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Add. ICC Brief of Intervenors Supp. Respondents, In Re: FCC 11-161

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Released: April 25, 2013
Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT


No. 11-9900


IN RE: FCC 11-161


On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Federal Communications Commission





UNCITED INTERVENORS’ BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF THE RESPONSE OF THE RESPONDENTS TO

THE ADDITIONAL INTERCARRIER COMPENSATION ISSUES BRIEF






CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT

TIMOTHY J. SIMEONE

WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP

1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1200

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 730-1300


Counsel for Sprint Nextel Corporation













Additional Counsel Listed On Following Pages

April 24, 2013

Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 2

CATHY CARPINO


JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN


GARY L. PHILLIPS


HEATHER M. ZACHARY
PEGGY GARBER



KELLY P. DUNBAR
AT&T SERVICES, INC.



WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

1120 20th Street, NW
HALE AND DORR LLP
Washington, DC 20036

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW






Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for AT&T Inc.

MARK A. STACHIW
CARL W. NORTHROP



General Counsel, Secretary & Vice
MICHAEL LAZARUS



Chairman
ANDREW MORENTZ

METROPCS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
2250 Lakeside Blvd.
PROFESSIONALS PLLC
Richardson, Texas 75082
875 15th Street, NW, Suite

750Washington, DC 20005


Counsel for MetroPCS


Communications, Inc.

RICK CHESSEN
HOWARD J. SYMONS
NEAL M. GOLDBERG
ROBERT G. KIDWELL
STEVEN MORRIS
ERNEST C. COOPER
JENNIFER MCKEE
MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS
THE NATIONAL CABLE &
GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION
701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
25 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 900
Suite 100
Washington, DC 20004
Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for NCTA
















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Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 3
DAVID H. SOLOMON
L. CHARLES KELLER
WILKINSON BARKER KNAUER, LLP
2300 N Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20037

Counsel for T-Mobile USA, Inc.

SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH
MICHAEL E. GLOVER
BRENDAN J. CRIMMINS
CHRISTOPHER M. MILLER
JOSHUA D. BRANSON
CURTIS L. GROVES
KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN, TODD,
VERIZON
EVANS & FIGEL, P.L.L.C.
1320 North Courthouse Road, 9th Floor
1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
Arlington, Virginia 22201
Washington, D.C. 20036
(703) 351-3071
(202) 326-7900

Counsel for Verizon and Verizon

Wireless








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Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 4

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the Intervenors
joining this brief hereby submit these disclosure statements in connection with the
above-captioned case.

AT&T

is a publicly traded corporation that, through its wholly owned
affiliates, is principally engaged in the business of providing communications
services and products to the general public. AT&T has no parent company, and no
publicly held company owns ten percent or more of its stock.

MetroPCS Communications, Inc.

is a publicly-traded company listed on
the New York Stock Exchange and is organized to provide wireless and data
services to its customers. MetroPCS has no parent corporation, and, to MetroPCS’
knowledge, no publicly-held company holds more than ten percent of its stock.

NCTA

is the principal trade association of the cable industry in the United
States. Its members include owners and operators of cable television systems
serving over 90 percent of the nation’s cable television customers as well as more
than 200 cable program networks. NCTA’s cable operator members also provide
high-speed Internet service to more than 50 million households, as well as
telephone service to more than 26 million customers. NCTA also represents
equipment suppliers and others interested in or affiliated with the cable television
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Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 5
industry. NCTA has no parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliates whose listing
is required by Rule 26.1.

Sprint Nextel

has no parent corporation, and no publicly-held corporation
owns 10% or more of Sprint Nextel’s stock.1

T-Mobile, USA, Inc.

, a Delaware corporation, is wholly-owned subsidiary
of T-Mobile Global Holding GmbH, a German entity which, in turn, is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of T Mobile Global Zwischenholding GmbH, a German entity.
T Mobile Global Zwischenholding GmbH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Deutsche Telekom AG, a German entity. Deutsche Telekom AG is a publicly-
traded company in that the American Depository Receipts of Deutsche Telekom
AG are publicly traded in the Over-the-Counter Market in the United States. T-
Mobile’s general nature and purpose are to provide wireless voice and data
services to customers throughout the United States.
The

Verizon companies

participating in this filing are Cellco Partnership
d/b/a Verizon Wireless and the regulated, wholly owned subsidiaries of Verizon
Communications Inc. Cellco Partnership, a general partnership formed under the

1 On October 15, 2012, SoftBank Corp. and certain of its wholly-owned
subsidiaries and Sprint Nextel entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger
(“Merger Agreement”), which is currently subject to shareholder and regulatory
approval. If the Merger Agreement is consummated, SoftBank – a publicly-held
corporation – will own 10% or more of Sprint Nextel’s stock. Sprint Nextel’s 10Q
at page 1 (filed Feb. 28, 2013) available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101830/000010183013000006/sprint2012
10-k.htm.
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Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 6
law of the State of Delaware, is a joint venture of Verizon Communications Inc.
and Vodafone Group Plc. Verizon Communications Inc. and Vodafone Group Plc
indirectly hold 55 percent and 45 percent partnership interests, respectively, in
Cellco Partnership. Both Verizon Communications Inc. and Vodafone Group Plc
are publicly traded companies. Verizon Communications Inc. has no parent
company. No publicly held company owns ten percent or more of Verizon
Communications Inc.’s stock. Insofar as relevant to this litigation, Verizon’s
general nature and purpose is to provide communications services, including
broadband Internet access services provided by its wholly owned telephone
company and Verizon Online LLC subsidiaries and by Verizon Wireless.


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Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .................................................................................................... v

Glossary...................................................................................................................... vi

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 1

ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................. 2

I.
Intervenors Offer No Additional Argument on the First
Point Raised in Petitioners’ Additional ICC Brief ................................. 2

II.
The Commission has Unquestioned, Plenary Authority Over
Intercarrier Compensation for all LEC-CMRS Traffic .......................... 2

III. The Commission’s Access Stimulation Rules Are a
Reasonable Response to a Widespread Problem of Traffic
Pumping Schemes .................................................................................. 8

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 10


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases and Other Administrative Decisions

Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC,
120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................... 4

Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499 (1996) .............................................. 3

MetroPCS California, LLC v. FCC
, 4
644 F.3d 410 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................... 4

Qwest Corporation v. FCC,
252 F.3d 462 (D.C. Cir. 2001) .................................................................................... 4

Statutes and Other Authorities

47 U.S.C. §152(b) ....................................................................................................... 3

47 U.S.C. §251(b)(5)............................................................................................. 1, 2, 5, 6

47 U.S.C. §252(d)(2)................................................................................................. 1, 5

47 U.S.C. §332 ....................................................................................................... passim

47 C.F.R. §51.701(b)(2) .............................................................................................. 3

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-213 (Aug. 4, 1993) ............................................................. 3

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GLOSSARY


1996 Act
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.

56 (amending the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §151
et seq.)
Communications Communications Act of 1934, as amended (47 U.S.C. §151 et
Act (‘the Act”)
seq.)
CLEC
Competitive Local Exchange Carrier
CMRS
Commercial Mobile Radio Service
FCC
Federal Communications Commission
FCC Prin. Br.
Federal Respondents’ Response to the Joint Intercarrier
Compensation Principal Brief of Petitioners (filed Mar. 6, 2013)
ICC
Intercarrier Compensation
LEC
Local Exchange Carrier
MTA
Major Trading Area
Order
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Connect America Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663 (2011)
Pet. Add. Br.
Additional Intercarrier Compensation Brief of Petitioners (filed
November 6, 2012)
USF
Universal Service Fund



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Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 10

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

The FCC’s Response to Petitioners’ Additional Intercarrier
Compensation Brief concisely demonstrates the flaws in Petitioners’ first
argument—that the Commission improperly denied USF support to rural CLECs—
and Intervenors offer no further argument.

II.

Petitioners’ second argument, that the Commission erred by
implementing bill-and-keep for CMRS-LEC Traffic and in doing so more rapidly
than for LEC-LEC traffic, is wrong for the following reasons:

A.

Petitioners err in arguing that the Commission’s new wireless
regulations are “dependent upon the validity” of the wireline rules. Pet. Add. Br.
22. The Commission has independent (and plenary) statutory authority under
Section 332 to establish and oversee the intercarrier compensation regime for all
wireless traffic without regard to its authority under Section 251(b)(5).

B.

Petitioners’ claim that bill-and-keep infringes on the authority of state
commissions under Section 252(d)(2) is irrelevant with respect to LEC-CMRS
traffic. Again, the Commission has unquestioned authority over intercarrier
compensation for wireless traffic under Section 332 and that authority extends to
adoption of bill-and-keep for wireless traffic.

C.

Petitioners’ argument that the Commission’s bill-and-keep
implementation schedule for wireless traffic is “arbitrary and capricious” is
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Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 11
incorrect. The Commission fully articulated compelling reasons for the difference
between the wireless and wireline schedules.

III.

Petitioners’ argument that the Commission’s new access stimulation
rules are arbitrary and capricious also lacks merit. Those rules are a reasonable
response to a widespread problem of traffic pumping schemes. Such schemes pose
particular problems in the wireless context, which fully justifies retaining the new
wireless rules without regard to the Commission’s authority under Section
251(b)(5).

ARGUMENT


I.

Intervenors offer no additional argument on the first point raised in
Petitioners’ Additional ICC Brief.

II.

The Commission has Unquestioned, Plenary Authority Over
Intercarrier Compensation for all LEC-CMRS Traffic.


A.

Petitioners’ primary ICC argument in this appeal—that the FCC lacks
authority under §251(b)(5) to preempt state regulation of intrastate access
charges—is meritless for the many reasons the FCC and intervenors have
explained in separate briefs. Furthermore, the Commission’s separate authority
under §332 over intercarrier compensation for all wireless traffic was unquestioned
in the FCC proceeding and remains so before this Court. Accordingly, “[w]ith
respect to traffic exchanged with wireless carriers,” §332 “provide[s] ...
independent authority for the FCC to adopt its reforms.” FCC Prin. Br. 6.
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The Commission’s reliance on its §332 authority to establish and oversee the
intercarrier compensation regime for all wireless traffic is well founded. In 1993,
Congress limited the states’ historical authority over intrastate rates by prohibiting
them from exercising “any authority to regulate” wireless entry and rates. See 47
U.S.C. §332(c)(3)(A). At the same time, the 1996 Act made clear that it was the
FCC, not the states, that has authority over intercarrier compensation for wireless
traffic by exempting the amended §332 from the restrictions that §2(b) of the Act,
47 U.S.C. §152(b), had imposed on FCC jurisdiction over intrastate traffic, see
also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-213, at 497 (Aug. 4, 1993). Finally, the 1993 Act
empowered the FCC to order any LEC to interconnect with a wireless carrier and
to establish the terms and conditions for the exchange of all traffic. See id.
§332(c)(1); see also Order, ¶834.

Significantly, “[t]he Eighth and D.C. Circuits have confirmed that 47 U.S.C.
§ 332 provides the FCC with independent authority to establish reciprocal
compensation terms with respect to wireless traffic exchanged with a LEC.” FCC
Prin. Br. 24. In 1996, the Commission’s Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
15499 (1996), adopted the “intraMTA rule,” see 47 C.F.R. §51.701(b)(2), which
had the effect of prohibiting LECs from imposing access charges (including
intrastate access charges) on mobile-to-land calls that originate and terminate
within the same Major Trading Area (“MTA”). LECs argued on appeal that the
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FCC did not possess the authority to eliminate intrastate access charges. In Iowa
Utilities Board v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 900 n.21 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit
rejected this LEC argument based on the statutory provisions discussed above. No
one challenged this portion of this Eighth Circuit ruling in the subsequent appeal of
this decision to the Supreme Court.
The D.C. Circuit has twice acknowledged the Commission’s plenary
authority over all intercarrier compensation for LEC-CMRS calls. First, in Qwest
Corporation v. FCC, 252 F.3d 462 (D.C. Cir. 2001), Qwest appealed an FCC order
enforcing one of the wireless rules the Eighth Circuit had affirmed in Iowa Utilities
Board. The D.C. Circuit ruled that, because “[t]he Petitioners did not seek
certiorari as to the Eighth Circuit’s holding on § 332,” the decision was a “final
judgment with preclusive effects.” 252 F.3d at 466. More recently, the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in MetroPCS California, LLC v. FCC, 644 F.3d 410, 414 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), also acknowledged that the Commission has broad §332 authority to
preempt state authority over intrastate rates affecting wireless companies but has
no duty to do so, thus upholding the Commission’s election at the time to delegate
to state regulators certain rate-setting responsibilities. The Order fully justified the
FCC’s decision to alter that decision and to establish a federal bill-and-keep
methodology for LEC-wireless traffic. Order, ¶ 993.
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In sum, the FCC has authority under §332 and D.C. Circuit precedent to
impose the Order’s reforms of wireless intercarrier compensation, including
establishing a default bill-and-keep regime.

B.

With respect to LEC-LEC traffic, Petitioners argue in their Principal
ICC Brief that the Commission’s adoption of bill-and-keep infringed on the
authority of state commissions under §252(d)(2). With respect to LEC-CMRS
traffic, that claim is irrelevant—again, the Commission has unquestioned authority
over intercarrier compensation for wireless traffic under §332.
Several Petitioners—in an argument not joined by the vast majority of the
Petitioners in this appeal—argue that the Commission elected to move to bill-and-
keep for LEC-CMRS traffic because it had imposed that regime on LEC-LEC
traffic under §251(b)(5). Pet. Add. Br. 21. But there is nothing in the Order that
suggests that the Commission intended the adoption of bill-and-keep for LEC-
CMRS traffic to hinge on the adoption of bill-and-keep for LEC-LEC traffic.
Indeed, the reasons the Commission articulated in the Order for moving to bill-
and-keep apply equally to LEC-LEC and CMRS-LEC traffic, including that bill-
and-keep:
 “brings market discipline to intercarrier compensation because
it ensures that the customer who chooses a network pays the
network for the services the subscriber receives” (¶742);
 is “less burdensome” than other options because it “reduces
significant regulatory costs” (¶743);
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 “eliminates arbitrage and marketplace distortions” (¶752);
 ensures that “success in the marketplace will reflect a carrier’s
ability to serve customers efficiently, rather than its ability to
extract payments from other carriers” (¶756); and
 is “most consistent with the models used for wireless and IP
networks, models that have flourished and promoted
innovation and investment” (id.).
In addition, the Commission did not simply adopt bill-and-keep generically—it did
so specifically for “wireless traffic exchanged with a LEC,” including for both
“interstate and intrastate traffic.” ¶779. Moreover, the Commission did so
pursuant to “separate authority under sections 201 and 332(c),” quite apart from its
§251(b)(5) authority over LEC-LEC traffic. Id.

C.

Certain Petitioners present a jumble of arguments to the effect that the
FCC’s bill-and-keep implementation schedule for wireless traffic is “arbitrary and
capricious” because it is different from the one the Commission adopted for
landline traffic. These arguments may be simplified to the claims that: (1) the
“FCC’s dissimilar treatment of similar traffic is arbitrary and capricious,” Pet.
Add. Br. 22; and (2) the agency’s approach unlawfully “reverses” prior FCC
findings without acknowledgment or explanation, id. at 23. These claims are
erroneous.
First, the argument that the Order treats LEC-LEC and LEC-CMRS traffic
differently for no reason is incorrect. In fact, the Commission gave sensible
reasons for the difference in treatment, including:
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 The “need for immediate application of a bill-and-keep methodology in [the]
context” of LEC-CMRS non-access traffic is greater than for LEC-LEC
traffic because of “a significant and growing problem of traffic stimulation
and regulatory arbitrage” for “LEC-CMRS non-access traffic” (¶995); and

 Because the Commission “until recently had no pricing methodology
applicable to competitive LEC-CMRS traffic,” CLECs “had no basis for
reliance on such a [non-bill-and-keep] methodology in their business
models.” (¶996).

The Order thus appropriately treats LEC-CMRS traffic differently because of an
irrefutable record of new, growing arbitrage problems, and because the
Commission is not “transitioning” from an existing regime at all, but rather filling
a void as to which CLECs had no detrimental reliance interests.

In attempting to refute the FCC’s conclusion that a quicker transition for
CMRS-LEC traffic would cause fewer market disruptions, Petitioners present
contradictory arguments: that CLECs’ inability to collect compensation results
from the FCC’s inaction, and that CLECs in fact have been collecting considerable
compensation. Pet. Add. Br. 26-28. Petitioners cannot have it both ways. In any
event, neither of these arguments undermines the FCC’s reasoned justifications for
treating LEC-CMRS traffic differently. Moreover, as the FCC pointed out, see
FCC Add. Br. at 28, many of Petitioners’ arguments stem from their mistaken
belief that the Commission adopted a “flash cut” to bill-and-keep for LEC-CMRS
traffic. In fact, the Commission declined to abrogate existing interconnection
agreements, and extended the implementation deadline by six months for carriers
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with existing agreements—the “effect of that change was to ensure no such carrier
would be required to convert to bill-and-keep” without a further “transition”
period. Id. at 28-29.

Second, there is no unexplained reversal of course here. Petitioners’
arguments that the Commission declined to “singl[e] out LEC-CMRS traffic and
subject[] it to bill-and-keep” in 1996, and that “it was unwilling to adopt” bill-and
keep for ISP-bound traffic in 2001, Pet. Add. Br. 23, are “true, but irrelevant,”
FCC Add. Br. 30. As the Commission explained, those earlier decisions declined
to mandate bill-and-keep for wireless traffic in light of the Commission’s overall
policy at the time of not adopting a bill-and-keep framework more broadly. See id.
“Here, by contrast, the FCC adopted the same regime—bill-and-keep—as the end
point for all traffic exchanged with a LEC,” and the only issue was the “pace of ...
reform during the transition period” for LEC-CMRS versus LEC-LEC traffic. Id.
With respect to that issue, the Commission has reasonably explained that it makes
sense to move more quickly with respect to LEC-CMRS traffic.

III.

The Commission’s Access Stimulation Rules Are a Reasonable
Response to a Widespread Problem of Traffic Pumping Schemes.


Only two petitioners—Core Communications, Inc. and North County
Communications Corp.—claim that the FCC acted arbitrarily in addressing the
problem of traffic pumping (or “access stimulation”). They challenge only one
aspect of the FCC’s new traffic pumping rules: the FCC’s refusal to permit CLECs
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to submit cost studies to support higher rates for their pumped traffic. The FCC
ably responds to those claims and correctly notes that its “findings about the
detrimental effects of access stimulation” are “undisputed.” FCC Add. Br. 22.

However, in the course of challenging the FCCs’s bill-and-keep
implementation schedule for wireless traffic, the petitioners joining the Additional
ICC Brief do dispute the existence of traffic pumping. To the contrary, the record
is replete with evidence of serious, systematic traffic pumping schemes involving
multiple carriers and multiple states. See Order ¶ 663-66; see also Comments of
MetroPCS Communications, Inc. (April 18, 2011) (JA __-__) (referencing traffic
pumping disputes plaguing CMRS providers before at least six state PUCs and at
least three federal courts); CTIA Ex Parte at 1-2 & Attach. at 1-8 (Nov. 24, 2010)
(JA __-__) (listing pending disputes); Verizon and Verizon Wireless Ex Parte at 5-
7 (June 28, 2010) (JA __-__) (identifying recent increase in disputes). Moreover,
the record reflects that these problems were by no means limited to interstate
traffic—traffic pumping was equally prevalent for intrastate traffic. See, e.g.,
Reply Comments of MetroPCS (Feb. 21, 2012) (JA __-__).
Given their denial of the existence of traffic pumping, Petitioners do not
even attempt to offer any public interest justification for revenue sharing schemes
that stimulate traffic. But the very existence of these schemes demonstrates that
the termination charges of traffic pumpers are excessive. Traffic-pumping CLECs
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can only afford to pay third parties to drive traffic to the carriers for termination
because there is substantial excess intercarrier compensation revenue—so much so
that the terminating carrier is able to “share” its revenues with its business partners.
See FCC Add. Br. 31-32 (CLECs sought rates as high as “$0.011 or $0.015” for
“non-access wireless traffic,” which in some cases was likely 10,000 times higher
than necessary rates).

This problem of traffic stimulation in the CMRS market led the Commission
to conclude that the “need for immediate application of a bill-and-keep
methodology in [the] context” of LEC-CMRS non-access traffic is greater than for
LEC-LEC traffic because of “a significant and growing problem of traffic
stimulation and regulatory arbitrage” for “LEC-CMRS non-access traffic.” Order
¶995. The FCC-recognized need for an accelerated glide path to a bill-and-keep
regime for LEC-CMRS traffic further justifies retaining the Commission’s new
intercarrier compensation rules governing wireless under its §332 authority
regardless of whether it is sustained for all other services resulting in a uniform
regime.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the FCC’s brief, the Court
should deny the petitions for review insofar as they relate to issues presented in the
Additional ICC Issues brief.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,



/S/



CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT
TIMOTHY J. SIMEONE
WILTSHIRE & GRANNIS LLP
120 18th Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 730-1300

Counsel for Sprint Nextel Corporation

/S/

/S/


CATHY CARPINO


JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN


GARY L. PHILLIPS


HEATHER M. ZACHARY
PEGGY GARBER



KELLY P. DUNBAR
AT&T SERVICES, INC.



WILMER CUTLER PICKERING

1120 20th Street, NW
HALE AND DORR LLP
Washington, DC 20036

1875 Pennsylvania Ave., NW



Washington, DC 20006


Counsel for AT&T Inc.
Counsel for AT&T Inc.





/S/

/S/


MARK A. STACHIW
CARL W. NORTHROP



General Counsel, Secretary & Vice
MICHAEL LAZARUS



Chairman
ANDREW MORENTZ

METROPCS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
2250 Lakeside Blvd.
PROFESSIONALS PLLC
Richardson, Texas 75082
875 15th Street, NW, Suite

750Washington, DC 20005


Counsel for MetroPCS
Counsel for MetroPCS
Communications, Inc.
Communications, Inc.




11


Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 21
/S/

/S/


RICK CHESSEN
HOWARD J. SYMONS
NEAL M. GOLDBERG
ROBERT G. KIDWELL
STEVEN MORRIS
ERNEST C. COOPER
JENNIFER MCKEE
MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS
THE NATIONAL CABLE &
GLOVSKY AND POPEO, P.C.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION
701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
25 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 900
Suite 100
Washington, DC 20004
Washington, DC 20001



Counsel for NCTA
Counsel for NCTA


/S/


DAVID H. SOLOMON
L. CHARLES KELLER
WILKINSON BARKER KNAUER, LLP
2300 N Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20037

Counsel for T-Mobile USA, Inc.





/S/

/S/


SCOTT H. ANGSTREICH
MICHAEL E. GLOVER
BRENDAN J. CRIMMINS
CHRISTOPHER M. MILLER
JOSHUA D. BRANSON
CURTIS L. GROVES
KELLOGG, HUBER, HANSEN, TODD,
VERIZON
EVANS & FIGEL, P.L.L.C.
1320 North Courthouse Road, 9th Floor
1615 M Street, N.W., Suite 400
Arlington, Virginia 22201
Washington, D.C. 20036
(703) 351-3071
(202) 326-7900




Counsel for Verizon and Verizon
Counsel for Verizon and Verizon
Wireless
Wireless


April 24, 2013
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitations, Typeface

Requirements, Type Style Requirements, Privacy Redaction

Requirements, and Virus Scan



1.
This brief contains 2,211 words of the 21,400 words the Court allocated for
the briefs of intervenors in support of the FCC in its October 1, 2012 Order
Consolidating Case No. 12-9575 with Other FCC 11-161 Cases, Establishing
Windstream Briefing Schedule, and Modifying Intervenor Participation. The
intervenors in support of the FCC have complied with the type-volume limitation
of that order because their briefs, combined, contain a total of fewer than 21,400
words, excluding the parts of those briefs exempted by Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

2.
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and 10th Cir. R. 32(a) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14-point Times New Roman font.

3.
All required privacy redactions have been made.

4.
This brief was scanned for viruses with VIPRE (version 6.0.5481, updated
on April 24, 2013) and, according to the program, is free of viruses.



/s/
Christopher J. Wright

April 24, 2013



Appellate Case: 11-9900 Document: 01019041753 Date Filed: 04/24/2013 Page: 23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I hereby certify that on April 24, 2013 I caused the foregoing Uncited
Intervenors’ Brief in Support of the Response of the Respondents to the Additional
Intercarrier Compensation Issues Brief to be filed by delivering a copy to the Court
via e-mail at FCC_briefs_only@ca10.uscourts.gov. I further certify that the
foregoing documents will be furnished by the Court through (ECF) electronic
service to all parties in this case through a certified CM/ECF user. This document
will be available for viewing and downloading on the CM/ECF system.
/s/


Christopher J. Wright
April 24, 2013



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