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We also address petitions for clarification or reconsideration  X-in the Ameritech and NANP proceedings. (D {O -ԍ See In the Matter of Proposed 708 Relief Plan and 630 Numbering Plan Area Code by Ameritech  {Oe -Illinois, IAD File no. 94102, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 10 FCC Rcd 4596 (1995) (Ameritech Order) and  {O/ -Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, CC Docket No. 92237, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd  {O -2588, 2591 (1995) (NANP Order). 3. Dialing parity, nondiscriminatory access, network disclosure, and numbering administration issues are critical issues for the development of local competition. As stated in  XL-the First Report and Order, incumbent local exchange carriers have little incentive to provide access to potential competitors to their networks. In other words, potential competitors in the local and long distance markets face numerous operational barriers to entry notwithstanding their legal right to enter such markets. The dialing parity, nondiscriminatory access, and network disclosure requirements should remove those barriers to entry. The rules we adopt herein will benefit consumers by making some of the strongest aspects of local exchange carrier incumbency the local dialing, telephone numbers, operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing available to all competitors on an equal basis.  X- A. Actions to Implement Section 251(b)(3)  1. Dialing Parity  X:-  X#-4. Section 251(b)(3) of the 1996 Act directs each local exchange carrier (LEC) #4  yO-ԍ The 1996 Act defines the term "local exchange carrier" as "any person that is engaged in the provision of telephone exchange service or exchange access. Such term does not include a person insofar as such person is engaged in the provision of commercial mobile service under section 332(c), except to the extent that the Commission finds that such provider should be included in the definition of such term." 47 U.S.C.  153(26). For purposes of the dialing parity and nondiscriminatory access obligations that we impose pursuant to section  {O"-251(b)(3), we find that commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) providers are not LECs. See infra para. 29.  to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange and telephone toll"  0*(("  X-service.$  yOy-ԍ According to the 1996 Act, the term "dialing parity" means "that a person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use of any access code, their telecommunications to the telecommunications services provider of the customer's designation from among 2 or more telecommunications services providers (including such local exchange carrier)." 47U.S.C.153(15).$ This requirement means that customers of these competitors should not have to dial extra digits to have their calls routed over that LEC's network. To implement this statutory requirement, we adopt broad guidelines and minimum federal standards that build upon the experiences and accomplishments of state commissions. Although the 1996 Act requires a LEC to provide dialing parity only to providers of telephone exchange and toll services, section 251(b)(3) does not limit the type of traffic or service for which dialing parity must be afforded to those providers. We conclude, therefore, that section 251(b)(3) requires LECs to  X_-provide dialing parity to providers of telephone exchange or toll service with respect to all telecommunications services that require dialing to route a call and encompasses international, interstate, intrastate, local and toll services.  X -5. With respect to toll service, we further find that section 251(b)(3) requires, at a minimum, that customers be entitled to choose different presubscribed, or preselected, carriers for both their intraLATA and interLATA toll calls. In states, like Alaska and Hawaii, that  X -have no LATAs,|x x yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 153(25). According to the 1996 Act, a LATA is a "local access and transport area." It is a "contiguous geographic area (A) established before the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by a Bell operating company such that no exchange area includes points within more than 1 metropolitan statistical area, consolidated metropolitan statistical area, or State, except as expressly permitted under the AT&T Consent Decree; or (B) established or modified by a Bell operating company after such date of enactment and approved by the Commission."| customers must be able to choose different presubscribed carriers for both their intrastate and interstate toll calls. Based on this finding, we adopt a rule requiring all LECs to implement intraLATA and interLATA toll dialing parity, using the "full 2PIC"  Xy-presubscription method.$y  yO-ԍ We note that the abbreviation "PIC" in the past has stood for the term "primary," or "preferred, interexchange carrier." While we retain the acronym "PIC," we define the term to include any toll carrier for  {Or-purposes of the presubscription rules that we adopt in this Order. For a discussion of the full 2PIC  {O<-presubscription methodology, see infra section II.B(4). The toll dialing parity requirement we adopt is defined by LATA boundaries given that the Bell Operating Companies' (BOCs') operations are likely to be shaped by LATA boundary restrictions for a period of unforeseeable duration. Given that implementation of the 1996 Act over time may diminish the significance of LATA boundaries, however, we permit states to redefine the toll dialing parity requirement based on state, rather than LATA, boundaries where a state deems such a requirement to be pro X-competitive and otherwise in the public interest.)X yOD&-ԍ To illustrate, if the presubscription requirement were based on LATA boundaries, a customer would be entitled to choose a primary carrier for all intraLATA toll calls and a separate, or the same, primary carrier for all interLATA toll calls. If the presubscription requirement were based on state boundaries, a customer would be"'0*(('" entitled to choose a primary carrier for all intrastate toll calls and a separate, or the same, primary carrier for all interstate toll calls.) " 0*(("Ԍ X-ԙ6. In order to facilitate the orderly implementation of toll dialing parity, we require each LEC, including a BOC, to submit a plan to the state regulatory commission for each state in which it provides telephone exchange service setting forth the LEC's plan for implementing toll dialing parity, including the methods it proposes to enable customers to select alternative providers. In the event that a state elects not to evaluate such a plan sufficiently in advance of the date on which a LEC is required to implement toll dialing parity, we require the LEC to file its plan with the Commission. The Commission will act upon such a plan within 90 days of the date on which it is filed with the Commission.  X1-7. Under the toll dialing parity implementation schedule we adopt, we require each LEC, including a BOC, to implement toll dialing parity no later than February 8, 1999. In addition, we require a LEC, including a BOC, to provide toll dialing parity throughout a state coincident with its provision of inregion, interLATA or inregion, interstate toll services in that state. LECs, other than BOCs, that are either already offering or plan to begin to provide inregion, interLATA or inregion, interstate toll services before August 8, 1997, must implement toll dialing parity by August 8, 1997. We note that smaller LECs, for which this implementation schedule may be unduly burdensome, may petition their state commission for  Xy-a suspension or modification of the application of this requirement.By  yOJ-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  251(f)(2).B  XK-8. Those states desiring to impose more stringent presubscription methodologies, e.g.,  X6-multiPIC or smartPIC,:Z6 yO-ԍ The multiPIC or smartPIC presubscription method would enable subscribers to select multiple carriers for various categories of toll traffic. For a discussion of multiPIC and smartPIC presubscription methodologies,  {O'-see infra section II.B(4). : will retain the flexibility to impose such additional requirements. We also announce our intention to issue a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking addressing the technical feasibility and nationwide availability of a separate presubscription choice for international calling based on the use of multiPIC or smartPIC technologies.  X-9. Pursuant to the local dialing parity requirements of section 251(b)(3), we require a LEC to permit telephone exchange service customers, within a defined local calling area, to dial the same number of digits to make a local telephone call, notwithstanding the identity of the customer's or the called party's local telephone service provider. We decline at this time to prescribe additional guidelines to address the methods that LECs may use to accomplish local dialing parity given our finding that local dialing parity will be achieved upon implementation of the number portability and interconnection requirements of section 251, as well as the provisions requiring nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers found in section 251(b)(3). " 0*(("Ԍ X- 10. We also decline to adopt federal consumer education programs or procedures that would inform consumers of the existence of competitive telecommunications providers. Instead, we leave decisions regarding consumer education and carrier selection procedures to the states. We conclude that, in order to ensure that dialing parity is implemented in a procompetitive manner, national rules are needed for the recovery of dialing parity implementation costs.   X_- 11. Section 271 of the 1996 Act requires BOCs to provide intraLATA toll dialing parity throughout a state coincident with the exercise of their authority to offer interLATA  X1-services originating within the state.E1 yO -ԍ 47U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A).E BOC entry into the interLATA market is conditioned upon their offering "nondiscriminatory access to such services or information as are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity in accordance with the  X -requirements of Section 251(b)(3)."eZ X {O-ԍ 47U.S.C. 271(c)(2)(B)(xii). We decline to address section 271(c)(2)(B) issues in this Order. We will consider each BOC's application to enter inregion, interLATA services pursuant to section 271(c)(2)(B) on a casebycase basis to determine whether the BOC has complied with section 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).e  X -  X - 2. Nondiscriminatory Access   X- 12. Section 251(b)(3) also requires all LECs to permit competing providers of telephone exchange service and toll service "nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers,  Xb-operator services, directory assistance and directory listings."Bbz yO-ԍ 47U.S.C. 251(b)(3).B We conclude that "nondiscriminatory access," as used in section 251(b)(3), encompasses both: (1) nondiscrimination between and among carriers in rates, terms and conditions of access; and (2) the ability of competing providers to obtain access that is at least equal in quality to that of the providing LEC. This definition of "nondiscriminatory access" in section 251(b)(3) recognizes the more general application of that section to all LECs, whereas section 251(c) places more specific duties upon incumbent LECs in terms of nondiscriminatory access. We conclude that the term "nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers" requires all LECs to permit competing providers access to telephone numbers that is identical to the access the  X-LEC provides to itself.  Xe- 13. We conclude that the term "operator services," for purposes of section 251(b)(3), means any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange for billing or completion, or both, of a telephone call. Such a definition includes busy line verification, emergency assistance, operatorassisted directory assistance, and any other such services used to arrange for the billing and/or completion of telephone calls. We further conclude that any customer of a telephone service provider that provides operator services should be able to obtain these services by dialing "0" or "0plus the desired telephone number." If a dispute arises regarding" 0*((" a competitor's access to operator services, the burden will be upon the providing LEC to demonstrate, with specificity, that it has permitted nondiscriminatory access and that any disparity is not caused by network elements within its control. To the extent that operator services use any information services and adjuncts that are not "telecommunications services," of which resale is required under 251(b)(1), LECs are required to make available such services to competing providers in their entirety as a requirement of nondiscriminatory access  Xv-under 251(b)(3).2v {O-ԍ Id.2 Finally, we find that the refusal of a LEC providing nondiscriminatory access to comply with reasonable requests of competing providers to "brand" resold operator services as those of the reseller, or to remove its brand, creates a presumption that the LEC is unlawfully restricting access to operator services.  X - 14. We conclude that the requirement in section 251(b)(3) of nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance means that LECs that provide directory assistance must permit access to this service to competing providers that is at least equal in quality to the access that the LEC provides to itself. We impose obligations upon all LECs to satisfy the requirement of nondiscriminatory access to directory listings. If a LEC provides directory assistance, that LEC must permit competing providers to have access to its directory assistance, so that any customer of a competing provider can access any listed number on a nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding the identity of the customer's local service provider. Further, we require LECs to share directory listings with competing service providers, in "readily accessible" tape or electronic formats, upon request, and in a timely manner. To the extent that all or part of directory assistance services are not "telecommunications services," of which resale is required under 251(b)(1), LECs must make available such services in their entirety as part of their  X-obligation to permit nondiscriminatory access to competing providers.2Z {O-ԍ Id.2 This requirement thus extends to any information services and adjuncts used to provide directory assistance. Finally, as with the branding of resold operator services, we find that the refusal of a LEC providing nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance to "brand" resold directory assistance services as those of the reseller, or to remove its brand, creates a presumption that the LEC is unlawfully restricting access to directory assistance.  XN-15. We also conclude that section 251(b)(3)'s requirement of nondiscriminatory access and its prohibition of unreasonable dialing delays applies to both the provision of local and toll dialing parity. We conclude that the dialing delay experienced by customers of a competing provider should not be greater than that experienced by customers of a LEC providing dialing parity or nondiscriminatory access, for identical calls or call types. Finally, we conclude that the statutory obligation to avoid unreasonable dialing delays places a duty on LECs that provide dialing parity, or nondiscriminatory access to operator services or directory assistance, to process all calls from competing providers on the same terms as calls  X"-from its own customers.  "# 0*((""Ԍ X- B. Actions to Implement Section 251(c)(5)   X-16. In addition to the duties imposed by section 251(b)(3) on all LECs, new section 251(c)(5) imposes upon incumbent LECs the duty to "provide reasonable public notice of changes in the information necessary for the transmission and routing of services using that local exchange carrier's facilities or networks, as well as of any other changes that would  Xv-affect the interoperability of those facilities or networks."kv yO-ԍ An incumbent LEC, with respect to an area, is defined under the 1996 Act as "the local exchange carrier that: (A) on the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, provided telephone exchange service in such area; and (B)(i) on such date of enactment, was deemed to be a member of the exchange carrier association pursuant to section 69.601(b) of the Commission's regulations (47 C.F.R. 69.601(b)); or (ii) is a person or entity that, on or after such date of enactment, became a successor or assign of a member described in clause (i)." 47U.S.C. 251(h)(1).k We adopt broad guidelines to implement section 251(c)(5). We also specify how public notice must be made whenever an upcoming change may affect the way in which a competing service provider transmits, routes, or otherwise provides its services.  X -17. We conclude that "information necessary for transmission and routing" in section 251(c)(5) means any information in the incumbent LEC's possession that affects a competing service provider's performance or ability to provide either information or telecommunications services. We define "interoperability" as the ability of two or more facilities, or networks, to be connected, to exchange information, and to use the information that has been exchanged.  Xy- C. Actions Taken to Implement Section 251(e)  Xb-  XK-18. New section 251(e)(1) restates the Commission's authority over matters relating to the administration of numbering resources by giving the Commission "exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of the North American Numbering Plan that pertain to the United  X-States."D@ yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  251(e)(1). D This section also requires the Commission to "create or designate one or more impartial entities to administer telecommunications numbering and to make such numbers  X-available on an equitable basis."2 {OY-ԍ Id.2 Finally, section 251(e)(2) provides that the cost of establishing telecommunications numbering administration arrangements "shall be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis as determined by the  X-Commission."Bb  yO#-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  251(e)(2).B In this Order, we address whether further action is required to create or designate an impartial entity to administer telecommunications numbering. We clarify the states' role in number administration, and provide direction to states wishing to use area code overlay plans. We also clarify how cost recovery for numbering administration will occur. We deny the petition for expedited declaratory ruling filed by the Texas Commission based on"9 0*((" our finding that the Texas Commission's wirelessonly area code overlay plan violates the  X-guidelines set forth in our Ameritech Order. We authorize Bellcore and the incumbent LECs to perform number administration functions as they did prior to the enactment of the 1996 Act until such functions are transferred to the new North American Numbering Plan Administrator.  Xx-19. We conclude that we have taken appropriate action to designate an impartial number administrator pursuant to section 251(e)(1). We further conclude that the Commission should retain its authority to set policy with respect to all facets of numbering administration to ensure the creation of a nationwide, uniform system of numbering that is essential to the efficient delivery of interstate and international telecommunications services and to the development of a competitive telecommunications services market. While we retain this policymaking authority, we authorize the states to resolve matters involving implementation  X -of new area codes subject to the guidelines set forth in this Order.  X -20. In this Order, we also prohibit the use of servicespecific or technologyspecific area code overlay plans. States may employ allservices overlays only if they also mandate 10digit dialing for all local calls within the area affected by the area code change and ensure the availability of at least one central office code in the existing area code to every entity authorized to provide local exchange service in that area, including CMRS providers.  X#-21. To fulfill the mandate of section 251(e)(2), we require that (1) only "telecommunications carriers," as defined in Section 3(44) of the 1996 Act, shall contribute to  X-the costs of numbering administration;E yOn-ԍ The term "telecommunications carrier" means "any provider of telecommunications services, except that such term does not include aggregators of telecommunications services (as defined in section 226). A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services, except that the Commission shall determine whether the provision of fixed and mobile satellite service shall be treated as common carriage." 47 U.S.C.  153(44).E and (2) that such contributions shall be based on each contributor's gross revenues from its provision of telecommunications services reduced by all payments for telecommunications services and facilities that have been paid to other telecommunications carriers.  Xk- { ` hpX` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:|,  {O-X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:%-X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:63. We further conclude that the 1996 Act does not authorize the Commission to give effect to a state order that purports to grant a BOC a deferral, waiver or suspension of the BOC's obligation to implement dialing parity. We note that section 251(f)(2) provides procedures for suspending or modifying application of the dialing parity requirements only for  X~-certain LECs, i.e., those "with fewer than 2 percent of the Nation's subscriber lines installed  Xi-in the aggregate nationwide."2i",  yO<-X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:{,  yO-X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: MFS justifies this position by noting "some incumbent LECs say they already provide access, some say they are not obligated to offer such offering for resale, some assert that they are included in various unbundled elements or that they should not be unbundled . . . incumbent LECs should not be allowed to unilaterally decide whether, or to what extent to offer access to operator services, directory assistance and  X-directory listings.")0 ,  yO-X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:H!0*((<"  X-call.k",  {Oy-X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: d ,  {O-X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:-in the NPRM."JE>|,  {Ok -X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:s,  yOK-ԍ GVNW comments at 12.> These incumbent LECs claim that competing providers' informational needs would be fulfilled even if public disclosure were limited to "relevant  X-interfaces or protocols."ItXX,  yO-ԍ Nortel states that the incumbent local exchange carrier should only "provide the interface information," and the competing service provider should then "perform its own `reverse engineering' in developing its own products so as to be compatible with the interface." Nortel comments at 5.I USTA suggests an alternate definition: "all changes in information necessary for the transmission and routing of services using the local exchange carrier's facilities, or that affects interoperability."   XH-169. According to some competing providers, narrowing the scope of information that must be publicly disclosed would preserve the information advantage that incumbent  X -LECs possessed before the passage of the 1996 Act.Vu x,  {OC-ԍ See, e.g., Time Warner comments at 34.V Also, AT&T notes that a narrowly constructed disclosure requirement would contradict the language of the statute that specifically identifies "changes that would affect the interoperability of those facilities or  X -networks."=v ,  yO-ԍ AT&T reply at 2526.= AT&T states that some information "is both necessary for proper transmission and routing and can affect the network's interoperability" although it is not directly relevant to  X -the interconnection point.2w ,  {O-ԍ Id.2 AT&T presents five examples of technical changes that do not directly relate to the interconnection point but that nevertheless could have "profound" implications for competing service providers. These changes include those that (1) alter the timing of call processing; (2) require competing service providers to install new equipment, such as echo cancelers; (3) affect recognition of messages from translation nodes; (4) alter loop impedance levels, which could cause service disruptions; and (5) could disable a  X-competing service provider's loop testing facilities.<x, ,  yO-ԍ AT&T reply at n.56.<  X-170. Some incumbent LECs suggest that network disclosure requirements should also  X-apply to competing service providers.y ,  yOE#-ԍ Ameritech comments at 29; BellSouth comments at 2; NYNEX comments at 1516; Rural Tel. Coalition comments at n.4. MCI and MFS contend, however, that the plain language of the statute requires imposition of public disclosure requirements only upon incumbent LECs. MFS states that the duty to disclose change information was imposed upon incumbent local exchange carriers because they have sufficient "control over network standards to harm competition" and the "requisite size and market power to change their"|Oy0*((n"  X-networks in a manner that stymies competition.";z,  yOy-ԍ MFS reply at 26. ; MFS argues that imposing notification requirements on competing service providers would be an "empty exercise" because "new entrants . . . can do little, if anything,to change their networks in a manner that adversely  X-impacts the [incumbent LECs]."<{X,  yO-ԍ MFS reply at 2627.< MFS also argues that competing service providers have "powerful economic incentives" for maintaining compatibility with incumbent local exchange  X-networks.2|,  {O& -ԍ Id.2  X_- ` `  b.Discussion   X1-171. Section 251(c)(5) requires that information about network changes must be disclosed if it affects competing service providers' performance or ability to provide service. Requiring disclosure about network changes promotes open and vigorous competition contemplated by the 1996 Act. We find that additional qualifiers that restrict the types of  X -information that must be disclosed, such as "relevant information or protocols," would create uncertainty in application and appear inconsistent with the statutory language. Timely disclosure of changes reduces the possibility that incumbent LECs could make network changes in a manner that inhibits competition. In addition, notice of changes to ordering, billing and other secondary systems is required if such changes will have an effect on the operations of competing service providers, because the proper operation of such systems is essential to the provision of telecommunications services.  X-172. We agree with MCI and MFS that the plain language of the statute requires  X-imposition of public disclosure requirements only upon incumbent LECs.M}z,  yO3-ԍ MCI reply at 7; MFS reply at 25, 26.M In addition, we conclude that imposing this requirement upon competing service providers would not enhance competition or network reliability. While competing service providers must respond to incumbent LEC network changes, competing service providers, in general, are not in a position to make unilateral changes to their networks because they must rely so heavily on their connection to the incumbent LEC's network in order to provide ubiquitous service. Accordingly, competing service providers already face sufficient incentives to ensure compatibility of their planned changes with the incumbent LEC's network. In addition, if an incumbent LEC were permitted to obtain such information from a competing service provider, the incumbent LEC might be able to obtain the competing service provider's business plans  X"-and thereby stifle competition.~X" ,  yO%-ԍ NCTA asserts that incumbent LECs are "entirely capable of providing adequate notice of their network changes without 'full disclosure of competing service provider's operations and future plans.'" NCTA reply at 12.""P* ~0*(("Ԍ X-ԙ173. We conclude that our disclosure standard is consistent not only with section  X-251(c)(5), but also with the requirements of the "all carrier rule" D,  {Ob-ԍ Unless clearly specified otherwise, in this Order, we use the term "all carrier rule" to refer to the  {O,-Commission's network disclosure rule contained in 47 C.F.R. 64.702, as interpreted in the Second Computer  {O-Inquiry. The all carrier rule obligates "all carriers owning basic transmission facilities [to release] all information relating to network design . . . to all interested parties on the same terms and conditions, insofar as such information affects either intercarrier interconnection or the manner in which interconnected [customerpremises  {OP-equipment] operates." Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second  {O-Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 8283 (1980), further  {O-recon., 88 FCC 2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d  {O -198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).  The all carrier rule also requires that "[w]hen such information is disclosed to the separate corporation it shall be disclosed and be available to any member of the  {O@ -public on the same terms and conditions." See 47 C.F.R. 64.702; Application of The Southern New England  {O -Tel. Co., 10 FCC Rcd 4558, 4559 n.23 (1995); Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report  yO -and Order, 6 FCC Rcd 5880, 5911 n.270 (1991) (The all carrier rule obligates "all carriers to disclose, reasonably in advance of implementation, information regarding any new service or change in the network.");  {Od-Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5880, 5911 n.270. (1991).  yO-Another of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. 68.110(b), requires similar disclosure to customers of network changes "if such changes can be reasonably expected to render any customer's terminal equipment incompatible with telephone company communications facilities, or require modification or alteration of such  yO-terminal equipment, or otherwise materially affect its use or performance." We will refer to this rule specifically by number where necessary. and the scope of the  X-Computer IIIS,  {OW-ԍ See infra para. 204 and n.449.S disclosure requirement, both of which have been applied to incumbent LEC activities for some time. In light of these preexisting requirements, we find that the standard we proposed in the NPRM is not burdensome but reasonable, providing sufficient disclosure to insure against anticompetitive acts as well as to ensure certain and consistent disclosure requirements.  XJ-174. We have considered the impact of our rules in this section on small incumbent LECs, including Rural Tel. Coalition's and GVNW's requests for a less inclusive definition of  X -"information necessary for transmission and routing."a f,  yO3-ԍ Rural Tel. Coalition comments at 2; GVNW comments at 1.a We do not adopt these proposals because we are unable to grant such leniency to small businesses and simultaneously ensure adequate information disclosure to facilitate the development of a procompetitive environment for every market participant, including other small businesses. We note, however, that under section 251(f)(1) certain small incumbent LECs are exempt from our  X -rules until (1) they receive a bona fide request for interconnection, services, or network elements; and (2) their state commission determines that the request is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent with the relevant portions"}Q0*((K" of section 254. In addition, certain small incumbent LECs may seek relief from our rules  X-under section 251(f)(2).,  {Ob-ԍ For a discussion of the implications and operation of section 251(f), see First Report and Order at section XII.  X- ` ` 2. Definition of "Services"  X-  X- ` `  a.Background and Comments   X_-175. Commenters, including incumbent LECs, interexchange carriers, and industry organizations, unanimously support our tentative conclusion that the term "services," as used in section 251(c)(5), includes both telecommunications services and information services, as  X -defined in sections 3(46) and 3(20), respectively." ",  {O -ԍ 47 U.S.C.  153(20), (46). See NPRM at para. 189; ALTS comments at 2; Ameritech comments at 25; BellSouth comments at 3; District of Columbia Commission comments at 67; GCI comments at 4; Illinois Commission comments at 59; MCI comments at 15; MFS comments at 12; Telecommunications Resellers Association comments at 11; U S WEST comments at 12. Parties agree that it is reasonable to require that providers of both telecommunications and information services receive this information. ALTS points out that exclusion of information services or telecommunications  X -services from our definition would be "needlessly restrictive."< ,  yO-ԍ ALTS comments at 2.< BellSouth also notes that the inclusion of information services for public notice purposes should not vest information service providers with substantive rights under Section 251, except where they are also  X-operating as a telecommunications carrier under the 1996 Act.A,  yO-ԍ BellSouth comments at 3.A  Xb- ` `  b.Discussion   X4-176. We conclude that the term "services" includes both telecommunications services and information services, as defined in sections 3(46) and 3(20) of the Act, respectively. Providers of both telecommunications services and information services may make significant use of the incumbent LEC's network in making these offerings. Accordingly, exclusion of either information services providers or telecommunications services providers would be needlessly restrictive. We also affirm that the inclusion of information services for public notice purposes does not vest information service providers with substantive rights under other provisions within section 251, except to the extent that they are also operating as telecommunications carriers. "NR, 0*(("  X- ` ` 3. Definition of "Interoperability"  X-` `  a.Background and Comments   X-177. The Commission tentatively concluded that the term "interoperability," as used in section 251(c)(5), should be defined as "the ability of two or more facilities, or networks, to be connected, to exchange information, and to use the information that has been  X_-exchanged."A_,  {O-ԍ NPRM at para. 189.A This definition of "interoperability" was taken from the IEEE Standard  XJ-Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms.JZ,  {OU -ԍ See IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms 461 (J. Frank ed. 1984). Commenters, including incumbent LECs, interexchange carriers, state commissions, and industry associations, are unanimous in their  X -support for our tentative conclusion.n  ,  yO-ԍ ALTS comments at 2; Ameritech comments at 25; AT&T comments at 23; District of Columbia Commission comments at 67; GCI comments at 4; Illinois Commission comments at 4; MCI comments at 15; MFS comments at 1213; Ohio Commission comments at 4; Telecommunications Resellers Association comments at 12; U S WEST comments at 12.n The Ohio Commission also suggests that we expand our definition of "interoperability" to "recognize that the exchange of traffic between an [incumbent local exchange carrier] and an interconnector must be seamless and transparent to  X -both parties' end users."G ,  yO^-ԍ Ohio Commission comments at 4.G No alternative definitions for the term "interoperability" were proposed by commenting parties.  X- ` `  b.Discussion    Xf-178. We define the term "interoperability" as "the ability of two or more facilities, or networks, to be connected, to exchange information, and to use the information that has been  X8-exchanged." As this definition of "interoperability" was taken from the IEEE Standard  X#-Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms, we believe that this well established and widely accepted industry standard can be applied easily and consistently. We find that the concepts of seamlessness and transparency are already adequately incorporated into this definition's specific interoperability criteria, and that further exposition of these concepts is not necessary. "Sd 0*((3"  X- ` ` 4. Changes that Trigger the Public Notice Requirement  X-` `  a.Background and Comments   X-179. In the NPRM, we noted that "public notice is critical to the uniform implementation of network disclosure, particularly for entities operating networks in numerous  Xx-locations across a variety of states."Ax,  {O-ԍ NPRM at para. 190.A We requested comment as to what changes should trigger the notice requirement.  X3-180. Several commenters suggest that timely notice should be provided whenever an upcoming change in the incumbent LEC's network may affect the way in which a competing  X -provider offers its service. Z,  yO-ԍ ACSI comments at 11; ALTS comments at 23; AT&T comments at 23; Cox comments at 910; GCI comments at 5; Ohio Commission comments at 4; and Time Warner comments at 4. Examples of such changes include, but are not limited to, changes in transmission, signalling standards, call routing, network configuration and logical  X -elements.= ,  yO:-ԍ ACSI comments at 11.= Also, commenters assert that public notice should be required when a change will affect the electronic interfaces, data elements, or transactions that support ordering,  X -provisioning, maintenance and billing of the network facilities.i B,  {O-ԍ See, e.g., AT&T comments at 24; Time Warner comments at 4.i The Illinois Commission notes, however, that the types of changes that trigger public notice should not be "microdefined" because overly specific trigger requirements could create situations in which carriers would not be required to provide public notice if a particular change has not been clearly  XM-identified.LM,  yO-ԍ Illinois Commission comments at 59.L ALTS also supports a broadly defined class of changes that trigger network disclosure requirements, asserting that some changes, such as those affecting provisioning and billing for a carrier's service, might not otherwise be reported adequately, resulting in service  X-disruptions.?d ,  yO-ԍ ALTS comments at 2, 3.?  X-181. Ameritech claims that disclosure obligations should only be triggered by a new or "substantially changed" network interface, or a change that "otherwise affects the routing or  X-termination of traffic delivered to or from the incumbent LEC's network."F ,  yOQ$-ԍ Ameritech comments at 26, 27.F Ameritech also claims that changes "that do not impact interconnection and interoperability . . . do not need"T 0*(("  X-to be disclosed at all."2,  {Oy-ԍ Id.2 AT&T observes, however, that public notice requirements should  X-also apply to some changes that do not directly relate to the interconnect point.?Z,  yO-ԍ AT&T reply at 26 n.56.?  X- ` `  b.Discussion   X-182. We conclude that an incumbent LEC must provide public notice in accordance with the rules and schedules we adopt in this proceeding, once the incumbent LEC makes a decision to implement a change that either (1) affects competing service providers' performance or ability to provide service; or (2) otherwise affects the ability of the incumbent LEC's and a competing service provider's facilities or network to connect, to exchange information, or to use the information exchanged. We believe that a broad standard is appropriate, to reduce the possibility that incumbent LECs may fail to disclose information a competing service provider may need in order to maintain adequate interconnectivity and interoperability in response to incumbent LEC network changes. Examples of network changes that would trigger public disclosure obligations include, but are not limited to, changes that affect: transmission; signalling standards; call routing; network configuration; logical elements; electronic interfaces; data elements; and transactions that support ordering, provisioning, maintenance and billing. This list is not exclusive but exemplary; incumbent LECs are not exempted from public notice requirements for a particular change that is not included among these examples.  X-` ` 5. Types of Information to be Disclosed  X-` `  a.Background    X-183. In the NPRM, we tentatively concluded that incumbent LECs should be required to "disclose all information relating to network design and technical standards, and  X-information concerning changes to the network that affect interconnection."\,  {O0-ԍ NPRM at para. 190. We referred, as an example, to the "All Carrier Rule," which requires public disclosure of "all information relating to network design and technical standards...[affecting]  {O-interconnection...prior to implementation and with reasonable advance notification." See note 383, supra. We also tentatively concluded that incumbent LECs specifically must provide: (1) the date changes are to occur; (2) where changes are to be made or to occur; (3) the type of changes; and (4) the potential impact of changes; and that these four categories represented the "minimum information that a potential competitor would need in order to achieve and maintain efficient  X"-interconnection."A",  {O%-ԍ NPRM at para. 190.A  X- "U0*((Z"  X-` `  b.Comments   X-184. A number of commenters agree with our tentative conclusions regarding the breadth of information that must be reported, as well as our minimum reporting  X-requirements.KX,  yO-ԍ Illinois Commission comments at 60; ALTS comments at 3; AT&T comments at 2324; District of Columbia Commission comments at 7; Excel comments at 10; GCI comments at 45; MCI comments at 15; MFS comments at 1213; NCTA comments at 12; Telecommunications Resellers Association comments at 12.K Ameritech, however, claims that our requirement is "too broad" and would "impose an onerous burden" on incumbent LECs, exceeding the statutory requirements of  Xv-section 251(c)(5).Bv,  yO -ԍ Ameritech comments at 26.B Ameritech asserts that "excessive exchange of information between competitors is inconsistent with . . . a competitive marketplace" and could spur "allegations of  XH-collusion and concerted action."2Hx,  {Oq-ԍ Id.2 Cox and Time Warner, however, state that uniform public notice of sufficient information can attenuate anticompetitive behavior. ALTS, AT&T and MCI suggest that the information that must be disclosed should include, but should not be limited to, technical specifications and references to standards regarding transmission, signaling, routing and facility assignment as well as references to technical standards that are applicable to any new technologies or equipment, or which may otherwise affect interconnection.  X-185. A significant crosssection of commenters specifically advocates disclosure of the  Xy-potential impact of changes.X y ,  yO4-ԍ ACSI comments at 11; ALTS comments at 3; District of Columbia Commission comments at 7; Excel comments at 10; GCI comments at 5; MCI comments at 15; MFS comments at 1213; Ohio Commission comments at 5; TCC reply at 23; Telecommunications Resellers Association comments at 12; Time Warner comments at 8.X For example, Cox notes that disclosure should, at a minimum, enable a competing service provider to understand: "(1) how its existing technical interconnection arrangements will be affected; and (2) how the form and content of the  X4-information passed between the interconnected networks will change."94 ,  yO-ԍ Cox reply at 13.9 ACSI clearly states that "the content of the notice should specifically identify . . . the impact of the change on  X-current interconnection or access arrangements."= ,  yO9"-ԍ ACSI comments at 11.=  X-186. Some incumbent LECs, however, take exception to our tentative conclusion to impose on them an obligation to make public disclosure of the potential impact of network"V0*(("  X-changes.,  yOy-ԍ Ameritech comments at 28; BellSouth comments at 3; GVNW comments at 3; NYNEX reply at 9; USTA reply at 11. They argue that this obligation would require incumbent LECs to become "experts on the operations of other carriers," or impose a "duty to know what [an] interconnector's  X-service performance abilities are." ,  {O-ԍ BellSouth comments at 3. See, e.g., Ameritech comments at 28; GVNW Comments at 3; NYNEX reply at 9. Specifically, USTA expresses concern that this requirement "could be misconstrued as a duty to predict what the precise impact might be, or  X-to educate a competitor on how to reengineer their network.":z,  yO -ԍ USTA reply at 11.: Ameritech claims that this requirement is "unfair," and "of little or no value," and implies that this requirement creates a "general duty for [incumbent LECs] to operate their competitor's businesses or help them  X_-market their services."H_ ,  yO-ԍ Ameritech comments at 28.H BellSouth asserts that "the better approach would be to [disclose] information from which an interconnecting carrier would be able to determine for itself  X1-whether its service performance or abilities might be affected."A1,  yO|-ԍ BellSouth comments at 3.A NYNEX alleges that "[s]uch proposals are overbroad and unnecessary to ensure...network  X -interconnection/interoperability.": * ,  yO-ԍ NYNEX reply at 9.: NYNEX rejects responsibility for evaluating the effect that changes it would make might have upon competing service providers and asserts that "there is no basis for changing the traditional responsibility of each carrier to maintain its own  X -network and respond to technological and market changes."2 ,  {O)-ԍ Id.2 NYNEX also claims that while it has the ability to "make an assessment of the likely impact of a technical change at the interface with a competitor's network," it would require "detailed knowledge of a competitor's network architecture" in order to calculate the impact a change may have on a competing  Xb-service provider's performance.?bL ,  yO_-ԍ NYNEX reply at 9 n.24.?  X4-187. MCI and TCC suggest that an incumbent LEC should also be required to designate a contact for additional information in its public notice. PacTel argues, in response, that such a requirement would be "impossible to fulfill" because it would require an  X-incumbent LEC to designate a "single omniscient individual."=,  yO|%-ԍ PacTel reply at 67.= MFS states that the public notice should also include: "(a) the charges that the incumbent LEC anticipates will apply to the carrier for the change; (b) the specific number of circuits affected if the change occurs at"Wl0*((" the time of the notification; (c) the projected minimum, maximum, and average down times  X-per affected circuit; (d) alternatives available to the interconnector;_X,  yOb-ԍ Although MFS does not elaborate on this requirement, we interpret this suggestion as a request that an incumbent LEC identify in its public notice a range of proposed competing service provider responses to the planned change that will maintain interconnectivity and interoperability of the carriers' networks._ and (e) any other information necessary to evaluate alternatives and effectuate necessary changes or  X-challenges."=,  yOT-ԍ MFS comments at 14.= The Ohio Commission, in contrast, claims that information relating to network design should be excepted from public disclosure, and that incumbent LECs should only be  X-obliged to disclose information regarding changes to existing interconnection arrangements.Gx,  yO -ԍ Ohio Commission comments at 5.G  X_- ` `  c.Discussion   X1-188. We conclude that we should adopt a requirement of uniform public notice of sufficient information to deter anticompetitive behavior and that, at a minimum, incumbent LECs should give competing service providers complete information about network design, technical standards and planned changes to the network. Specifically, public notice of changes shall consist of: (1) the date changes are to occur; (2) the location at which changes are to occur; (3) types of changes; (4) the reasonably foreseeable impact of changes to be implemented, and (5) a contact person who may supply additional information regarding the changes. Information provided in these categories must include, as applicable, but should not be limited to, references to technical specifications, protocols, and standards regarding transmission, signaling, routing and facility assignment as well as references to technical standards that would be applicable to any new technologies or equipment, or that may otherwise affect interconnection.  X-189. We find that making available a contact person will simplify the public notification process and reduce the risk that the notifications will be misunderstood or misconstrued. Commenters have requested that public notices include a variety of specific information categories, some of which may not be covered by the specific categories  X-identified in the NPRM. Such specific information, however, may be inapplicable, unnecessary or proprietary in some circumstances and inadequate or confusing in others. Accordingly, we require instead that incumbent LECs identify a contact person. Such a contact need not be "omniscient," but rather should be able to serve as an initial contact point for the sharing of information regarding the planned network changes.  X"-190. Providing notice of the reasonably foreseeable potential impact of changes does not require incumbent LECs to educate a competitor on how to reengineer its network, or to be experts on the operations of other carriers, or impose a duty to know the competing service provider's service performance or abilities. Rather, we intend that incumbent LECs perform"X0*((" at least rudimentary analysis of the network changes sufficient to include in its notice (where appropriate) language reasonably intended to alert those likely to be affected by a change of anticipated effects. We find that such cautionary language will be a valuable, but not burdensome, element of reasonable public notice.  X-191. We do not limit network disclosure to information pertinent to those changes in incumbent LEC network design or technical standards that will affect existing interconnection arrangements, as requested by the Ohio Commission. Such a limitation is neither consistent with the obligations imposed by section 251(c)(5) nor consistent with the development of competition. In formulating interconnection and service plans, both actual and potential competing service providers need information concerning network changes that potentially could affect anticipated interconnection, not just those changes that actually affect existing interconnection arrangements.  X - B.` ` How Public Notice Should be Provided   Xy-` ` 1. Dissemination of Public Notice Through Industry Fora and Publications(#  X4-` `  a.Background  X- 192. Section 251(c)(5) requires incumbent LECs to provide "reasonable public notice"  X-of relevant network changes. In the NPRM, the Commission requested comment on how this notice should be provided. The Commission tentatively concluded that "full disclosure of the required technical information should be provided through industry fora or in industry  X-publications.",  yO%-ԍ The Commission gave as examples the Network Operations Forum (NOF) and the Interconnection Carrier  {O-Compatibility Forum (ICCF). NPRM at para. 191. The Commission stated that "this approach would build on a voluntary practice that now exists in the industry and would result in broad availability of the  X~-information."A~",  {OQ-ԍ NPRM at para. 191.A The Commission sought comment on this tentative conclusion. The Commission also requested comment on whether a reference to information on network changes should be filed with the Commission and, if so, where that information should be located.  X"- " Y0*((="  X-` `  b.Comments   X-193. Most commenters agree with our tentative conclusion in the NPRM that existing  X-industry fora and publications are appropriate vehicles for public notice of network changes.,  yO6-ԍ ALTS comments at 34; Ameritech comments at 2829, reply at 1718; AT&T comments at 24; Bell Atlantic comments at 10; Cox reply at 13; GCI comments at 5; Illinois Commission comments at 62; MCI comments at 15; MFS reply at 25; NCTA reply at 11; NYNEX comments at 15, reply at 10; PacTel comments  {O-at 7, reply at 6; Teleport comments at 11; Telecommunications Resellers Association at 12. See also NPRM at para. 191. Bell Atlantic notes that "industry participants with an interest in new interfaces routinely  X-monitor publications and announcements for disclosures."(Xz,  yO -ԍ Bell Atlantic also states that exchange carriers should be able to satisfy their disclosure obligation by indicating their intention to deploy specifications at the time that they are published by a standards organization. Bell Atlantic comments at 1011.( Some incumbent LECs support the use of industry fora and publications because they are well established, already in place, reach the targeted audience, have worked effectively for a number of years, or allow for  XJ-widespread dissemination.UJ,  yO-ԍ Ameritech reply at 1718; GTE comments at 7.U USTA states that "voluntary practices can serve as a platform  X3-from which to implement this act."@3* ,  yO-ԍ USTA comments at 1112.@  X -194. Several commenters, however, caution that industry fora and publications should  X -not be the only vehicles used for the public dissemination of network change information ,  {OY-ԍ E.g., Cox reply at 12; MCI comments at 17; GVNW comments at 4; Rural Tel. Coalition comments at 3.  X -and request flexible disclosure methods.Z L ,  {O-ԍ E.g., Rural Tel. Coalition comments at 3,5.Z Although MCI does not object to utilizing industry fora and publications, MCI cautions against over reliance on these vehicles because it "do[es] not believe that...parties affected by technical changes [will] receive information in  X-sufficient detail, objectivity, and timeliness."?,  yO!-ԍ MCI comments at 1718.? Many commenters indicate that additional disclosure vehicles are required because not all carriers participate in these fora on a regular  Xd-basis (partly as a result of limited resources)dn,  {O"-ԍ See, e.g., Cox comments at 11, reply at 13; MCI comments at 17; GVNW comments at 4; Rural Tel. Coalition comments at 3. or because the BOCs, in the past, have used industry fora to limit competitors' access to full and timely information in order to put them  X6-at a competitive disadvantage.6,  yO&-ԍ MCI comments at 1718, reply at 7. Bell Atlantic refutes this allegation. Bell Atlantic reply at 10. Several commenters have noted the potential of the Internet"6ZX0*(("  X-as a vehicle for providing public notice of network changes.,  {Oy-ԍ See, e.g., ALTS comments at 34; U S WEST comments at 14; MCI comments at 17; Time Warner comments at 10 n.12; MFS reply at 25; TCC reply at 24. Others specifically suggest that incumbent LECs should be required to file technical change information with the Commission "in order to ensure a complete, reliable, and consistent body of information that  X-all parties may utilize."Z",  {O-ԍ MCI comments at 19; MFS comments at 13. See also Time Warner comments at 10 (establishing the Commission as a "central point of reference" could be less burdensome on incumbent LECs than other means of providing public notice). Some incumbent LECs, however, disagree, arguing that the Commission need not become a repository of disclosure notices because such Commission filings would be "redundant with existing industry functions and contrary to the Commission's  Xv-current initiative to eliminate unnecessary filings."|vD,  {Ok -ԍ BellSouth comments at 4 n.11. See also NYNEX reply at 10; PacTel reply at 6.|  XH-195. Bell Atlantic suggests that "direct disclosure to a mailing list of interconnectors  X1-should also be allowed."F1,  yO-ԍ Bell Atlantic comments at 10.F MFS proposes extending direct mail notification to "any other  X -carrier...who specifically requests such notice."I f ,  yO1-ԍ MFS comments at 14, reply at 25.I PacTel, however, claims that imposing these sorts of requirements would "impose excessive and unnecessary costs on [incumbent]  X -LECs."; ,  yO-ԍ PacTel reply at 6.;  X -196. BellSouth argues that no Commission rule is necessary because current voluntary  X -practices are "sufficient to ensure that this information is broadly available."A ,  yO-ԍ BellSouth comments at 4.A Similarly, GVNW suggests that information should only be passed to competing service providers "case  Xy-by case...as required."<y,  yO@-ԍ GVNW comments at 4.< Several commenters, however, disagree. Time Warner, for example, contends that "the Commission must adopt a uniform . . . rule which prescribes a specific method by which notification and disclosure must be provided" and that will allow  X4-interested parties to gain ready access to the information they require.4,  {O#-ԍ Time Warner comments at 9. See also AT&T reply at 27 n.58. (arguing that the very existence of such broad disagreement on this issue itself bespeaks the need for a uniform national rule and that the absence of a uniform public disclosure requirement would lead to "disparate application of a uniform federal statutory duty, unduly narrow interpretations of that duty by [independent local exchange carriers] . . . and competitive harm to new entrants"). "[X0*(("Ԍ X-197. The District of Columbia Commission asserts that state commissions may also require information to be filed at the state level, and may need the same information in order to comply with section 252. As such, state commissions could also be used to make information available to small competing service providers. AT&T, however, argues that there are no specific differences among the various states that are "material" to our network  X-disclosure requirements.<,  yO-ԍ AT&T reply at n.59.<  X_- ` `  c.Discussion   X1-198. We conclude that incumbent LECs may fulfill their network disclosure obligations either (1) by providing public notice through industry fora, industry publications, or on their own publicly accessible Internet sites; or (2) by filing public notice with the Commission's Common Carrier Bureau, Network Services Division, in accordance with the format and method requirements of the rules we are adopting in this proceeding. In either case, the public notice must contain the minimum information categories identified in paragraph 188, above. Incumbent LECs using public notice methods other than Commission filings must file a certification with the Common Carrier Bureau, Network Services Division, identifying the proposed change(s), stating that public notice has been given in compliance with this Order, identifying the location of the information describing the change and stating how the information can be obtained by interested parties. This certification must also comply with the rules we adopt in this proceeding.  X-199. As discussed above, we conclude that industry fora, industry publications, and the Internet may be used to make public disclosure of network changes and required technical information. We affirm our belief that "this approach would build on a voluntary practice  X-that now exists in the industry and would result in broad availability of the information."AX,  {O-ԍ NPRM at para. 191.A Reliance solely on voluntary participation in industry fora and publications, however, may inhibit the ability of some small carriers to disseminate or receive this information. Because of their more limited resources, some smaller incumbent LECs and competing service providers do not participate in these fora on a regular basis; nevertheless, all carriers, competing service providers, and potential competitors must have equal opportunities to provide and to receive change information on a national scale. We believe that wide availability of pertinent network change information effectively removes potential barriers to entry, which could otherwise frustrate the efforts of new competitors. As a consequence, we conclude that the Commission should function as a "backstop" source of information for other interested parties. Accordingly, in lieu of disclosure in industry fora, publications, or the Internet, an incumbent LEC may file network change information directly with the Commission. In the alternative, if an incumbent LEC chooses to provide public notice through one or more industry fora or publications, or the Internet, we require that it also file a certification with the Commission containing the information outlined above. We are"#\0*(("" confident that even small incumbent LECs with limited resources will be able to use one of these alternatives to give public notice of network changes.  X-200. An incumbent LEC must maintain both the information disclosed in its public notice and any nondisclosed supporting information that is nevertheless relevant to the  X-planned change, until the change is implemented. As discussed in paragraph 235, infra, once a change is implemented in the incumbent LEC's network, information on the change must be disclosed under the general interconnection obligations imposed by section 251(c)(2).  X3-201. We find that information filed with the Commission under section 251(c)(5) should eventually be made available on the FCC Home Page or through other online access vehicles, such as "LISTSERV" subscription mailings or others, and we intend to explore this option fully for the future. In addition, we will explore vigorously the possibility that hypertext links from the Commission Home Page to incumbent LEC Internet sites could both facilitate public notice and centralize access to change information. We find that direct mail notification alone does not comport with our interpretation of "public notice" as used in this proceeding, because such direct mailings do not provide notice to the "public," but rather provide individual notice to a selected group of recipients. Such mailings could, however, supplement other methods of notification.  X6-202. We also address the impact on small incumbent LECs. We agree with GVNW=6,  yO-ԍ GVNW comments at 4.=  X-and Rural Tel. CoalitionOX,  yO(-ԍ Rural Tel. Coalition comments at 3,5.O that we can mitigate the impact of our rules on small incumbent LECs by allowing public notice to be given at several alternative locations. Because many of these carriers lack the resources to participate in industry fora, we have also provided low cost alternatives, including Internet postings or Commission filings. We expect that our requirement that either public notice or certification be filed with the Commission will allow small entities, both incumbent LECs and new entrants, to locate network change information quickly and inexpensively. In any event, under section 251(f)(1), certain small incumbent  X~-LECs are exempt from our rules until (1) they receive a bona fide request for interconnection, services, or network elements; and (2) their state commission determines that the request is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent with the relevant portions of section 254. In addition, certain small incumbent LECs may seek relief  X$-from our rules under section 251(f)(2).$,  {O"-ԍ For a discussion of the implications and operation of section 251(f), see First Report and Order, section XII.  X- "]B0*((<"  X-` ` 2. When Should Public Notice of Changes Be Provided?(#  X-  X- ` `  a.Background   X-203. Section 251(c)(5) requires an incumbent LEC to provide "reasonable public  X-notice" of certain changes to its network. In the NPRM, we tentatively concluded that this statutory language requires incumbent LECs: (1) to provide notice of these changes within a "reasonable" time in advance of implementation; and (2) to make the information available  XJ-within a "reasonable" time if responding to an individual request.AJ,  {O -ԍ NPRM at para. 192.A We sought comment on what constitutes a reasonable time in each of these situations, and on whether the Commission should adopt a specific timetable for disclosure of technical information.  X -204. In the NPRM, we specifically sought comment on whether we should adopt a  X -disclosure timetable similar to that adopted by the Commission in the Computer III  X -proceeding.x Z,  {O-ԍ Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Computer III), Phase I, 104  {O-F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Phase I Order), recon., 2 FCC Rcd 3035 (1987) (Phase I Recon. Order), further recon., 3  {Oc-FCC Rcd 1135 (1988) (Phase I Further Recon. Order), second further recon., 4 FCC Rcd 5927 (1989) (Phase I  {O--Second Further Recon.), Phase I Order and Phase I Recon. Order vacated, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217  {O-(9th Cir. 1990) (California I); Phase II, 2 FCC Rcd 3072 (1987) (Phase II Order), recon., 3 FCC Rcd 1150  {O-(1988) (Phase II Recon. Order), further recon., 4 FCC Rcd 5927 (1989) (Phase II Further Recon. Order), Phase  {O-II Order, vacated, California I, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Computer III Remand Proceedings, 5 FCC Rcd  {OU-7719 (1990) (ONA Remand Order), recon., 7 FCC Rcd 909 (1992), pets. for review denied, California v. FCC, 4  {O-F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) (California II); Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company  {O-Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange Company Safeguards, 6 FCC Rcd 7571 (1991) (BOC Safeguards Order);  {O-BOC Safeguards Order, vacated in part and remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994)  {O}-(California III), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1427 (1995).#XN\  PynXP#Ѹ In Phase II of that proceeding, the Commission required AT&T and the BOCs to disclose information about network changes or new network services that affect the  X-interconnection of enhanced services with the network at two points in time.m\ ,  {O-ԍ Phase II Recon. Order, 3 FCC Rcd at 1164. Although the Ninth Circuit vacated the Phase II Recon.  {O-Order, the Commission reimposed the network disclosure requirements on remand. See BOC Safeguards Order,  yOu-6 FCC Rcd at 76027604.#XN\  PynXP#m First, these carriers were required to disclose such information at the "make/buy" point that is, when the carrier decides to make itself, or to procure from an unaffiliated entity, any product the  XQ-design of which affects or relies on the network interface.Q,  {O"-ԍ Phase II Recon. Order, 3 FCC Rcd at 1164.#XN\  PynXP# Second, carriers were required to release publicly all technical information at least twelve months prior to the introduction of a new service or network change that would affect enhanced service interconnection with the  X -network.> P,  {O '-ԍ Id. at 116465.> If a carrier could introduce a new service between six and twelve months of the" ^0*((" make/buy point, public disclosure was permitted at the make/buy point, but in no event could  X-the carrier introduce the service earlier than six months after the public disclosure.;,  {Ob-ԍ Id. at 1165.;  X-205. The disclosure obligations imposed by section 251(c)(5) are broader than those  X-adopted in the Computer III proceeding. While Computer III applies only to the BOCs and to AT&T, section 251(c)(5) imposes disclosure requirements on all incumbent LECs.  Xx-Furthermore, while the Computer III disclosure requirements apply only to technical  Xc-information related to new or modified network services affecting the interconnection of  XN-enhanced services to the BOC networks, section 251(c)(5) mandates disclosure of a much  X9-broader spectrum of information.9Z,  {OD -ԍ See discussion of the definitions of "information necessary for the transmission and routing of services"  {O -and "interoperability," supra.#XN\  P!ynXP# Accordingly, we sought comment in the NPRM on  X$ -whether the Commission should adopt a timetable comparable to that imposed in Computer III for section 251(c)(5) network disclosure purposes and, if so, how such a timetable should be implemented.  X -#A\  P"ɒP# #XN\  P#ynXP#` `  b.Comments   X-206. Most commenters express support for our tentative conclusion that section 251(c)(5) requires incumbent LECs to disclose publicly information on network changes  Xn-within a reasonable time in advance of implementation.n,  {O-ԍ See, e.g., Ameritech comments at 29; GCI comments at 5; MCI comments at 15; Time Warner comments at 6; U S WEST reply at 1. No commenters suggest that the timing of disclosure is not governed by section 251(c)(5)'s "reasonableness" standard, although at least two commenters appear to indicate that it would be reasonable to implement  X)-network changes immediately upon disclosure.),  yO-ԍ BellSouth argues that "the Commission should permit the offering of the new interface immediately upon  {O-the disclosure of the requisite information." BellSouth comments at 5; see also Nortel comments at 4. Commenters also support our tentative conclusion that an incumbent LEC must make this information available within a "reasonable"  X-time if responding to an individual request.Mj ,  {O -ԍ See, e.g., MCI comments at 15.M Time Warner requests a concrete standard in this area and suggests that the Commission should indicate that, once an incumbent LEC has released a public notice of change under section 251(c)(5), it must respond to individual requests for detailed, technical information concerning network changes under section  X-251(c)(5) within ten business days of receiving the request.D ,  yOL%-ԍ Time Warner comments at 11.D "_ 0*((P"Ԍ X-207. Commenters were split on whether we should adopt a specific disclosure  X-timetable for section 251(c)(5) purposes. Several commenters,  {Ob-ԍ See, e.g., Ameritech comments at 29; BellSouth comments at 2, 5; District of Columbia Commission comments at 6, 78; GVNW comments at 5; Bell Atlantic reply at 89. oppose the adoption of a specific timetable, primarily arguing that: (1) any regulations adopted under section 251(c)(5) should define only minimum guidelines, allowing the states flexibility under section 251(d)(3) to adopt more stringent disclosure requirements dictated by local conditions; (2) a fixed disclosure timetable will needlessly or arbitrarily delay the introduction of new services or technical advances; (3) overly long advance disclosure periods will put the incumbent LECs at a competitive disadvantage because competitors will be able to bring planned services to market more quickly; (4) the industry already has in place detailed disclosure guidelines that are widely followed on a voluntary basis and that obviate the need for independent Commission examination of this issue; and (5) the Commission's existing "all carrier" rule, which contains a flexible standard, adequately addresses the obligations imposed by section  X -251(c)(5).x ",  {O-ԍ The requirements of the all carrier rule are discussed in note 383 supra.x GVNW warns that the interval from the make/buy decision to inservice for small LECs is often less than twelve months and states that the Commission should not require technology to be implemented at a slower pace than is technically feasible merely to  X -satisfy a notice requirement.= ,  yO -ԍ GVNW comments at 4.= Commenters also argue that carriers already face powerful incentives to ensure that their networks interconnect properly because the reputation of both  Xy-the incumbent LEC and the interconnecting LEC are at stake if service fails.SyD,  {On-ԍ See, e.g., Ameritech comments at 30.S In addition, BellSouth claims that section 251(c)(5) is "selfeffectuating and needs no interpretive  XK-regulations."AK,  yO-ԍ BellSouth comments at 1.A  X-208. Several other commenters argue that, while a disclosure timetable may be  X-necessary, the Computer III requirements are too rigid. The District of Columbia Commission notes that any eventual disclosure timetable must balance "the need to ensure the earliest possible disclosure of information needed by competitors [against] the need to impose the  X-least administrative burden on" incumbent LECs.Wf ,  yO!-ԍ District of Columbia Commission comments at 8.W Accordingly, the District of Columbia Commission maintains that state commissions should be afforded flexibility to set timetables  X-that are appropriate in light of local conditions.2 ,  {O<%-ԍ Id.2 Several commenters note existing industry notification timing standards adopted and issued by the Industry Carriers Compatibility Forum"~` 0*((n"  X-("ICCF"),  {Oy-ԍ Industry Carriers Compatibility Forum, Recommended Notification Procedures to Industry for Changes in  {OC-Access Network Architecture, ICCF 920726004, Rev. 2 (Jan. 5, 1996). and argue that widespread industry use of these standards has obviated the need  X-for an additional Commissionimposed timetable.j$,  yO-ԍ USTA comments at 13; NYNEX comments at 1617; SBC comments at 14.j MCI, however, cautions that these existing industry guidelines are inadequate because industry fora, in general, have historically  X-been controlled by the RBOCs.8,  yO -ԍ MCI reply at 7.8 U S WEST supports disclosure at the "make/buy" point, but argues that additional notice should not be required for deployment of standard interfaces  X-and services.AD,  yO -ԍ U S WEST comments at 13.A While MCI supports adoption of the Computer III timetable in this proceeding, it requests that, in addition: (1) we impose a mandatory 6month disclosure period for network changes that can be implemented within 6 months of the "make/buy" point; and (2) we clarify that incumbent LECs must disclose relevant information they discover after services have been introduced, if such information would have been subject to prior  X -disclosure.? ,  yO-ԍ MCI comments at 2021.? AT&T also supports the general parameters of the Computer III timetable, but requests that we specifically impose a one year minimum advance disclosure obligation on  X -changes to network elements or operations support system technology.= d ,  yO-ԍ AT&T comments at 25.= Similarly, while  X -ACSI notes that the Computer IIIĠtimetable is a "useful starting place," it argues for a minimum oneyear notice period for modification of the physical form of interconnection, with an additional 6 month period in which use of the changes by a competing service  X-provider is permissive only.= ,  yO;-ԍ ACSI comments at 12.=  Xh-209. Cox argues that disclosure should be made at the "earliest possible time" and, in particular, at the time the decision is made internally to implement a change, with the "make/buy" point being considered the "absolute latest date" on which disclosure is  X#-permitted.?# ,  yOX!-ԍ Cox comments at 1011.? In addition, Cox requests that we obligate incumbent LECs to disclose any unimplemented network changes that are subject to the section 251(c)(5) notice requirement at  X-the outset of interconnection negotiations.9,  {O$-ԍ Id. at 11.9 "a0*((&"Ԍ X-210. MFS proposes a tripartite scheme, loosely based on the Computer III timetable,  X-that classifies certain changes as "major," "location," or "minor."?,  yOd-ԍ MFS comments at 1516.? "Major" changes, would be defined as those "introducing any change in network equipment, facilities, specifications, protocols, or interfaces that will require other parties to make any modification to hardware or software in order to maintain interoperability." Major changes would be subject to 18 months advance notice. "Location" changes would be defined as those "that require changes in the geographic location to which traffic is routed, or at which unbundled network elements can be obtained, but [that] do not otherwise change the manner of interconnection or of access"; such changes could be implemented on 12 months notice. "Minor" changes, including those in "numbering, routing instructions, signalling codes, or other information necessary for the exchange of traffic that do not require construction of new facilities or changes in hardware or software" could be made upon notice in accord with the time intervals prescribed by the  X -ICCF. X,  {O-ԍ These intervals are prescribed in the ICCF Recommended Notification Procedures. See note 466 supra.  X -211. Many commenters recognize the need for a concrete disclosure timetable. AT&T argues that the broad disagreement among commenters itself is evidence that section  X-251(c)(5) is not selfeffectuating.:,  yO--ԍ AT&T reply at 27.: AT&T opposes the statebystate approach advocated by the District of Columbia Commission, as well as the casebycase approach advocated by Rural Tel. Coalition, because these approaches could lead to the disparate application of the uniform statutory duty imposed by section 251(c)(5). AT&T notes that the record does not reflect any material conditions that vary among states or justify differing rules. In addition, AT&T disputes the applicability of the ICCF timetable, since that document sets forth only  X-guidelines to be used by the independent LECs in notifying the BOCs of network changes.2z,  {O3-ԍ Id.2  X-212. Of the commenters supporting concrete federal standards, most support the  X-adoption of the Computer III disclosure timetable.w ,  {O-ԍ See, e.g., Teleport comments at 11; GCI comments at 5; AT&T reply at 27.w PacTel notes that existing Commission disclosure requirements are familiar to the industry and adequate to meet the requirements of section 251(c)(5); accordingly it supports the establishment of "safe harbor" rules based on  X-Computer III and the disclosure requirements contained in our existing rules.u,  {O#-ԍ PacTel comments at 5. See 47 C.F.R. 64.702(d)(2), 68.110(b).u As discussed above, although it advocates certain revisions, U S WEST agrees that "disclosure pursuant to  XT-the Computer [III] Rules would seem to satisfy the requirements of the [1996] Act."DT0 ,  yO5'-ԍ U S WEST comments at 1213.D GTE"Tb 0*((" notes that the "make/buy" point is an appropriate disclosure trigger because it ensures both the delivery of timely information to parties that use the networks and the promotion of carriers'  X-development efforts to support network innovation.W,  yOK-ԍ GTE reply at 78 and comments cited at 7 n.15.W  X-213. Several commenters urge us to adopt rules prohibiting an incumbent LEC from disclosing network changes to certain preferred entities, including long distance or equipment  Xv-manufacturing affiliates, prior to public disclosure.vX,  {O -ԍ See, e.g., Time Warner comments at 8; NCTA reply at 12; Ohio Consumer's Council reply at 56.  XH- ` `  c.Discussion   X -214. We find that it would be unreasonable to expect other telecommunications carriers or information services providers to be able to react immediately to network changes that the incumbent LEC may have spent months or more planning and implementing; accordingly we reject requests to permit incumbent LECs to implement changes immediately on disclosure. In order to clarify incumbent LECs' obligations to disclose these changes a "reasonable time in advance of implementation," we adopt a disclosure timetable based on that  X-developed in the Computer III proceeding. Under this timetable, incumbent LECs will be required to disclose planned changes, subject to the section 251(c)(5) disclosure requirements,  Xd-at the "make/buy" point,d,  {O-ԍ The definition of the "make/buy" point for section 251(c)(5) purposes is discussed infra at paras. 216217. but a minimum of twelve months before implementation. If the planned changes can be implemented within twelve months of the make/buy point, then public notice must be given at the make/buy point, but at least six months before implementation.  X-215. With respect to changes that can be implemented within six months of the make/buy point, incumbent LECs may wish to provide less than six months notice. In such a case, the incumbent LEC's certification or public notice filed with the Commission, as applicable, must also include a certificate of service: (1) certifying that a copy of the incumbent LEC's public notice was served on each provider of telephone exchange service that interconnects directly with the incumbent LEC's network a minimum of five business days in advance of the filing; and (2) providing the name and address of all such providers of local exchange service upon which the notice was served. The Commission will issue public notice of such shortterm filings. Such short term notices will be deemed final on the tenth business day after the release of the Commission's public notice unless a provider of information services or telecommunications services that directly interconnects with the incumbent LEC's network files an objection to the change with the Commission and serves it on the incumbent LEC no later than the ninth business day following the release of the Commission's public notice. If such an objection is filed, the incumbent LEC will have the opportunity to respond within an additional five business days and the Common Carrier" c|0*((" Bureau, Network Services Division, will issue, if necessary, an order determining the reasonable public notice period.  V-i. The Section 251(c)(5) Timetable  X-216. Without adequate notice of changes to an incumbent LEC's network that affect the "information necessary for the transmission and routing" of traffic, a competing service provider may be unable to maintain an adequately high level of interoperability between its network and that of the incumbent LEC. This inability could degrade the quality of transmission between the two networks or, in a worse case, could interrupt service between  X -the two service providers. ,  yO -ԍ Because the incumbent LECs control the vast majority of both facilities and customers in most markets, the impact of such difficulties, at least at present, would be felt most acutely by a competing service provider. Under the rules we adopt today, incumbent LECs must disclose  X -changes subject to section 251(c)(5) at the "make/buy" point, i.e., the time at which the incumbent LEC decides to make for itself, or procure from another entity, any product the  X -design of which affects or relies on a new or changed network interface,f ,  {O-ԍ BOC Safeguards Order, 6 FCC Rcd at 7603. The Commission has stated that, "make/buy applies not only to a carrier's decision to make or buy products to implement a change in the network, but also to any  {O:-decision to make or buy products that would rely on such changes." Phase II Order, 2 FCC Rcd at 3087. The  {O-precise definition of the "make/buy" point has been clarified in some detail. See, e.g., id.; Phase I Order, 104  {O-F.C.C.2d at 108086; Computer and Business Equip. Mfrs. Assoc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding  {O-Section 64.702(d)(2) of the Commission's Rules and the Policies of the Second Computer Inquiry, Report and  {Ob-Order ("CBEMA Order"), 93 F.C.C.2d 1226, 124344 (1983).f but at least twelve  X -months in advance of implementation of a network change. In Computer III, the Commission defined "product" in the enhanced services context to be "any hardware or software for use in the network that might affect the compatibility of enhanced services with the existing  X}-telephone network, or with any new basic services or capabilities."S}l ,  {O-ԍ Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1084.S We believe that this definition can be used to craft a definition of "product" for purposes of section 251(c)(5). Accordingly, for purposes of network disclosure under section 251(c)(5), we define "product" to be "any hardware or software for use in an incumbent LEC's network or in conjunction with an incumbent LEC's facilities that, when installed, could affect the compatibility of the network, facilities or services of an interconnected provider of telecommunications or information services with the incumbent LEC's network, facilities or services."  X-217. We recognize that some network changes that affect interconnection, e.g., some location changes, may not require an incumbent LEC to make or buy any products. Disclosure of such changes, however, may be required under section 251(c)(5). For purposes of section 251(c)(5), therefore, we clarify that the "make/buy" point includes the point at which the incumbent LEC makes a definite decision to implement a network change in order to begin offering a new service or change the way in which it provides an existing service. Such a "definite decision" requires the incumbent LEC to move beyond exploration of the"=d 0*((" costs and benefits of a change or the feasibility of a change. Instead, a "definite decision" is reached when the incumbent LEC determines that the change is warranted, establishes a timetable for anticipated implementation, and takes the first step toward implementation of the  X-change within its network.U,  {O4-ԍ Cf. Phase II Order, 2 FCC Rcd at 3087.U  X-218. We recognize that many changes to an incumbent LEC's network that are subject to disclosure under section 251(c)(5) can be fully implemented less than twelve months after the make/buy point. Accordingly, if the service using the network changes can be initiated within twelve months after the make/buy date, public notice must be given on the make/buy date, but at least six months before implementation of the planned changes.  X -219. We agree with several commenters that competing service providers should not require a full six months to respond to some categories of relatively minor network changes and that we would needlessly slow the pace of technical advance were we to require a full six months notice in such a case. As evidence of this fact, several commenters have submitted or referred us to industry guidelines developed by ICCF, which detail recommended notice  X-periods of 45 days to six months for certain network changes.sZ,  {O-ԍ ICCF Recommended Notification Procedures. See supra note 466.s Based on the record before us, we agree that six months may be too long a minimum in some circumstances. We conclude, however, that neither the ICCF guidelines nor any other categorization scheme adequately encompasses every potential change affecting interconnection that an incumbent LEC may wish to make to its network. In addition, for changes that can be implemented in less than six months, the length of time required for notice to be considered "reasonable" may vary considerably based on advances in technology, the specific implementation plan developed by an incumbent LEC, the particular capabilities of interconnecting carriers to adapt, and the willingness of the incumbent LEC to be forthcoming with information. Based on these considerations, we find that a fixed timetable for such shortterm notices would not be appropriate.  X|-220. Accordingly, with respect to changes subject to section 251(c)(5) disclosure that the incumbent LEC wishes to implement on less than six months' notice, we require that the incumbent LEC's Commission filing, whether certification or public notice, also include a certificate of service: (1) certifying that a copy of the incumbent LEC's public notice was served on each provider of telephone exchange service that interconnects directly with the incumbent LEC's network a minimum of five business days in advance of the filing; and (2) providing the name and address of all such providers of local exchange service upon which the notice was served. Such filings must be clearly titled "Short Term Public Notice (or Certification of ShortTerm Public Notice) Pursuant to Rule 51.333(a)."  X"-221. The Commission will issue a public notice of such shortterm filings separate from its public notice of other section 251(c)(5) filings. Unlike sixmonth or twelvemonth"#e0*(("" notices, certain interested parties will have an opportunity to file objections to such shortterm public notices. Specifically, short term notices will be deemed final on the tenth business day after the release of the Commission's public notice unless a provider of information services or telecommunications services that directly interconnects with the incumbent LEC's network files an objection to the change with the Commission and serves it on the incumbent LEC no later than the ninth business day following the release of the Commission's public notice. Such an objection must state: (1) specific reasons why the objector is unable to implement adjustments to accommodate the incumbent LEC's changes by the date the incumbent LEC has specified, including specific technical information, questions, or other assistance required that would allow the objector to accommodate those changes; (2) specific steps the objector is taking to implement changes to accommodate the incumbent LEC's changes on an expedited basis; (3) the earliest possible date by which the objector anticipates that it can accommodate the incumbent LEC's changes, assuming it receives the assistance requested in item (1) (not to exceed six months from the date the incumbent LEC gave its original public notice); (4) the affidavit of the objector's president, chief executive officer, or other corporate officer or official with suitable authority to bind the corporation and knowledge of details of the objector's inability to adjust its network on a timely basis that he or she has read the objection, that the statements contained in it are true, that there is good ground to support the objection, and that it is not interposed for purposes of delay; and (5) any other information relevant to the objection. Because the power to interpose such objections could vest competing service providers with extensive power to delay implementation of changes, we caution competing service providers that we will not hesitate to intervene where necessary to ensure that objections are not posed merely to delay implementation of incumbent LEC network changes and that abuse of the Commission's processes for such a purpose would  X-expose a competing service provider to sanctions.Q,  {OQ-ԍ See 47 C.F.R. 1.17, 1.52.Q  X-222. If one or more objections are filed, the incumbent LEC will have five additional  X-business days (i.e., until no later than the fourteenth business day following the release of the Commission's public notice) within which to file a response to the objection(s) and serve it on all objectors. Such a response shall: (1) include information responsive to the allegations and concerns identified by objectors; (2) state whether the implementation date(s) proposed by the objector(s) would be acceptable; (3) indicate any specific technical assistance that the incumbent LEC is willing to give to the objector(s); and (4) state any other information relevant to the incumbent LEC's response. In the case of such contested shortterm public notices, the Common Carrier Bureau will issue an Order fixing a reasonable public notice period. In the alternative, if the incumbent LEC does not file a response within the fiveday time period allotted, or if the response accepts the latest date stated by an objector in response to item (3) of its objection, then the incumbent LEC's public notice shall be deemed amended to specify implementation on the latest date stated by an objector in item (3) of its objection without further Commission action. "j$fZ0*((F#"Ԍ X-223. At the make/buy point, incumbent LEC plans should be sufficiently developed that the incumbent LEC could provide adequate and useful information to competing service providers. At earlier stages of the planning process, options are still being explored and alternatives weighed. Disclosure at such an early stage could cause interconnecting carriers to waste resources in an effort to respond to network changes that may not occur or that occur ultimately in a significantly different way. As the process of implementing the planned changes into the network goes forward, specific information may also require revision. Accordingly, we require an incumbent LEC to keep its public notice information complete, accurate, and uptodate in whatever forum it has chosen for disclosure.  X -224. We agree with several commenters that incumbent LECs should not make preferential disclosure to selected entities prior to disclosure at the make/buy point.  X -Accordingly, we prohibit disclosure to separate affiliates, separated affiliates,< ,  yOe -ԍ 47 U.S.C. 274.< or unaffiliated entities (including actual or potential competing service providers), until the time of public notice.  V-ii. Other Disclosure Proposals  Xb-225. We find that section 251(d)(3) does not require the Commission to preserve state authority over the timing of public notice of changes to the "information necessary for the transmission and routing" of traffic. Section 251(d)(3) prevents the Commission from "preclud[ing] the enforcement of any [state commission] regulation, order or policy," to the extent that such regulation, order or policy "establishes [LEC] access and interconnection  X-obligations,"EX,  yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 251(d)(3)(A).E is "consistent with the requirements of [section 251]"E,  yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 251(d)(3)(B).E and does not  X-"substantially prevent implementation of this section and the purposes of this part."Ex,  yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 251(d)(3)(C).E  X-226. Public notice requirements that varied widely from state to state could subject both incumbent LECs and potential competing service providers to burdensome, duplicative, and potentially inconsistent obligations that would impermissibly hamper the achievement of the goals of section 251. Such varied filings requirements would obligate incumbent LECs to file in, and potential interconnecting carriers to canvass, a multitude of statelevel fora in order to glean information concerning network changes. Incumbent LECs that operate in multiple states could be required to disclose a single networkwide change piecemeal in a variety of state filings; interconnecting carriers would then need to retrieve the information, also piecemeal, from many different locations. Neither section 251(c)(5) nor a fixed disclosure timetable limits the range of network changes an incumbent LEC might make;"g0*((" rather incumbent LECs remain free to make any otherwise permissible change upon appropriate notice. Accordingly, particularly with respect to entities whose operations span several states, clear, national rules are essential to the uniform implementation of network  X-disclosure.G,  {O4-ԍ See NCTA comments at 12.G  X-227. Several commenters argue that a fixed disclosure timetable will needlessly or arbitrarily delay the introduction of technical advances or new services. It is our intention in this proceeding, however, to develop disclosure rules that minimize unnecessary delay by providing competing service providers with adequate, but not excessive, time to respond to changes to an incumbent LEC's network that affect interconnection. The primary concern reflected in section 251(c)(5) is continued interconnection and interoperability. If proper planning occurs, however, the delay associated with this goal should be minimal.  X -228. At least one commenter argues that, because incumbent LECs and competing service providers have a common interest in ensuring that their networks function together properly an interest that removes incentives to withhold vital interconnection information  X-and obviates the need for fixed, enforceable advance disclosure obligationsOZ,  yO-ԍ Ameritech comments at 30, reply at 17.O any fixed timetables for disclosure should be negotiated between carriers as part of individual interconnection agreements. We disagree. The mere fact that interconnection failures can adversely affect both an incumbent LEC and a competing service provider does not remove the incumbent LEC's incentives to delay release of information concerning network changes solely in order to inconvenience its competitors. The impact of such failures would fall disproportionately on the competing service provider because, at least in the near term, the incumbent LEC's network will connect most of the customers in its service area directly, without using any facilities of a competing service provider. Indeed, we believe that this is the reason that Congress chose to place this obligation on incumbent LECs only and not on all LECs. In addition, notice of network changes provided to an interconnecting carrier, pursuant to a privately negotiated agreement, will not necessarily be provided to members of  X|-the public who are not parties to the specific agreement."|,  yO-ԍ Although the contents of privately negotiated interconnection agreements themselves must be disclosed to  {O-the public through state level filings, see 47 U.S.C. 252(h), information exchanged pursuant to the terms of such an interconnection agreement might not be provided at all to this Commission, state commissions or the public. Accordingly, while carriers may negotiate individual notice arrangements (consistent with the preferential disclosure prohibitions discussed in paragraph 224, above) as part of private interconnection agreements, we are unable to rely on such private notice to satisfy section 251(c)(5)'s duty to provide  X"-reasonable public notice.  X-229. Although advance disclosure periods will place competing service providers on notice of certain products and services the incumbent LECs intend to bring to market, we do"h0*((" not believe that this information will automatically translate into a competitive advantage for the competing service providers. The incumbent LEC's network disclosure obligations are intended to allow competing service providers to make required changes to their own networks in order to maintain interoperability and uninterrupted, high quality service to the public. These obligations are designed to prevent incumbent LECs from using their currently substantial percentages of subscribers and highly developed networks anticompetitively to prevent the entry of potential competitors.  XH-230. Several commenters have argued that existing practices under industry issued,  X1-ICCF guideliness1,  {O -ԍ ICCF Recommended Notification Procedures. See supra note 466.s or the Commission's "all carrier" rule,Q1Z,  {O< -ԍ See supra n.383.Q satisfy the requirements of section 251(c)(5) and that no further Commission action is necessary. We disagree. The guidelines that commenters bring to our attention are neither compulsory nor enforceable at the Commission. We cannot rely on continued goodwill among carriers that soon may be locked in competition to assure timely disclosure of network changes. Similarly, we cannot trust in the "mutually satisfactory arrangements for timely information exchange" that GVNW alleges  X -IXCs and small LECs reached to ease the conversion to equal access.< ,  yOD-ԍ GVNW comments at 5.< Our new rules, and the new market dynamics, may not produce such agreements.  Xb-231. While we are aware of no specific complaints concerning the functioning of the "all carrier rule," the advent of competition for basic telephone service in the local market will require rules that are specific, easily enforced and very clear. In this respect, we believe that the all carrier rule standard lacks adequate specificity to function efficiently in the section 251 context. Requiring carriers to litigate the meaning of "reasonable" notice through our complaint process on a casebycase basis might slow the introduction and implementation of new technology and services, and burden both carriers and the Commission with potentially lengthy, factspecific enforcement proceedings. A fixed timetable will create a clear, specific standard that will be more easily and quickly enforceable and that will better facilitate the development of competition and serve the public interest.  Xe-232. At least one commenter urges us to adopt the Computer III timetable merely as a  XP-"safe harbor" provision.>P|,  yO}"-ԍ PacTel comments at 6.> If we were to do so, however, we would open the notice process to many of the same risks that lead us to reject the all carrier rule. Under "safe harbor" rules, competing service providers' notice complaints could become bifurcated into an initial inquiry as to whether an incumbent LEC met the safe harbor provisions of the timetable. If the answer were in the negative, a second, factspecific inquiry as to whether notice was nevertheless reasonable, would then follow. The delay in resolving such disputes would not"i 0*((" serve the public interest. We believe the better course is to adopt a binding, fixed standard applicable to notice by all incumbent LECs.  X-233. MFS's proposed regulatory structure based on a tripartite scheme, classifying changes as "major," "location," or "minor," subject to advance disclosure of 18 months, 12 months, and according to industry standards, respectively, is flawed in several respects. Initially, section 251(c)(5) disclosure applies to a broad spectrum of potential network changes and we are not confident that MFS's definitions, or any similar definitions, could adequately capture and clarify every potential alteration affecting interconnection that an incumbent LEC could make to its network. Categorization debates would inevitably arise among carriers concerning the status of specific, planned changes. Reasonable public notice is a function of the length of time an incumbent LEC will take to implement a change and the length of time an interconnecting carrier will need to respond. Fixed 18month and 12month disclosure periods will not be flexible enough to take advantage of advances in technology that may permit increasingly rapid implementation of and reaction to network changes. Also, we find that the extended notice periods MFS proposes are too long. MFS provides no evidence or explanation to support its assertion that competing service providers will need a minimum of  Xy-18 months notice of major changes,y,  {O-ԍ Cf. NYNEX reply at 1011 (Such a long notice period would "hamstring technological progress and deny customer benefits"); U S WEST reply at 23. and the record contains broad support for the 12 month  Xb-notice period from Computer III.$b",  {O5-ԍ See, e.g., AT&T comments at 2425 (Noting that the time periods from Computer III are familiar to incumbent LECs and a oneyear minimum for certain changes would be sufficient advance notice to alternative LECs); MCI comments at 16 (agreeing 12 months advance notice is sufficient); Cox comments at 11 ("The  {O-proposal in the [NPRM] represents the minimum possible standard for disclosure"). While we intend that competing service providers have adequate notice of planned network changes, we acknowledge the valid concerns of some commenters that overextended advance notification intervals could needlessly delay the introduction of new services, provide the interconnecting carrier with an unfair competitive  X-advantage, or slow the pace of technical innovation.TZ,  {O-ԍ Cf. Phase II Order, 2 FCC Rcd at 3087 ("[W]hile we believe enhanced service providers are entitled to receive network information on a timely basis, we are also concerned that premature disclosure of this information could impair carriers' development efforts and inhibit network innovation").T  V-iii. Application to Network Changes in Progress  X-234. On the effective date of the rules implementing incumbent LECs' network disclosure obligations under section 251(c)(5), some incumbent LECs may be implementing network changes that the new rules otherwise would have required them to disclose. With respect to these changes, we do not perceive a need to delay implementation, and no commenter has requested that we do so. We do require, however, that incumbent LECs give public notice of such changes as soon as it is practical, and that notice in accordance with the section 251(c)(5) network disclosure rules be given: (1) before the incumbent LEC begins""j0 0*((z" offering service using the changes to its network; and (2) no later than 30 days after the effective date of the rules adopted in this Order.  X-235. We similarly find no need to adopt rules obligating incumbent LECs to make any formal, initial public disclosure of comprehensive information concerning their networks to provide background information against which connecting carriers could then evaluate  Xv-changes. In the First Report and Order, we have concluded that, under section 251(c)(2), incumbent LECs are under an obligation to provide, interconnection for purposes of transmitting and routing telephone exchange traffic alone, exchange access traffic alone, or  X3-both.U3,  {O -ԍ First Report and Order at section IV. U Implicit in this obligation under section 251(c)(2) is the obligation to make available to requesting carriers information indicating the location and technical characteristics of incumbent LEC network facilities. Accordingly, actual or potential competing service providers needing this type of baseline information may request it from the incumbent LEC under section 251(c)(2); subsequent changes to this information will be addressed by the section 251(c)(5) rules we adopt today.  V-iv. Small Business Considerations  Xd-236. We have considered the impact of our rules on small incumbent LECs. We agree with GVNW that many network changes may not require twelve months advance disclosure. Accordingly, we have provided for six month, or shorter, notice periods, when such changes can be accomplished quickly. In addition, we note that, under section 251(f)(1),  X-certain small incumbent LECs are exempt from our rules until (1) they receive a bona fide request for interconnection, services, or network elements; and (2) their state commission determines that the request is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent with the relevant portions of section 254. In addition, certain small  X-incumbent LECs may seek relief from our rules under section 251(f)(2).Z,  {O-ԍ For a discussion of the implications and operation of section 251(f), see First Report and Order, section XII.  X- C.` ` Relationship with other Public Notice Requirements and Practices.   XR- X ` ` 1. Relationship of Sections 273(c)(1) and 273(c)(4) with Section 251(c)(5).  X   X$-` `  a.Background   X-237. Section 273(c)(1) requires each BOC to maintain and file with the Commission "full and complete information with respect to the protocols and technical requirements for connection with and use of its telephone exchange facilities," in accordance with Commission" k0*(("  X-rules.,  yOy-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 273(c)(1). The Commission will address section 273 in a separate rulemaking proceeding. Section 273(c)(4) obligates the BOCs to provide timely information on the planned deployment of telecommunications equipment to interconnecting carriers providing telephone  X-exchange service.BX,  yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 273(c)(4).B We sought comment in the NPRM on the relationship between these  X-sections and the network disclosure obligations contained in section 251(c)(5).A,  {OV-ԍ NPRM at para. 193.A  X- ` `  b.Comments   Xa-238. Ameritech states that the requirements of section 251(c)(5) "should be reconciled  XJ-with [the] related obligations" set forth in section 273(c)(1) and 273(c)(4)."BJz,  yOu-ԍ Ameritech comments at 31.B Bell Atlantic  X3-suggests that sections 251(c)(5) and 273(c)(1) cover the same type of technical information.F3 ,  yO-ԍ Bell Atlantic comments at 12.F Bell Atlantic further recommends that we find that "timely" release of the information covered by section 273(c)(4) means that the information should be made available "a sufficient time in advance that the competing service providers may make any necessary changes to their  X -networks." ,  {O"-ԍ Id. Bell Atlantic advocates the same "reasonable advance notice" standard for use in connection with section 251(c)(5). SBC comments that the disclosure obligations imposed by sections 251(c)(5),  X -273(c)(1), and 273(c)(4) are "substantially similar."? ,  yOe-ԍ SBC comments at 1314.? MCI argues that section 273(c)(1) imposes on the RBOCs substantially the same information disclosure obligations that 251(c)(5) imposes on the incumbent LECs in general, with the exception that 273(c)(1)  X{-explicitly obligates the RBOCs to file the information with the Commission.<{ ,  yO-ԍ MCI comments at 19.< MCI further argues that section 273(c)(4)'s "timely" disclosure requirement goes beyond that contained in  XM-section 251(c)(5).2M,  {O!-ԍ Id.2  X-239. USTA suggests that "there is no basis to impose different requirements on the BOCs for purposes of compliance with section 273(c)(1) than those they are required to follow for section 251(c)(5). This is in fact one area in which uniformity would provide a  X-benefit to the industry and would be administratively simple."=,  yO1'-ԍ USTA comments at 13.= In contrast, the Rural Tel."l60*((&" Coalition argues that the requirements of section 273 apply only to the BOCs and "are not  X-expected to correlate with the requirements of 251(c)(5) that apply to all incumbent LECs."L,  yOb-ԍ Rural Tel. Coalition comments at 4.L The Rural Tel. Coalition states that the Commission should fashion flexible notice requirements under these sections, recognizing differences in size, market power, and ability to impact competing service providers' operations that exist among the BOCs and independent  X-LECs, and competing service providers.:X,  {O-ԍ Id. at 45.: AT&T also disagrees with USTA, arguing that the Commission filing contemplated by section 273(c)(1) is more detailed than the disclosure  X_-mandated in section 251(c)(5).J_,  yO -ԍ AT&T comments at 24, reply at 28.J  X1- ` `  c.Discussion   X -240. Because the BOCs clearly meet the 1996 Act's definition of an "incumbent  X -LEC,"? z,  yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 251(h).? the minimum disclosure requirements of section 251(c)(5) apply to the BOCs. We will address the specific implications of section 273, including the question whether section 273 imposes additional disclosure requirements on the BOCs, in a separate rulemaking proceeding.  Xy- ` ` 2. Relationship of Sections 251(a) and 251(c)(5) with Section 256.   XK- ` `  a.Background   X-241. Section 251(a) sets forth general duties of telecommunications carriers, including the duty to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers, and the duty not to install network features, functions or capabilities that do not comply with the guidelines and standards established pursuant to  X-section 255  ,  yO|-ԍ Section 255, "Access by Persons with Disabilities," will be addressed in a separate rulemaking proceeding. and 256.? ,  yO !-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 251(a).? Section 251(c)(5) sets forth the duty of all incumbent LECs to provide reasonable public notice of changes in the information necessary for the transmission  X-and routing of services using the incumbent LEC's network.B * ,  yOn$-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(5).B The goal of section 256, entitled "Coordination for Interconnectivity," is "to promote nondiscriminatory accessibility by the broadest number of users and vendors of communications products and services to public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications service" and defines the"Nm 0*(("  X-Commission's role in achieving this goal.< ,  yOy-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 256.< In the NPRM, we sought comment on the  X-relationship of sections 251(a) and 251(c)(5) with section 256.A X,  {O-ԍ NPRM at para. 193.A  X- ` `  b.Comments   X-242. We received few comments on this issue. USTA states that, "in developing oversight procedures for public telecommunications network interconnectivity standards under Section 256, the Commission can assist in alerting the industry to general types of technology  XJ-changes which may lead to specific upgrades or modifications by individual carriers."=J,  yO -ԍ USTA comments at 13.= In addition, USTA notes that all telecommunications carriers are obligated by section 251(a)(2) to comply with standards prescribed under sections 255 and 256 and, accordingly, cautions that the section 256 process should be conducted with carriers' section 251(a)(2) obligations  X -in mind.< z,  {O-ԍ Id. at 1314.< USTA therefore suggests the possibility that an industry group could develop a set of uniform guidelines for use by all carriers in providing notice of changes that could affect  X -interconnection or interoperability.9 ,  {O}-ԍ Id. at 14.9  X-243. Ameritech comments that section 251(c)(5) is only one part of the overall regulatory structure for coordinating network planning by the industry and facilitating  Xd-interconnection and interoperability.Bd,  yO-ԍ Ameritech comments at 31.B Based on this analysis, Ameritech argues that the notification obligations section 251(c)(5) imposes should be extended to all LECs under  X6-section 256.26. ,  {O-ԍ Id.2  X- ` `  c.Discussion   X-244. Section 251(a)(2) imposes a duty on all telecommunications carriers to act in ways that are not inconsistent with any guidelines and standards established under section 256. Section 251(c)(5) imposes network disclosure obligations on incumbent LECs that are related to the goals of section 256, inasmuch as section 251(c)(5) sets forth one specific procedure to promote interconnectivity. We do not decide here whether compliance with section 251(c)(5) is sufficient to satisfy section 256, however. The Network Reliability and Interoperability Council will develop recommendations to the Commission on the implementation of section"Pn 0*((0"  X-256.k,  yOy-ԍ At its meeting on July 15, 1996, the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council discussed (1) barriers to interconnectivity; (2) how the FCC most efficiently can oversee network planning to assure  {O -interoperability; (3) need for standards-setting; and (4) the overall reliability of networks. See Communications  {O-Daily, June 11, 1996 (announcing July 15 meeting); Public Notice, NYNEX CEO Seidenberg to Head New  {O-Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, 1996 WL 185795 (F.C.C. Apr. 18, 1996).k We intend to address carrier and Commission obligations under section 256 in a future rulemaking proceeding.  X- D.` ` Enforcement and Safeguards  X-` ` 1. Enforcement Mechanisms  X_-` `  a.Background and Comments   X1-245. In the NPRM, we sought comment on what enforcement mechanism, if any, we  X -should use to ensure compliance with the section 251(c)(5) public notice requirement.A ~,  {OK-ԍ NPRM at para. 193.A Bell Atlantic, in conjunction with its advocacy of a flexible disclosure standard based on "reasonableness," suggests that the Commission review complaints of premature  X -implementation on a casebycase basis and, where necessary, issue ceaseanddesist orders.F ,  yO-ԍ Bell Atlantic comments at 12.F Ameritech and GTE argue that no specific, additional enforcement mechanisms are necessary, because there is no evidence that existing industry practices are producing network conflicts  X-or hardships, or are otherwise not working.S,  yO-ԍ Ameritech comments at 29; GTE reply at 10.S U S WEST suggests that, if carriers fail to  X{-make timely disclosure, additional enforcement options can be considered in the future.={0 ,  yO\-ԍ U S WEST reply at 3.= In contrast, NCTA states that we must adopt meaningful sanctions to enforce our new network disclosure rules, including significant monetary sanctions whenever a competitor's service is  X6-disrupted because of an incumbent LEC's failure to comply with the notice requirements.=6 ,  yO-ԍ NCTA comments at 12.= Cox argues that any incumbent LEC found to violate section 251(c)(5)'s disclosure requirements should be required to inform all affected customers of interconnecting carriers that the incumbent LEC's actions caused any adverse effects attributable to the improperly  X-disclosed network changes.<P ,  yO$-ԍ Cox comments at 12.<  X-246. MFS states that the Commission should adopt rules that would: (1) require each incumbent LEC to respond to Commission questions regarding the information previously"o0*((" made available regarding any network changes within the scope of section 251(c)(5), and to supplement the information if requested by the Commission; (2) establish a procedure for temporarily blocking any proposed network change until the Commission has time to investigate any alleged violations, with respect to either provision of notice, or the nature of the network change; and (3) allow the Commission, for good cause, to issue an order, without prior notice or hearing, requiring an incumbent LEC to cease and desist from making any specified changes for a period of up to 60 days to permit Commission investigation of alleged  X_-violations.X_,  yO-ԍ MFS comments at 16. MFS does not explain what type of network change might require Commission investigation or what type or level of allegations we should considered sufficient in issuing cease and desist orders. Time Warner suggests that any failure to comply with the rules we establish  XH-should be addressed through our existing section 208 complaint process.DH,  yO -ԍ Time Warner comments at 11.D  X -` `  b.` Discussion (#  X -247. It is essential to the development of local competition that incumbent LECs comply with the network disclosure obligations of section 251(c)(5). Even if a competing provider of local exchange service had made significant inroads into the incumbent LEC's customer base, it would have to transmit a substantial number of its customers' calls to the incumbent LEC's network for termination. If these calls cannot be terminated reliably, customers will be more reluctant to use the competing provider's services.  XK-248. We recognize the importance of compliance with our network disclosure rules, and note that many of the specific enforcement sanctions offered by commenters may have merit. The commenters' suggestions indicate a belief that the Commission should delay or prohibit the implementation of changes if we receive sufficiently credible allegations of notice violations. Our existing enforcement authority would permit us to impose such a sanction and we will not hesitate to do so in appropriate circumstances. The Commission, however, also has a range of other penalties it could impose to ensure incumbent LEC compliance with the network disclosure rules. The record currently before us does not reveal a need for us to mandate specific enforcement procedures in the section 251(c)(5) context. Rather, we will intervene in appropriate ways if necessary to ensure adequate disclosure of public notice information, should sanctions become necessary to encourage full compliance with our  XN-network disclosure rules.Nx,  {Ow"-ԍ See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 154(j), 206209, 218; 47 C.F.R. 0.91, 0.291. In addition, we intend to explore how we can increase the efficiency of the current section 208 formal complaint process in a separate rulemaking proceeding. "p 0*((<"  X-` ` 2. Protection of Proprietary Information, Network and National  X-Security (#   X-` `  a.` Background and Comments (#  X-249. In the NPRM, we sought comment on the extent to which safeguards may be necessary to ensure that information regarding network security, national security and the proprietary interests of manufacturers and others is not compromised by the section 251(c)(5)  XJ-network disclosure process.AJ,  {O -ԍ NPRM at para. 194.A  X -250. BellSouth states that, to address these concerns, the Commission should permit disclosing incumbent LECs to require the recipient of such information to execute a confidentiality agreement, which could be drafted to include liquidated damages,  X -indemnification, or other appropriate remedial provisions.p Z,  {O-ԍ BellSouth comments at 5. See Illinois Commission comments at 63.p In addition, BellSouth requests that the Commission confirm that incumbent LECs are not obligated to disclose proprietary information of third parties, but may instead require competing service providers to negotiate  X-directly with the third party for access.8,  {O/-ԍ Id. at 6.8  Xd-251. GVNW suggests that we limit incumbent LEC disclosure only to references to industry and manufacturers' specifications that are widely available, and to other information required to interconnect at the interface, which would reduce the amount of proprietary or  X-sensitive information that would be subject to disclosure. ~,  yON-ԍ GVNW comments at 5. Ameritech advocates a similar narrowing of the disclosure obligation. Ameritech comments at 26 n.52. In addition, GVNW and the Rural Tel. Coalition state that an incumbent LEC should not be obligated to disclose the specific location of physical plant facilities except under strict nondisclosure agreements, in order to preserve the LEC's competitive position and protect against potential terrorist  X-disruptions.W!,  {OJ -ԍ Id.; Rural Tel. Coalition comments at 4.W  X-252. Noting that the telecommunications equipment market is competitive, Nortel states that a manufacturer would be seriously disadvantaged if its proprietary information were  Xg-disclosed to competitors."Xgh ,  yO%-ԍ Nortel comments at 3; Motorola, Inc. reply at 5. Citing similar concerns, GTE urges us to strike a balance between the information necessary to ensure seamless interconnection and the protection of proprietary information. GTE comments at 6. In addition, Nortel argues that, in such a case, manufacturers"gq "0*(("  X-would face substantially reduced incentives to develop advanced products.2#,  {Oy-ԍ Id.2 Motorola, Inc.,  X-expresses its agreement with both BellSouth and NortelH$Z,  yO-ԍ Motorola, Inc. comments at n.4.H and comments that disclosure of proprietary information may undermine the competitive position of U.S. manufacturers in the  X-global market.E%,  yOV-ԍ Motorola, Inc. reply at n.5.E Motorola, Inc., also asks us to clarify that no disclosure is required of  X-technical information at "testing" or "trial" stages,8&z,  {O -ԍ Id. at 6.8 where typically a carrier is evaluating  X-new technology in the field.2' ,  {OJ -ԍ Id.2  X_-253. Sprint, in ex parte comments, states that nondisclosure agreements related to the  XJ-marketing of new services that will be available from both carriers may be appropriate.(J,  {O-ԍ Ex parte letter from Jay C. Keithley, Sprint, to Mr. William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, filed in CC Docket No. 9698, June 26, 1996, at 2. Sprint also notes, however, that many routine network upgrades, such as establishment of new central offices, remote offices, or tandems, elimination of tandem locations, changes in the incumbent LEC's SS 7 network, and basic software upgrades, may not require the use of  X -nondisclosure agreements.2) ,  {O-ԍ Id.2 While agreeing that network and national security issues deserve the highest attention, Teleport expresses concern that proprietary interest claims could be used  X -to keep essential network interconnection information from potential competitors.A* ,  yO-ԍ Teleport comments at 12.A  X-` `  b.` Discussion (#   Xd-254. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the judicious use of nondisclosure agreements will help protect incentives to develop innovative network improvements, and will also protect against potential threats to both national and network security by limiting the flow of detailed information concerning the operation of the national telecommunications  X-network.+,  yO#-ԍ Should these agreements prove inadequate for this purpose, we would revisit this issue. Accordingly, we will permit the use of nondisclosure agreements, subject to certain restrictions.  X-255. Incumbent LECs have a statutory obligation to provide "reasonable public notice of changes in the information necessary for the transmission and routing of services using that"r+0*((" [incumbent LEC's] facilities or network, as well as of any other changes that would affect the  X-interoperability of those facilities and networks,"B,,  yOb-ԍ 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(5).B as defined in this proceeding. Under another provision of the 1996 Act, however, the BOCs and any entities that they own or otherwise control must protect "the proprietary information submitted for procurement  X-decisions from release not specifically authorized by the owner of such information."B-X,  yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  273(e)(5).B Thus a rule requiring a BOC to provide change information publicly, without any provision for the use of a nondisclosure agreement, could place a BOC in the position of having to choose between compliance with the Commission's rule and compliance with section 273(e)(5). We also find that requiring disclosure to the public of competitively sensitive, proprietary, or trade secret information without allowing for the possible use of nondisclosure agreements would be  X -inconsistent with section 251(c)(5)'s requirement that incumbent LECs provide "reasonable public notice" (emphasis added). It would not be "reasonable" to require such disclosures because they have significant implications with respect to network and national security, as well as the development of competition and innovative network improvements. Accordingly, we find that section 251(c)(5) requires incumbent LECs to provide notice of planned changes to the public sufficient to allow an interested party to assess the possible ramifications of the change and evaluate whether it needs to seek disclosure of additional information. The five categories of information disclosure we mandate here will meet this standard.  XM-256. We do not anticipate that the minimum public notice requirements we are adopting will obligate carriers to disclose competitively sensitive, proprietary, or trade secret information in the public arena. In addition, despite the concerns of Motorola, Inc., Nortel, and others, we do not anticipate that the level of information required by a competing service provider either to transmit and to route services, or to maintain interoperability will, in the ordinary case, include proprietary information. In the event that such information is required, however, an incumbent LEC's public notice must nevertheless identify the type of change planned in sufficient detail to place interested persons on notice that they may potentially be affected, and must state that the incumbent LEC will make further information available to persons signing a nondisclosure agreement. We believe that suitably fashioned nondisclosure agreements can appropriately balance the competing service provider's need for knowledge of network changes with the interests of the incumbent LEC and equipment manufacturers in retaining control of proprietary information.  X -257. Accordingly, to the extent that otherwise proprietary or confidential information of an incumbent LEC falls within the scope of the network disclosure obligation of section 251(c)(5), it must be provided by that incumbent LEC on a timely basis. If an interconnecting carrier or information service provider requires genuinely proprietary information belonging to a third party in order to maintain interconnection and interoperation with the incumbent LEC's network, the incumbent LEC is permitted to refer the competing service provider to the owner of the information to negotiate directly for its release. While"#s-0*(("" the incumbent LEC might represent the most expedient source of the required information, third parties would be less able to protect themselves from misuse of their proprietary information and preserve potential remedies if the incumbent LEC were to disclose directly a third party's proprietary information directly in response to a request.  X-258. We are concerned that protracted negotiation periods over the terms of a suitable nondisclosure agreement, or the payment of fees or royalties, could consume a significant portion of a competing service provider's notice period. The rules we adopt today require that, except under shortterm public notice procedures, an incumbent LEC must give public notice of network changes a minimum of either six months or twelve months in advance of implementation. We find that these periods will provide adequate notice to interconnecting carriers and information service providers, to ensure that a high level of interconnectivity and interoperability can be maintained between networks. These periods, however, are not excessive and will not allow excessive time for the negotiation of the terms of nondisclosure agreements. Because section 251(c)(5) places an affirmative obligation on the incumbent LEC to ensure reasonable public notice of changes to its network, we require that disclosure of information designated by the incumbent LEC as proprietary, whether owned by the incumbent LEC or a third party, be accomplished on appropriate terms as soon as possible after an actual or potential competing service provider makes a request to the information owner for disclosure. Specifically, upon receipt by the incumbent LEC of a competing service provider's request for disclosure of confidential or proprietary information, the applicable public notice period will be tolled to allow the interested parties to agree on suitable terms for a nondisclosure agreement. This tolling is consistent with the incumbent LEC's public notice obligations and will preserve the competing service provider's ability to implement required changes in its own network to accommodate those planned by the incumbent LEC. In accordance with its obligation to keep the public notice information complete, accurate, and uptodate, the incumbent LEC must, if necessary, amend its public notice: (1) on the date it receives a request from a competing service provider for disclosure of confidential or proprietary information, to state that the notice period is tolled; and (2) on the date the nondisclosure agreement is finalized, to specify a new implementation date.  X7-259. Given these incentives, we conclude that it is unnecessary either to adopt a precise definition of "competitively sensitive" or "proprietary" information, or to mandate the  X -terms of nondisclosure agreements. The Computer III rules, upon which we have modeled the disclosure timetable for use in the section 251(c)(5) context, explicitly permit the use of nondisclosure agreements in connection with carrier disclosure of planned changes to the  X -enhanced services industry at the "make/buy" point.Q. ,  {O?#-ԍ Phase II Order, 2 FCC Rcd at 3092.Q In that proceeding also, the Commission explicitly rejected requests to prescribe a specific type of agreement, instead holding that: Xwe do not think it necessary or helpful for us to dictate the terms of these private agreements. Nondisclosure agreements are widely used in"S%tZ.0*(('$" telecommunications, as well as in other fields. We believe it better to leave the exact specifications of the terms of such agreement to the parties. We would of course be prepared to intervene should parties bring to our attention evidence  X-of noncompliance with the requirements established in this proceeding.>/,  {O4-ԍ Id. at 309293.>  Although we recognize that legitimate concerns exist regarding the security of proprietary information, the potential exists for some incumbent LECs to use such concerns as either a shield against the entry of competitors into their markets, or a sword to hamper the competitor's business operations. We emphasize that incumbent LECs are required to provide adequate access to even proprietary information if a competing service provider needs that information to make adjustments to its network to maintain interconnection and interoperation.  X -260. We agree with Motorola, Inc., that market and technical trials are not subject to disclosure under section 251(c)(5). Trials are not considered regular service and, because the validity of the incumbent LEC's trial results rests, in part, on successful interconnection, the incumbent LEC has sufficient incentives ensure that competing service providers receive adequate information. Notice of trials may be given, as needed, on a private, contractual basis.  XK-   V. NUMBERING ADMINISTRATION\  X- 261. The Commission has repeatedly recognized that access to telephone numbering resources is crucial for entities wanting to provide telecommunications services because telephone numbers are the means by which telecommunications users gain access to and  X-benefit from the public switched telephone network.0Z,  {O-ԍ See Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, CC Docket No. 92237, Report and Order, 11  {O-FCC Rcd 2588, 2591 (1995) (NANP Order). In enacting the 1996 Act, Congress also recognized that ensuring fair and impartial access to numbering resources is a critical component of encouraging a robustly competitive telecommunications market in the United States. Congress has required the Commission to designate an impartial administrator of telecommunications numbering and has conferred upon the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of the North American Numbering Plan (NANP) that pertain to the United  XN-States.B1N,  yO!-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  251(e)(1).B " uF10*((z"  X- A.` ` Designation of an Impartial Number Administrator  X-  X-` ` 1. Background   X-262. Section 251(e)(1) requires the Commission to "create or designate one or more impartial entities to administer telecommunications numbering and to make such numbers  Xv-available on an equitable basis."22v,  {O-ԍ Id.2 In the NPRM, we tentatively concluded that action taken  Xa-by the Commission in its July 1995 NANP Order satisfied this requirement.3&aZ,  {Ol -ԍ See NANP Order. The NANP Order was initiated in response to Bellcore's stated desire to relinquish its  {O6 -role as NANP administrator.  See Letter from G. Heilmeier, President and CEO, Bellcore to the Commission (Aug. 19, 1993). Bellcore, however, will continue performing its NANP Administration functions until those  {O -functions are transferred to a new NANP administrator pursuant to the NANP Order. In that Order, the Commission directed that functions associated with NANP administration be transferred to a new administrator of the NANP, unaligned with any particular segment of the  X -telecommunications industry. In the NPRM, we sought comment on whether this action  X -satisfied the Section 251(e)(1) requirement that we designate an impartial administrator. (#(#  X - ` ` 2. Comments   X -263. There is nearly unanimous agreement that action taken by the Commission in the  X-NANP Order satisfies the requirement of Section 251(e)(1).4H,  {O-ԍ See, e.g., Ameritech comments at 22; District of Columbia Commission comments at 1; GCI comments at 5; NYNEX comments at 18; AT&T reply at 23. GTE states that the NANP  X-Order "will ensure that numbering mechanisms are applied in a carrierneutral fashion,  Xl-consistent with the objectives of the 1996 Act."J5l,  {O-ԍ See, e.g., GTE reply at 34.J Parties, contending that number administration now performed by Bellcore potentially disadvantages nonBOC providers of telecommunications services by delay or denial of numbering resources to them, nevertheless  X'-urge the Commission to move quickly to implement the NANP Order fully.a6'4 ,  {O -ԍ See, e.g., CTIA comments at 4; MCI comments at 10.a Moreover,  X-some argue that to give the NANP Order full effect, the North American Numbering Council  X-(NANC) must be convened promptly.7" ,  {Ot"-ԍ See, e.g., AT&T comments at 11. The North American Numbering Council (NANC) is a Federal Advisory Committee created for the purpose of addressing and advising the Commission on policy matters relating to administration of the NANP. NANC will provide the Commission advice reached through consensus to foster efficient and impartial number administration.  CTIA states that until that time, "contentious numbering issues will either go unresolved, leading to additional pressure on already burdened numbering resources, or these issues will be resolved by the remnant of a monopoly era"v70*(("  X-system."M8,  {Oy-ԍ See, e.g., CTIA comments at 4.M One commenter, Beehive, argues that the NANP Order does not meet the requirements of Section 251(e)(1) because it does not address toll free number  X-administration.A9Z,  yO-ԍ Beehive comments at 24.A  X-` ` 3. Discussion    Xx-264. We conclude that the action taken in the NANP Order satisfies the section 251(e)(1) requirement that the Commission create or designate an impartial numbering  XL-administrator. The NANP Order requires that functions associated with NANP administration  X7-be transferred to a new NANP administrator. In the NANP Order, the Commission articulated  X" -its intention to undertake the necessary procedural steps to create the NANC.N:" ,  {O-ԍ NANP Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 2608.N Additionally, it directed the NANC to select as NANP administrator an independent, nongovernment entity  X -that is not closely associated with any particular industry segment.G; |,  {O!-ԍ Id. at 2610, 2614, 2617.G These actions satisfy section 251(e)(1).  X -265. Commenters' arguments that we have not fulfilled our duty pursuant to section 251(e)(1) because the NANC has not been convened and has not selected a new NANP  X-administrator are not persuasive. In the NANP Order, we required that there be a new, impartial number administrator and established the model for how that administrator will be chosen. We thus have taken "action necessary to establish regulations" leading to the designation of an impartial number administrator as required by section 251(e)(1).  X- 266. We disagree with Beehive's contention that the NANP Order does not meet the requirements of section 251(e)(1) because it does not address toll free number administration.  X-In the NANP Order, we directed the NANC to provide recommendations on the following question: "What number resources, beyond those currently administered by the NANP  X-Administrator should the NANP Administrator administer?";<,  {Ow -ԍ Id. at 2610.; Our purpose in directing NANC to address this question was to develop a record with respect to commenters' suggestions that the new administrator assume additional responsibilities beyond those of the current NANP administrator, if necessary, to facilitate competition in telecommunications services. By asking this question and seeking recommendations from the NANC, we set into  XE-motion a process designed to foster competition in all telecommunications services, including  X0-toll free, through neutral numbering administration. While the NANP Order outlines broad objectives for number administration for all telecommunications services, the specific details"w<0*((" of implementation for toll free services are addressed in the ongoing toll free proceeding, CC Docket No. 95155.  X- B.` ` Delegation of Numbering Administration Functions  X-  X- 267. In this section, we address the role of state public utility commissions in numbering administration. We authorize states to perform the task of implementing new area  X_-codes subject to our numbering administration guidelines contained in the Ameritech Order  XJ-and further clarified in this Order  . We also incorporate the petition for declaratory ruling, the application for review, and the record in that proceeding and address the Texas Commission's pleadings regarding its plan for area code relief in Dallas and Houston which includes wireless overlays. We view prompt examination of the Texas Commission's plan as necessary because the area codes currently assigned to these cities have already reached  X -exhaust.= ,  yOR-ԍ Area code exhaust occurs when nearly all of the NXXs in a given numbering plan area (NPA) have been consumed. Area code exhaust is a subset of number exhaust, which describes the situation in which numbers used for any purpose to support telecommunications services are consumed. NPAs are known commonly as area codes. The second three digits of a telephone number are known as the NXX code or Central Office code (CO code) . Typically there are 792 NXX codes available for assignment in an area code (every possible combination of three digits excluding numbers beginning with a 0 or 1 and numbers ending with 11).  X - 1.` ` Delegation of Matters Related to Implementation of New Area Codes (#`  X}-` `  a.Background    XO- 268. Section 251(e)(1) confers upon the Commission "exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of the North American Numbering Plan that pertain to the United States," but states that "[n]othing in this paragraph shall preclude the Commission from delegating to state  X -commissions or other entities all or any portion of such jurisdiction."B> @,  yO-ԍ 47 U.S.C.  251(e)(1).B In response to this  X-provision, the Commission tentatively concluded in the NPRM that it should authorize state commissions to address matters involving the implementation of new area codes so long as  X-they act consistently with the Commission's numbering administration guidelines.A?,  {OH -ԍ NPRM at para. 256.A  X- ` `  b.Comments   Xk- 269. Most parties contend that the Commission should "retain [its] plenary authority over all facets of [numbering] administration with delegation to states of only certain limited"Txb ?0*(("  X-functions."@,  {Oy-ԍ ALTS comments at 8; See also Frontier comments at 5; GCI comments at 5; Indiana Commission Staff comments at 3; NYNEX comments at 18. PageNet urges that any delegation "should be clearly defined as to scope,  X-review standards, and decision time limits."@A",  yO-ԍ PageNet comments at 6. @ Similarly, Time Warner recommends that any  X-such delegation be accomplished in conformity with the Commission's guidelines.DB,  yO5-ԍ Time Warner comments at 18.D Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Mobile, while stating that states may be in the best position to implement area code relief tailored to the particular needs of their residents, warns that the Commission must intervene promptly when any state "departs from federal numbering policies prohibiting  Xv-discrimination against any type of carrier."OCvB,  yOi -ԍ Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Mobile reply at 2.O  XH- 270. While some commenters argue that the Ameritech Order strikes a "proper jurisdictional balance," permitting state commissions to make initial determinations regarding area code administration, subject to Commission review," others request further clarification  X -of the federal and state role in numbering.D ,  {O-ԍ See Ameritech Order, 10 FCC Rcd 4596.  See, e.g., AT&T reply at 7; Bell Atlantic comments at 9;  yOR-Pennsylvania Commission comments at 5; ACSI comments at 12.  The Texas Commission specifically requests that the "FCC clarify the states' roles in number administration by expanding on statements in  X -the Ameritech Order and elsewhere regarding the balance of authority between the FCC and  X -the states."QE , ,  yO-ԍ Texas Commission comments at 6.hhCQ  X -  X-` `  c.Discussion   Xf-271. We retain our authority to set policy with respect to all facets of numbering administration in the United States. By retaining authority to set broad policy on numbering administration matters, we preserve our ability to act flexibly and expeditiously on broad policy issues and to resolve any dispute related to numbering administration pursuant to the 1996 Act. While we retain this authority, we note that the numbering administration model  X-established in the NANP Order will allow interested parties to contribute to important policy recommendations.  X-272. We authorize the states to resolve matters involving the implementation of new area codes. State commissions are uniquely positioned to understand local conditions and what effect new area codes will have on those conditions. Each state's implementation method is, of course, subject to our guidelines for numbering administration, including the  XT-guidelines enumerated in the Ameritech Order and in this Order as detailed below. We note"Ty E0*((" that this authorization for states to resolve matters involving implementation of new area codes is effective immediately. Because of the need to avoid disruption in numbering administration, there is good cause for this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553  (d)(3). Some states have implemented new area codes prior to our release of this order. We ratify their actions insofar as they are consistent with these guidelines.  Xv-` ` 2. Area Code Implementation Guidelines   XH-` ` a.Background   X -273. When almost all of the central office (CO) codes in an area code are consumed, a new area code must be assigned to relieve the unmet demand for telephone numbers. Prior to the enactment of the 1996 Act, state commissions approved plans developed and proposed by the LECs, as CO code administrators, for implementing new area codes. New area codes can be implemented in three ways. Traditionally, states have preferred to implement new area codes through a geographic split, in which the geographic area using an existing area code is split into two parts, and roughly half of the telephone customers continue to be served through the existing area code and half must change to a new area code. States can, however, simply require a rearrangement of existing area code boundaries to accommodate local needs. The third method available to them is called an area code overlay, in which the new area code covers the same geographic area as an existing area code; customers in that area may thus be served through either code.  X-274. In the Ameritech Order, the Commission recognized the states' role in area code relief, attempted to clarify the balance of jurisdiction over numbering administration between the Commission and the states, and enumerated guidelines governing number administration.  X-Additionally, the Ameritech Order declared that Ameritech's proposed wirelessonly area code overlay would be unreasonably discriminatory and anticompetitive in violation of the  X-Commission's guidelines and the Communications Act of 1934. The NPRM sought comment on whether the Commission should reassess the jurisdictional balance between the  XT-Commission and the states that was crafted in the Ameritech Order in light of Congress' grant to the Commission of exclusive jurisdiction over numbering administration, with permission to  X(-assign to the states any portion of that authority.LF(,  {O-ԍ See 47 U.S.C.  251(e)(1).L The NPRM also sought comment on what action the Commission should take when a state appears to be acting inconsistently with the  X-Commission's numbering administration guidelines.AGZ,  {O#-ԍ NPRM at para. 257.A " zG0*(("  X-` ` b.Comments   X-275. Several commenters request that we clarify the Ameritech Order to prohibit  X-servicespecific overlays.H,  {O6-ԍ See, e.g., Cox comments at 6 n.11; PageNet comments at 23; SBC comments at 11; WinStar reply at 16; Vanguard reply at 5. Others request clarification about all area code overlays, not just servicespecific overlays. NCTA, for example, argues that all overlays deter the development of local competition. If competitors are relegated to new area codes, it says, potential customers will be forced to change their telephone numbers to obtain service from  Xa-competitors.<Ia",  yO4 -ԍ NCTA comments at 9.< NCTA adds that a customer is unlikely to trade a familiar code for a number that may appear to involve a toll charge, or to purchase additional lines from a competitor if  X3-those lines receive a different area code than other lines in their home or business.2J3,  {O-ԍ Id.2 Customers who do change to competing LECs, it claims, will have to dial ten or eleven digits to place local calls to incumbent LEC customers in the same local calling area. By contrast, NCTA maintains that incumbent LEC customers will be able to reach most other local  X -customers through traditional sevendigit dialing.WK D,  {O-ԍ Id. See also MFS comments at 89.W Sprint agrees that all overlays are  X -anticompetitive and argues that the industry should adopt a geographic split approach.L ,  {OG-ԍ Sprint reply at 13. See also Cox reply at 35; MCI comments at 11; WinStar reply at 17.  X-276. MCI urges the Commission to allow an overlay only when it is the only practical alternative, and suggests that such circumstances might include: (a) exhaust in a small metropolitan area; (b) multiple nearlysimultaneous area code exhausts; or (c) when exhaust is  XM-so imminent that a split cannot be implemented quickly enough.<MMh ,  yOf-ԍ MCI comments at 12.< Numerous commenters  X6-suggest that the Commission should clarify the Ameritech Order by imposing conditions on  X!-the adoption of area code overlays.N! ,  {O-ԍ See, e.g., Cox comments at 5, 6 n.12; MFS comments at 89; California Commission comments at 8; MCI comments at 1214; NCTA comments at 10; WinStar reply at 17. Suggested conditions include: (a) mandatory tendigit  X -dialing for all calls within the overlay area;O R ,  {O #-ԍ See, e.g., MFS comments at 89; California Commission comments at 8; MCI comments at 1213; WinStar reply at 17; PageNet comments at 8. (b) permanent service provider local number" {O0*((("  X-portability;P",  {Oy-ԍ See, e.g., MFS comments at 89; Cox comments at 5; California Commission comments at 8; MCI comments at 12 14 (overlays should be conditioned upon the substantial mitigation of the cost of interim local number portability to competing LECs pending the implementation of permanent local number portability); NCTA comments at 10; WinStar reply at 17. and (c) the reservation for each competing LEC authorized to operate within a numbering plan area (NPA) of at least one NXX code from the  X-original area code.Q,  {O5-ԍ See, e.g., MFS comments at 89; MCI comments at 1213 (all remaining NXXs in the old NPA should be assigned to competitors).  X-277. Cox asserts that area code overlays should be prohibited until the competitive  X-concerns they raise are addressed by the implementation of number portability.=R ,  yOJ -ԍ Cox comments at 34.= Similarly, PageNet asserts that number portability may render the concept of an area code meaningless;  X_-once location portability is feasible, numbers will be ported from one area code to another.^S\_,  yO-ԍ The term "port" means the transfer of a telephone number from one carrier's switch to another carrier's  {Ot-switch, which enables a customer to retain his or her number when transferring from one carrier to another. See   {O>-Number Portability Order at n.32.^  XH-When this happens, it says, public preference for a particular area code will disappear.=TH ,  yO-ԍ PageNet reply at 4. =  X -278. In the view of some, the Ameritech Order does not prohibit all area code overlays and they request clarification that overlays are an appropriate response to area code  X -exhaust.~U P ,  {O-ԍ See, e.g., Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Mobile reply at 46; BellSouth comments at 20. ~ In Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Mobile's view, for example, the Commission should not  X -prohibit overlays when they may be the best solution to area code exhaust.RV ,  yOj-ԍ Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Mobile reply at 46. R PacTel agrees that overlays are valuable and, in some metropolitan areas, are preferable to geographic splits because: (1) overlays do not require existing customers to change their numbers; (2) overlays maintain existing communities of interest in their existing geographical area code boundaries; (3) overlays do not change the boundaries of existing area codes; and (4) overlays take less  Xd-time to implement than a split.AWdr,  yO"-ԍ PacTel reply at 3132. A These are significant considerations for states facing  XM-number exhaust at an accelerated pace, it says.2XM,  {O%-ԍ Id.2 pp   X-279. According to some commenters, issues pertaining to area code relief plans should be addressed in the first instance by state commissions, with the understanding that the"|X0*((d"  X-Commission can intervene if necessary._Y,  {Oy-ԍ See, e.g., NYNEX reply at 12; GTE reply at 34. _ Similarly, the Texas Commission argues that the  X-Ameritech Order can and should be interpreted to allow for "innovative" means of area code relief crafted to balance the interests, benefits, and burdens for all interested parties. Should  X-the Commission determine that the Ameritech Order does not permit such an interpretation,  X-the Texas Commission requests that the Ameritech Order be overruled.ZZ,  yO-ԍ Texas Commission comments at 5. See our discussion below at paras. 294295 for the Texas Commission's proposed means of area code relief. By contrast,  X-Vanguard warns against allowing states too much latitude in interpreting the Ameritech Order. It argues that, if the Commission does not set boundaries for state action, the Commission's procompetitive objectives will remain unrealized as state regulators deprive Commission  XP-initiatives of their effect.B[P,  yO -ԍ Vanguard comments at 34.B  X" -280. Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Mobile states that, if states act inconsistently with  X -Commission guidance on numbering policies, the Commission should intervene promptly.O\ B,  yO-ԍ Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Mobile reply at 2.O The District of Columbia Commission urges that "on a showing that a particular state is acting in violation of FCC guidelines, the FCC may revoke its delegation of jurisdiction to that  X -state."W] ,  yOI-ԍ District of Columbia Commission comments at 2.W PageNet says the Commission should impose a strict time limit on state commission  X -review of relief plans.A^ b ,  yO-ԍ PageNet comments at 78.A Sprint advises that any party "retains the right to appeal any detrimental state commission mandate to the FCC, and . . . the FCC will act promptly on such  X-appeals."?_ ,  yO$-ԍ Sprint comments at 15.?   XS-` `  c.  Discussion .   X%-