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If you need the complete document, download the WordPerfect version or Adobe Acrobat version, if available. ***************************************************************** Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) AT&T Corp., et al., ) ) ) Complainants, ) ) File No. E-98-41 v. ) ) Ameritech Corporation, ) ) Defendant, ) ) and ) ) Qwest Communications Corporation, ) ) Defendant/Intervenor. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopted: June 30, 1998 ; Released June 30, 1998 By the Commission: I. INTRODUCTION 1. In this order, we consider a motion for interim relief in the form of a "standstill order," filed by AT&T Corp. (AT&T) and MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI) (together the "Petitioners") in the above-captioned complaint proceeding. The Petitioners ask that we enjoin the defendant Ameritech Corporation (Ameritech) from enrolling additional customers under its "teaming" agreement with Qwest Communications Corporation (Qwest), and refrain from further marketing and promoting of the "CompleteAccess" program under such agreement, pending a final determination by the Commission of the lawfulness of that agreement. Petitioners contend that by entering into a "teaming" agreement, which has been implemented through the CompleteAccess program, Ameritech is providing interLATA services in violation of section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act), and is in violation of its equal access and non- discrimination obligations under section 251(g) of the Act. Ameritech opposes Petitioners' motion. As discussed in detail below, we conclude that a standstill order is warranted in this case. II. BACKGROUND 2. Ameritech is a local telephone company that offers local exchange and other services in a five-state region in the midwest. As a Bell Operating Company (BOC), Ameritech is prohibited from providing interLATA service originating in its region under section 271 of the Act and is required to provide all interexchange carriers with equal access to its local exchange facilities under section 251(g) of the Act, which continued the equal access and non-discrimination obligations existing on the date before the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act). Qwest is a long distance telephone company that offers interexchange service in the United States. 3. On May 14, 1998, Ameritech and Qwest publicly announced their Complete Access program that offers to "residential and small business customers a combined local and long- distance package of services from a single source." Ameritech and Qwest have promoted this offering as "a competitively priced package of local and long distance services on one single, convenient bill, supported by a single customer service number." This package of Ameritech's local and intraLATA toll services combined with Qwest's interLATA services is offered pursuant to an agreement between Ameritech and Qwest entered into on May 6, 1998 ("Ameritech/Qwest Agreement"). The agreement permits Ameritech to market Qwest's interLATA long distance service to potential subscribers either independently or packaged with Ameritech's services, including local and intraLATA toll services. In exchange, Qwest pays to Ameritech an amount set by the agreement for each customer that Qwest acquires through Ameritech's marketing and promotion efforts, as well as for billing and collection services provided by Ameritech with respect to these customers. A similar agreement was earlier entered into between Qwest and U S West ("U S West/Qwest Agreement"). 4. On May 13, 1998, AT&T and MCI, along with other complainants, filed a lawsuit against U S West challenging the legality of the U S West/Qwest Agreement under sections 251(g) and 271 of the Act in the United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle (the "Washington District Court"). On May 14, 1998, the same day that Ameritech and Qwest announced the CompleteAccess program, AT&T and MCI, along with other complainants, filed a lawsuit against Ameritech in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (the "Illinois District Court"), similarly challenging the legality of the Ameritech/Qwest Agreement under sections 251(g) and 271 of the Act. 5. On June 4, 1998, the Washington District Court issued an order granting a request for preliminary injunction prohibiting any further marketing, promoting, or enrollment of additional customers under the U S West/Qwest Agreement and referring the questions of the legality of the U S West/Qwest Agreement under sections 251(g) and 271 to this Commission for determination in the first instance under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Washington District Court granted preliminary relief based upon a finding that plaintiffs had demonstrated "serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping sharply in their favor." On June 9, 1998, the Illinois District Court similarly referred the questions of the legality of the Ameritech/Qwest Agreement under sections 251(g) and 271 to this Commission for determination under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Illinois District Court denied AT&T's request for a preliminary injunction, noting that AT&T would have the opportunity to renew its request for interim relief before the Commission. 6. On June 11, 1998, the Common Carrier Bureau (Bureau) released a Public Notice establishing expedited procedures for the Commission's consideration of the issues referred by both the Illinois and Washington District Courts. Pursuant to the Public Notice, AT&T and MCI, along with other complainants, filed a consolidated complaint against Ameritech on June 15, 1998, which included, inter alia, AT&T and MCI's request for a standstill order pending a final determination on the merits by the Commission. On June 16, 1998, the Bureau released a Public Notice modifying the pleading schedule in part. On June 17, 1998, Qwest moved to intervene in this proceeding in support of Ameritech. The Bureau granted Qwest's motion. Ameritech and Qwest filed oppositions to the request for interim relief on June 22, 1998, to which AT&T and MCI filed a reply on June 24, 1998. III. DISCUSSION Contentions of the Parties 7. Petitioners present two alternative rationales in support of their request for a standstill order pending final action by the Commission on the complaint. Petitioners argue that a standstill order is appropriate in this case because the Commission has already determined that there are "'serious questions as to whether the terms of Ameritech's agreement with Qwest, in effect, make Ameritech a provider of long-distance service in violation of section 271,'" and that "'there is also a significant issue as to whether the Ameritech-Qwest agreement is consistent with Ameritech's responsibility to provide equal access to its facilities to all long distance carriers.'" Petitioners state that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. establishes the Commission's authority to enter a standstill order while it considers the merits of a proceeding. 8. Alternatively, Petitioners contend that grant of an interim standstill order is supported by an examination of the facts under the four principles generally cited by the courts and the Commission in determining whether to grant a stay or other injunctive relief. Petitioners assert that they have established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits because the Ameritech/Qwest Agreement and Ameritech's actions under the agreement demonstrate that Ameritech is providing prohibited interLATA service and wrongfully preferring Qwest over other long distance carriers (IXCs) in violation of sections 271 and 251(g) of the Act, respectively. Next, Petitioners assert that they, along with other carriers, will be irreparably harmed by their loss of customers and goodwill that cannot be adequately compensated for by monetary damages due to the substantial marketplace impact that is likely to result from Ameritech's further implementation of the agreement. Next, Petitioners maintain that prohibiting Ameritech from continuing to implement the Ameritech/Qwest Agreement would not irreparably harm Ameritech because it will be able to resume its marketing activities immediately in the event the agreement is ultimately deemed lawful. Petitioners add that a standstill order will not prevent Qwest from continuing to market its long distance offerings to customers in Ameritech's region at the rates specified in the Ameritech/Qwest Agreement. Finally, Petitioners argue that entry of an interim standstill order will protect the public interest because implementation of such an agreement will distort both local and long distance telecommunications markets in a short period of time. 9. Ameritech opposes this motion, arguing as an initial matter that the Commission lacks authority under section 4(i) to halt the ongoing "teaming" activities of Ameritech and Qwest absent a determination, following a hearing under section 312 of the Act, that such activities are unlawful. Ameritech contends that Southwestern Cable stands only for the proposition that the Commission may order parties to refrain from "expanding" conduct that is ongoing at the time an interim relief order is issued. Ameritech contends that Petitioners may not use section 4(i) to deprive Ameritech of the procedural protections Congress intended to provide in section 312. 10. Ameritech argues further that, even if the Commission is deemed to have authority to grant the relief Petitioners seek, the facts of this case do not support such relief under the four criteria traditionally relied upon by the courts and the Commission. Ameritech asserts that Petitioners have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. According to Ameritech, the Ameritech/Qwest Agreement was carefully crafted to comport with sections 271 and 251(g) of the Act. Ameritech maintains that it is not selling its own in-region interLATA services under the agreement, and has made the agreement available to other IXCs on a non-discriminatory basis -- the basic tenets of sections 271 and 251(g). Next, Ameritech argues that Petitioners have not demonstrated they will suffer irreparable harm absent interim relief, because (1) the loss of customers can be adequately compensated for with monetary damages, (2) the loss of customers to price competition does not equate to loss of goodwill, and (3) the potential loss of goodwill does not constitute irreparable harm. Ameritech asserts that it, on the other hand, will suffer irreparable harm if interim relief is ordered because Ameritech's reputation will be damaged by being required to inform inquiring customers that it is legally precluded from making available a service that it has publicly announced. Finally, Ameritech contends that the public interest will be harmed by an interim relief order because the ability of competitive IXCs such as Qwest to inform the public of their competitive offerings will be limited and, as a result, consumers will be deprived of the benefits of the lower prices offered by IXCs other than AT&T and MCI. 11. Ameritech also opposes the grant of the relief sought by Petitioners on constitutional grounds. It contends that any interpretation of sections 271 and 251(g) of the Act that invalidates Ameritech's marketing of Qwest's long distance service would render the Act in violation of the First Amendment. Citing to numerous cases in which the courts have upheld the dissemination of commercial messages about products and services, Ameritech argues that Petitioners' "version of the Act 'constitutes a blanket prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product,' designed to 'serve[] an end related to consumer protection.'" Ameritech argues that even if there existed a compelling purpose in regulating Ameritech's speech, such regulation by the government may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government purpose. According to Ameritech, the speech restriction that Petitioners read into the Act would render the Act unconstitutional because it would do nothing to further the Act's goal of promoting competition in telecommunications. 12. In reply, Petitioners describe as frivolous Ameritech's First Amendment claims. Petitioners argue that to the extent the Commission finds that Ameritech has violated the Act by entering into a teaming arrangement with Qwest, Ameritech's marketing speech is not protected by the First Amendment. Petitioners add that under Ameritech's reasoning, the equal access and line of business restrictions that were in place under the MFJ for more than a decade were invalid restrictions on its First Amendment rights. Discussion A. Standard for Issuance of Interim Relief 13. In our recent Order establishing rules of procedure to govern formal complaint proceedings, we concluded that it is appropriate "to consider requests for interim or injunctive relief on a case-by-case basis," and we expressly declined to delineate procedural requirements or a single evidentiary standard applicable to all requests for interim injunctive relief or other emergency orders. However, the Commission and the federal courts generally consider the four criteria set forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers to evaluate requests for preliminary injunctive relief: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm absent the grant of preliminary relief; (3) the degree of injury to other parties if relief is granted; and (4) that the issuance of the order will further the public interest. We conclude here that a balancing of these criteria is appropriate. Although not mandated by the Communications Act, the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers standard is consistent with the standard previously used by the Commission in the standstill order affirmed by the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable, where the Commission assessed the seriousness of the legal questions and the interests of the public and the private parties involved. 14. In applying the four criteria, we recognize that no single factor is necessarily dispositive. For example, a compelling demonstration that the public interest would be irreparably harmed lessens the level of certainty required of a moving party to show that it will prevail on the merits. Indeed, the court in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers recognized the relative importance of the four criteria will vary depending upon the circumstances, noting that "[i]n litigation involving the administration of regulatory statutes designed to promote the public interest, this factor necessarily becomes crucial." In evaluating essentially the same question presented to us, the Washington District Court issued a preliminary injunction upon concluding that petitioners "have shown serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping sharply in their favor." We reach the same conclusion in this instance. B. The Merits 15. The Commission has not affirmatively addressed whether agreements like the Complete Access program are permitted under the Act. Petitioners have alleged that the Complete Access program (1) violates Ameritech's equal access and nondiscrimination obligations under section 251(g) of the Act, and (2) constitutes the provision of in-region interLATA service in violation of section 271 of the Act. While not reaching any determination here as to the ultimate merits of the arguments, we conclude that petitioners have raised serious questions involving core provisions of the Act. In deciding whether the terms of this agreement must be suspended during the pendency of our consideration, we must be cognizant that such an agreement could have a significant impact on the competitive landscape in these markets that is potentially inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the Act. For example, section 271 is central to the statutory scheme Congress adopted to promote competition in telecommunications because this section specifies how the largest local telephone companies may enter the lucrative long distance market, namely, by opening their local markets to competition. The Commission's obligation is to ensure that the competitive landscape is not changed in ways that contravene the Act. Because this agreement could cause significant changes to the competitive landscape in the local exchange and long distance markets and because we find the petitioners raise serious questions regarding whether the agreement violates the Act, we conclude that these issues must be addressed before any lasting effects resulting from this agreement take place in these markets. 16. Petitioners make several arguments to support their assertion that Ameritech has violated its equal access and nondiscrimination obligations under section 251(g). First, they urge that by actively recommending Qwest to its local customers and providing Qwest with various operational benefits not available to other long distance carriers, Ameritech is unlawfully favoring Qwest and endorsing Qwest's services over those of other carriers, contrary to MFJ precedent. Ameritech responds that its marketing of Qwest is comparable to that which we permit under section 272 on behalf of a long distance affiliate after a BOC has satisfied the requirements of section 271. 17. Second, petitioners urge that even if Ameritech were to make its arrangement available to other long distance carriers, such an arrangement would require such carriers to pay for nondiscriminatory treatment to which they are entitled by law -- in effect, compelling long distance carriers to pay Ameritech for marketing and other services in order to remain competitive. Ameritech asserts in response that it need not tailor its arrangements to satisfy the needs of all long distance providers. 18. Third, petitioners deny that Ameritech's arrangement is or could ever be made available to long distance carriers on an equal basis. They argue that because the Qwest arrangement precludes Qwest from providing intraLATA toll service, such an arrangement clearly favors those carriers that do not offer intraLATA toll service in competition with Ameritech. In effect, Petitioners urge that Ameritech unlawfully would extract from its competitors the substantial concession that they cease competing in the intraLATA toll market as a quid pro quo for access to this arrangement, in violation of the nondiscrimination requirements of 251(g). Further, they argue that the arrangement is tailor-made only for those long distance carriers that have no retail marketing, billing, or collection units, and little name recognition, and that therefore would not object to paying Ameritech for those services. We conclude that these arguments set forth by petitioners raise serious questions, many of first impression, as to whether the arrangement under consideration violates the equal access and nondiscrimination requirements of section 251(g) of the Act. 19. Petitioners also argue that through its arrangement with Qwest, Ameritech is violating the prohibition in section 271 that a Bell operating company may not provide interLATA services until it has satisfied the requirements of that section. Petitioners argue that by (1) designing a package of services including long distance, (2) selecting the long-distance carrier, (3) negotiating and controlling the price for the long distance services to be offered under the package, (4) performing all marketing and billing functions, (5) providing the point of contact for all customer care relating to the long distance service, and (6) shaping the package so as to preclude the long distance carrier from offering intraLATA toll services, Ameritech is providing long distance service within the meaning of section 271 of the Act. Ameritech responds that it is not in violation of the Act because Qwest provides the actual interLATA transmission. Ameritech further denies any "direct financial stake" in Qwest's provision of interLATA services. Nonetheless, we consider the questions raised by petitioners to be serious. 20. Petitioners suggest that it could not have been the intent of Congress to permit a BOC to wield local monopoly power to shape competition in the long distance markets, while simultaneously reinforcing its customer base in the intraLATA toll market. In addition, petitioners argue that Ameritech "will effectively be cross-subsidizing the competitive efforts of a single long- distance carrier," and, as such, will engage in the provision of long distance service. Ameritech disputes that its behavior is anti-competitive and that any cross-subsidies exist. We find these questions to be serious ones. 21. Finally, we note that while the parties each have relied upon various cases that may affect our interpretation of the meaning of sections 251(g) and 271, the parties hotly dispute what is the appropriate precedential effect of those cases and, indeed, the principles to be extracted from them. What is evident is that the serious questions presented by the case before us now have not previously been decided, and merit serious consideration as we move forward expeditiously with this proceeding. C. The Equities 22. Having found that the Petitioners raise serious questions going to the merits of the dispute before us, we move to the second part of our inquiry, a balancing of the hardships, to determine whether a standstill order is warranted in this case. We examine the threat of irreparable harm absent the grant of preliminary relief, the degree of injury to other parties if relief is granted, and whether the issuance of the order will further the public interest. In balancing the factors we emphasize, as did the court in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers, that "[i]n litigation involving the administration of regulatory statutes designed to promote the public interest, this factor necessarily becomes crucial. The interests of private litigants must give way to the realization of public purposes." 23. In enjoining a similar agreement between US West and Qwest, the district court in Seattle concluded that, if the agreement were found unlawful, "to undo or rectify the damage would be extremely difficult." "On the other hand," the court continued, "if the teaming agreement is upheld, the marketing program can be resumed." Furthermore, the court added, "if the agreement violates the Telecommunications Act, it will harm consumers' interests, as identified by Congress, because of its anti-competitive nature." We find "a balance of hardships tipping sharply in . . . favor" of a standstill order for essentially the same reasons. 24. In the 1996 Act, as a key part of its new framework for transitioning local telephone markets to competition, Congress explicitly prohibited the BOCs from providing in-region interLATA services unless and until they show to the Commission that they have met certain conditions, including a showing that they have satisfied certain market opening requirements. The Commission has previously rejected Ameritech's application to enter the Michigan long distance market after determining that Ameritech had not yet complied with the requirements of Congress's competitive checklist. As discussed above, Ameritech's agreement with Qwest raises serious questions as to whether Ameritech's actions under the agreement constitute the provision of long distance services and thus circumvent the prohibition in section 271 and our order denying Ameritech's Michigan application. If we allow Ameritech to continue to implement its arrangement, and then ultimately find the arrangement unlawful, Ameritech would already have provided in-region interLATA service without authorization, in violation of the careful balance Congress sought to strike in section 271. We find that allowing the agreement to go forward before these important questions of lawfulness are resolved imposes a strong risk of upsetting the balance struck by Congress in section 271. In fact, in the absence of a standstill order it will be virtually impossible to "unscramble" the effects of the agreement and return to the current status quo. These important public interest factors, viewed in light of the significant questions regarding the legality of the agreement, weigh heavily in favor of granting the standstill order. 25. Moreover, as we found in Midwest, a standstill order is warranted where the circumstances are such that it would be impracticable to "withdraw[] service, once established, because of its disruptive effect." Once a customer is receiving service under the terms of the Ameritech- Qwest agreement, it would be similarly impracticable to require that customer to switch carriers in the event the agreement is found to be illegal (assuming we have the authority to do that); or, alternatively, disruptive to advise the customer that the specific package under which it has sought service is no longer available. Ameritech does not dispute that it is poised to market the CompleteAccess program aggressively and that such marketing would likely result in substantial market gains, similar to those experienced by U S West as a result of its arrangement with Qwest. The prospects for substantial migration by consumers to the CompleteAccess program increases the potential for widespread customer uncertainty and confusion in the event Ameritech is ultimately determined to be providing prohibited interLATA services and/or discriminating against other IXCs in favor of Qwest. 26. We are not persuaded by Ameritech's counter-argument that a standstill order will deprive consumers of the benefits of competitive prices and better services while the Commission considers the merits of the complaint. Ameritech's principal claim in this regard appears to be that if customers are selecting the CompleteAccess program in substantial numbers, then the public interest dictates that the program continue. We disagree. In the first place, if we issue a standstill order Qwest could still market its services to consumers in Ameritech's region at the rates reflected in the CompleteAccess program. Only Ameritech's role will be curtailed; Qwest will be free to continue to offer the rates contemplated in the "teaming" arrangements. Consumers may thus continue to have access to the rates contemplated in the agreement. Moreover, as the district court in Seattle concluded, "if the agreement violates the Telecommunications Act, it will harm consumer interests, as identified by Congress, because of its anti-competitive nature." In other words, if the agreement is an unlawful circumvention of Congress's framework for encouraging local competition, it harms consumers by reducing Ameritech's incentive to take the Congressionally mandated steps to open its local telephone markets to competition. 27. With respect to the interests of the parties, we recognize that either the petitioners or Ameritech will suffer some degree of harm depending on whether we issue a standstill order here. On balance, however, we find that the potential harm to Petitioners is substantially greater than any harm to Ameritech caused by mere delay. Petitioners are already losing customers to Ameritech/Qwest and, if we do not order a standstill, they are likely to continue to do so. If we later find the agreement to be unlawful, it will be very difficult to remedy these losses without serious disruptions in service to the public and, indeed, it is possible that customers who have migrated to Ameritech/Qwest pursuant to the agreement will never return to their previous carriers. Thus, Petitioners may not be able to obtain full recovery of their losses if we do not issue the standstill order. We are also concerned that, in the absence of a standstill order, Petitioners may in effect be compelled to alter their own marketing practices in ways that may be substantial and irreversible. On the other hand, a standstill order will prevent Ameritech, for a time, from offering the CompleteAccess program, receiving marketing payments from Qwest, and benefitting from potentially increased intraLATA toll revenues. This delay in realizing these benefits does not outweigh the Petitioners' losses. Moreover, we give little weight to Ameritech's argument that it will suffer injury to its reputation because of a delay in offering a program announced with substantial fanfare. Even if such damage to reputation would result, it would not outweigh the competing interests we have identified. We underscore here that the interim relief granted herein does not prejudge whether the "teaming" arrangement is lawful, and we presume that Ameritech will make this point clear to its customers and the public. If the Ameritech/Qwest Agreement is determined to be lawful, Ameritech will, of course, be able to resume its marketing of the CompleteAccess program. We have established an expedited pleading schedule and anticipate a prompt resolution of the merits. 28. We conclude, therefore, that the balance of hardships, particularly the potential for harm to the public interest, tips sharply in favor of ordering a standstill. Allowing the agreement to go forward runs the risk that the local and long distance markets will be changed in ways that Congress did not intend, and that will substantially harm the Petitioners, and ultimately the public as well. These factors substantially outweigh any potential harm to Ameritech resulting from a delay in implementing its program. 29. In addition, we reject Ameritech's contention that issuance of a standstill order would violate its First Amendment rights. In the first place, the order targets the service contemplated by the CompleteAccess program -- not the marketing of the program in and of itself. The Supreme Court "has never . . . deemed [it] an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language . . . ." In any event, even if the order incidentally reaches Ameritech's commercial speech, there is no First Amendment violation here. The D.C. Circuit recently upheld section 274 of the Act against a First Amendment challenge on the grounds that "it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests." It cannot reasonably be denied that Congress's interest in managing an orderly transition to competition in the local telephone markets is an important one. Sections 271 and 251(g) advance that goal by setting forth a detailed framework for the transition that places restrictions on the services BOCs may provide in the absence of local competition in order to provide a strong incentive for the BOCs to open the local markets. As explained above, the public interest weighs heavily in favor of a standstill order while the Commission decides the significant questions as to the agreement's legality under these provisions. 30. The Commission recognizes that it is in the interest of the parties and the public generally to resolve these important questions quickly, and we are committed to doing so. In particular, we recognize that it is important, as a general matter, to resolve matters of this nature quickly so as not to impede unduly the development of potentially procompetitive new business arrangements. As such, the interim relief granted herein will terminate 90 days after adoption of this Order unless the Commission resolves the questions at issue or otherwise takes further action. We will not hesitate to extend the duration of the relief granted here if we determine that the complexity and novelty of the issues, the volume of the record filed, or other pertinent circumstances warrant. We underscore, however, that we remain committed to resolving the issues presented by the parties as expeditiously as possible, and we will make every effort to do so. IV. CONCLUSION 31. Sections 251(g) and 271 are core provisions of the Act, adopted as part of the 1996 Act and central to the Congressional policy regarding competition in telecommunications markets. We conclude that the strong public interest in preserving the balance struck by Congress in the 1996 Act during the transition to competition and the interest in preventing potential customer confusion weigh strongly in favor of issuing a standstill order in this case. Any harm to Ameritech as a result of a standstill order does not outweigh these concerns. We therefore conclude that a standstill order shall issue. Specifically, we direct Ameritech to suspend enrollment of additional customers to the CompleteAccess program, as well as all marketing and promotion of the program, for ninety days from the date of release of this order unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. This standstill order does not require Ameritech to discontinue service under the CompleteAccess program to those subscribers that are already taking service under CompleteAccess, or have contracted to take service under CompleteAccess, as of the date of this order. V. ORDERING CLAUSES 32. IT IS ORDERED pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 208, 251(g), 271 and 303(r) of the Act, 47 U.S.C.  151, 154(i), 154(j), 208, 251(g), 271, 303(r), that the Motion for Interim Relief in the Form of a Standstill Order filed by AT&T and MCI IS GRANTED to the extent indicated herein. 33. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon release of this order, Ameritech SHALL NOT enroll additional customers in, nor market or promote, the CompleteAccess program for ninety days from the date of release of this order unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. 34. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ameritech's Petition for En Banc Hearing Prior to Disposition of Motion for Interim Relief and Petitioners' Opposition to Petition for En Banc Hearing Prior to Disposition of Motion for Interim Relief ARE DISMISSED as moot. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Magalie Roman Salas Secretary