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If you need the complete document, download the WordPerfect version or Adobe Acrobat version, if available. ***************************************************************** Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 In re Applications of ) CC DOCKET NO. 91-142 ) ALGREG CELLULAR ENGINEERING ) File No. 10607-CL-P-307-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 307, Alabama 1-Franklin ) ) CRANFORD CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10611-CL-P-311-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 311, Alabama 5- Clebur ) ) NEW ERA CELLULAR ) File No. 10563-CL-P-332-A-89 TELE-COMMUNICATIONS ) ) For facilities in the Domestic Publ Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 332, Arkansas 9- Polk ) ) BAY CELLULAR OF FLORIDA ) File No. 10754-CL-P-497-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 497, Mississippi 5- ) Washington ) ) FLORIDA CELLULAR ) File No. 10445-CL-P-505-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 505, Missouri 2- Harriso ) ) A-1 CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10454-CL-P-514-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 514, Missouri 11- Moniteau ) BRAVO CELLULAR ) File No. 10673-CL-P-579-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 579, ) North Carolina 15 - Cabarrus ) ) ALPHA CELLULAR ) File No. 10909-CL-P-586-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 586, Ohio 2 - Sandus ) ) CEL-TEL COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10912-CL-P-589-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 589, Ohio 5- Hancock ) ) EJM CELLULAR PARTNERS ) File No. 10567-CL-P-596-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 596, Oklahoma 1 - Cimarron ) ) PINELLAS COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10808-CL-P-613-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 613, Pennsylvania 2 - ) McKean ) ) CENTAUR PARTNERSHIP ) File No. 10720-CL-P-631-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 631, South Carolina 7 - ) Calhoun ) ) SIGNAL CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10721-CL-P-632-A89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 632, South Carolina 8 - ) Hampton ) ) A-1 CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10409-CL-P-661-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 661, Texas 10 - Navarro ) ) EJM CELLULAR PARTNERS ) File No. 10116-CL-P-721-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 721, Wyoming 4- Niobrar ) ) SATELLITE CELLULAR SYSTEMS ) File No. 10037-CL-P-318-A-89 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 318, Arizona 1 - Mohave, ) for Station KNKN 268 ) ) JAYBAR COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10042-CL-P-323-A-88 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 323, Arizona 6 - Graham, ) for Station KNKN 251 ) ) DATA CELLULAR SYSTEMS ) File No. 10029-CL-P-345-A-88 ) File No. 07080-CL-P-MP-91 For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 345, California 10 - Sierra, ) for Station KNKN 250 ) ) CELLULAR PACIFIC ) File No. 10031-CL-P-346-A-88 ) File No. 06606-CL-MP-90 ) File No. 06688-CL-MP-90 For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 346, California 11 - ) El Dorado, for Station KNKN 252 ) NORTH AMERICAN CELLULAR ) File No. 10066-CL-P-388-A-88 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 388, Idaho 1 - Boundary, ) for Station KNKN 253 ) ) ALPHA CELLULAR ) File No. 10318-CL-P-410-A-88 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 410, Indiana 8 - Brown, for ) Station KNKN 340 ) ) For assignment of Station KNKN 340 in the ) File No. 04924-CL-AL-1-90 340 in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 410, Indiana 8, RSA ) ) ALEE CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS ) File No. 10074-CL-P-555-A-88 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 555, New Mexico 3 - ) Catron for Station KNKN 271 ) ) CRYSTAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS ) File No. 10078-CL-P-606-A-88 ) For facilities in the Domestic Public Cellular ) Telecommunications Radio Service on Frequency ) Block A, in Market 606, Oregon 1 - Clatsop, ) for Station KNKN 309 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopted: May 20, 1997 ; Released: June 3, 1997 By the Commission: 1. By this action, we grant in part and deny in part applications for review of Algreg Cellular Engineering, 6 FCC Rcd 2921 (CCB 1991) (HDO), designating the above-captioned applications for hearing and ordering those with authorizations to show cause why their authorizations should not be revoked, and of the Review Board's Decision in Algreg Cellular Engineering, 9 FCC Rcd 5098 (Rev. Bd. 1994), recon. denied, 9 FCC Rcd 6753 (Rev. Bd. 1994), affirming, 7 FCC Rcd 8686 (ALJ 1992). We reverse the Bureau's determinations in the HDOthat participation in risk-sharing arrangements renders the applications defective and reflects adversely on licensees' qualifications, and we set aside the Review Board's decision dismissing the applications and revoking the licenses on this basis. Of the above captioned applications, we find that those filed by EJM, Centaur and Bravo cannot be granted on the record before us and remand them to the Bureau for expedited consideration. We grant the remaining applications and terminate the revocation proceeding with respect to all of the above-captioned licensees, except for Alee. We find that, although Alee's ownership structure complies fully with 47 U.S.C.  310(b), as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, its lack of candor concerning its alien general partner mandates revocation of its license. Finally, we conclude that only the settlement agreement involving Alpha Cellular's pending application for the Ohio 2 Rural Service Area (RSA) market requires Commission approval, and we hold that settlement agreement in abeyance pending further submissions by the parties. I. BACKGROUND 2. Cellular applications filed in 428 RSA markets between July 1988 and January 1989 included two groups, the "East Coast" and the "West Coast," that were prepared by The Cellular Corporation (TCC). Fourteen applications prepared by TCC won RSA lotteries. (Algreg Cellular Engineering, Cranford Cellular Communications, New-Era Cellular Tele-communications, Bay Cellular of Florida, Florida Cellular, A-1 Cellular Communications, Bravo Cellular, TNT, Alpha Cellular, Cel-Tel Communications, EJM Cellular Partners, Pinellas Communications, Centaur Partnership, and Signal Cellular Communications [hereinafter the Applicants].) Nine applications prepared by TCC received RSA authorizations (Satellite Cellular Systems, Jaybar Communications, Data Cellular Systems, Cellular Pacific, North American Cellular, Alpha, Edison, Alee Cellular, and Crystal Communications [hereinafter the Licensees].) 3. With the exception of Alpha, each Applicant filed amendments and each of those with authorizations informed the Commission that they had entered into an agreement styled as the "Mutual Contingent Risk-Sharing Agreement" (MCRSA) from October 28, 1989 through November 28, 1989. Alpha filed an informational statement reporting that it had been erroneously identified as a MCRSA signatory. Subsequent amendments filed by all except Alpha reported either that the agreement was rescinded or that its partners had voted to rescind it. HDO, 6 FCC Rcd at 2424  9. 4. Drafted by TCC's attorney, William J. Franklin, two MCRSAs, one signed by the East Coast partnerships and one signed by the West Coast partnerships, linked the signatories. The East and West Coast Agreements are identical in all material respects. Each provides that the licensee retains ownership and control of the cellular system, but it accords each signatory the right to receive income and sales proceeds from any party to the Agreements whose RSA application is granted. Specifically, the Agreements state that beginning three years after commencement of the commercial operation of any cellular system, 50 percent of any "distributed income proceeds" from that operation will be distributed to the other signatories. The Agreements further provide that, depending upon the amount of any income proceeds already distributed to the signatories, they will receive up to 50 percent of "distributed sales proceeds" if the licensee decides to sell the cellular system. In addition, each signatory has the right to inspect the licensee's books and records, the right to review material contracts relating to any proposed sale of the cellular system, and the right to receive regular certified financial statements. II. HEARING DESIGNATION AND SHOW CAUSE ORDER 5. On May 29, 1991, the Common Carrier Bureau designated for consolidated hearing the above-captioned RSA cellular applications and ordered those with authorizations to show cause why their authorizations should not be revoked. Algreg Cellular Engineering, 6 FCC Rcd 2921 (CCB 1991). Construing the MCRSA as an arrangement among fewer than all the applicants in these markets according the parties reciprocal interests in each others' applications, the Bureau found that the Agreements violate 47 C.F.R.  22.33(b)(2), which prohibits partial settlements among nonwireline RSA applicants. HDO, 6 FCC Rcd at 2925  13. Those Agreements entered into after the filing of an application were also found to violate 47 C.F.R.  22.922, which bans the transfer of interests in pending nonwireline RSA applications. Id. at 2925  20. Additionally, the Bureau found a violation of 47 C.F.R.  22.921(b), which prohibits cross ownership interests in competing nonwireline applications for the same RSA market. It concluded that, as a matter of law, the reciprocal right to share profits or sale proceeds and the right to inspect the licensee's books conferred by the Agreements are ownership interests within the meaning of section 22.921(b). Id. at  17, 19. Because it did not want to encourage unchecked rule violations, the Bureau refused to credit the parties' efforts to rescind the Agreement, which occurred after the lotteries had been held. Id. at 2926  23. 6. The Bureau also specified a reporting issue against those Licensees who signed the MCRSAs after filing their applications to determine whether any of them had violated 47 C.F.R.  1.65 by not timely amending their then-pending applications to report their subsequent execution of the Agreements. 6 FCC Rcd at 2926, 2928  22, 43. On the other hand, those Licensees who signed the Agreements before filing their applications were found to have falsely certified their applications, in violation of 47 C.F.R.  22.923(b)(7), to the extent that their applications did not disclose their participation in the MCRSA. Id. at 2925  20. Under section 22.923(b)(7) an applicant must certify, inter alia, that there are no undisclosed agreements granting anyone else a direct or indirect ownership interest in the application. 7. Having determined that the Agreements violated the prohibitions against partial settlements, against cross-ownership interests in competing nonwireline RSA applications, and against the transfer of interests in pending nonwireline RSA applications and that the parties' rescission efforts could not be credited, the Bureau concluded that any Applicant who entered such an agreement, or otherwise took actions making it a party to the MCRSA's risk-sharing provisions, has filed a defective application that must be dismissed without regard to any mitigation evidence. Id. at 2927-28  39 & nn. 34, 26. It therefore specified a single issue against the Applicants to determine their involvement in the MCRSAs. Id. at  42. 8. Additionally, the Bureau concluded that participation in the risk-sharing Agreements could reflect adversely on the Licensees' qualifications, but that, standing alone, this would not necessarily be grounds for revocation. Id. at 2928  40. It therefore initiated revocation proceedings and issued a show cause order against those signatories to the Agreements whose authorizations had already been granted. Id. at  37-38. It invoked 47 U.S.C.  312(a) of the Communications Act, which permits revocation because of conditions coming to the attention of the Commission that would have warranted denial of the original application. Finally, the Show Cause Order included lack of candor and alien ownership issues against Alee. Id. at 2928, 2931  43, n.24. 9. Party status was granted to the Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau, the law firm of Pepper & Corazzini, and to the following entities that had filed petitions to deny or dismiss the pending applications and/or to revoke the authorizations: Applicants Against Lottery Abuses (AALA), The Committee for A Fair Lottery (CFL), Buckhead Cellular Communications Partnership (Buckhead), and Cole Raywid & Braverman (Cole). Id. at  48. AALA, CFL, and Cole were deemed to have standing because they are or comprise mutually exclusive applicants in markets in which mutually exclusive applications are pending. Id. at 2930 n.8. III. REVIEW BOARD DECISION 10. The Board affirmed the ALJ's determination, Algreg Cellular Engineering, 7 FCC Rcd 8686 (ALJ 1992), that each of the Licensees and each of the Applicants was a willing participant in TCC's risk-sharing scheme. It therefore summarily dismissed the fifteen cellular applications for the RSA markets that were filed by thirteen applicants: Algreg, Cranford, New Era, Bay, Florida Cellular, A-1 Cellular (two applications), Bravo, Alpha, Cel-Tel, EJM (two applications), Pinellas, Centaur, and Signal. It likewise revoked the RSA cellular authorizations held by Satellite, Jaybar, Data, Pacific, North American, Alpha, Alee, and Crystal. In dismissing the applications and revoking the licenses, the Board, like the ALJ, had no occasion to address arguments that the Bureau erred in determining in the HDO that the MCRSA violated several RSA rules. The Board properly concluded that the issue of whether the specific rules were violated, as opposed to the consequences of such violations, was beyond its jurisdiction under Frank H. Yemm, 39 RR 2d 1657 (1977). See also Atlantic Broadcasting Co., 5 FCC 2d 717, 721 (1966). 11. The Board also affirmed the ALJ's determination that Alee's application, as originally filed, exceeded the limits on alien ownership set forth in section 310(b)(3) of the Communications Act, but it did not address the related candor issue. 9 FCC Rcd 5098, 5147  80. The Board agreed with the ALJ that the section 310(b)(3) violation was an independent basis for revoking Alee's cellular authorization. Id. at 5150  86. 12. In addition, the Board certified to the Commission for its consideration a request for approval of a settlement agreement between Crystal and intervenors Buckhead Cellular Communications, Cellular Applicants' Coalition, Miller Communications, Inc., Skywave Partners, Inc., Thomas Domencich, Committee for A Fair Lottery, Applicants Against Lottery Abuses, and ZDT Partnership (hereafter Petitioners), under which Petitioners would withdraw from participating in issues that relate exclusively to the Oregon 1 RSA market. A similar agreement has been reached with Alpha, the selectee for the Indiana 8 market, and the licensee for the Ohio 2 market. IV. APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW 13. Of the thirteen applicants and eight licensees, all except New Era seek Commission review. As New Era did not file an application for review, the dismissal of its cellular application for the Arkansas 9 - Polk market is final. New Era is therefore deleted from the caption. 14. In their Applications for Review, the Applicants and the Licensees allege that the Bureau committed a number of procedural and substantive errors in designating the pending applications for hearing and ordering those with authorizations to show cause why their authorizations should not be revoked. They also challenge the Review Board's determination to summarily dismiss the applications and revoke the licenses on this basis. In addition, Alee appeals the Board's determination that alien ownership is an independent basis for revoking Alee's license and the ALJ's determination that Alee lacked candor concerning its alien general partner. V. DISCUSSION 1. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 15. We affirm the Bureau's consolidation of the application and revocation proceedings and its decision to allow Petitioners to participate in that consolidated proceeding. By virtue of the fact that their authorizations have become final, the Licensees are in a somewhat different legal position than the Applicants and the designated issues properly reflect that difference. However, the factual foundation underlying those issues -- that is, the risk-sharing scheme and the steps taken to implement that scheme -- is identical for the Applicants and the Licensees. Parallel evidentiary proceedings would have entailed an unacceptable and unnecessary drain on the Commission's resources, particularly given the number of parties allegedly involved in the risk-sharing agreements. 16. The Licensees concede that, with the exception of Pepper & Corazzini, the intervenors may have standing to participate in the Applicant portion of the proceeding to the extent that they filed applications that are mutually exclusive with the pending applications. Cf.Orange Park v. FCC, 811 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Virginia Communications, Inc., 2 FCC Rcd 1895 (1987). As noted above, the MCRSAs were drafted by TCC's attorney, William Franklin. Franklin was formerly associated with the law firm of Pepper & Corazzini, and various lawsuits have been filed against the law firm as a result of Franklin's involvement with the risk-sharing scheme at issue in this adjudicatory proceeding. The outcome of this proceeding is likely to have an impact on those lawsuits. Accordingly, Pepper & Corazzini is a party in interest with standing to participate in the application proceeding under FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940). 17. We do not accept the Licensees' claim that the intervenors' participation in this proceeding should have been limited to the application proceeding. Given the consolidation of the application and revocation proceedings and the common factual questions relating to both Applicants and Licensees, it would have been administratively difficult to ensure that the intervenors' participation in the application proceeding did not spill over into the revocation proceeding. 18. Moreover, third party participation in revocation proceedings is not expressly barred by either 47 U.S.C  312 of the Communications Act or 47 C.F.R.  1.91 of the rules, and has been permitted where special circumstances establish that such participation would be of assistance to the Commission. See Blue Ribbon Broadcasting, Inc., 90 FCC 2d 1023, 1024  3 (Rev. Bd. 1982); Pass Word, Inc., 61 FCC 2d 410 (1976). Here it was appropriate to accord full party status to the intervenors, who had actively participated in the Bureau's year-long investigation of this matter and who had raised substantial questions of fact and law relating equally to the Licensees and to the Applicants. 2. MCRSA ISSUE 19. For the reasons that follow we reverse the Bureau's conclusions that any Applicant who entered into the MCRSAs has filed a defective application, and that the participation of any Licensee in the MCRSAs potentially affects its qualifications to retain its authorization. We therefore set aside that portion of the Review Board Decision summarily dismissing the applications pursuant to  22.20 of the Rules and revoking the licenses pursuant to  312(a)(2) of the Act. 20. As an initial matter, we reject the Petitioners' claim that the request for Commission review of the Bureau's adverse determination concerning the legality of the MCRSAs is untimely. Petitioners urge that, despite the designation of hearing issues as to the facts and circumstances relating to the Licensees' and the Applicants' involvement in the Agreements, the separate conclusion that, as a matter of law, the Agreements contravene sections 22.33(b)(2), 22.921(b), 22.922 of the rules is final and may not be revisited by the Commission. 21. Section 1.115(e)(3) of the rules expressly provides that "[a]pplications for review of a hearing designation order issued under delegated authority shall be deferred until applications for review of the final Review Board Decision in the case are filed." Here the decision to conduct evidentiary hearings as to the parties' participation in the Agreements stems from the Bureau's ruling that the Agreements are unlawful under the cellular rules. It is not clear from the face of the order, however, that it contains two distinct actions and that only the one concerning the legality of the Agreements is immediately appealable. There are, for example, no separate ordering clauses declaring the Agreements to be unlawful as a matter of law. Apart from this lack of notice as to the intended effect of the HDO, Petitioners cite no precedent for such a piecemeal approach, which would clearly undermine the rationale behind the rule against interlocutory appeals of designation orders. Finally, to the extent Petitioners rely on the fact that the order was not simply entitled "Order Designating Applications for Hearing and Order To Show Cause" but also included the phrase, "Memorandum Opinion and Order," the title of the Bureau's order does not change the character of the action contained therein, and we decline to elevate form over substance in this manner. 22. Turning to the merits, the Applicants and the Licensees maintain that the Agreements do not violate the ban against partial settlements, the prohibition against the transfer of interests in pending RSA applications, or the prohibition against cross-ownership interests in competing applications. Specifically, they claim that the RSA rules allegedly violated by the MCRSA pertain only to ownership interests, and that the MCRSAs grant the participants only contingent contractual rights rather than any ownership interests. They note that under the Agreements the Applicant/Licensee retains 100 percent ownership and control of the cellular system, with the other signatories receiving only a share of any income and/or sale proceeds. They emphasize further that the signatories get nothing unless the licensee decides to distribute profits or to sell the station. In the alternative, they claim that, if the Bureau's "expansive" reading of the rules is accepted, they did not have adequate notice that the MCRSAs are unlawful. They urge further that there have been no false certification or reporting violations. 23. The Bureau and the Petitioners counter that the rights created by the MCRSAs are tantamount to those of a non-voting stockholder or a limited partner, both of which have always been cognizable under the cross-ownership rules that apply to cellular applications. See Cellular Lottery Reconsideration, 101 FCC 2d 577, 600  42 (1985). They further fault the efforts of the Applicants/Licensees to treat ownership and control as equivalent. They point out that the licensee retained control and managerial responsibility even under the earlier, so-called alliance, agreements. (Alliances were less than full market settlements in which a group of applicants agreed that, if selected in the lottery, the tentative selectee would dilute its ownership interest to no less than 50.1 percent and accord each of the other group members an ownership interest of less than one percent. Such arrangements were permissible under an earlier version of section 22.921 that disregarded ownership interests of less than one percent.) Yet, all agree that such alliances constitute impermissible partial settlement agreements under section 22.33(b)(2). 24. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the MCRSAs do not create "ownership interests," as is expressly required by the multiple ownership (section 22.921(b)) and certification (section 22.923(b)(7)) rules, and that the parties did not have notice that the contractual interests conferred by the MCRSAs would violate either of these rules. We find further that violations of sections 22.33(b)(2) and 22.922, which ban partial settlements and pre-grant transfers respectively, do not render an application defective or adversely affect a licensee's basic qualifications. Thus, while the MCRSAs constitute a partial settlement agreement within the plain meaning of section 22.33(b)(2), this violation is not a basis to summarily dismiss the applications or to revoke the licenses. Moreover, as noted in paragraph 3 above, all of the above- captioned applicants and licensees, except Alpha, have voluntarily rescinded the Agreement. Having concluded that the Agreements violate section 22.33(b)(2), we will require that Alpha likewise rescind the Agreement without determining whether the Agreements also violate section 22.922's prohibition against pre-grant transfer of interests in a nonwireline application. 25. At the outset it is useful to understand the broader context in which the rules at issue in this proceeding were developed. When the Commission decided to select cellular licensees by lottery rather than through comparative hearings, it advised that it would scrutinize carefully any application that appeared to skew the lottery in the applicant's favor. In an effort to encourage settlements, particularly among applicants for markets 31-90 who had filed in anticipation of a comparative hearing, the Commission adopted section 22.33(b), providing for the award of cumulative chances to a joint venture created by a partial settlement among mutually exclusive cellular applicants. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection from Among Mutually Exclusive Competing Cellular Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of Comparative Hearings, 98 FCC 2d 175, 201  48 (1985), recon granted in part and denied in part, 101 FCC 2d 577, 584  14 (1985), further recon 59 RR 2d 401 (1985), aff'd sub nom. Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (hereafter Cellular Lottery Rulemaking, Cellular Lottery Reconsideration, and Cellular Lottery Further Reconsideration). At that time, applications for markets below the top-90 had not been filed. The Commission nonetheless provided for the award of cumulative chances to settling applicants in markets below the top-90, who settled after filing their applications. Id. at 201  48. By according cumulative chances to settling applicants who effectuate joint ventures, the Commission recognized that such arrangements may have been formed for legitimate business purposes. Id. at  48 & n.73. 26. Concerned that permitting parties to have multiple ownership interests in competing applications for the same market would be an open invitation for manipulation of the lottery process that would needlessly prolong cellular proceedings, the Commission enacted section 22.921 proscribing such multiple ownership interests except that interests of less than one percent were not considered. Id. 98 FCC 2d at 218  79. In doing so, the Commission sought to give applicants wide latitude in forming business relationships and at the same time maintain consistency and simplicity in the administration of the cellular lottery. Id. It later determined that, given its concern in the cellular context with preserving the integrity and fairness of the lottery process, passive ownership interests held by a non-voting stockholder or a limited partner ownership should be fully attributable. Recon. Order, 101 FCC 2d at 600-01  42. It explained that disregarding such interests could result in the same individuals having limited partnership or nonvoting stock interests in a number of mutually exclusive applications. Id. This would create cumulative chances, thereby fostering speculative filings and undermining the integrity of the lottery, whether the individuals exercised control or were only passive owners. 27. The one-percent exception to the prohibition against multiple ownership interests, as well as the rule permitting cumulative chances for partial settlements, had the unfortunate effect of encouraging speculative nonwireline applications for markets 91-120, which were filed in contemplation of selection by lottery. In particular, the prospect of obtaining cumulative lottery chances became an incentive for abusive filing schemes by applicants more interested in the applications as an investment than in the opportunity of operating a cellular system. Recon. Order, 101 FCC 2d at 585-86  15-16. This flood of applications strained the Commission's processing resources, and made it less likely that bona fide applicants seriously interested in operating a cellular system would ultimately obtain licenses. 28. To deter speculative and abusive filings primarily designed to "stack the odds" in favor of such insincere applicants, the Commission modified section 22.33(b) to prohibit cumulative chances for partial settlements among nonwireline applicants in markets beyond the top-120. Id. at 586-87  17-20. Under the revised rule, partial settlements among nonwireline applicants were still permissible, but cumulative chances were disallowed. Id. at 588  22. By not prohibiting partial settlements entirely, section 22.33(b) gave nonwireline applicants the flexibility to effectuate joint ventures that were motivated by legitimate business considerations. Id. Moreover, the Commission had experienced no problem with speculative wireline applications. It therefore had no reason to eliminate cumulative chances for wireline applicants that enter into partial settlements. Id. at 588  21. 29. Notwithstanding the elimination of cumulative chances for nonwireline applicants in partial settlements, the problem of speculative nonwireline filings continued. Amendment of the Commission's Rules for Cellular Service (Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 1 FCC Rcd 499  3 (1986) (hereafter FNPRM). As part of its ongoing effort to screen out insincere applicants, the Commission proposed, and ultimately adopted, various rule changes that would apply to the processing of RSA cellular applications. FNPRM, 1 FCC Rcd at 499  1; Amendment of the Commission's Rules for Rural Cellular Service, 4 FCC Rcd 2440  2 (1988) (hereafter Third Report and Order). First, to deter filings by speculators, it amended section 22.33(b) to categorically ban all partial settlements among nonwireline applicants. Third Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 2441-42  14-17. Second, to effectuate the ban on nonwireline partial settlements, it also amended section 22.921(b) to prohibit nonwireline applicants from having any ownership interest, even those of less than one-percent, in more than one application in a market. Id. at 2443  24. Finally, to eliminate the delay associated with the pre-licensing assignment or transfer of cellular applications, it amended section 22.922 to prohibit the alienation of any interest in an RSA application before the grant of a construction authorization. Id. at 2444  30. 30. Despite the common rationale behind these rules (i.e., to deter speculative filings that accord multiple lottery chances), their language is not uniform. In proscribing partial settlements among nonwireline applicants for the RSA, the Commission defined such settlements as an exchange of reciprocal interests. Third Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 2447 n.3 ("By 'partial settlement,' we mean any arrangement among fewer than all of the applicants in a market that provides reciprocal interests in the applications of the parties to the arrangement."). The prohibition against pre-grant transfers likewise bars the transfer of any interest in or of such applications. Id. at 2444  30 ("we are amending our rules to prohibit the alienation of any interest in an RSA application prior to the grant of a construction authorization."). By contrast, the multiple ownership rule expressly refers to ownership interest, as does section 22.923(b)(7) requiring certification as to who holds an ownership interest in the applicant. 31. Nor do these rules carry identical penalties. The Commission will not approve a partial settlement agreement, but it does not necessarily penalize applicants for entering into such a settlement. See McElroy Electronics Corporation, 10 FCC Rcd 6762, 6766 & n.6 (1995) (denying a joint motion for settlement on the ground that it did not constitute a full-market settlement), remanded on other grounds, 86 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1996), pet. for rehearing denied(Aug. 19, 1996). By contrast, an application that violates the multiple ownership and certification rules is deemed to be defective and is summarily dismissed under 47 C.F.R.  22.20. See, e.g., Progressive Cellular, 6 FCC Rcd 7178 (1991), aff'd by judgment, 986 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Florida Cellular Mobil Communications Corp., 6 FCC Rcd 6910  5 (1991), aff'd subnom. Florida Cellular Mobil Communications Corp. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 191 (D.C.Cir. 1994). Given the severity of this sanction, fairness demands that applicants have explicit notice of what constitutes an "ownership interest" within the meaning of sections 22.921(b) and 22.923(b)(7). See generally Salzer v. FCC, 778 F.2d 869, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("fundamental fairness . . . requires that an exacting application standard, enforced by the severe sanction of dismissal without consideration on the merits, be accompanied by full and explicit notice of all prerequisites for such consideration.") 32. Section 22.921(b) With this background in mind, we turn first to the alleged violations of section 22.921(b). The rule expressly bans any party to a nonwireline RSA application from having "an ownership interest, direct or indirect, in more than one application for the same service area." The Court of Appeals has held that the term "ownership" is a flexible one that must nevertheless be interpreted in accordance with the rationale of the provision in which the term is used, and that "the Commission's intent [behind the cellular multiple ownership rule] is to prevent excessive accumulations of chances to win the economic benefits of the license lottery." Corporate Telecom v. FCC, 55 F.3d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). The Agreements at issue here expressly accord the signatories reciprocal rights to receive a share of the income and/or sales proceeds from any party to the agreement whose RSA cellular application is granted. This affords the signatories a financial stake in each others' applications that increases each signatory's chance of participating financially in a winning cellular application, thereby contravening the underlying purpose of the multiple ownership rules (i.e., to prohibit arrangements that accord multiple chances to participate in the economic benefits of a winning cellular applications). Whatever the underlying purpose of the rule, however, Salzer is clear that the rule must be interpreted in a manner that affords the parties explicit notice as to what the rule proscribes. As noted above, the responsibility to be clear is heightened here because of the severity of sanctions prescribed for section 22.921(b) violations (i.e. revocation of the licensees and dismissal of the applications). 33. Notwithstanding the anti-speculative rationale of section 22.921(b), which would be furthered by an expansive reading of "ownership," we find that the Agreements do not contravene the rule's plain meaning, and that the language of the rule is not sufficiently precise to accord notice that it prohibits the rights conferred on the signatories. Stressing that ownership in the cellular context need not entail the authority to manage or control, the Bureau argues that a signatory's right to a share of a successful RSA applicant's income and/or sale proceeds is analogous to the ownership interests of a non-voting shareholder or a limited partner. Alternately, it submits that this is the type of "indirect" ownership interest that is expressly banned by the rule. The Bureau is correct that, given its overriding concern with deterring speculative applications that skew the lottery and with safeguarding the integrity of the lottery, the Commission made clear from the outset that in the cellular context "owner" includes passive ownership interests as well as those ownership interests that accord managerial control or influence. See Cellular Lottery Reconsideration, 101 FCC 2d at 600  42. As set forth more fully below, however, we disagree that the Agreements accord rights that are analogous to the ownership interest of a non-voting stockholder or a limited partner. 34. To the extent that the Bureau relies on the express ban against "indirect" ownership, this term generally refers to ownership through a subsidiary or affiliate rather than through a corporation directly. Moreover, even if the term could reasonably be construed to encompass interests other than ownership interests, as the Bureau appears to argue, it is far too imprecise to afford the explicit notice required where enforcement of a rule leads to harsh results. Thus, we do not find that the express ban against "direct or indirect" ownership interests is sufficiently broad to afford explicit notice that these Agreements would violate section 22.921(b) and thus subject their applications to summary dismissal pursuant to section 22.20 of the rules. 35. Our reading of the Agreements is that they constitute a contract for the payment of money but do not confer any ownership interests, direct or indirect, on the signatories. Specifically, the Agreements provide that, beginning three (3) years from the date of Initial Commercial Operation on an Eligible system, the licensee will receive 50 percent and the signatories will receive 50 percent of "distributed income proceeds" from the operation of the cellular system. (Sec. 2.1). In addition, depending upon the amount of any income proceeds previously distributed to the signatories, the signatories will receive up to 50 percent of any "distributed sales proceeds" from the sale of the cellular system and the licensee will receive the remaining portion of the sales proceeds. (Sec. 3.1). However, the licensee has sole responsibility for the prosecution expenses of its application (Sec. 8.1), as well as exclusive power to direct, control and manage the cellular system. (Sec. 6.1). All property associated with the cellular system is vested in the licensee (Section 5.1). By its express terms, the Agreements are legally enforceable. (Sec. 11.8). For enforcement purposes, the signatories are authorized to inspect each other's books and records, including executed sales contracts and certified financial statements. (Sec. 9.3). 36. Nevertheless, the signatories have no claim to any income proceeds from the operation of any cellular system "except to the extent that the [licensee] elects to make such distribution." (Sec. 2.2). The Agreements expressly provide that the licensee has the sole discretion to determine if income proceeds are to be distributed, as well as the timing and the amount of any such distribution. (Sec. 2.1, 2.2). The licensee also has sole discretion to determine if, to whom, and for how much, the system should be sold. (Sec. 3.2). Sales proceeds are defined as "any sales profits determined in accordance with Generally Accepted Practices" (Art. I), but they may be reduced by the amount of distributed income proceeds previously paid by the selling licensee. (Sec. 3.1). The Agreement also limits the cumulative income proceeds that may be paid to a selling licensee after he has sold his cellular system. (Sec. 2.3). Once the selling licensee has received income proceeds that are equivalent to 125 percent of the amount of the total sale proceeds that he distributed to other participants upon the sale of his cellular system, the selling licensee ceases to be a participant in the agreement and he is not entitled to any further distribution thereunder. (Sec. 2.4). 37. The signatories have no equity interests in any of the competing applications, as would be the case with a non-voting stockholder or a limited partner. And, except for their respective applications and cellular authorizations, the signatories do not have any obligation to contribute any funds towards prosecuting an RSA application or operating a cellular system. Thus, in contrast to the equity interests of a non-voting stockholder or a limited partner, the signatories have only a contingent right to a share of the distributed income or sales proceeds if the licensee decides that income proceeds should be distributed or that the cellular system should be sold. The fact that such payment, if it is made, represents a share of the profits does not mean that the signatories are owners. Not only is the distribution decision to be made solely by the licensee, the licensee also makes all decisions as to net profit and net loss subject only to "generally accepted accounting practices consistently applied." (Sec. 5.2). This means that, absent a showing of fraud or outright breach of the terms that govern such distribution, a disgruntled signatory cannot challenge a licensee's decision to make no distribution or to include only a portion of revenue in such distribution, or otherwise take legal action to force a distribution. Thus, while a licensee not wishing to forego any economic benefit from the cellular system must include the signatories in any distribution of profits and must divide such distribution according to the ratio set forth the Agreements, he has sole discretion over the timing of and amount of revenue to be included in such distribution. 38. The Petitioners (see  12, above) urge that, because the decision to pay a dividend ultimately rests with the corporate board and the decision to distribute partnership profits rests with the general partners, the signatory's right to a share of the profits (or sales proceeds) is legally indistinguishable from that of a non-voting stockholder or a limited partner. Citing United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), the Petitioners note further that, as a practical matter, a non-voting stockholder can compel the payment of a dividend only in limited circumstances. We find these arguments unpersuasive. Whatever the likelihood of a court actually ordering the payment of a dividend to a non-voting stockholder, the corporate officer has a fiduciary duty to the stockholder because the stockholder is an owner of the corporation. Under these Agreements, however, the licensee owes no special fiduciary duty to the signatories, as it would to a stockholder or a limited partner. 39. We note, moreover, that the Agreements further limit the total amount of income or sales proceeds distributions that a signatory may receive under certain circumstances. As such, the contingent right to future payments is more analogous to the right of a creditor to receive a fixed sum of money in the form of principal and interest, or to the right of an executive to receive monetary payments under a phantom stock plan. Such phantom stock plans confer on key employees the financial benefits of stock ownership (i.e., dividends and appreciation in the value of the stock), without granting them an equity interest or requiring them to make capital contributions. Notwithstanding Petitioners' attempt (Consolidated Opposition at 11) to equate an ownership interest with the right to share profits, a well known treatise on corporations, cited by Petitioners, makes it clear that an ownership interest entails a share of the equity as well as a share of the profits: Debt and equity securities represent totally different relationships between the issuer and the security holder. Equity securities represent ownership rights which, in varying degrees, depending on the type of equity security, entitle the holder to a right to participate in surplus profits, and, upon dissolution, to share in those assets that remain after all debts have been paid. On the other hand, debt securities require the issuer to repay the principal amount loaned to the corporation by fixed maturity date, and to do so at a stated rate of interest. The difference between the ownership and creditor interests is one that cannot be erased by mere labels. (emphasis added.) 6A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations  2635 (rev. perm. ed. 1989) (footnotes omitted). Here the signatories have no right upon dissolution to a share of the licensee's assets after the satisfaction of all debts and no obligation to make capital contributions to the licensee. Instead, like ordinary creditors or phantom stockholders, they have a contractual right entitling them to a payment of money in the future, and that right is legally enforceable. To protect their present right to future payments from any party to the Agreement whose cellular application is granted, built, operated, and/or sold, the signatories can protect themselves against fraud and self-dealing by inspecting the licensee's books, certified annual financial statements and any executed contract for the sale of the cellular system. There is no merit, however, to the Petitioners' suggestion that these rights enable a signatory to sue the licensee for mismanagement. The Agreement is quite clear that all decisions as to net profit and net loss, as well as the calculation of sales proceeds, is subject only to Generally Accepted Accounting practices. (Sec. 5.2, Art. I) Thus, a signatory, unlike a limited partner or a non-voting stockholder, has no redress against mismanagement and waste. 40. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the Agreements did not accord the participants "ownership interests" in each others' applications. We therefore determine that the Agreements did not contravene the plain meaning of section 22.921(b). In so concluding, we nevertheless recognize that, unless the licensee is prepared to forego the economic benefits of the cellular system, it must pay 50 percent of the "distributed income proceeds" to the signatories, and, if it decides to sell, up to 50 percent of the "distributed sales proceeds," depending upon the amount of any income proceeds already distributed to the signatories. In this respect, the Agreements accord the signatories genuine rights to share in the economic benefits of all the winning cellular applications for the RSA. This is exactly the type of arrangement skewing the lottery that the Commission intended to prohibit when it amended its rules concerning multiple ownership, partial settlements, and transfers of interests in RSA nonwireline applications and authorizations in its continuing effort to deter speculative filings that undermine the integrity of the lottery process by enabling an applicant to participate in more than one application. Third Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd 2440 (1989). Whatever the underlying intent of the rule, however, its express language is not sufficiently precise to encompass the interests at issue here, and on this basis we find that there has been no violation of section 22.921(b). And, given the rule's explicit reference to "ownership interest," we conclude that it fails to afford explicit notice that it prohibits the type of arrangement at issue here. 41. Section 22.33(b)(2): The parties to the Agreement argue that section 22.33(b)(2), like section 22.921(b), pertains only to ownership interests and that there is therefore no violation of this rule. Specifically, they read the rule as banning only those agreements that involve an exchange of reciprocal ownership interests or of interests that entail the ability to manage or control the application. To support this interpretation, the parties point to nothing in the rule, the Third Report and Order or elsewhere expressly setting forth their asserted two-pronged definition of partial settlements. And, while they offer a myriad of examples to demonstrate that arrangements involving ownership or managerial interests do constitute impermissible partial settlements, they offer nothing to support the contention that these are the only arrangements that violate section 22.33(b)(2)'s absolute prohibition against partial settlements among nonwireline applicants for the same RSA market. 42. Moreover, we find nothing in the language of rule, its underlying purpose, or its administrative history, to support this restrictive reading of the rule. The rule, which was adopted before the execution of the MCRSAs, expressly provides that "[p]artial settlements among non-wireline applicants for Rural Service Areas are prohibited." The purpose and history of the rule do not give us any basis to depart from the clear language of the rule. In revising the RSA rules, the Commission defined partial settlement as "any arrangement among fewer than all the applicants in a market that provides any reciprocal interests in the applications of the parties to the arrangement." Third Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 2447 n.3 (emphasis added). It advised further that the term "partial settlement" includes the so-called alliance agreements, whereby each participant in the alliance agreed that if it won a particular market, it would retain at least 50.1 percent of the application and the other members of the alliance would each acquire a maximum .99 percent ownership interest in the winning application. Id. This strongly suggests that the definition encompasses, but is not limited to arrangements that, like alliances, involve an exchange of ownership interests. 43. It is also instructive that, when the Commission adopted section 22.33(b)(2)'s absolute bar on all partial settlements between nonwireline RSA applicants, it also amended section 22.921(b) to eliminate the one-percent rule for nonwireline RSA applicants. Id. at 2443  24. This change was necessary to implement section 22.33(b)(2) because the one-percent exception to the multiple ownership rule had provided a basis for partial settlements among MSA applicants. Id. Far from demonstrating that partial settlements are limited to ownership interests, however, the simultaneous consideration of sections 22.921 and 22.33(b) in the Third Report and Order makes it clear that the ban on partial settlements is not limited to ownership interests. Otherwise, the prohibition against partial settlements would be redundant: section 22.921(b), as amended by the Third Report and Order, necessarily precludes any partial settlement among nonwireline RSA applicant that involves an exchange of reciprocal ownership interests. In other words, if the Commission had intended to proscribe only partial settlements among nonwireline RSA applicants that involve reciprocal ownership interests, it did not need a separate rule to do so. 44. Thus, to the extent that the parties rely on earlier discussions of partial settlements that focused on agreements involving an exchange of ownership interests, we note that, before the elimination of the one-percent rule in the Third Report and Order, it was perfectly permissible for applicants to enter into arrangements in which all but one of the applicants would dismiss their applications in exchange for ownership interests of less than one percent in the remaining application. It is therefore not surprising that previous discussions of partial settlements would have been couched in terms of ownership interests. Nor does GEM Cellular, 2 FCC Rcd 4499 (1987), support the contention that contractual rights are beyond the rule's reach. That case involved MSA, rather than RSA, applicants. In contrast to the absolute ban on partial settlements among nonwireline RSA applicants, section 22.33(b) allows partial settlements among MSA applicants but disallows any cumulative chances derived therefrom. The issue was therefore whether the settlement agreement violated either the one-percent rule or the prohibition against cumulative chances, neither of which apply to RSAs applicants, who may not participate in partial settlements under any circumstances. This does not establish that an agreement among nonwireline RSA applicants is permissible under section 22.33(b) if it confers contract rights. 45. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of section 22.33(b)(2) would totally frustrate the expressed purpose of the ban against partial settlements. In this respect, the absolute partial settlement ban adopted in the Third Report and Order was one of a series of measures taken by the Commission to combat the problem of speculative applications that accord cumulative chances to share in the economic benefits of winning the lottery for a particular RSA market. As Petitioners argue, partial settlements among nonwireline RSA applicants create financial safety nets that encourage the filing of speculative applications and delay service to the public whether they involve reciprocal interests or only reciprocal ownership interests. Arrangements that enable participation in the economic benefits of a cellular system even if one's own application is not the lottery winner likewise create a risk-free investment climate whether or not the transferred interest constitutes an ownership interest or permits the exercise of managerial control. Thus, the stated intent behind the rule -- to prevent the excessive accumulation of lottery chances that encourages speculative "lottery" tickets -- confirms that when the Commission outlawed "any reciprocal interest" it did not mean to outlaw only "reciprocal ownership interests." For these reasons, it is clear that the MCRSAs violate the absolute ban on partial settlements among nonwireline applicants set forth in section 22.33(b)(2), the expressed purpose of which was to bar abusive application practices that squander the Commission's time and administrative resources. 46. To the extent that the parties claim that the term "interest" is too imprecise to afford notice that it would encompass the contingent rights created by the Agreements, it is appropriate to consider the severity of the sanction involved. As noted in paragraph 31 above, the appropriate remedy for participating in a partial settlement is to disapprove the partial settlement. We are unaware of any Commission precedent -- and neither the Bureau nor the Petitioners has cited such precedent -- that would warrant dismissing the applications, or disqualifying the licensees because of their participation in a partial settlement. We note, for example, that, when the Commission eliminated the cumulative chance policy for future filings, it instructed the staff to identify applicants that appeared to be a part of an orchestrated scheme to skew the odds of winning the lottery in a particular market. It advised that such applicants were to be given a choice of either dismissing their applications, amending them to withdraw from the prefiling agreement, or maintaining them as originally filed. Recon. Order, 101 FCC 2d at 585-86  16 & n. 22, citing Public Notice, Common Carrier Bureau to Return Defective Cellular Applications and Permit Withdrawal from Pre-filing Settlement Agreements in Markets 91-120, Report No. C-291 (Apr. 10, 1985). More recently, in McElroy Electronics Corporation, 10 FCC Rcd 6762 (1995), remanded on other grounds, 86 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1996), pet. for rehearing denied, the Commission considered a settlement agreement that purported to be a full-market settlement. The Commission disagreed that the settlement was a full-market settlement and disapproved it on this basis. Id. at 6766 & n.6. In doing so, however, the Commission did not penalize, or even address whether it should penalize, the parties for their participation in the partial settlement. 47. We note, moreover, that all of the above-captioned applicants/licensees except Alpha have voluntarily rescinded the Agreements. Alpha is both a licensee and an applicant. It denies that it was ever a party to the Agreements. Nevertheless, the Review Board determined (9 FCC Rcd at 5140  66) that Alpha was a party to the Agreements. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the totality of the evidence supports the Board's determination. Our conclusion that the Agreements contravene the plain meaning, as well as the underlying rationale, of section 22.33(b)(2) warrants no further action with respect to those licensees and/or applicants that have already rescinded the Agreement. Given our determination herein that the Agreements violate the ban on partial settlements, however, it is appropriate to require that Alpha join in the rescission of the Agreements. 48. Section 22.922: Section 22.922, like section 22.33(b)(2)'s ban on partial settlements, contains the generic reference to "interest," rather than to "ownership interest." Again, the remedy for engaging in a pre-grant transfer is not revocation or dismissal of one's application as defective; rather the remedy is to either waive the rule and permit the transfer or to deny the waiver and disallow the transfer. See Catherine L. Waddill, 8 FCC Rcd 2169, 2171-72  13, 19-20 (1993) (section 22.922 violations were not a basis for revocation or other remedial sanction against a licensee). See also Amendment of Section 22.922 of the Commission's Rules to Permit Limited Transfers and Assignments of RSA Applications in Rural Service Areas, 5 FCC Rcd 3265, 3265-66  4-5 (1991) (recognizing that section 22.922's overbreadth had engendered a profusion of waiver requests). Thus, having concluded that the MCRSAs violate the plain meaning of section 22.33(b)(2) and that it is appropriate to recognize the parties' rescission of the agreements and to require Alpha to likewise rescind the Agreement, we need not determine whether the Agreements would also violate section 22.922's explicit ban on pre-grant transfers of interests in nonwireline cellular applications for the RSA market. 49. False certification and Reporting Issues: There is some ambiguity as to whether the false certification and reporting issues apply to the Applicants, or only to the Licensees. On the one hand, the issue specified against the Applicants is limited to their actual involvement in the MCRSAs. See 6 FCC Rcd at 2928 42. On the other hand, the text clearly contemplates that, if it is concluded that the Applicants entered into the MCRSAs, possible violations of sections 22.923(b)(7) (false certification) and 1.65 (failure to report) should also be considered. Id. at 39. We need not resolve this question, however, since we determine that none of the signatories to the MCRSAs violated either the false certification or the reporting rules. 50. Section 22.923(b)(7) requires certification by an RSA applicant that no one other than the named applicant has an ownership interest in the application. Having concluded that the MCRSAs do not confer ownership interests on the signatories, we determine that participation in the MCRSAs did not have to be disclosed when the applications were filed. Thus, those signatories who executed the MCRSAs prior to filing their applications had no obligation under section 22.923(b)(7) to disclose the existence of the MCRSA when filing their applications. By the same token, those signatories who executed the MCRSA after filing their applications did not violate section 1.65 of the Rules. Under section 22.918(b), the tentative RSA selectee has 30 days following the release of the Public Notice announcing the lottery results to report any information required by section 1.65. Section 1.65, in turn, requires the reporting of substantial changes in one's application. However, the MCRSAs did not create any ownership interests that had to be disclosed on the application, pursuant to section 22.923(b)(7). Thus, the signatories' subsequent execution of the MCRSAs was not a reportable event under section 1.65. There was therefore no reporting violation. 3. OTHER MATTERS 51. Having concluded that participation in the risk-sharing agreement is not a basis for denying any application or revoking any license, we turn to matters that are unrelated to the risk- sharing agreement. For the reasons stated below, we revoke Alee's license for lack of candor, terminate the revocation proceedings with respect to the other licensees, remand the applications of EJM, Centaur and Bravo to the Bureau to permit consideration of certain amendments, and grant the other applications. In doing so, we recognize that, apart from the MCRSA issue, the Initial Decision contains additional reasons for disqualifying virtually all of the applicants and revoking virtually all of the licenses. See generally, 7 FCC Rcd at 8750-51, Conclsions  21- 30. As noted in  7 above, the only issue specified against the applicants pertained to their involvement in the MCRSAs. As to the licensees, the Bureau specified alien ownership and lack of candor issues against Alee, and the ALJ added abuse of process issues against Satellite, Crystal, Pacific and North American. In addition to his adverse findings on all the specified issues, the ALJ made adverse findings against the licensees and the applicants where no formal issues were ever specified. The latter conclusions were procedurally improper in the absence of formal issues, see West Coast Media, Inc. v. FCC, 695 F.2d 617, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983), and the Review Board properly vacated several such findings on that narrow procedural ground without pursuing them further. 9 FCC Rcd at 5150  85. We affirm this action, as well as the Board's cancellation of the forfeitures that the ALJ imposed against licensees Satellite, Crystal, Pacific, and North American on the abuse of process issue. Given its determination on the MCRSA issue, the Board had no occasion to consider the merits of exceptions that concerned such findings relating to undesignated issues, other potentially disqualifying issues, or certain interlocutory rulings. 52. The pending applications for review do not challenge the ALJ's adverse findings on these non-issues, the Review Board's vacation of certain findings on procedural grounds, or its failure to resolve other disqualifying issues. Nevertheless, in view of our conclusion that participation in the risk-sharing agreement is not a basis to dismiss any application or revoke any license, we have independently reviewed the Initial Decision, the parties' Exceptions, and the evidentiary record compiled in this proceeding to determine whether there is any impediment to the grant of any pending application or any basis to institute further revocation proceedings against any licensee. Based upon that review, we find there are no substantial and material questions of fact warranting the specification of further issues against any of the applicants. Because the applications of EJM, Centaur, and Bravo cannot be granted based upon the record before us, however, we remand them to the Bureau to permit expeditious consideration of the further submissions described in paragraphs 81 and 83 below. We grant the remaining applications. And, having reviewed the record regarding the licensees, we revoke Alee's license for lack of candor and terminate the revocation proceeding with respect to the other licensees. We note that, even assuming that the ALJ's findings on various non-designated matters are valid and that further administrative sanctions might be appropriate under other circumstances, none of the misconduct catalogued by the ALJ is within the one-year statute of limitations for imposing a forfeiture. Furthermore, we see no basis under the facts and circumstances to exercise our discretion under 312(a) of the Act to institute further revocation proceedings against any licensee. See MCI Telecommunications Corporation, 3 FCC Rcd 509, 513-14  47 & n.18 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Telestar, Inc. v. FCC, 886 F.2d 442 (1989), cert denied, 498 U.S. 812 (1990) (section 309's substantial and material question of fact standard does not apply to the Commission's exercise of its discretion in the revocation context). A. ALIEN OWNERSHIP 53. The ALJ determined (7 FCC Rcd at 8749  16) that EJM and Alee had violated the restrictions on alien ownership in 47 U.S.C.  310(b)(3) of the Communications Act and 47 C.F.R.  22.4(b) of the Commission's rules, and that this was a separate reason to revoke Alee's authorization and to deny EJM's application. As set forth below, we find that, due to changes in the statute and in the Commission's related policies since the grant of Alee's authorization became final, the public interest would not be served by revoking Alee's license or instituting forfeiture proceedings on this basis. We therefore modify that portion of the Board's decision (9 FCC Rcd at 5147-48  80) that held, in accordance with the law in effect prior to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, that the inclusion of an alien general partner in Alee's initial application was an independent ground for revoking Alee's license. Also, as no alien issue was ever specified against EJM, we will vacate the ALJ's findings with respect to EJM, which the Board did not review, and grant its pending application, which comports with the current restrictions on alien ownership set forth in the Act and in applicable Commission rules and policies. 54. Alee We find that Alee complies fully with section 310(b)(3), as amended by 403(k) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, inasmuch as the four percent equity/voting interest of the alien general partner included in its original application falls far short of the 20 percent limit benchmark on stock that may be alien owned or voted. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Implement Section 403(k) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Citizenship Requirements), 11 FCC Rcd 13072 (1996) (to implement the statutory elimination of the per seprohibition against alien officers or directors, the Commission modifies certain policies treating certain alien partners as the equivalent of officers and directors for section 310(b) purposes). Given these changes, we do not believe that the public interest would be served by disturbing or instituting a forfeiture proceeding with respect to the now-final grant of Alee's license. Continental Cellular, 6 FCC Rcd 6834, 6838  13 & n.24 (1991). However, for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 57-79 below we resolve a related candor issue against Alee and revoke its authorization on that basis. 55. EJM No alien ownership issue was ever specified against EJM affording it appropriate notice, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.  554(b)(3), of the matters of fact and law asserted. Under these circumstances, the ALJ's premature findings regarding EJM's alien ownership must be vacated. Nevertheless, we lack statutory authority to grant EJM's application unless it complies with section 310(b)(3) of the Act. In this regard, the ALJ determined that the alien in question, Long B. Vu, is a partner of W.L. Communications, which itself is a general partner of EJM. Prior to enactment of the Telecom Act and changes to various related Commission rules and policies, general partners were considered to be the equivalent of corporate officers and directors for purposes of the statute. Thus, when EJM filed its application, Mr. Vu's interest in one of EJM's general partners would have violated the statute per se unless he was a limited partner adequately insulated from its management. With the elimination of the prohibition against alien officers or directors and corresponding changes in applicable rules and policies, however, whether EJM complies with section 310(b)(3) depends on the amount of W.L. Communications' ownership and/or voting interest in EJM, and the extent to which Mr. Vu's ownership and/or voting interest in W.L Communications is attributable to EJM. In this regard, the record reflects that W.L. Communications has only a 2.29 percent partnership share in EJM. ( Buckhead Ex. 23, p.5 ). Thus, even if Mr. Vu has a controlling interest in W.L. Communications, the alien ownership of EJM will not exceed 2.29 percent, an interest that is well within section 310(b)(3)'s 20 percent benchmark. See Wilner & Scheiner, 103 FCC 2d at 522  20 & n.51. Accordingly, there is no section 310(b)(3) violation under current law. 56. We recognize that, in applying the current restrictions on alien ownership, rather than the more stringent restrictions in effect when EJM filed its application, we are departing from precedent that participation by an alien general partner is a major defect that renders a cellular application ungrantable and subject to immediate summary dismissal. See Continental Cellular, 6 FCC Rcd 6834, 6835  9 (1991). However, that precedent was not statutorily compelled. Moreover, while we have consistently rejected curative amendments in cellular cases where the applicable rule or statute remained in effect, such cases do not, in our view, require the dismissal of a pending application for failure to comply with a statutory provision that is no longer in effect. Given the elimination of section 310(b)'s prohibition against common carrier licensees having alien officers or directors and corresponding changes in our policies regarding alien general partners, we discern no public interest rationale for pursuing the question of whether EJM's application, by virtue of Mr. Vu's interest in W.L. Communications, violated the prior prohibition against cellular licensees having an alien general partner or a noninsulated limited partner. B. LACK OF CANDOR 57. Having concluded that the public interest would not be served by revoking Alee's licensee for its initial section 310(b) violation, we must review the ALJ's finding that Alee lacked candor concerning this matter. Given its resolution of the MCRSA and alien ownership issues, the Board had no occasion to consider this issue. Based upon our independent review of the record and the exceptions, we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports the ALJ's findings, and that Alee's evident lack of candor mandates revocation of its license. 58. Alee is a general partnership with fourteen partners. It was organized and initially managed by TCC broker, Allan Kane. (As noted in  2 above, TCC prepared the cellular applications at issue in this proceeding.) Kane has no ownership interest in Alee, but his former son-in-law, Robert Bernstein, is Alee's signing partner and largest equity holder. In a letter dated April 30, 1990, Alee advised the Commission that its initial RSA applications, filed on August 12, 1988, included a four percent alien general partner Shafi M. Sharifan, but that his partnership interest was transferred to Amir R. Riahi-Shiraz (a U.S. citizen) on September 23, 1988. After winning the lottery in December 1988, Alee filed a section 1.65 amendment on January 9, 1989. That amendment, signed by Bernstein and prepared by Alee's attorney, William Franklin, listed Sharifan (not Riahi-Shiraz) as a partner and inaccurately stated that all the partners were U.S. citizens. Alee's applications for Tiers 1 and 2, filed on August 12, 1988, list Shafi M. Sharifan as a partner, whereas the later filed applications for Tiers 3 through 5 list Amir R. Riahi-Shiraz as a partner. Bernstein signed all of Alee's applications. 59. This led the Bureau to specify an issue to determine if Alee lacked candor in failing to reveal that it had an alien general partner or that there had been a change in its ownership structure. 6 FCC Rcd at 2928, 2931 43 & n.24. After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ determined that Alee, aware of its initial section 310(b)(3) violation, knowingly "fomented a cover-up" and engaged in "[a] deceit, pure and simple." Initial Decision, 7 FCC Rcd at 8705  199. 60. Initial Decision: In concluding that Alee's January 9, 1989 amendment was deliberately false, the ALJ focused on Alee's first partnership meeting held on December 19, 1988, at which the alien ownership problem was discussed. Faced with conflicting testimony as to the extent of that discussion, the ALJ credited the testimony of William Franklin, who participated in the meeting by speakerphone. Franklin testified that the partners had agreed to continue to rely on Shafi Sharifan as a partner and on the original questionnaire erroneously listing him as a U.S. citizen. The ALJ found, based on demeanor observations, that the partners who testified "were perfectly willing, indeed anxious, to bend the truth and/or outright lie . . . [and] to find a scapegoat (with money of course) that they could blame for their own shortcomings." 7 FCC Rcd 8747  9 & n.159 (Conc.) The ALJ made no formal demeanor findings concerning Allan Kane. Id. at 8699  109-10. He nevertheless discredited as "border[ing] on the incredible," id. at 8704 n. 178 & n.48, Kane's testimony that he had never decided in his own mind whether Sharifan was an alien. 61. In finding an intentional lack of candor, the ALJ also cited: (1) Franklin's subsequent letter to Bernstein accompanying the draft 1.65 amendment that expressly referred to the partnership's December 19, 1988 decision to retain the identification of Sharifan as an Alee partner, id. at 8705  191; (2) a discrepancy between the partners listed on the Tiers 1-2 applications and on the Tier 3 applications, all of which Bernstein had signed and certified as accurate, id. at  192; and (3) Sharifan's subsequent receipt and payment of capital calls, attendance at partnership meetings, and signature on partnership documents (including the January 3, 1990 rescission of the MCRSA) id. at 8704-05  189, 193. Additionally, the ALJ found "passing strange" the claim that none of the partners knew each other and thus had no idea which of only fourteen partners was the alien. Id. at  193 & n.53. He also noted Bernstein's testimony that he remembered meeting Sharifan at one or two partnership meetings. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that, despite having information to the contrary, Alee decided at that meeting to rely on Sharifan's original questionnaire reflecting that he was a United States citizen. Id. at 8704  183-88. 62. Exceptions: Citing Fox River Broadcasting, Inc., 93 FCC 2d 127 (1983), Alee urges that, as a matter of law, there was no lack of candor because it did not intend to deceive the Commission when it filed the section 1.65 amendment erroneously identifying Sharifan as a partner and certifying that all partners were United States citizens. It categorically denies ever agreeing to conceal Sharifan's citizenship from the Commission. It faults the ALJ for imputing to Alee the knowledge of TCC representatives Allan Kane and Kent Malecki, who discovered that Sharifan was an alien and arranged for the transfer of his partnership interest to Riahi. Alee concedes that the partners learned at the December 19 meeting that there had been an alien partner initially, but that he had been replaced by a U.S. citizen. It claims, however, that neither the alien partner (Sharifan) nor his successor (Riahi) was identified by name at the December 19th meeting, that none of the partners had ever met the alien partner, and that the alien partner did not attend that first partnership meeting. It claims further that Kane and Franklin assured the partners attending the meeting that this matter had been satisfactorily resolved. Accordingly, Alee claims that when Bernstein signed the January 9, 1989 amendment erroneously listing Sharifan (rather than Riahi) as a partner and erroneously certifying that all of the partners were U.S. citizens, none of Alee's partners, including Bernstein, knew, or had reason to know, that Sharifan was no longer a partner or that he was an alien. 63. Since Bernstein understood from the meeting that the alien problem had been taken care of and since he did not know the name of the former alien partner or that the transfer was contrary to the rules, Alee maintains that he had no reason to question the accuracy of the list of partners in the draft section 1.65 amendment prepared by Franklin. According to Alee, it was reasonable for Bernstein to rely on Franklin to apprise him of the Commission's disclosure requirements and to provide him with the correct information to meet those disclosure requirements. It deems such reliance to be particularly appropriate given the hiring of Franklin to serve as Alee's communications counsel and Franklin's service as TCC's counsel when Alee's application was prepared and filed. 64. Alee also claims that Franklin's testimony is riddled with inconsistencies, and that his version of what occurred at the meeting (i.e., that he offered several alternatives, and that the partners chose to rely on the original questionnaire (erroneously) identifying Sharifan as a U.S. citizen) is not corroborated by any of the partners who attended that meeting. For example, handwritten notes on Franklin's copy of Alee's ownership exhibit, which Kane faxed to him on December 13 (i.e., before December 19th partnership meeting), suggested that Franklin knew, and actually focused on, the substitution of Riahi for Sharifan starting with the Tier 3 applications. (CCB Ex. 6). Nevertheless, Franklin testified that at the time of the December 19, 1988 meeting he was unaware of the September 23, 1988 transfer to Riahi. Alee also denies that Bernstein had any knowledge of the cover letter that accompanied the draft section 1.65 amendment, noting that Franklin sent the letter to Kane's, instead of Bernstein's, address, who did not show it to Bernstein. 65. Alee submits that the partners did not learn of the alien partner's identity until January 1990 when new counsel replaced Franklin. Upon being advised by successor counsel that Sharifan is the alien and that his inclusion on the list of partners contained in the January 9, 1989 amendment was erroneous, Alee immediately advised the Commission of the facts and requested a waiver of section 22.922 to permit the September 23, 1988 transfer of Sharifan's partnership interest to Mr. Riahi-Shiraz. Alee claims that this voluntary disclosure, which led the Bureau to specify the alien ownership and lack of candor issues, further belies that there was an intent to deceive. 66. Discussion: As the Board found (9 FCC Rcd at 5145  76), the ALJ erroneously asserted that the burden of proof is on the licensees, and not on the Bureau, as is required by 47 U.S.C.  312(d). Accordingly, we have independently reviewed the record under the correct burden of proof. Based upon that review, we find that a preponderance of the evidence establishes that when Bernstein signed the amendment (1) he knew that having an alien partner would adversely affect the tentative selectee's chance of getting the construction permit; and (2) he knew that the information contained in the amendment was false. We therefore affirm the ALJ's determination that Alee lacked candor, and revoke Alee's license on this basis. In so doing, we need not rely on the considerable record evidence concerning Kane's complicity in this matter, inasmuch as the record establishes a sufficient likelihood of intentional concealment of relevant information by Bernstein independently to support a finding that Alee lacked candor. 67. Candor is a fundamental duty of Commission applicants and licensees, on whose submissions the Commission must be able to rely for completeness and accuracy. WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); RKO General v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 and 457 U.S. 1119 (1982). A party's intent to deceive is an essential element of a finding of lack of candor. A finding of lack of candor therefore requires a showing that relevant information has been withheld; that the party in question knew the information was relevant, and that it intended to withhold that information. Fox Television Stations, 10 FCC Rcd 8452, 8478  60 (1995), pet for recon denied, 11 FCC Rcd 7773 (1996). Relevant information is defined as that potentially having decisional significance. Because this is a revocation proceeding, the Bureau has the burden of proof, and each of these elements must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Silver Star Communications-Albany, Inc., 6 FCC Rcd 6905, 6906  18 & n.3 (1991). This requires a showing that it is more likely than not that Alee was aware of the alien general partner, understood the relevance of this information, and deliberately withheld the facts from the Commission. 68. We turn first to the relevance of the citizenship of Shafi Sharifan, a four percent general partner in Alee. Prior to the adoption of the Telecom Act, see paragraph 54 above, and at the time of the events in question, section 310(b)(3) of the Communications Act and section 22.4(b)(3) of the rules expressly prohibited the grant of a common carrier radio license to a corporation with any alien officer or director, and the Commission had treated the position of a general partner as being comparable to that of a corporate officer or director. Wilner and Scheiner, 103 FCC 2d at 520  16 & n.43. In addition, strict rules that govern the processing of cellular applications provide that the inclusion of an alien general partner is a major defect that cannot be corrected by amendment. Continental Cellular, 6 FCC Rcd 6834, 6835  9 (1991), aff'd sub nom. Moving Phones Partnership v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Accord Cellwave Telephone Services v. FCC, 30 F.3d 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Sacramento RSA Limited Partnership, 9 FCC Rcd 3182 (1994), aff'd sub nom. Sacramento RSA Limited Partnership v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Thus, as the ALJ noted (7 FCC Rcd at 8750  22), if Alee had advised the Commission on January 9, 1989 that one of its initial general partners was an alien, the Commission would have summarily dismissed its application pursuant to 47 C.F.R.  22.20 of the Rules. 69. According to Alee, it did not intend to deceive the Commission when it filed the erroneous section 1.65 amendment listing Sharifan as a general partner and representing that all its partners were U.S. citizens. Alee's signing partner claims to have relied on the assurance of its attorney, William Franklin, and of its initial manager, Allan Kane, that although Alee initially had an alien partner, the matter had been taken care of, but this claim is not credible nor supported by the record. A preponderance of the evidence establishes that Alee, understanding that this was a matter that could adversely affect the grant of the construction permit, intentionally concealed the presence of the alien partner. 70. First, a preponderance of the evidence reflects that Bernstein understood the significance of Sharifan's alien status when he signed the section 1.65 amendment. He testified that he knew at the time of the December 19 meeting, when he first learned of the alien partner, that "this was a serious matter," that applicants are forbidden to have alien partners, and that this could invalidate Alee's cellular application. (Tr. 5903, 5907). He was aware of the seriousness of this matter from earlier conversations with Kane, in which Kane recounted the difficulties of other partnerships that had inadvertently filed with an alien. (Tr. 5907). He was therefore relieved by Franklin's explanation that the matter had been taken care of through a substitution of a non-alien. (Tr. 5904). Partners Becky Jo Clark and Terry Jones, who served with Bernstein on Alee's executive committee, likewise understood the significance of this information. Both attended the initial partnership meeting on December 19, 1988. Clark, in particular, was very upset, furious in fact, when she learned that there had been an alien and tremendously relieved by Franklin's explanation that the substitution took care of the matter. (Tr. 6365, 6545, 6434). 71. Alee cites testimony that Franklin did not advise Alee about the Commission's policies concerning misrepresentation and lack of candor. (Tr. 2637). That applicants have a fundamental duty to be candid with the Commission that is breached by withholding relevant information is not a technical issue requiring the expertise of communications counsel. The record in this case, as detailed by the ALJ and as discussed below, reflects that Alee, aware that it had an alien partner, filed an amendment representing that all of its partners were United States citizens. Whether it did so on the advice of counsel, or on its own initiative, and whether it understood the precise legal consequences of reporting false information (i.e., that lack of candor is absolutely disqualifying), Alee did not need to consult an attorney, let alone communications counsel, in order to appreciate that information filed with a federal agency should be truthful. Alee's reliance on Fox Television Stations is misplaced. That case is clearly distinguishable because it involved a technical issue concerning the relevance of equity contributions in assessing compliance with section 310(b). Failure to report such information did not constitute a lack of candor where the licensee could not determine, based upon published cases, that the information was material, and where the licensee had relied in good faith reliance on erroneous, but not inherently implausible, advice of counsel on that issue. 10 FCC Rcd at 8500-01  118- 19. The test is whether a reasonable person could, and whether the party in question actually did, understand the impropriety of withholding the information. Id. at  119 & n.67; Stereo Broadcasters Inc., 87 FCC 2d 87, 103 (1981); WADECO, 628 F.2d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Pontchartrain Broadcasting Company, 7 FCC Rcd 3264 (Rev. Bd. 1992), review denied, 8 FCC Rcd 2256 (1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1994). There is, however, nothing esoteric or complicated about a tentative selectee's duty of candor with respect to information that is clearly known to, or readily ascertainable by the tentative selectee. 72. Here, the record is clear that Bernstein, in addition to appreciating the significance of the alien matter, knew when he signed the amendment that he was certifying the truthfulness of the information contained therein. The likelihood that Bernstein knew when he signed the erroneous section 1.65 amendment that the facts contained therein were false is also established by a preponderance of the evidence. The amendment that Bernstein signed in January 1989 was very short. It represented on its face that "[n]one of these changes make any change to the partnership," and that "[t]here is no change in the ownership previously identified in the application." (CCB Ex. 10, p.3). Even assuming Bernstein did not know the names of the partners, he would have realized something was wrong when he read the amendment. If, as Bernstein claims, he was told that the alien problem was "fixed" by substituting a new non-alien partner, signing an amendment stating that there was no change in Alee's ownership should have given him pause. And, if Bernstein compared the names on the amendment with those on the partnership agreement, he would have discovered that the names matched. This would have alerted him to the fact that, despite the ownership change supposedly effected to "fix" the alien problem, the amendment included the name of the original alien partner (rather than the substitute partner). At that point, he would have also realized that the amendment's representation concerning the partners' citizenship was wrong. Not only was Bernstein aware of the seriousness of alien matter, he testified that he understood that in signing the amendment he was certifying the accuracy and truthfulness of the information contained therein. (Tr. 5972, 5973). Under these circumstances, it is simply not credible that, apprised at the December 20 partnership meeting that the alien problem was "taken care of" by replacing the alien partner (Tr. 5904-05), he would have signed an amendment less than one month later that states there is no change in ownership without focusing on the alien matter or on the ownership change effected by the substitution. (Tr. 5972). It is also incredible that Bernstein, aware from his earlier discussions with Kane that an alien partner could invalidate Alee's application, never talked to Kane about the alien problem after the December 19th meeting (Tr. 5918), or inquired as to the identity of the alien (Tr. 5910). 73. Nothing in the record, other than the testimony of Alee partners Becky Jo Clark and Terry Jones, corroborates Bernstein's self-serving version of what occurred at the December 19th meeting. We are not inclined to reject the contrary testimony of William Franklin simply because all three partners testified that Kane and/or Franklin advised them at the meeting that the alien problem was taken care of. Franklin testified that the partners decided at the December 19, 1988 meeting to retain the identification of Sharifan as a partner based on the questionnaire reflecting that he is a U.S. citizen. (Tr. 2543-44, 2555-57). In evaluating the credibility of Franklin vis-a-vis that of Alee's three testifying partners, a motive to misrepresent what course was agreed to at the December 19 meeting is clear only with respect to the partners, all of whom understood that the presence of an alien partner was a serious matter. In contrast, it is unclear what motive Franklin, who had no financial interest in Alee and had just been retained to represent Alee, would have had to misrepresent the partners' decision regarding the alien matter. Since Franklin was not counsel for Alee when it filed its application, he was in no way responsible for the initial inclusion of an alien general partner. Thus, it is not apparent what motive he would have had to conceal the true nature of the alien problem from the partners or to keep them in the dark as to how the alien problem was resolved. 74. We are not persuaded by Alee's attempt to impeach Franklin's credibility on the ground that his testimony is internally inconsistent. There is, as Alee points out, some ambiguity in his testimony as to whether he was aware of the Sharifan-Riahi transfer or of Sharifan's actual citizenship status when he prepared the section 1.65 amendment. As Pepper and Corazzini notes, however, Franklin's awareness that the later tier applications "listed" Riahi as a partner does not establish actual knowledge of the Sharifan-Riahi transfer. This is confirmed by Franklin's testimony that, although he was told that Riahi was listed on the later applications, he was not told that Sharifan's partnership share was transferred to Riahi or apprised of the circumstances surrounding the listing of Riahi on the later applications. (Tr. 2552-53). He explained further that, in light of the partnership's decision to retain the identification of Sharifan as a partner, he did not feel obliged to check out the rumor that he was an alien. (Tr. 2555). Whether Franklin knew that Sharifan was an alien or had only heard a rumor to that effect does not impact on his testimony as to what occurred at that partnership meeting regarding the alien matter. In any event, the questionable nature of certain discrete portions of Franklin's testimony would not require that we reject his entire testimony. Dorothy O. Schulze and Deborah Brigham, 8 FCC Rcd 442, 444  21-24 (1993), citing United States v. Interstate Engineering Corp., 288 F. Supp. 4 02, 415 (D. N.H. 1967). 75. In this regard, a host of documentary evidence supports Franklin's testimony. First, there is Franklin's December 28, 1988 letter to Bernstein that accompanied the draft section 1.65 amendment. The letter states: "[p]er the partnership's decision at its December 19 meeting we have retained Mr. Sharifan's identification as a partner." The letter also reflects that the partnership had discussed the risk of dismissal for subsequent applications but that "on balance this alternative minimizes risk to Alee." (CCB Ex. 10). The latter suggests that other risks not specifically mentioned in the letter were deemed "on balance" to pose the greater obstacle to Alee's receiving the license. The record reflects that, as Alee claims, the letter was sent to Kane's office rather than to Bernstein directly. Although Kane does not recall forwarding the letter to Bernstein, he confirmed that he had instructed Franklin to send Bernstein's mail to Kane's office and that he routinely forwarded such mail to Bernstein. (Tr. 3480-81). Given Kane's practice of routinely forwarding such letters to Bernstein, the Franklin letter, apparently written with the expectation that Bernstein would receive it, is probative of what occurred at that first partnership meeting even if Bernstein never saw the letter. In this regard, Alee had retained Franklin as its communications counsel by the time of the December 19th meeting. (CCB Ex. 61; Tr. 2548-49). It is unclear why Franklin would have written such a letter if, as Alee claims, the partners never agreed to retain the identification of Sharifan as a partner. 76. Second, although the partners' testimony is clear that each learned of an alien partner at the December 19 meeting, the minutes of that meeting reflect only a discussion of "confidential matters." (AALA/CFL Ex. 89). Mrs. Clark, concerned that the minutes should accurately record what transpired at the meeting, suggested three changes to the minutes. Yet, she saw no reason that the minutes specifically reflect the discussion of the alien matter. (Tr. 6534-35). If, as all three partners testified, Kane and Franklin advised them that substituting the non-alien partner took care of this matter, there would have been no reason for such secrecy. Similarly, a follow-up letter from Kane, while referring to "confidential matters," states that "all of you in Alee are in the greatest and yet the damnedest position imaginable." (CCB Ex. 116). Kane admitted that he was talking in code. (Tr. 3479). He gave deposition testimony that this referred to the alien matter but he testified at the hearing that this referred instead to the risk- sharing agreement. (Tr. 3479, 3564). Bernstein understood that this referred to the alien matter. (Tr. 5910). 77. Third, the notes of a telephone conversation between Kane and Franklin reflect that they discussed how to present Alee's alien problem at the December 19, 1988 partnership meeting. The notes reflect that Franklin stressed that the damage had been done, and recommended that, with the agreement of the other partners, Alee should leave Sharifan in the partnership and hope that no one discovered the alien. He advised that the real risk would be a second win to Alee, which would increase the odds of someone discovering the alien and filing a petition to deny on that basis. (Tr. 3470; CCB Ex. 7). Kane testified that, as the notes reflect, Franklin's advice was to lay it all out at the partnership meeting, get a vote on it, and disclose exactly what the situation was. (Tr. 3472). Franklin has no specific recollection of this conversation (tr. 2629-30), but he testified that if Kane had told him that there was some doubt as to Sharifan's citizenship this is precisely what he would have advised. (Tr. 2631-32). 78. In addition to documentary evidence belying the partners' self-serving testimony, the ALJ, based upon his observations as to their demeanor, made adverse credibility findings as to all three Alee partners. Specifically, he concluded that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, the partners testifying on behalf of the applicants or licensees involved in this consolidated proceeding were "perfectly willing, indeed anxious, to bend the truth and/or lie outright . . . . [and] to find a scapegoat (with money of course) that they could blame their troubles on." 7 FCC Rcd at 8747  9 (Conc.) As to testifying partner Becky Jo Clark, the ALJ stated, 7 FCC Rcd at 8719 n.64, "[p]ut in its most charitable light her testimony was less than persuasive." We find no basis to disregard these findings, which are entitled to decisional deference unless those findings irreconcilably conflict with the record evidence. WHW Enterprises v. FCC, 753 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1985). We recognize that these findings do not single out Alee's three testifying partners. We deem it significant, however, that the ALJ made these credibility findings in the context of the partnerships' efforts to blame all of their legal troubles on Franklin. This, of course, is precisely the defense that Alee has invoked here. And, as reflected above, the ALJ's credibility findings are not in conflict with the record evidence. 79. Finally, we are unimpressed by Alee's "voluntary" reporting of this matter to the Commission in its April 30, 1990 letter to the FCC Secretary. There, Alee reported that it had initially had an alien, whose partnership interest was transferred prior to the September 23, 1988 lottery. Alee is correct that it was the April 30, 1990 letter, rather than any independent investigation by the Bureau that led to the specification of lack of candor and alien ownership issues against Alee. However, Alee delayed reporting this matter until after grant of the construction permit. This meant that instead of dismissing Alee's application the Commission had to institute revocation proceedings. Moreover, even assuming that Alee did not discover the errors in its amendment until early 1990, it delayed almost four months in advising the Commission of this matter, and even then it failed to make a full disclosure. It did not disclose that Sharifan had continued to participate in partnership matters following the December 19, 1988 meeting by paying capital calls and attending partnership meetings. Bernstein testified that he was unaware of Sharifan's continued participation until after Alee retained new counsel in January 1990. Nevertheless, Bernstein testified that he remembered meeting Sharifan at one or two partnership meetings. Even more troublesome is Bernstein's explanation as to why Alee did not disclose Sharifan's continued involvement in partnership affairs in its April 1990 letter. Bernstein claims that he thought there was a second alien, but the letter says nothing about a second alien. The failure to fully disclose the facts involving Sharifan's participation in Alee in a timely manner, together with Bernstein's dubious testimony on this matter, significantly undercuts the claim that the "voluntary" reporting of these matters belies any intent to deceive the Commission. C. OWNERSHIP QUESTIONS 80. Bravo: The ALJ identified various discrepancies in Bravo's application, its direct case, and other documentary evidence as to the number, identity, and ownership interests of Bravo's partners. 7 FCC Rcd at 8738  606-09. He also found that Bravo had not provided complete ownership information for eight of the partners listed in its application. 7 FCC Rcd at 8737  600 & nn. 133-35. Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that somewhere along the way Bravo misrepresented its ownership structure and effectuated a post-filing transfer. Id. at 8738  606, 608. In its exceptions, Bravo contends that its only representation of its ownership was contained in its application, and that there is no evidence that that representation was incorrect or that its initial ownership has changed. 81. We find that, apart from its failure to provide complete ownership lists for certain partnerships that hold partnership interests in Bravo, Bravo has adequately explained the irregularities noted by the ALJ, and that it is appropriate to permit Bravo to file a clarifying amendment setting forth this information. In this regard, there is merit to the claim that some of the irregularities noted by the ALJ were due to his reliance on documents obtained during discovery that were not necessarily indicative of Bravo's ownership structure. To the extent that Bravo failed to provide complete ownership information, such omissions, while numerous and the result of evident carelessness in preparing the ownership exhibit, are nevertheless minor and do not render Bravo's application substantially incomplete or otherwise unacceptable for filing. See Cagal Cellular Communications Corp., 6 FCC Rcd 2285, 287-88  15 (1991), aff'd sub nom.Singleton v. FCC, 952 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (carelessness in preparing application does not present a prima facie case for denying application); 47 C.F.R.  22.128(d). We will therefore allow Bravo to file a clarifying amendment and will remand Bravo's application to the Bureau with instructions to review such amendment in accordance with its usual application procedures. 82. EJM and Centaur: By Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 91M-3487 (rel. Dec. 23, 1991), the ALJ summarily refused to add section 22.921(b) issues against applicants EJM and Centaur based upon the fact that Ida and Joseph Washington, by operation of Louisiana's community property statute, may each have an ownership interest in each others' competing cellular applications. We affirm that ruling, but remand both applications to the Bureau for expedited consideration of the affidavits described below. 83. Ordinarily ownership interests held by spouses (or other family members) do not contravene section 22.921(b) in the absence of a showing of an actual ownership interest in, or potential to exercise control over, the licensed facility. See Corporate Telecom, 55 F.3d at 678, citing Nancy Naleszkiewicz, 5 FCC Rcd 7131, 7137  51 (CCB 1990) (recognizing that in contrast to the nearly conclusive presumption in effect from 1976 to 1992 that one spouse's broadcast/cable interests should be attributed to the other under  73.3555 and  76.501, the Commission never applied such a presumption in evaluating lottery applications under section 22.921(c)). We have not previously considered whether the prohibition against having more than one application for the same cellular market is violated if one spouse, solely by operation of a community property statute, has an interest in the other's cellular application. On that novel question of law, we do not find that the concerns underlying section 22.921(b) require that we interpret ownership within the meaning of that rule to encompass an interest derived solely from operation of a community property statute. We nevertheless find that it is appropriate to require that EJM and Centaur reaffirm their certifications pursuant to  22.923(b)(7) that "the applicant is the real party in interest in this application." To that end, EJM and Centaur should submit affidavits from Joseph and Ida Washington certifying that: (1) each has taken whatever steps are necessary under Louisiana's community property statute to rebut the statutory presumption that their respective interests in EJM and in Centaur are community property; (2) each intends to treat his/her partnership interest as separate property rather than community property; and (3) each relinquishes any property right vested by state law in the other spouse's partnership interest. 84. In so holding, we note that there is no Commission precedent for interpreting our multiple ownership rules to encompass ownership interests that are derived solely from the operation of community property statutes. Even in the broadcast context, where we only recently eliminated the spousal attribution presumption, we have not constructively attributed media interests in a spousal relationship based solely on community property law. See Richard P. Bott II, 4 FCC Rcd 4924, 4930 n.10 (Rev. Bd. 1989), review denied, 5 FCC Rcd 2508 (1990), aff'd sub nom. Radio Representatives v. FCC, 926 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the Review Board declined to treat spouses in a community property state as 50% owners for purposes of the integration of ownership into management criteria, noting that the multiple ownership rules do not constructively attribute media ownership interests to spouses based solely on community property laws). . 85. Moreover, as set forth in paragraph 26 above, section 22.921(b) was adopted in the context of the lottery and for the express purpose of discouraging multiple filings by applicants seeking only to increase their chances of selection by lottery. 98 FCC 2d at 218. We subsequently declined the suggestion that we prohibit applicants who are related from filing for the same RSA market as a means of reducing the number of speculative filings. Third Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd at 2442  21. We concluded that the integrity of the lottery process was adequately protected by requiring certification that the applicant is the real-party-in-interest in the application. In doing so, we cited Virginia Communications, 2 FCC Rcd 1895 (1987). That case involved MMDS licenses which, like cellular licenses, are chosen by lottery and are subject to similar ownership and real-party-in-interest rules. Id. at  2. An MMDS applicant had certified that she was the real-party-in-interest in the application without disclosing that her husband had a vested interest in the application derived from Arizona's community property statute. The Commission found a technical violation of the real-party-in-interest rules, and required that applicant to certify both that the husband relinquished all rights in any authorizations acquired by the wife and that any authorizations acquired by the wife are owned exclusively by her. From a regulatory standpoint, we deem it appropriate under the circumstances of this case to require a similar certification reaffirming that, notwithstanding any rights conferred by the community property statute, Ida and Joseph Washington do not have undisclosed interests in each others' cellular applications. VI. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 86. Petitioners have reached settlement agreements with Crystal, the licensee of the Oregon 1 RSA market, and with Alpha, the licensee of the Indiana 8 and the selectee for the Ohio 2 RSA markets. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Crystal agreement and that portion of the Alpha agreement relating to the Indiana 8 RSA market are outside the scope of 47 C.F.R.  22.129 and may be effectuated without Commission approval, but that the portion of the agreement relating to Alpha's pending application is subject to the provisions of section 22.129. However, because we cannot approve that portion of the agreement based upon the record before us, we will hold it in abeyance to permit further submissions by the parties. 87. Prior to the HDO, Petitioners (see 12 above) filed a Petition to Deny or Dismiss the pending applications and a Request for Institution of Revocation Proceedings against the licensees. While petitions for reconsideration of the Board's decision were pending before the Board, Petitioners entered into a settlement agreement with Crystal, the licensee for the Oregon 1 market. The Board concluded (9 FCC Rcd at 6757  13) that the agreement raised a policy question of first impression, and it certified the Joint Motion for Approval of the Settlement Agreement to the Commission. In particular, the Board was concerned that the public interest questions raised in this proceeding would still require consideration despite the settlement agreement. Under the agreement, Petitioners would withdraw from further participation with respect to the Oregon 1 portion of the proceeding in exchange for partial reimbursement of their legitimate and prudent expenses, but they would continue to participate as to issues that are common to the Oregon 1 RSA market and to other unsettled applicant or licensee markets. While Applications for Review were pending before the Commission, Petitioners reached a similar agreement with Alpha, which is the selectee for the Ohio 2 market and the licensee for the Indiana 8 market. 88. In the Joint Motions for Approval of Settlement, the parties urge that neither Petitioners' agreement with Crystal nor their subsequent agreement with Alpha requires Commission approval. Petitioners point out that, having reached a settlement with only one of the above-captioned applicants, they are not withdrawing their petition to deny since that pleading related to all of the above-captioned applications. With respect to their agreements with the licensees of the Oregon 1 and Indiana 8 markets, Petitioners assert that section 22.129 does not apply to agreements to dismiss pleadings filed against licensees. Petitioners therefore assert that the agreements involving all three markets are beyond the scope of section 22.129. Alternatively, the parties to the settlement agreements seek a determination that approval of the agreements serves the public interest. The parties urge that there are unique and compelling circumstances that support approval of both the Crystal and the Alpha settlement agreements. In particular, they cite the complexity of the proceeding, as well as the fact that Alpha is the only applicant to dispute that it was a party to the MCRSAs. Additionally, they emphasize that, under the agreements, Petitioners will receive only a partial reimbursement of the substantial expenses legitimately and prudently incurred in participating in the consolidated risk-sharing proceeding. 89. Discussion: In conjunction with a thorough rewrite of its cellular rules, the Commission codified settlement policies for cellular applicants in 47 C.F.R.  22.129. Seealso Revision of Part 22 Rules, 9 FCC Rcd at 6549-50. Section 22.129 provides that "[p]arties that have filed . . . a petition to deny, informal objection or other pleading against a pending applicant in the Public Mobile Services and then seek to withdraw or request dismissal of . . . the petition, either unilaterally or in exchange for a financial consideration, must obtain the approval of the FCC." (emphasis added) Authorizations were issued to Crystal for the Oregon 1 RSA market and to Alpha for the Indiana 8 RSA market, and Petitioners filed a pleading to revoke those authorizations. By virtue of their agreement with Crystal and that portion of their agreement with Alpha pertaining to the Indiana 8 market, Petitioners effectively seek partial dismissal of their petition to revoke the above-captioned licenses. As the language of section 22.129 is clearly limited to agreements to dismiss or withdraw pleadings against a pending applicant, Commission approval is not required for agreements to withdraw or dismiss pleadings filed against a licensee. 90. We find, however, that Commission approval is required for Petitioners' agreement to withdraw from further participation, either before the Commission or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in those issues relating exclusively to Alpha's pending application for the Ohio 2 RSA market. We are not persuaded by the parties' assertion that the settlement agreement involving Alpha's pending application is outside the scope of section 22.129 because Petitioners filed a single petition to deny all pending applications. That Petitioners have reached a settlement with only one of the pending applicants does not exempt them from the payment limitations of section 22.129. There is nothing in the plain language of the rule or its underlying rationale to support such an interpretation. Accordingly, we conclude that Commission approval is required for Petitioners' agreement to withdraw its objection to Alpha's pending application even though they have not reached settlement agreements with the other pending applicants. 91. Turning to the public interest question raised by the Board, it is correct that the Commission has generally disfavored settlements in which petitioners to deny, having raised issues of public interest significance, seek reimbursement for their expenses before those questions have been resolved. However, the thrust of our concern has been avoiding coercive tactics, particularly where the petitioner has raised issues affecting the public interest, and then is paid to withdraw, leaving those allegations unadjudicated. See Tidewater Radio, Inc., 24 RR 653 (1962). We are persuaded that the Ohio 2 settlement agreement will not encourage the filing of abusive petitions to deny designed to secure the payment of money. Petitioners have vigorously participated in this proceeding and their proposed withdrawal comes only after the development of a full hearing record. By participating in every phase of this complex, multi- party, multi-market proceeding, Petitioners have made a substantial contribution to the adjudication of matters affecting the public interest, and have pledged to continue their efforts except for those issues that relate exclusively to Alpha's pending application. Consistent with that pledge, Petitioners filed extensive pleadings in response to the pending Applications for Review. Moreover, due to the unprecedented number of markets and parties involved, the litigation expenses have been enormous, making partial reimbursement particularly appropriate. Under these circumstances, we deem Petitioners' substantial, non-frivolous participation at every stage of this proceeding to be analogous to that of private attorney generals. 92. Notwithstanding the clear public interest benefits of permitting piecemeal settlements in this multi-party, multi-market proceeding, we cannot approve the settlement agreement based upon the record before us. In accordance with the requirements of section 22.129 of the rules, Petitioners have submitted a copy of the Alpha settlement agreement, as well as declarations from each individual petitioner. The declarations state that the settlement agreement sets forth the exact nature and amount of any and all consideration received or promised in connection with resolution of the disputes being settled. Each petitioner has also certified that its share of the settlement proceeds does not exceed its legitimate and prudent out-of-pocket expenses in the consolidated risk-sharing proceeding. 93. Having agreed to settle their disputes with only one RSA applicant involved in the consolidated risk-sharing proceeding, however, Petitioners are entitled to only that fraction of their total expenses in the consolidated proceeding relating to the RSA applications that is attributable to the dispute involving Alpha's application. Although the Joint Motion states that Petitioners have incurred legal fees in excess of $2 million in the course of the consolidated proceeding initially involving 18 pending applicants and 9 licensees, they have agreed to settle their disputes in the Ohio 2 RSA market in exchange for a payment of $250,000. In the absence of certification by each Petitioner that its share of this amount does not exceed its legitimate and prudent expenses for the one applicant market involved, we cannot approve this portion of the Alpha settlement agreement. Our concern is that, as a result of a series of such agreements with the applicants, Petitioners may ultimately recover more than their legitimate and prudent expenses in the connection with their petition to deny or dismiss the above- captioned RSA applications. This would violate section 22.129 of the rules and disserve the public interest. 94. For this reason, we will hold the settlement agreement for the Ohio 2 market in abeyance pending the submission of declarations from each individual petitioner certifying that its share of the Ohio 2 payment does not exceed its legitimate and prudent expenses with respect to the dispute involving that one market. We will accord Petitioners considerable flexibility in meeting this requirement. Each Petitioner may, for example, calculate its expenses for the Ohio 2 market as a proportion of the total expenses legitimately and prudently incurred in filing and prosecuting the petition to deny or dismiss the pending RSA applications. Alternatively, each petitioner may calculate such expenses based upon those factors asserted to be unique to the disputes involved in the Ohio 2 RSA market. Petitioners' request for reimbursement of expenses should be supported by statements demonstrating attorney's fees in accordance with Reevaluation of Standards for Professionals Seeking Reimbursement Pursuant to Rule 73.3525, 86 FCC 2d 1047, 1048  3 (1982), and by an itemized accounting of any other expenses, as is required by section 22.129(a)(3). Finally, pursuant to section 22.129(b), the parties must also submit an affidavit from Alpha certifying that it has not paid, and will not pay, any money or other consideration in excess of Petitioners' legitimate and prudent expenses in exchange for their promise to withdraw the objections to the grant of Alpha's Ohio 2 RSA application. To expedite consideration of this matter, the General Counsel may make a determination in accordance with its delegation of authority as to the adequacy of the parties' further submissions and either approve or disapprove the Ohio 2 portion of the Alpha agreement on that basis. VII. ORDERING CLAUSES 95. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED That the Motion for Leave to File Partial Reply, filed on February 15, 1995 by Pepper & Corazzini, and the Motion for Leave to File a Limited Reply, filed on February 17, 1995 by The Partnerships ARE GRANTED; and that the Partial Reply to Petitioners' Opposition to Applications for Review, submitted for filing on February 15, 1995 by Pepper & Corazzini, and the Limited Reply to Petitioners' Consolidated Opposition to Applications for Review, filed on February 17, 1995 by The Partnerships ARE ACCEPTED. 96. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That, pursuant to 47 C.F.R.  1.115(g) of the Commission's Rules, (a) the following Applications for Review ARE GRANTED in part and DENIED in part: (i) separate Applications for Review filed on December 19, 1994 by Algreg Cellular, Alpha Cellular, Data Cellular Systems, Crystal Communication Systems, Signal Cellular Communications, Satellite Cellular Systems, Cellular Pacific, North American Cellular, and the law firm of Pepper & Corazzini; (ii) a single Application for Review, filed December 19, 1994 on behalf of The Partnerships [Jaybar Communications, Pinellas Communications, Centaur Partnership, Bay Cellular, EJM Cellular Partners, Cranford Cellular Communications, A-1 Cellular Communications, Cel-Tel Communications, and Alee Cellular Communications]; and (iii) a single Application for Review, filed December 19, 1994 by Bravo Cellular and Florida Cellular; (b) the Application for Review, filed on December 16, 1994 by Miller Communications and Skywave Partners, Inc. IS DENIED; and (c) the Memorandum Opinion and Order Designating Applications for Hearing and Order to Show Cause, 6 FCC Rcd 2921 (Com. Car. Bur. 1991), Algreg Cellular Engineering, 7 FCC Rcd 8686 (ALJ 1992), and Algreg Cellular Engineering, 9 FCC Rcd 5098 (Rev. Bd. 1994), recon. denied, 9 FCC Rcd 6753 (Rev. Bd. 1994), ARE SET ASIDE to the extent reflected herein. 97. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the following pleadings ARE DISMISSED: (a) Joint Request for Official Notice, filed on June 2, 1995 by Algreg Cellular and Satellite Cellular Systems; (b) Motion for Leave to Amend Application for Review, filed on June 5, 1995 by Crystal Communications Systems; (c) Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Application for Review, filed on June 6, 1995 by The Partnerships; (d) Joint Request for Official Notice, filed on June 14, 1995 by Cellular Pacific, Data Cellular Systems, North American Cellular, and Signal Cellular Communications; (e) Motion for Leave to File Request for Official Notice, filed on June 16, 1995 by Alpha Cellular; (f) Supplements to Application for Review submitted for filing on June 5, 1995 by Crystal, on June 6, 1995 by The Partnerships, and on June 16, 1995 by Alpha; and (g) Erratum to Supplement submitted for filing on June 13, 1995 by the Partnerships. 98. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the following pleadings ARE DISMISSED: (a) Joint Request for Official Notice, filed on March 13, 1997 by Algreg Cellular and Satellite Cellular Systems; (b) Response to Joint Request for Official Notice and Second Supplement to Application for Review, filed on March 24, 1997 by Crystal Communications Systems; (c) Motion to Accept Second Supplement to Application for Review, filed on March 24, 1997 by Crystal Communications Systems; (d) Motion for Leave to File Second Supplement to Application for Review, filed on March 27, 1997 by The Partnerships; (e) Second Supplement to the Application for Review, filed on March 27, 1997 by The Partnerships; (f) Motion to Accept Comments, filed on April 1, 1997 by Alpha Cellular; (g) Comments on the Second Supplement to Crystal Communications Systems' Application for Review, filed April 1, 1997 by Alpha Cellular; (h) Response to Motion for Leave to File Second Supplement to Application for Review and to Second Supplement to Application for Review, filed April 9, 1997 by Thomas Domencich and the Committee for Fair Lottery; (i) Motion to Accept Comments and Comments on Crystal Communications Systems' Second Supplement, filed on April 9, 1997 by Data Cellular Systems; (j) Motion to Accept Comments and Comments on Crystal Communications Systems' Second Supplement, filed on April 9, 1997 by Cellular Pacific; (k) Motion to Accept Comments and Comments on Crystal Communications Systems' Second Supplement, filed on April 9, 1997 by North American Cellular; and (l) Motion to Accept Comments and Comments on Crystal Communications Systems' Second Supplement, filed on April 9, 1997 by Signal Cellular Communications. 99. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the following applications ARE GRANTED: (a) A-1 Cellular Communications' applications for the Texas 10 (Navarro) RSA (File No. 10409-CL-P-661-A-89) and the Missouri 11 (Moniteau) RSA (File No. 10454-CL-P-514-A- 89); (b) Cranford Cellular Communications' application for the Alabama 5 (Cleburne) RSA (File No. 10611-CL-P-311-A-89); (c) Cel-Tel Communications' application for the Ohio 5 (Hancock) RSA (File No. 10912-CL-P-589-A-89); (d) Algreg Cellular Engineering's application for the Alabama 1 (Franklin) RSA (File No. 10607-CL-P-307-A-89); (e) Pinellas Communications' application for the Pennsylvania 2 (McKean) RSA (File No. 10808-CL-P- 613-A-89); (f) Florida Cellular's application for the Missouri 2 (Harrison) RSA (File No. 10445-CL-P-505-A-89); (g) Bay Cellular of Florida's application for the Mississippi 5 (Washington) RSA (File No. 10754-CL-P-497-A-89); and (h) Signal Cellular Communications' application for the South Carolina 8 (Hampton) RSA (File No. 10721-CL-P- 632-A-89). 100. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the applications of EJM Cellular Partners for the Oklahoma 1 (Cimarron) RSA (File No. 10567-CL-P-596-A-89) and for the Wyoming 4 (Niobrara) RSA (File No. 10116-CL-P-721-A-89), the application of Centaur Partnership for the South Carolina 7 (Calhoun) RSA (File No. 10720-CL-P-631-A-89), and the application of Bravo Cellular for the North Carolina 15 (Cabarrus) RSA (File No. 10673-CL-P-579-A-89) ARE REMANDED to the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau for further consideration in accordance with the instructions set forth in paragraphs 81 and 83 above. 101. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the revocation proceeding IS TERMINATED with respect to the licenses of Satellite Cellular System, Station KNKN 268, for Market 318 (Arizona 1 - Mohave) (File No. 10037-CL-P-318-A-89); Jaybar Communication, Station KNKN 251, for Market 323 (Arizona 6 - Graham) (File No. 10042-CL-P-323-A-89); Data Cellular Systems, Station KNKN 250, for Market 345 (California 10 - Sierra) (File No. 10029- CL-P-345-A-88); Cellular Pacific, Station KNKN 252, for Market 346 (California 11 - Eldorado) (File No. 10031-CL-P-346-A-88); North American Cellular, Station KNKN 253, for Market 388 (Idaho - Boundary) (File No. 10066-CL-P-388-A-88); and Crystal Communications Systems, Station KNKN 309, for Market 606 (Oregon 1 - Clatsop) (File No. 10078-CL-P-606-A-88). 102. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the two modification applications filed by Cellular Pacific (File Nos. 06606-CL-MP-90 and 06688-CL-MP-90) and the modification application filed by Data Cellular (File No. 07080-CL-MP-91) ARE DISMISSED without prejudice. 103. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That Alpha Cellular's application for Market 586 (Ohio 2 - Sandusky) (File No. 10909-CL-P-A-89) IS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED and that its license for Station KNKN 340, for Market 410 (Indiana 8 - Brown) (File No. 10318-CL-P- 410-A-88) IS CONDITIONALLY REINSTATED subject to its submission of written documentation within 30 days after the release of this order that it has formally rescinded the Mutual Contingent Risk Sharing Agreement. 104. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.  312(a)(2) of the Communications Act, the license of Alee Cellular Communications, Station KNKN 271, for Market 555 (New Mexico 3 - Catron) (File No. 10074-CL-P-555-A-88) IS REVOKED; and that Alee Cellular Communications IS AUTHORIZED to continue to operate Station KNKN 271 until 12:01 a.m. [six weeks after release of Memorandum Opinion and Order] to enable the licensee to conclude station affairs, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that if the licensee seeks reconsideration or judicial review of our action revoking its license, it is authorized to continue to operate Station KNKN 271 until final disposition of all administrative and/or judicial appeals. 105. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Motion for Leave to Comment and Comment on the Certification to the Commission of the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement, filed on January 6, 1995 by Buckhead Cellular, Cellular Applicants' Coalition, Miller Communications, Inc., Skywave Partners, Inc., Thomas Domencich, Committee for a Fair Lottery, Applicants Against Lottery Abuses, and ZDT Partnership IS DENIED; and the Comments on Motion for Leave to Comment and Comment on the Certification to the Commission of the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement, filed January 30, 1995, by Cellular Pacific and North American Cellular IS DISMISSED as moot. 106. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement, filed on October 20, 1994 by Crystal Communications Systems along with Petitioners Thomas Domencich, the Committee for a Fair Lottery, Applicants Against Lottery Abuses, Buckhead Cellular Communications Partnership, Miller Communications, Inc., Skywave Partners, Inc., Cellular Applicants' Coalition, and ZDT Partnership IS GRANTED; that the Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement, filed on April 18, 1995 by Alpha along with these same Petitioners IS GRANTED to the extent that it concerns Alpha's authorization for the Indiana 8 RSA market and IS HELD in abeyance to the extent that it concerns Alpha's pending application for the Ohio 2 RSA market. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION William F. Caton Acting Secretary