WPC/ 2J BNLZTimes Roman#|f]\  PCP"S^*8DSS888S^*8*.SSSSSSSSSS..^^^Jxooxf]xx8Axfxx]xo]fxxxxf8.8NS8JSJSJ8SS..S.SSSS8A.SSxSSJP!PZ8*888888888888S.xJxJxJxJxJooJfJfJfJfJ8.8.8.8.xSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxSxJxSxSxSxSxS]SxJxJoJoJoJoJxSfJfJfJfJxSxSxSxSxSxSxS8S8S888SA8xSf.f8f8f8f.xSxSxSxSxSxo8o8o8]A]A]A]Af8f8f8xSxSxSxSxxSfJfJN:*LS8JSSSSS.4}}S2S}2JJS88SS]]8J2t^^\\^^ee*C^.wR)Ewn\1fy\r\Sxx\rHP LaserJet 4 PostScriptHPLA4POS.PRS]\  PChhhh.FP2m|LX5 X-   X #XP\  P6QXP#"S^2CRddCCCdq2C28dddddddddd88qqqYzoCNzoozzC8C^dCYdYdYCdd88d8ddddCN8ddddY`(`lC2CC!CCCCCCCCCCd8YYYYYYzYzYzYzYC8C8C8C8ddddddddddYdddddodYYYYYYdzYzYzYzYdddddddCdCdCCCdNCdz8zCzCzCz8dddddCCCoNoNoNoNzCzCzCdddddzYzYNF2[dCYddddd7>d<d<$YYdCCddooCY%7777777777>>>1eOIIOC=OO%+OCbOO=OI=COOhOOC%%47%17171%777V7777%+77O77155<%%%n%%%%%%%%%%7O1O1O1O1O1bII1C1C1C1C1%%%%O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O7O1O7O7O7O7O7=7O1O1I1I1I1I1O7C1C1C1C1O7O7O7O7O7O7O7%7%7%%%7+%O7CC%C%C%CO7O7O7O7O7bOI%I%I%=+=+=+=+C%C%C%O7O7O7O7hOO7C1C1N'27%177777"SS7!TT7S!117n%%77l==n%1n!t>><<>>mBBs,>[N6-msTN[TTTH_<1CPthat Sprint favors larger customers, Erdman would have to show that a larger customer had a number  xdisconnected and was then able to recover it under the same circumstances as existed with regard to  xErdman. Erdman has presented no evidence to that effect. Moreover, with respect to the third prong,  x@Sprint's actions after the fact of the disconnection appear to be reasonable. In considering the  xreasonableness of Sprint's actions, we note that the other customer claimed to have printed the number  S- xin thousands of catalogs while Erdman admitted that it had done no advertising based on the number.*  Sd-  nԍXxSee 2d Am. Complaint at Exh. A, p.2 of Erdman/Goldberg conversation and Exh. A, p.8 of Erdman/Johnson conversation.(#ƾ  xWe further note that had Sprint taken the number from the second customer, that customer could then have  xcomplained against Sprint for disconnection of service without cause in violation of Sprint's tariff and the  S@- xAct. Additionally, when an alleged clerical error results in the disconnection and reassignment of a  xLnumber previously used by one customer to another customer, the carrier is faced with a choice between  xdisrupting two customers or one. It seems reasonable that the carrier would attempt to reach a satisfactory  xaccommodation with the first customer while avoiding inconveniencing or alienating the other customer.  xAs the transcripts of the recorded telephone conversations bear out, this is what Sprint did by permitting  xthe second customer to keep the Panasonic number and by offering Erdman both a refund of nonusage  xcharges it had paid for service via that number as well as an additional sum of money for the  S(-inconvenience.+( SN"-  ԍXxSee, e.g., 2d Am. Complaint at Exh. A, p. 2 of Erdman/Goldberg conversation. Erdman refused such offers.(#ƴ Sprint also reconnected those numbers that had not been reassigned.  S- ` ox18.` ` Further, Sprint's actions seem especially reasonable in light of the fact that Erdman had  S- xyno proprietary interest in the Panasonic number. Sprint's tariff, like those of other 800 carriers, provides" +0*(("  S- xthat no customer has any proprietary right or interest in the 800 numbers it uses.}, Sh-ԍXxSee, e.g., Sprint Tariff F.C.C. No. 2  3.23, 2.1.7(C).(#} These tariff provisions  S- xLare consistent with guidelines issued by the North American Numbering Plan Administrator that were in  xeffect at the time of the relevant events. These guidelines state that even the 800 carrier has no  S- x[proprietary interest in any 800 number.-j S-  ԍXxSee Initial Answer at Exh. III. These guidelines apply to threedigit or NXX 800number administration.(#Ƴ Moreover, the Commission has found that the "stockpiling of  S`-800 numbers is not in the public interest.".` S -  ԍXxSee, e.g., Provision of Access for 800 Service, 4 FCC Rcd 2824, 2846 n.182 (1989). The issue   |of hoarding and brokering of tollfree numbers is also being addressed in an ongoing rulemaking  S -  ^proceeding. See Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket   No. 95155, FCC 95419 (October 5, 1995). We note, however, that Sprint's arguments that   Erdman has been hoarding 800 numbers and recording telephone conversations have no bearing   on whether Sprint violated the Act with regard to the claims raised in this complaint. Even  S-  assuming, arguendo, that Erdman engaged in these activities, Sprint did not terminate Erdman's service for either of these reasons.(#Ɣ xD. Procedural and Other Matters  S- ` x19.` ` As noted above, Sprint moved to dismiss Erdman's initial complaint on the grounds that  x[the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that Erdman was seeking damages in both federal court  xand before the Commission in violation of Section 207 of the Communications Act. Erdman subsequently  x.stipulated that it would not seek monetary damages in the instant proceeding. Then, after retaining new  xcounsel, Erdman filed a motion to strike the stipulation. Both motions are mooted by our ruling on the merits. Accordingly we dismiss these motions.  S - ` }x20.` ` Further, Erdman requests that we award it attorney's fees to the present time and bifurcate  S - xthis proceeding by establishing a separate proceeding to address damages issues.R/ r  S-ԍXxSum. J. Mot. at 4, 1112.(#R These requests are  SX- xdenied. We do not have the authority to award attorney's fees.0X S -  ԍXxComark Cable Fund III v. Northwestern Indiana Telephone Company, 100 FCC 2d 1244, 1257 n.51 (1985).(#ƨ Further, having found that Sprint did  x]not violate the Act or a Commission rule or order, neither equitable relief, damages, nor a separate  xproceeding on damages issues is warranted. Similarly, enforcement proceedings, which are initiated solely in the Commission's discretion, are not warranted.  Sh-  IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERING CLAUSES ă  S- ` Cx21.` ` We conclude that Erdman has failed to prove its allegations that Sprint violated the Communications Act or the Commission's rules by disconnecting and failing to reconnect certain 800  b " 00*((%"  x b numbers used by Erdman. Accordingly, Erdman is not entitled to the equitable relief or damages it seeks. Further, we conclude that initiation of enforcement proceedings against Sprint is not warranted.  S- ` bx22.` ` Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 208 of the  x>Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), and 208, that the abovecaptioned complaint filed by Erdman Technologies Corporation IS DENIED.  S-x23.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Erdman's motion for summary judgment IS DENIED.  S- ` x24.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Erdman's requests for an award of attorney's fees, the  xestablishment of a separate proceeding on damages issues, and the initiation of enforcement proceedings against Sprint ARE DENIED.  S - ` 5x25.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Erdman's motion to strike the stipulation IS DISMISSED.  S - ` }x26.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Erdman's motion for leave to file an amended complaint IS GRANTED.  S-x27.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sprint's motion to dismiss IS DISMISSED.  S-x28.` ` IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding IS TERMINATED. x` `  hh@FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION x` `  hh@Regina M. Keeney x` `  hh@Chief, Common Carrier Bureau