that a strong spirit of cooperation, evidenced   x<by formal and informal mutual aid arrangements, exists throughout   h<the industry. After studying the full variety of telecommunications   <mutual aid arrangements, the NRC Mutual Aid and Restoration Team   <determined that there was extensive vendorwithcarrier and   <carrierwithcarrier cooperation both prior to and during   @<emergencies and that "commitment to prompt notification,   h<cooperative interaction and the provision of technical and material  ?@<  I <assistance during emergencies is general throughout the industry." @8U ?<  <ԍ Mutual Aid and Restoration Compendium, Report to the Nation, Section H, page 17.   x<We have found no evidence to the contrary. Although virtually all   x<aspects of telecommunications service and equipment provision are   <becoming more competitive, the evidence before us suggests that   <carriers provide assistance to each other when requested to do so.  ?( <  <This assistance has taken different forms.( 8U ?<  i<ԍ See Minutes of September 30, 1992 NRC meeting for reports   <on mutual aid measures taken during Hurricane Andrew, which hit   0<Florida on August 24, 1992, and Louisiana a day later, and  ?0<  <Hurricane Iniki which struck Hawaii on September 14, 1992; see   x<Minutes of December 15, 1992 NRC meeting for report of mutual aid   <measures taken during the flood of October 9, 1992, in Fairfax,  ?<  <South Carolina; see Minutes of March 17, 1993 NRC meeting for   <report of mutual aid measures taken after the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993.  Major interexchange   h<carriers experiencing significant service disruptions have assisted   <customers in obtaining access to other interexchange carriers, and   <have informed each other that they are doing so. The Commission   <publishes consumer bulletins that inform customers how to access   x<different interexchange carriers. Finally, carriers have begun to   <implement a number of the measures proposed by TCA. The Regional   <Bell Operating Companies, Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company,   h<Southern New England Telephone Company, the GTE Telephone Operating   <Companies, Sprint/United Telephone Companies, and Bellcore NS/EP   <recently have entered into the Local Exchange Carrier Mutual Aid   <Agreement. The carriers provide more than 92 percent of the access   x<lines in the United States. The agreement is designed to resolve,   <in advance, issues relating to the sharing of equipment, people,   <supplies, and network capacity among carriers in times of emergency.  ?p<  < H73. Because we are aware of no incidents of carriers refusing   <cooperation, we see no need at this time to mandate mutual aid   <agreements or to specify the circumstances in which a refusal of   h<aid would be unreasonable. We believe such determinations should be   0<made on the basis of a complete record developed through a   x<complaint filed pursuant to Section 208 of the Act. We understand   <that current carrier practice is to provide assistance when   <requested; that understanding will be our point of departure in"! 0*(("" considering any such complaint.  ?<  h< I74.  IITP Financing Background: Following the September 12,   <1991 interindustry meeting on network reliability hosted by the   <Commission, the Internetwork Interoperability Test Plan Ad Hoc   <Committee was established by the Network Operations Forum of the   <Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions and is   <administered by Bellcore. The Committee has developed   <interoperability internetwork test scripts and interconnected   h<multiple carrier and supplier laboratories to cooperatively execute   <those test scripts. The recommendations of the NRC's SS7 Focus  ?<  h<Team, summarized for comment in the Notice, stated that "there must   <be increased commitment of personnel and resources across the  ?( <industry for the Internetwork Interoperability Test Plan (IITP)."A( 8U ? <ԍ Notice at para 12.A  ? <  < J75.  IITP Financing Comments: In its comments, Bell Atlantic   <states that the costs for IITP testing, presently assumed entirely   <by several LECs, should be shared more generally. It asks the   <Commission to provide an industrywide mechanism such as that   <established by the NRC for funding the NRC Symposium or the ATIS  ?<  z<Steering Committee to do this.FX8U ?<ԍ Bell Atlantic comments at 11.F BellSouth agrees.G8U ?<ԍ BellSouth reply comments at 6.G Pacific   <agrees that costs for IITP testing should be shared more equitably   <across the industry, but believes, along with AT&T, that funding   x<can be resolved within the industry and that no Commission action  ?<  i<is necessary.^x8U ?<ԍ AT&T reply comments 67; Pacific reply comments at 6.^ MCI argues that industrywide funding for IITP is   x<not necessary for fairness reasons, since LECs recover their IITP   <costs through the interexchange access rates and says that the  ?<costs of industrywide funding would greatly exceed benefits.C8U ?<ԍ MCI reply comments at 89.C  ?<  Y< K76.  IITP Financing Discussion: In its recommendation to the   0<Commission, the NRC's SS7 Focus Team stated that an unfair   <placement of the burden for IITP on a small number of LECs "has  ?<  i<complicated and delayed the scheduling and execution of tests."R8U ?(#<ԍ Report to the Nation, Section B, page 46.R   <This is of serious concern. The IITP was proposed as a response to   <concerns that interconnected signalling networks using different   x<equipment and rapidly evolving software may be more vulnerable to   <telephone service outages due to unexpected interactions. The IITP   <provides the ability to test different networks using different   <equipment, lowering the risk of unintended interactions. In""( 0*((#"   x<addition to prophylactic applications, the IITP can be used after   x<an event to diagnose an incident. For example, the IITP was used   <to diagnose a service outage caused by switches of different   <manufacture interpreting a remote makebusy feature in different   <ways. The feature that caused the outage has been modified to   <resolve the immediate problem, but the incident illustrates the   <point that unintended, service disabling events are possible in an   x<environment in which multiple service and equipment providers are   <attempting to meet a broad range of customer service requirements. The IITP provides a way to minimize these risks.  ?<  < L77. We agree with Pacific and AT&T that the funding problem   <should be resolved within the industry. The NRC is the best   <mechanism for resolving any IITP funding problem that may exist,   h<either by means of specific recommendations to the industry or, if   <such a solution is not possible, by means of a recommendation to the FCC. We refer this question to the NRC.  ?<  !< M78. Confidentiality Background and Comments: In the Notice,   <the Commission indicated that it would continue to follow the   <procedures set forth in Section 0.459 of the Rules, 47 C.F.R.    <0.459, in deciding requests for confidentiality for material in   <outage reports and that it does not anticipate, as a general   <matter, that carriers will be able to demonstrate a basis for  ?<  Y<keeping outage reports confidential.B8U ?<ԍ Notice at para. 20.B NYNEX asks the Commission to   <clarify that no presumption against a legitimate request will   <exist. TCG agrees with NYNEX, stating that public disclosure of   <certain kinds of network information could prove harmful to   <competition and would inhibit carriers from providing detailed  ?<  <information.;X8U ?<ԍ TCG comments at 3.; Sprint states that as long as the Commission's   <procedures for confidentiality in Section 0.459 of the Rules are  ?8<available, outage reports can be given public treatment.>88U ?<ԍ Sprint comments at 8.>  ?<  H!< N79. Confidentiality Discussion: We did not intend in the Notice   0<to modify our interpretation of or to provide for a unique   <application of our confidentiality rules in cases where carriers   <request confidentiality for outage reports. We have had very few   <such requests and see no reason that such requests should become   <more common under the amendments established in the present order. We will continue to apply Section 0.459 as we have in the past.  ? <  "< O80. CAP Reporting Background, Comments and Discussion: All who   <offered comments on the issue approved our decision, in the  ?!<  <reconsideration portion of the Notice, to include CAPs in the"!#x0*((P("  ?<  i<reporting requirement.8U ?X<  i<ԍ See, e.g., TCG comments at 2 and Rochester reply comments at 2. USTA, however, requests that the text of   <our proposed rules clearly reflect the Commission's decision to  ?<  <require CAPs to report outages.> 8U ?@<ԍ USTA comments at 12.> There was no opposition in the   <reply comments to this request. In the interests of making our   0<rules clear, we will add the phrase "or competitive access   <provider" to the text of the rules to show clearly that such   0<carriers are included in the reporting requirements. As an   x<additional editorial change to clarify reporting requirements, we   <will specifically state that an outage includes not only a failure   h<of the carrier's network, but also a degradation in the performance   <of the network where a customer's ability to establish or maintain a channel of communications is compromised.  ?( <  < P81. Lessee Reporting Background and Comments: The proposed  ? <  x<rules would require common carrier lessees, as well as owners and   <operators, of facilities in which an outage occurs to report  ? <  <outages.D 8U ?<ԍ Notice at Appendix A.D  AT&T states that lessees should not be required to   h<report outages because the owner or operator of affected facilities   <is in the best position to determine root cause, analyze best   x<practices and mitigate outages. AT&T argues that lessee reporting   <would cause confusion, leaving some outages unreported and causing   <duplicate reporting of others. AT&T states that the lessee must   x<already notify the owner or operator of facilities affected by an  ?<outage and provide assistance in completing reports.<@8U ?<ԍ AT&T comments at 8.<  ?<  W!< Q82. Lessee Reporting Discussion: We agree that some duplication   <of reports will occur as a result of our inclusion of lessees in   x<the reporting requirement. We see no reason, however, to conclude   <that other outages would go unreported. Under the present rules,   <which do not mention lessees, some outages have been reported late   @<and some may have gone unreported by reason of differing   <understandings between facilities owners and lessees as to the   h<application of the requirement. Occasional duplicate outage reports   x<from different carriers involved in the same outage does not seem   h<to be a burden. Therefore, we will include lessees in our reporting requirement.  ? <  ?<  < R83. Reporting to Affected Parties Background, Comments and  ?<  <Discussion : The Notice proposed to require the submission of outage   <reports only to the FCC. NYC, however, suggests that "regulators   <and other interested parties must be apprised immediately of major   <service disruptions" because, for some businesses, even short" $0*((p&"  ?<  <disruptions can be severely damaging.;8U ?X<ԍ NYC comments at 5.; Requiring carriers to   h<report outages to affected parties such as businesses could produce   <insurmountable difficulties in many cases. State regulators, of   <course, who wish to be apprised of outages within their   <jurisdictions may establish such requirements themselves. We refer   <to the Council the issue of whether there are any affected parties   <other than 911 PSAP officials who may need to be separately   x<notified of outage conditions, and, if so, how that notice should be made.  ?<- IV. CONCLUSION ă  ?( <  < S84. Consistent with the Commission's objective to encourage the   <development of a competitive, innovative and excellent American   <communications system and in response to the recommendations   h<submitted by the Network Reliability Council to the Commission, we   h<are today amending Section 63.100 of our Rules to require reporting   x<of: 1) outages potentially affecting 30,000 or more customers and   x<lasting 30 or more minutes; 2) outages lasting 30 or more minutes   x<and affecting certain special facilities regardless of the number   h<of customers affected; and 3) firerelated incidents affecting 1000   <or more lines and continuing for 30 or more minutes. We are   x<requiring carriers to include in their outage reports an analysis   <of the root cause of the incident and evaluate the effectiveness   <and application of best practices identified by the Council. We   <also amend the time in which outages affecting 50,000 or more   h<customers are initially reported to the Commission. In addition, we   0<are requiring carriers to notify the management of any 911   h<facilities affected by a reportable outage. We are amending certain   <language of Section 63.100 to make clear that competitive access  ?8<  <providers are to report outages, as provided in the Memorandum  ?<  <Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,   <released December 1, 1993 in this Docket. The information we   <receive will facilitate our monitoring of the quality of service   <being provided and enable us to take swift remedial action as   h<required. Finally, we are asking the Network Reliability Council to   <collect and analyze data and report to the Commission on: 1)   x<whether special facilities outage reporting should be expanded to   <include satellite, cellular, and other wireless carriers; 2)   @<whether and how a funding structure for the Internetwork   x<Interoperability Test Plan should be designed and; 3) whether and how customers of carriers should be informed of service outages.  ?`"<e V. ORDERING CLAUSES   ?#<  Z< T85. Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), and 201 of the   x<Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154 and   <201, Section 63.100 of the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R.  63.100,"%%X0*((-"   x<IS AMENDED as set forth in the Appendix hereof, effective 30 days  ?<after publication in the Federal Register.r8U ? <  1<ԍ Carriers are, of course, free to begin complying immediately.r  ?X<  < U86. It is Further Ordered, that, the Secretary shall cause a  ? <  h<summary of this Order to be published in the Federal Register which   <shall include a statement describing how members of the public may   h<obtain the complete text of this Commission decision. The Secretary  ?x<  <shall also provide a copy of this Order to each state utility commission.  ?< e FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  ?( < e William F. Caton e Acting Secretary" & 0*(("  ?< C APPENDIX ă   <Part 63 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (chapter 1 of   h<title 47 of the Code of Federal regulations, Part 63) is amended as follows: 1. The authority citation for part 63 remains as follows:  ?<  < AUTHORITY: Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201205, 218 and 403 of the   <Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. Secs. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201205, 218, and 403, unless otherwise noted.   <2. 63.100 is amended by deleting the present 63.100 in its entirety and substituting the following: * * * * *  ?<  63.100 NOTIFICATION OF SERVICE OUTAGE (a) As used in this section:   < (1) "outage" is defined as a significant degradation in the   <ability of a customer to establish and maintain a channel of   <communications as a result of failure or degradation in the performance of a carrier's network.   p< (2) "customer" is defined as a user purchasing telecommunications service from a common carrier.   < (3) "special offices and facilities" are defined as major   <airports, major military installations, key government facilities,   <nuclear power plants and 911 public service answering points (PSAPs).   < (4) An outage which "potentially affects" a 911 "special   x<facility" is defined as an outage which disrupts more than 25% of   x<the lines to any PSAP without providing automatic rerouting to an alternative PSAP.   h< (5) "major airports" are defined as those airports described by   x<the Federal Aviation Administration as large or medium hubs. The   <member agencies of the National Communications System (NCS) will   P<determine which of their locations are "major military installations" and "key government facilities."   < (6) An outage which "potentially affects" a major airport is   x<defined as an outage that disrupts 50% or more of the air traffic   <control links or other FAA communications links to any major   <airport, any outage that has caused an ARTCC or major airport to"''0*((/"   h<lose its radar, any ARTCC or major airport outage that is likely to   h<be of media interest, any outage that causes a loss of both primary   h<and backup facilities at any ARTCC or major airport, and any outage   h<to an ARTCC or major airport that is deemed important by the FAA as indicated by FAA inquiry to the carrier management personnel.   x< (7) A "missionaffecting" outage is defined as an outage that   <is deemed critical to national security/emergency preparedness   <(NS/EP) operations of the affected facility by the National   0<Communications System member agency operating the affected  ?<facility.  ?` <  0<(b) Any local exchange or interexchange common carrier or   h<competitive access provider that operates transmission or switching   <facilities and provides access service or interstate or   <international telecommunications service, that experiences an   h<outage which potentially affects 50,000 or more of its customers on   x<any facilities which it owns, operates or leases, must notify the   <Commission if such outage continues for 30 or more minutes.   <Satellite carriers and cellular carriers are exempt from this   0<reporting requirement. Notification must be served on the   <Commission's Monitoring Watch Officer, on duty 24 hours a day in   0<the FCC headquarters building in Washington, D.C., or on a   <secondary basis it may be served on the Commission's Watch Officer   <on duty at the FCC's facility at Grand Island, Nebraska. The   x<notification must be by facsimile or other record means delivered   <within 120 minutes of the carrier's first knowledge that the   h<service outage potentially affects 50,000 or more customers, if the   <outage continues for 30 or more minutes. Notification shall   <identify a contact person who can provide further information, the   <telephone number at which the contact person can be reached, and   <what information is known at the time about the service outage   <including: the date and estimated time (local time at the location   x<of the outage) of commencement of the outage; the geographic area   <affected; the estimated number of customers affected; the types of  ?X<  <services affected (e.g. interexchange, local, cellular); the  ? <  <duration of the outage, i.e. time elapsed from the estimated   x<commencement of the outage until restoration of full service; the   x<estimated number of blocked calls during the outage; the apparent   <or known cause of the incident, including the name and type of   x<equipment involved and the specific part of the network affected;   <methods used to restore service; and the steps taken to prevent   h<recurrences of the outage. Carriers must indicate, when specifying   x<the types of services affected by any reportable outage, when 911   h<is one of those services, whether more than 25% of the lines to any   <PSAP were disrupted and there was no automatic rerouting to an   <alternate PSAP. The report shall be captioned Initial Service   x<Disruption Report. Lack of any of the above information shall not   <delay the filing of this report. Not later than thirty days after   x<the outage, the carrier shall file with the Chief, Common Carrier   x<Bureau, a Final Service Disruption Report providing all available   <information on the service outage, including any information not"'(0*((/"   <contained in its Initial Service Disruption Report and detailing   <specifically the root cause of the outage and listing and   <evaluating the effectiveness and application in the immediate case   <of any best practices or industry standards identified by the   x<Network Reliability Council to eliminate or ameliorate outages of the reported type.  ?x<  <(c) Any local exchange or interexchange common carrier or   h<competitive access provider that operates transmission or switching   <facilities and provides access service or interstate or   <international telecommunications service, that experiences an   <outage which potentially affects at least 30,000 and less than   x<50,000 of its customers on any facilities which it owns, operates   <or leases, must notify the Commission if such outage continues for   <30 or more minutes. Satellite carriers and cellular carriers are   <exempt from this reporting requirement. Notification must be   <served on the Commission's Monitoring Watch Officer, on duty 24   x<hours a day in the FCC headquarters building in Washington, D.C.,   <or on a secondary basis it may be served on the Commission's Watch   <Officer on duty at the FCC's facility at Grand Island, Nebraska.   <The notification must be by facsimile or other record means   x<delivered within 3 days of the carrier's first knowledge that the   <service outage potentially affects at least 30,000 but less than   x<50,000 customers, if the outage continues for 30 or more minutes.   <Notification shall identify the carrier and a contact person who   <can provide further information, the telephone number at which the   h<contact person can be reached, and what information is known at the   <time about the service outage including: the date and estimated   <time (local time at the location of the outage) of commencement of   x<the outage; the geographic area affected; the estimated number of  ?p<  @<customers affected; the types of services affected (e.g.  ?8<  x<interexchange, local, cellular); the duration of the outage, i.e.   <time elapsed from the estimated commencement of the outage until   <restoration of full service; the estimated number of blocked calls   <during the outage; the apparent or known cause of the incident,   <including the name and type of equipment involved and the specific   <part of the network affected; methods used to restore service; and   h<the steps taken to prevent recurrences of the outage. Carriers must   <indicate, when specifying the types of services affected by any   x<reportable outage, when 911 is one of those services whether more   x<than 25% of the lines to any PSAP were disrupted and there was no   <automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP. The report shall be   <captioned Initial Service Disruption Report. Lack of any of the   <above information shall not delay the filing of this report. Not   <later than thirty days after the outage, the carrier shall file   x<with the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, a Final Service Disruption   x<Report providing all available information on the service outage,   <including any information not contained in its Initial Service   <Disruption Report and detailing specifically the root cause of the   h<outage and listing and evaluating the effectiveness and application   x<in the immediate case of any best practices or industry standards   <identified by the Network Reliability Council to eliminate or"')0*((/" ameliorate outages of the reported type.   <(d) Any local exchange or interexchange carrier or competitive   <access provider that operates transmission or switching facilities   0<and provides access service or interstate or international   h<telecommunications service that experiences a firerelated incident   <in any facilities which it owns, operates or leases that impacts   <1000 or more service lines must notify the Commission if the   <incident continues for a period of 30 minutes or longer. Satellite   <carriers and cellular carriers are exempt from this reporting   <requirement. Notification must be served on the Commission's   <Monitoring Watch Officer, on duty 24 hours a day in the FCC   <headquarters building in Washington, D.C., or on a secondary basis   x<it may be served on the Commission's Watch Officer on duty at the   <FCC's facility at Grand Island, Nebraska. The notification must be   h<by facsimile or other recorded means delivered within 3 days of the   <carrier's first knowledge that the incident is firerelated,   @<impacting 1000 or more lines for thirty or more minutes.   <Notification shall identify the carrier and a contact person who   <can provide further information, the telephone number at which the   h<contact person can be reached, and what information is known at the   <time about the service outage including: the date and estimated   <time (local time at the location of the outage) of commencement of   x<the outage; the geographic area affected; the estimated number of  ?<  @<customers affected; the types of services affected (e.g.  ?<  x<interexchange, local, cellular); the duration of the outage, i.e.   <time elapsed from the estimated commencement of the outage until   <restoration of full service; the estimated number of blocked calls   <during the outage; the apparent or known cause of the incident,   <including the name and type of equipment involved and the specific   <part of the network affected; methods used to restore service; and   h<the steps taken to prevent recurrences of the outage. Carriers must   <indicate, when specifying the types of services affected by any   x<reportable outage, when 911 is one of those services whether more   x<than 25% of the lines to any PSAP were disrupted and there was no   <automatic rerouting to an alternate PSAP. The report shall be   <captioned Initial Service Disruption Report. Lack of any of the   x<above information shall not delay the filing of this report. Not   x<later than thirty days after the incident, the carrier shall file   h<with the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, a Final Report providing all   <available information on the incident, including any information   <not contained in its Initial Report and detailing specifically the   <root cause of the incident and listing and evaluating the   <effectiveness and application in the immediate case of any best   <practices or industry standards identified by the Network   <Reliability Council to eliminate or ameliorate incidents of the reported type.  ?%<  0<(e) Any local exchange or interexchange common carrier or   h<competitive access provider that operates transmission or switching   <facilities and provides access service or interstate or   <international telecommunications service, that experiences an"'*0*((/"   <outage on any facilities which it owns, operates or leases which   <potentially affects special offices and facilities must notify the   0<Commission if such outage continues for 30 or more minutes   <regardless of the number of customers affected. Satellite carriers   x<and cellular carriers are exempt from this reporting requirement.   <Notification must be served on the Commission's Monitoring Watch   h<Officer, on duty 24 hours a day in the FCC headquarters building in   x<Washington, D.C., or on a secondary basis it may be served on the   x<Commission's Watch Officer on duty at the FCC's facility at Grand   <Island, Nebraska. The notification must be by facsimile or other   <record means delivered within 120 minutes of the carrier's first   <knowledge that the service outage potentially affects a special   <facility, if the outage continues for 30 or more minutes.   <Notification shall identify a contact person who can provide   <further information, the telephone number at which the contact   <person can be reached, and what information is known at the time   <about the service outage including: the date and estimated time   x<(local time at the location of the outage) of commencement of the   <outage; the geographic area affected; the estimated number of  ?<  <customers affected; the types of services affected (e.g. 911   <emergency services, major airports); the duration of the outage,  ?h<  <i.e. time elapsed from the estimated commencement of the outage   <until restoration of full service; the estimated number of blocked   <calls during the outage; the apparent or known cause of the   h<incident, including the name and type of equipment involved and the   <specific part of the network affected; methods used to restore   <service; and the steps taken to prevent recurrences of the outage.   <Carriers must indicate, when specifying the types of services   <affected by any reportable outage, when 911 is one of those   <services whether more than 25% of the lines to any PSAP were   <disrupted and there was no automatic rerouting to an alternate   <PSAP. The report shall be captioned Initial Service Disruption   x<Report. Lack of any of the above information shall not delay the   h<filing of this report. Not later than thirty days after the outage,   <the carrier shall file with the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, a   h<Final Service Disruption Report providing all available information   x<on the service outage, including any information not contained in   <its Initial Service Disruption Report and detailing specifically   <the root cause of the outage and listing and evaluating the   <effectiveness and application in the immediate case of any best   <practices or industry standards identified by the Network   <Reliability Council to eliminate or ameliorate outages of the   h<reported type. Under this rule, carriers are not required to report   P<outages affecting nuclear power plants, major military   <installations and key government facilities to the Commission.   h<Reports at these facilities will be made according to the following procedures:  0<e(1) When there is a missionaffecting outage, the affected   <facility will report the outage to the National Communications   h<System (NCS) and call the service provider in order to determine if   <the outage is expected to last 30 minutes. If the outage is not"'+0*((/"   h<expected to, and does not, last 30 minutes, it will not be reported   <to the FCC. If it is expected to last 30 minutes or does last 30   x<minutes, the NCS, on the advice of the affected special facility, will either:   8<e (A) forward a report of the outage to the   h<Commission, supplying the information for initial reports affecting   <special facilities specified in this section of the Commission's Rules;   8<e (B) forward a report of the outage to the   <Commission, designating the outage as one affecting "special"   x<facilities," but reporting it at a level of detail that precludes identification of the particular facility involved; or  p<e (C) hold the report at the NCS due to the critical nature of the application.  <e(2) If there is to be a report to the Commission, a written or   <oral report will be given by the NCS within 120 minutes of an   <outage to the Commission's Monitoring Watch Officer, on duty 24   x<hours a day in the FCC headquarters building in Washington, D.C.,   <or on a secondary basis it may be served on the Commission's Watch   h<Officer on duty at the FCC's facility at Grand Island, Nebraska. If   <the report is oral, it is to be followed by a written report the   h<next business day. Those carriers whose service failures are in any   <way responsible for the outage must consult with NCS upon its request for information.  <e(3) If there is to be a report to the Commission, the service   <provider will provide a written report to the NCS, supplying the   <information for final reports for special facilities required by   <this section of the Commission's rules. The service provider's   <final report to the NCS will be filed within 28 days after the   <outage, allowing the NCS to then file the report with the   <Commission within 30 days after the outage. If the outage is   <reportable as described above, and the NCS determines that the   <final report can be presented to the Commission without   P<jeopardizing matters of national security or emergency   h<preparedness, the NCS will forward the report as provided in either (e)(1)(A) or (e)(1)(B) of this section to the Commission.   x<(f) If an outage is determined to have affected a 911 facility so   <as to be reportable as a special facilities outage, the carrier   x<whose duty it is to report the outage to the FCC shall as soon as   h<possible by telephone or other electronic means notify any official   <who has been designated by the management of the affected 911   <facility as the official to be contacted by the carrier in case of   <a telecommunications outage at that facility. The carrier shall   <convey all available information to the designated official that   <will be useful to the management of the affected facility in   x<mitigating the affects of the outage on callers to that facility. "',0*((/"   h<(g) In the case of LEC end offices, carriers will use the number of   <lines terminating at the office for determining whether the   x<criteria for reporting an outage has been reached. In the case of   <IXC or LEC tandem facilities, carriers must, if technically   h<possible, use realtime blocked calls to determine whether criteria   h<for reporting an outage have been reached. Carriers must report IXC   <and LEC tandem outages where more than 150,000 calls are blocked   <during a period of 30 or more minutes for purposes of complying   x<with the required 50,000 potentially affected customers threshold   <and must report such outages where more than 90,000 calls are   <blocked during a period of 30 or more minutes for purposes of   h<complying with the 30,000 potentially affected customers threshold.   <Carriers may use historical data to estimate blocked calls when   h<required realtime blocked call counts are not possible. When using   <historical data, carriers must report incidents where more than   <50,000 calls are blocked during a period of 30 or more minutes for   h<purposes of complying with the required 50,000 potentially affected   <customers threshold and must report incidents where more than   <30,000 calls are blocked during a period of 30 or more minutes for   0<purposes of complying with the 30,000 potentially affected customers threshold.