Auction of Paging Licenses Announced, Comment Sought
Federal Communications Commission
News Media Information 202 / 418-0500445 12th St., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554
TTY: 1-888-835-5322DA 13-60
February 1, 2013
AUCTION OF LOWER AND UPPER PAGING BANDS LICENSES
SCHEDULED FOR JULY 16, 2013
COMMENT SOUGHT ON COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCEDURES
FOR AUCTION 95AU Docket No. 13-12
Comments Due: February 22, 2013
Reply Comments Due: March 14, 2013
TABLE OF CONTENTSHeading
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1
II. LICENSES TO BE OFFERED IN AUCTION 95 ................................................................................. 2
A. License Descriptions ........................................................................................................................ 4
B. Incumbency Issues ........................................................................................................................... 6
III. DUE DILIGENCE.................................................................................................................................. 7
IV. BUREAU SEEKS COMMENT ON AUCTION PROCEDURES....................................................... 11
A. Auction Structure ........................................................................................................................... 12
1. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design ...................................................................... 12
2. Anonymous Bidding................................................................................................................ 13
3. Bidding Rounds....................................................................................................................... 19
4. Stopping Rule .......................................................................................................................... 22
5. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation .................................... 25
B. Auction Procedures........................................................................................................................ 26
1. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility .............................................................................. 26
2. Activity Rule ........................................................................................................................... 28
3. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility..................................................................... 32
4. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bids............................................................................... 37
5. Bid Amounts............................................................................................................................ 42
6. Provisionally Winning Bids .................................................................................................... 48
7. Bid Removal............................................................................................................................ 50
8. Bid Withdrawal ....................................................................................................................... 51
C. Post-Auction Payments .................................................................................................................. 54
1. Interim Withdrawal Payment Percentage ................................................................................ 54
2. Additional Default Payment Percentage.................................................................................. 56
V. DEADLINES AND FILING PROCEDURES ..................................................................................... 59
VI. CONTACTS ......................................................................................................................................... 66
ATTACHMENT A: Summary of Licenses to Be Auctioned
ATTACHMENT B: Block/Frequency Cross-Reference List
INTRODUCTION1. By this Public Notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (“Bureau”) announces an
auction of 5,905 paging licenses to commence on July 16, 2013 (“Auction 95”) and seeks comment on the
procedures to be used for this auction. The licenses available in Auction 95 consist of 4,902 licenses in
the lower paging bands (35-36 MHz, 43-44 MHz, 152-159 MHz, 454-460 MHz) and 1,003 licenses in the
upper paging bands (929-931 MHz).1
LICENSES TO BE OFFERED IN AUCTION 952. Auction 95 will offer licenses that remained unsold from previous auctions, licenses on which
a winning bidder in a previous auction defaulted, and licenses for spectrum previously associated with
licenses that cancelled or terminated. In a few cases, the available license does not cover the entire
geographic area due to an excluded area or previous partitioning.
3. Attachment A to this Public Notice provides a summary of the licenses available in
Auction 95. Due to the large number of licenses in Auction 95, the complete list of licenses available for
this auction will be provided in electronic format only, available as separate “Attachment A” files at
In the Paging Reconsideration Order, the Commission concluded that the lower bands
licenses should be awarded in each of the 175 geographic areas known as Economic Areas (EAs), and the
upper bands licenses should be awarded in each of the 51 geographic areas known as Major Economic
Areas (MEAs).3 These EAs and MEAs encompass the United States, Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa.
Tables containing the block/frequency cross-reference list for the paging bands are
included in “Attachment B” to this Public Notice. These licenses are limited to bandwidths of 20
kilohertz (kHz) or 20 kHz pairs (40 kHz total).4 Licensees may use the spectrum to provide (1) one-way
messaging, (2) two-way messaging, and (3) fixed wireless services.5 Provision of these services is subject
to the technical limitations set forth for the service in Part 22 of the Commission’s rules.6
There are pre-existing paging incumbent licenses. Incumbent (non-geographic) paging
licensees operating under their existing authorizations are entitled to full protection from co-channel
interference.7 Geographic area licensees are likewise afforded co-channel interference protection from
1 See 47 C.F.R. Chapter I, Part 22, Subparts C and E; Part 90, Subpart P. See Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the
Commission’s Rules to Facilitate Future Development of Paging Systems, Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act – Competitive Bidding, WT Docket No. 96-18, PR Docket No. 93-253, Memorandum Opinion
and Order on Reconsideration and Third Report and Order, FCC 99-98, 14 FCC Rcd 10,030 (1999) (“Paging
2 A copy of the complete list of licenses and any other documents relating to Auction 95 may also be obtained, for a
fee, from the Commission’s duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (“BCPI”), 445 12th Street, SW,
Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, 800-378-3160 or at http://www.bcpiweb.com. When ordering documents
from BCPI, please provide the appropriate FCC document number (for example, DA 13-60 for this Public Notice).
3 See Paging Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 10,043-46 ¶¶ 14-21.
4 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.531, 22.561.
5 See generally 47 C.F.R. Chapter I, Part 22, Subparts C and E (operational, technical and other requirements for
Paging and Radiotelephone Service).
7 Id. at 10,059-60 ¶¶ 42-44. See also Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission’s Rules to Facilitate Future
Development of Paging Systems, Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act – Competitive
incumbent licensees.8 Geographic area licensees are obligated to resolve possible interference concerns
of adjacent geographic area licensees by negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement with the
neighboring geographic licensee.9
DUE DILIGENCE7. Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating and evaluating all technical and
marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the licenses that it is seeking in this auction.
Each bidder is responsible for assuring that, if it wins a license, it will be able to build and operate
facilities in accordance with the Commission’s rules.
The FCC makes no representations or
warranties about the use of this spectrum for particular services. Each applicant should be aware
that an FCC auction represents an opportunity to become an FCC licensee in the paging service,
subject to certain conditions and regulations. An FCC auction does not constitute an endorsement
by the FCC of any particular service, technology, or product, nor does an FCC license constitute a
guarantee of business success.
would with any new business venture. Each potential bidder should perform technical analyses and/or
refresh any previous analyses to assure itself that, should it become a winning bidder for any Auction 95
license, it will be able to build and operate facilities that will fully comply with all applicable technical
and legal requirements. We strongly encourage each applicant to inspect any prospective transmitter sites
located in, or near, the geographic area for which it plans to bid; confirm the availability of such sites; and
familiarize itself with the Commission’s rules regarding the National Environmental Policy Act.10
9. We strongly encourage each applicant to conduct its own research prior to Auction 95 in
order to determine the existence of pending administrative, rulemaking, or judicial proceedings that might
affect its decisions regarding participation in the auction.
10. We strongly encourage participants in Auction 95 to continue such research throughout the
auction. The due diligence considerations mentioned in this Public Notice do not comprise an exhaustive
list of steps that should be undertaken prior to participating in this auction. As always, the burden is on
the potential bidder to determine how much research to undertake, depending upon the specific facts and
circumstances related to its interests.
BUREAU SEEKS COMMENT ON AUCTION PROCEDURES11. Consistent with the provisions of section 309(j)(3)(E)(i) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended, and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the
specific rules that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau,
under delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start
of each auction.11 We therefore seek comment on the following issues relating to the conduct of
(Continued from previous page)
Bidding, WT Docket No. 96-18, PP Docket No. 93-253, Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FCC 97-59, 12 FCC Rcd 2732, 2764 ¶¶ 57-58 (1997) (“Paging Second Report and Order”); 47 C.F.R.
8 Paging Second Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 2764 ¶ 57.
9 Paging Reconsideration Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 10,060-61 ¶¶ 45-46.
10 47 C.F.R. Chapter 1, Part 1, Subpart I.
11 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i). See Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules – Competitive Bidding
Procedures, WT Docket No. 97-82, Third Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
13 FCC Rcd 374, 447-49 ¶¶ 124-25, FCC 97-413 (1997) (“Part 1 Third Report and Order”) (directing WTB to seek
comment on specific mechanisms related to day-to-day auction conduct including, for example, the structure of
bidding rounds and stages, establishment of minimum opening bids or reserve prices, minimum acceptable bids,
initial maximum eligibility for each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of the auction, activity rule waivers,
criteria for determining reductions in eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and bid removal, stopping
Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design12. The Bureau proposes to auction all licenses included in Auction 95 using the Commission’s
standard simultaneous multiple-round auction format.12 As described further below, this type of auction
offers every license for bid at the same time and consists of successive bidding rounds in which eligible
bidders may place bids on individual licenses. Typically, bidding remains open on all licenses until
bidding stops on every license. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
Anonymous Bidding13. In several prior auctions the Commission has adopted procedures to limit the disclosure of
certain bidder-specific information until after the auction.13 Consistent with that practice, the Bureau
proposes to conduct Auction 95 using certain procedures for limited information disclosure or
“anonymous bidding.” Specifically, the Bureau proposes to withhold, until after the close of bidding,
public release of (1) bidders’ license selections on their short-form applications (FCC Form 175), (2) the
amounts of bidders’ upfront payments and bidding eligibility, and (3) information that may reveal the
identities of bidders placing bids and taking other bidding-related actions.
14. Under these proposed limited information procedures, the amount of every bid placed and
whether a bid was withdrawn would be disclosed after the close of every round, but the identities of
bidders placing specific bids or withdrawals and the net bid amounts would not be disclosed until after the
close of the auction.
15. Bidders would have access to additional information about their own bids. For example,
bidders would be able to view their own level of eligibility, before and during the auction, through the
Commission’s Integrated Spectrum Auction System (“ISAS” or “FCC Auction System”).
16. Moreover, for the purpose of complying with section 1.2105(c), the Commission’s rule
prohibiting certain communications between applicants (formerly referred to as the “anti-collusion rule”),
applicants would be made aware of other applicants with which they will not be permitted to cooperate,
collaborate, or communicate — including discussing bids, bidding strategies, or post-auction market
structure.14 Specifically, the Bureau would notify separately each applicant in Auction 95 whether
applicants with short-form applications to participate in pending auctions, including but not limited to
Auction 95, have applied for licenses in any of the same or overlapping geographic areas as that
17. After the close of bidding, bidders’ license selections, upfront payment amounts, bidding
eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related actions would be made publicly available.
(Continued from previous page)
rules, and information relating to auction delay, suspension or cancellation). See also 47 C.F.R. § 0.131;
Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission’s Rules – Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, Order,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 97-60, 12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5697-98
¶ 16 (1997) (“Part 1 Order”).
12 See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act — Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-
253, Second Report and Order, FCC 94-61, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2360-75 ¶¶ 68-159 (1994) (“Second Report and
Order”) for a general discussion of competitive bidding design.
13 See, e.g., “Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008; Notice and Filing Requirements,
Minimum Opening Bids, Reserve Prices, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auctions 73 and 76,” Public
Notice, DA 07-4171, 22 FCC Rcd 18,141, 18,181-85 ¶¶ 145-156 (WTB 2007); “Auction of Advanced Wireless
Services Licenses Scheduled for June 29, 2006; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront
Payments and Other Procedures for Auction No. 66,” Public Notice, FCC 06-47, 21 FCC Rcd 4562, 4600-05 ¶¶
140-157 (2006); “Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for May 25, 2010; Notice and
Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for Auction 87,” Public
Notice, DA 10-18, 25 FCC Rcd 6333 (WTB 2010) (“Auction 87 Procedures Public Notice”).
14 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c).
18. The Bureau seeks comments on its proposal to implement anonymous bidding in Auction 95.
The Bureau also seeks comment on alternatives to the use of anonymous bidding procedures for Auction
95. When the Commission first proposed limited information disclosure procedures, it did so in response
to analysis suggesting that under certain circumstances the competitiveness and economic efficiency of a
simultaneous multiple-round auction may be enhanced if such information is withheld until after the close
of the auction.15 The Bureau encourages parties to provide information about the benefits and costs of
complying with limited information procedures as compared with the benefits and costs of alternative
procedures that would provide for the disclosure of more information on bidder identities and interests in
the auction. If commenters believe that the Bureau should not adopt procedures to limit the disclosure of
certain bidder-specific information until after the auction, they should explain their reasoning.
Bidding Rounds19. Auction 95 will consist of sequential bidding rounds. The initial bidding schedule will be
announced in a public notice to be released at least one week before the start of the auction.
20. The Commission will conduct Auction 95 over the Internet using the Commission’s
Integrated Spectrum Auction System (FCC Auction System). Bidders will also have the option of placing
bids by telephone through a dedicated Auction Bidder Line. The toll-free telephone number for the
Auction Bidder Line will be provided to qualified bidders prior to the start of the auction.
21. The Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to foster
an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders’ need to study round results and adjust
their bidding strategies. Under this proposal, the Bureau may change the amount of time for bidding
rounds, the amount of time between rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding
activity and other factors. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal. Commenters on this issue should
address the role of the bidding schedule in managing the pace of the auction, specifically discussing the
tradeoffs in managing auction pace by bidding schedule changes, by changing the activity requirements or
bid amount parameters, or by using other means.
Stopping Rule22. The Bureau has discretion to establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions
in order to complete the auction within a reasonable time.16 For Auction 95, we propose to employ a
simultaneous stopping rule approach, which means all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding
stops on every license. More specifically, bidding will close on all licenses after the first round in which
no bidder submits any new bids, applies a proactive waiver, or withdraws any provisionally winning
bids.17 Thus, unless we announce alternative procedures, the simultaneous stopping rule will be used in
this auction, and bidding will remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.
Consequently, it is not possible to determine in advance how long the bidding in this auction will last.
23. Further, we propose to retain the discretion to exercise any of the following options during
a) Use a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that would close the auction for all
licenses after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, withdraws a provisionally
winning bid, or places any new bids on a license for which it is not the provisionally winning
bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which
15 “Auction of Advanced Wireless Services Licenses Scheduled for June 29, 2006; Comment Sought on Reserve
Prices or Minimum Opening Bids and Other Procedures,” Public Notice, DA 06-238, 21 FCC Rcd 794, 799 (2006).
16 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(e).
17 Provisionally winning bids are bids that would become final winning bids if the auction were to close in that given
round. They are discussed in Section IV.B.6. “Provisionally Winning Bids.” Proactive waivers are described in
Section IV.B.3. “Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility,” and bid withdrawals are described in Section
IV.B.8. “Bid Withdrawal,” below.
it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep the auction open under this modified
b) Use a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that would close the auction for all
licenses after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver, withdraws a provisionally
winning bid, or places any new bids on a license that is not FCC held. Thus, absent any other
bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license that does not already have a provisionally
winning bid (an “FCC-held” license) would not keep the auction open under this modified
c) Use a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule that combines (a) and (b) above.
d) Declare the auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds (“special stopping
rule”). If the Bureau invokes this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s), after which the auction will close.
e) Keep the auction open even if no bidder places any new bids, applies a waiver, or withdraws
any provisionally winning bids. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had
applied a waiver. The activity rule will apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity will
either lose bidding eligibility or use a waiver.
24. We propose to exercise these options only in certain circumstances, for example, where the
auction is proceeding unusually slowly or quickly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time or will close prematurely. Before
exercising these options, we are likely to attempt to change the pace of the auction. For example, the
Bureau may adjust the pace of bidding by changing the number of bidding rounds per day and/or the
minimum acceptable bids. We propose to retain the discretion to exercise any of these options with or
without prior announcement during the auction. We seek comment on these proposals.
Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation25. For Auction 95, we propose that the Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the
event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an auction
security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and efficient
conduct of competitive bidding.18 We will notify participants of any such delay, suspension or
cancellation by public notice and/or through the FCC Auction System’s announcement function. If the
auction is delayed or suspended, we may, in our sole discretion, elect to resume the auction starting from
the beginning of the current round or from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its entirety.
Network interruption may cause the Bureaus to delay or suspend the auction. We emphasize that we will
exercise this authority solely at our discretion, and not as a substitute for situations in which bidders may
wish to apply their activity rule waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.
Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility26. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine an appropriate upfront
payment for each license being auctioned, taking into account such factors as the efficiency of the auction
process and the potential value of similar licenses.19 As described further below, the upfront payment is a
refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments that
are related to the specific licenses being auctioned protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and
18 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(i).
19 See Part 1 Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98 ¶ 16. See also Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 425
¶ 86; Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 2377-79 ¶¶ 169-75.
provide the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of the
auction.20 For Auction 95, the proposed upfront payments are equal to the proposed minimum opening
bids. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
27. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder
will determine its initial bidding eligibility in bidding units. We propose to assign each license a specific
number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per dollar of the upfront payment listed for the license.
The specific bidding units for each license are set forth in the complete list of licenses available for
Auction 95, available as separate “Attachment A” files at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/95/. The
number of bidding units for a given license is fixed and does not change during the auction as prices
change. A bidder may place bids on multiple licenses, provided that the total number of bidding units
associated with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility. A bidder cannot increase its
eligibility during the auction; it can only maintain its eligibility or decrease its eligibility. Thus, in
calculating its upfront payment amount and hence its initial bidding eligibility, an applicant must
determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to bid (or hold provisionally
winning bids) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that total number of
bidding units. We request comment on these proposals.
Activity Rule28. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of time, an activity rule
requires bidders to bid actively throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction before
participating. A bidder’s activity in a round will be the sum of the bidding units associated with any
licenses upon which it places bids during the current round and the bidding units associated with any
licenses for which it holds provisionally winning bids placed in previous rounds. Bidders are required to
be active on a specific percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction.
Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in the use of an activity rule waiver, if any
remain, or a reduction in the bidder’s eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder’s ability to
place additional bids in the auction.21
29. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into at least two stages, each characterized by a
different activity requirement.22 The auction will start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes to advance the
auction to the next stage by announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the Bureau
will consider a variety of measures of auction activity, including but not limited to the percentage of
licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there are new bids,23 the number of new bids, and the
increase in revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
30. The Bureau proposes the following activity requirements, while noting again that the Bureau
retains the discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement during the auction:
Stage One:In each round of the first stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its
current bidding eligibility is required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of its
current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the required activity level will result in the use of
an activity rule waiver or a reduction in the bidder’s bidding eligibility for the next round of
bidding. During Stage One, a bidder’s reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the bidder’s current round activity by five-fourths (5/4).
20 See Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2377-79 ¶¶ 169-76.
21 See Section IV.B.3. “Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility,” below.
22 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(f).
23 For example, when monitoring activity for determining when to change stages, the Bureau may consider the
percentage of bidding units of the licenses receiving new provisionally winning bids, excluding any FCC-held
licenses. In past auctions, the Bureau has generally — but not always — changed stages when this measure was
approximately twenty percent or below for three consecutive rounds of bidding.
Stage Two:In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to maintain its current bidding
eligibility is required to be active on 95 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to
maintain the required activity level will result in the use of an activity rule waiver or a reduction
in the bidder’s bidding eligibility for the next round of bidding. During Stage Two, a bidder’s
reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder’s current round
activity by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).
31. The Bureau requests comment on these activity requirements. Under this proposal, the
Bureau will retain the discretion to change the activity requirements during the auction. For example, the
Bureau could decide to add an additional stage with a higher activity requirement, not to transition to
Stage Two if it believes the auction is progressing satisfactorily under the Stage One activity requirement,
or to transition to Stage Two with an activity requirement that is higher or lower than the 95 percent
proposed herein.24 If the Bureau exercises this discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement in the
FCC Auction System.
Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility32. When a bidder’s eligibility in the current round is below the required minimum level, it may
preserve its current level of eligibility through an activity rule waiver. An activity rule waiver applies to
an entire round of bidding, not to a particular license. Activity rule waivers, which can be either proactive
or automatic, are principally a mechanism for a bidder to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in the event
that exigent circumstances prevent it from bidding in a particular round.
33. The FCC Auction System assumes that a bidder that does not meet the activity requirement
would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore,
the system will automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding round in which a bidder’s activity
level is below the minimum required unless (1) the bidder has no activity rule waivers remaining; or
(2) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the
activity requirement. If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does not satisfy the required activity level,
the bidder’s current eligibility will be permanently reduced, possibly curtailing or eliminating the ability
to place additional bids in the auction.
34. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its bidding eligibility rather than use an
activity rule waiver. If so, the bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during
the bidding round by using the “reduce eligibility” function in the FCC Auction System. In this case, the
bidder’s eligibility is permanently reduced to bring it into compliance with the activity rule described
above. Reducing eligibility is an irreversible action; once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not
be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility, even if the round has not yet closed.
35. Under the proposed simultaneous stopping rule, a bidder may apply an activity rule waiver
proactively as a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder proactively applies an
activity rule waiver (using the “apply waiver” function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding
round in which no bids are placed or withdrawn, the auction will remain open and the bidder’s eligibility
will be preserved. An automatic waiver applied by the FCC Auction System in a round in which there are
no new bids, withdrawals, or proactive waivers will not keep the auction open. A bidder cannot apply a
proactive waiver after bidding in a round, and applying a proactive waiver will preclude it from placing
any bids in that round.25 Applying a waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is submitted, it cannot
be unsubmitted, even if the round has not yet closed.
24 If the Bureau implements stages with activity requirements other than the ones listed above, a bidder’s reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the bidder’s current round activity by the reciprocal of
the activity requirement. For example, with a 98 percent activity requirement, the bidder’s current round activity
would be multiplied by 50/49; with a 100 percent activity requirement, the bidder’s current round activity would
become its bidding eligibility (current round activity would be multiplied by 1/1).
25 In general, once a bidder places a proactive waiver during a round, the FCC Auction System does not allow the
bidder to take any other bidding-related action in that round, including placing bids or withdrawing bids.
36. Consistent with recent FCC auctions, the Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction 95 be
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used as set forth above at the bidder’s discretion
during the course of the auction. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bids37. Consistent with the statutory mandate of section 309(j),26 the Commission has directed the
Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid amount and/or reserve price prior to the
start of each auction.27
38. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an item will not be sold
in a given auction. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the
beginning of the auction below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the
competitive bidding process. It is possible for the minimum opening bid and the reserve price to be the
39. The Bureau proposes to establish minimum opening bid amounts for Auction 95. The Bureau
believes that a minimum opening bid amount, which has been used in other auctions, is an effective
bidding tool for accelerating the competitive bidding process.28 The Bureau does not propose to establish
separate reserve prices for the licenses to be offered in Auction 95.
40. As we did for the last auction of paging licenses, Auction 87, we propose to set the minimum
opening bid for each license available in Auction 95 at $500.29 The Bureau seeks comment on this
41. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bid amounts will result in unsold
licenses, are not reasonable amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should explain why
this is so and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. If requesting a lower minimum
opening bid amount for a specific license offered in this auction, a commenter should justify the requested
amount in detail. We ask commenters to support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested
amounts or formulas for reserve prices or minimum opening bids. In establishing minimum opening bid
amounts, the Bureau particularly seeks comment on factors that could reasonably have an impact on
valuation of the spectrum being auctioned, including levels of incumbency within these spectrum bands,
the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service areas, issues of
interference with other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors. The Bureau has not attempted to
adjust minimum opening bid amounts for licenses based on precise levels of incumbency within particular
geographic areas, and has instead proposed low minimum opening bid amounts that are intended to reflect
overall incumbency levels. The Bureau seeks comment on this approach, and on whether, consistent with
Section 309(j), the public interest would be served by having no minimum opening bid amount or reserve
Bid Amounts42. The Bureau proposes that, in each round, an eligible bidder will be able to place a bid on a
given license using one or more pre-defined bid amounts.30 Under this proposal, the FCC Auction
26 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F). See also 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(c), (d).
27 Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 454-56 ¶¶ 139-41. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(c), (d).
28 See, e.g., Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, Order, 12
FCC Rcd 16354, DA 97-2147 (WTB 1997); Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses, Auction Notice and
Filing Requirements for 908 Licenses Consisting of Economic Area (EA), Economic Area Grouping (EAG), and
Nationwide Licenses, Scheduled for September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening Bids and Other Procedural Issues,
Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 16445, DA 98-1010 (WTB 1998).
29 Auction 87 Procedures Public Notice, 25 FCC Rcd at 6370-71 ¶¶ 168-72.
30 Bidders must have sufficient eligibility to place a bid on the particular license. See Section IV.B.1. “Upfront
Payments and Bidding Eligibility,” above.
System interface will list the acceptable bid amounts for each license. The Bureau proposes to calculate
bid amounts as described below.
Minimum Acceptable Bids43. The first of the acceptable bid amounts is called the minimum acceptable bid amount. The
minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal to its minimum opening bid amount until
there is a provisionally winning bid for the license. After there is a provisionally winning bid for a
license, the minimum acceptable bid amount will be a certain percentage higher. That is, the FCC will
calculate the minimum acceptable bid amount by multiplying the provisionally winning bid amount times
one plus the minimum acceptable bid percentage. If, for example, the minimum acceptable bid
percentage is 10 percent, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal (provisionally winning bid
amount) * (1.10), rounded.31 In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning bid has been
withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal the second highest bid received for the
license.32 The Bureau proposes to use a minimum acceptable bid percentage of 10 percent. This means
that the minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be approximately 10 percent greater than the
provisionally winning bid amount for the license.
Additional Bid Amounts44. The FCC will calculate any additional bid amounts using the minimum acceptable bid
amount and a bid increment percentage, which need not be the same as the percentage used to calculate
the minimum acceptable bid amount. The first additional acceptable bid amount equals the minimum
acceptable bid amount times one plus the bid increment percentage, rounded. If, for example, the bid
increment percentage is 5 percent, the calculation is (minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1 + 0.05),
rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.05, rounded; the second additional acceptable bid
amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus two times the bid increment
percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid amount) * 1.10, rounded; etc. The Bureau will round
the results using the Commission’s standard rounding procedures for auctions.33 The Bureau proposes to
use a bid increment percentage of 5 percent.
45. For Auction 95 the Bureau proposes to start with eight additional bid amounts (for a total of
nine bid amounts).34 We seek comment on this proposal. If commenters believe we should start with
fewer or no additional bid amounts, they should address the issue of additional bid amounts in light of
particular circumstances of Auction 95, including the nature of the license inventory.
Bid Amount Changes46. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum acceptable bid amounts, the
minimum acceptable bid percentage, the bid increment percentage, and the number of acceptable bid
amounts if the Bureau determines that circumstances so dictate. Further, the Bureau retains the discretion
to do so on a license-by-license basis. The Bureau also retains the discretion to limit (a) the amount by
which a minimum acceptable bid for a license may increase compared with the corresponding
provisionally winning bid, and (b) the amount by which an additional bid amount may increase compared
with the immediately preceding acceptable bid amount. For example, the Bureau could set a $10,000
limit on increases in minimum acceptable bid amounts over provisionally winning bids. Thus, if
calculating a minimum acceptable bid using the minimum acceptable bid percentage results in a minimum
acceptable bid amount that is $12,000 higher than the provisionally winning bid on a license, the
31 Results are rounded using the Commission's standard rounding procedure for auctions: results above $10,000 are
rounded to the nearest $1,000; results below $10,000 but above $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $100; and results
below $1,000 are rounded to the nearest $10.
32 See Section IV.B.8. “Bid Withdrawal,” below.
33 See note 31 (concerning rounding), above.
34 In the event of duplicate bid amounts due to rounding, the FCC Auction System will omit the duplicates and will
list fewer than nine acceptable bid amounts for the license.
minimum acceptable bid amount would instead be capped at $10,000 above the provisionally winning
bid. The Bureau seeks comment on the circumstances under which the Bureau should employ such a
limit, factors it should consider when determining the dollar amount of the limit, and the tradeoffs in
setting such a limit or changing other parameters, such as changing the minimum acceptable bid
percentage, the bid increment percentage, or the number of acceptable bid amounts. If the Bureau
exercises this discretion, it will alert bidders by announcement in the FCC Auction System during the
47. The Bureau seeks comment on the above proposals. Commenters may wish to address the
role of the minimum acceptable bids and the number of acceptable bid amounts in managing the pace of
the auction and the tradeoffs in managing auction pace by changing the bidding schedule, activity
requirements, or bid amounts, or by using other means.
Provisionally Winning Bids48. Provisionally winning bids are bids that would become final winning bids if the auction were
to close in that given round. At the end of a bidding round, the FCC Auction System determines a
provisionally winning bid for each license based on the highest bid amount received. If identical high bid
amounts are submitted on a license in any given round (i.e., tied bids), the FCC Auction System will use a
random number generator to select a single provisionally winning bid from among the tied bids. (The
Auction System assigns a random number to each bid when the bid is entered. The tied bid with the
highest random number wins the tiebreaker.) The remaining bidders, as well as the provisionally winning
bidder, can submit higher bids in subsequent rounds. However, if the auction were to end with no other
bids being placed, the winning bidder would be the one that placed the provisionally winning bid. If the
license receives any bids in a subsequent round, the provisionally winning bid again will be determined
by the highest bid amount received for the license.
49. A provisionally winning bid will remain the provisionally winning bid until there is a higher
bid on the license at the close of a subsequent round, unless the provisionally winning bid is withdrawn.
We remind bidders that provisionally winning bids count toward activity for purposes of the activity
Bid Removal50. For Auction 95, the Bureau proposes the following bid removal procedures. Before the close
of a bidding round, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that round. By removing a
selected bid in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may effectively “undo” any bid placed within that
round. In contrast to the bid withdrawal provisions described below, a bidder removing a bid placed in
the same round is not subject to a withdrawal payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer
remove a bid. We seek comment on this bid removal proposal.
Bid Withdrawal51. The Bureau seeks comment on the following bid withdrawal procedures for Auction 95.
When permitted in an auction, bid withdrawals provide a bidder with the option of withdrawing bids
placed in prior rounds that have become provisionally winning bids. A bidder may withdraw its
provisionally winning bids using the “withdraw bids” function in the FCC Auction System. A bidder that
withdraws its provisionally winning bid(s), if permitted, is subject to the bid withdrawal payment
provisions of the Commission rules.36
52. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, the Commission explained that allowing bid
withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of backup strategies as
information becomes available during the course of an auction.37 The Commission noted, however, that
35 See Section IV.B.2. “Activity Rule,” above.
36 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g), 1.2109.
37 Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 459-60 ¶ 150.
in some instances bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The Bureau, therefore, has
discretion in managing the auction to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The
Commission stated that the Bureau should exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of rounds
in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission’s bid withdrawal procedures.38
53. For Auction 95, the Bureau proposes to limit each bidder to withdrawing provisionally
winning bids in only one round during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in
more than one round may encourage insincere bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive
purposes. The round in which withdrawals may be used will be at the bidder’s discretion, and there is no
limit on the number of provisionally winning bids that may be withdrawn during that round. Withdrawals
must be in accordance with the Commission’s rules, including the bid withdrawal payment provisions
specified in section 1.2104(g).39 The Bureau seeks comment on these bid withdrawal procedures. If
commenters believe that each bidder should be allowed to withdraw provisionally winning bids in more
than one round during the course of the auction, they should state how many bid withdrawal rounds they
seek and explain what specific factors lead them to that conclusion. If commenters believe that bidders in
this auction should not be permitted to withdraw any bids, they should discuss their reasoning for this
Interim Withdrawal Payment Percentage54.
The Bureau seeks comment on the appropriate percentage of a withdrawn bid that should
be assessed as an interim withdrawal payment in the event that a final withdrawal payment cannot be
determined at the close of the auction. In general, the Commission’s rules provide that a bidder that
withdraws a bid during an auction is subject to a withdrawal payment equal to the difference between the
amount of the withdrawn bid and the amount of the winning bid in the same or subsequent auction(s).41 If
a bid is withdrawn and no subsequent higher bid is placed and/or the license is not won in the same
auction, the final withdrawal payment cannot be calculated until after the close of a subsequent auction in
which a higher bid for the license (or the equivalent to the license) is placed or the license is won.42
When that final payment cannot yet be calculated, the bidder responsible for the withdrawn bid is
assessed an interim bid withdrawal payment, which will be applied toward any final bid withdrawal
payment that is ultimately assessed.43 Section 1.2104(g)(1) of the Commission rules requires that the
percentage of the withdrawn bid to be assessed as an interim bid withdrawal payment be between three
percent and twenty percent and that it be set in advance of the auction.44
39 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g). See also 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109.
40 See Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission’s
Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, FCC 06-4, Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd
891, 902-903 ¶ 29, 904 n.57 (2006) (“CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order”) (discussing considerations, such as nature
and availability of licenses offered at auction and bidders’ need to aggregate licenses, that may factor into decision
to permit bid withdrawals).
41 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(1). The withdrawal payment amount is deducted from any upfront payments or down
payments that the withdrawing bidder has deposited with the Commission. No withdrawal payment is assessed for a
withdrawn bid if either the subsequent winning bid or any of the intervening subsequent withdrawn bids equals or
exceeds that withdrawn bid. Id.
44 See id., as amended by CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd 891, 902-903 ¶ 29, 904 n.57.
55. The Commission has determined that the level of the interim withdrawal payment in a
particular auction will be based on the nature of the service and the inventory of the licenses being
offered.45 The Commission has noted that it may impose a higher interim withdrawal payment percentage
to deter the anti-competitive use of withdrawals when, for example, bidders likely will not need to
aggregate the licenses being offered in the auction, such as when few licenses are offered that are on
adjacent frequencies or in adjacent areas, or when there are few synergies to be captured by combining
licenses.46 With respect to the licenses being offered in Auction 95, the service rules permit a variety of
fixed, mobile, and paging services, though the opportunities for combining licenses on adjacent
frequencies or in adjacent areas are more limited than has been the case in previous auctions of paging
licenses. Balancing the potential need for bidders to use withdrawals to avoid winning incomplete
combinations of licenses with the Bureau’s interest in deterring undesirable strategic use of withdrawals,
the Bureau proposes a percentage below the maximum twenty percent permitted under the current rules
but above the three percent previously provided by the Commission’s rules. Specifically, the Bureau
proposes to establish an interim bid withdrawal payment of ten percent of the withdrawn bid for this
auction. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
Additional Default Payment Percentage56. Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the close of an auction (i.e., fails to
remit the required down payment within the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-form
application, fails to make full and timely final payment, or is otherwise disqualified) is liable for a default
payment under 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(2). This payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal to the
difference between the amount of the Auction 95 bidder’s winning bid and the amount of the winning bid
the next time a license covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal
to a percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is less.
57. The Commission’s rules provide that, in advance of each auction, it will establish a
percentage between three percent and twenty percent of the applicable bid to be assessed as an additional
default payment.47 As the Commission has indicated, the level of this additional payment in each auction
will be based on the nature of the service and the licenses being offered.48
58. For Auction 95, the Bureau proposes to establish an additional default payment of ten
percent. As noted in the CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, defaults weaken the integrity of the auction
process and may impede the deployment of service to the public, and an additional ten percent default
payment will be more effective in deterring defaults than the three percent used in some earlier auctions.49
At the same time, the Bureau does not believe the detrimental effects of any defaults in Auction 95 are
likely to be unusually great. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
DEADLINES AND FILING PROCEDURES59. Comments are due on or before February 22, 2013, and reply comments are due on or before
March 14, 2013. All filings related to procedures for Auction 95 must refer to AU Docket No. 13-12.
Comments may be submitted using the Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (“ECFS”) or by
filing paper copies.50 We strongly encourage interested parties to file comments electronically.
60. Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the
ECFS at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs. Filers should follow the instructions provided on the website for
45 See CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 903-04 ¶¶ 30-31.
46 See id. at 904 n.57.
47 See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(2).
48 See CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 21 FCC Rcd at 903-04 ¶¶ 30-31.
49 Id., 21 FCC Rcd at 902-03 ¶ 29.
50 See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, GC Docket No. 97-113, Report and Order, FCC
98-56, 13 FCC Rcd 11,322 (1998).
submitting comments. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S.
Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket number, AU Docket No. 13-12. To get filing
instructions, filers should send an e-mail to email@example.com, and include the following words in the body of
the message: “get form.” A sample form and directions will be sent in response.
61. Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and four copies of
each filing. Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by
first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission’s
Secretary Attn: WTB/ASAD, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
· The Commission’s contractor will receive hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings
for the Commission’s Secretary at the FCC Headquarters building located at 445 12th Street, SW,
Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours at this location are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00
p.m. Eastern Time (ET). All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or
fasteners. Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building.
· Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and Priority Mail) must
be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
· U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street,
SW, Washington DC 20554.
62. Auction 95 E-mail Box: We also request that a copy of all comments and reply comments be
submitted electronically to the following address: firstname.lastname@example.org.
63. Copies of comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection between 8:00
a.m. and 4:30 p.m. ET Monday through Thursday, or 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays, in the FCC
Reference Information Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554, and will
also be accessible through the search function on the ECFS web page at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs.
64. This proceeding has been designated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance
with the Commission’s ex parte rules.51 Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance of the presentations
and not merely a listing of the subjects discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the
views and arguments presented is generally required. Other provisions pertaining to oral and written ex
parte presentations in permit-but-disclose proceedings are set forth in Section 1.1206(b) of the
Commission’s rules. 52
65. To request materials in accessible formats (Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format)
for people with disabilities, send an e-mail to email@example.com or call the Consumer and Government
Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
51 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200(a), 1.1206.
52 The Commission substantially revised its ex parte rules in 2011. These revised rules require for example, that an
ex parte notice must be filed for each oral ex parte presentation, not just for those presentations that involve new
information or arguments not already in the record. Further, a filer typically must submit an ex parte notice
electronically in machine-readable format. A filer may not submit a PDF image created by scanning a paper
document, except in a situation in which a word processing version of the document is not available. See
Amendment of the Commission’s Ex Parte Rules and Other Procedural Rules, GC Docket No. 10-43, Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 11-11, 26 FCC Rcd 4517 (2011).
For further information concerning this proceeding, contact the offices listed below:
Mobility Division, Wireless Telecommunications BureauFor paging service rule questions:
Kathy Harris (legal) or Keith Harper (technical), at (202) 418-
Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications BureauFor general auction questions:
Debbie Smith or Lisa Stover at (717) 338-2868
For auctions legal questions:
Howard Davenport at (202) 418-0660
Office of Communications Business Opportunities
For questions concerning small business inquiries:
- FCC -
Summary of Licenses to Be Offered in Auction 95 *
Totals By Frequency Band
Lower Bands35 MHz
152 and 158 MHz Paired
152 and 158 MHz Unpaired
454 and 459 MHz Paired
Total Lower Bands
Upper Bands929 MHz
Total Upper Bands
Total Lower and Upper Paging Bands5,905
* Due to the large number of licenses in Auction 95, the complete list of licenses available for this auction
will be provided in electronic format only, available as separate “Attachment A” files at
A copy of the complete list of licenses and any other documents relating to Auction 95 may be purchased
from the Commission’s duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (“BCPI”), 445 12th Street,
SW, Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, 800-378-3160 or at http://www.bcpiweb.com.
Block/Frequency Cross-Reference ListBelow are tables containing block and frequency information for the lower paging bands (35-36 MHz,
43-44 MHz, 152-159 MHz, 454-460 MHz) and the upper paging bands (929-931 MHz). While the lower
paging bands list frequency ranges and the upper paging bands list the center frequency, operations on
these channels are restricted to a 20 kHz bandwidth; 10 kHz on each side of the center frequency.53 For
Auction 95, licenses are not available in every block listed in these tables. See Attachment A to this
Public Notice for more information about the licenses to be offered in Auction 95.
35 MHz Lower Bands Unpaired Paging Channels
35.19 - 35.21
35.29 - 35.31
35.45 - 35.47
35.57 - 35.59
35.21 - 35.23
35.33 - 35.35
35.49 - 35.51
35.59 - 35.61
35.23 - 35.25
35.37 - 35.39
35.53 - 35.55
35.25 - 35.27
35.55 - 35.57
35.65 - 35.67
43 MHz Lower Bands Unpaired Paging Channels
43.19 - 43.21
43.29 - 43.31
43.45 - 43.47
43.57 - 43.59
43.21 - 43.23
43.33 - 43.35
43.49 - 43.51
43.59 - 43.61
43.23 - 43.25
43.37 - 43.39
43.53 - 43.55
43.61 - 43.63
43.25 - 43.27
43.41 - 43.43
43.55 - 43.57
43.65 - 43.67
152 MHz and 158 MHz Lower Bands Unpaired Paging Channels
152.230 - 152.250
158.090 - 158.110
152.830 - 152.850
158.690 - 158.710
53 See 47 C.F.R. § 22.531. See also 47 C.F.R. § 22.561.
152 and 158 MHz Lower Bands Paired Paging Channels
152.015-152.045 / 158.475-158.505
152.555-152.585 / 157.815-157.845
152.045-152.075 / 158.505-158.535
152.585-152.615 / 157.845-157.875
152.075-152.105 / 158.535-158.565
152.615-152.645 / 157.875-157.905
152.105-152.135 / 158.565-158.595
152.645-152.675 / 157.905-157.935
152.135-152.165 / 158.595-158.625
152.675-152.705 / 157.935-157.965
152.165-152.195 / 158.625-158.655
152.705-152.735 / 157.965-157.995
152.195-152.225 / 158.655-158.685
152.735-152.765 / 157.995-158.025
152.495-152.525 / 157.755-157.785
152.765-152.795 / 158.025-158.055
152.525-152.555 / 157.785-157.815
152.795-152.825 / 158.055-158.085
454 and 459 MHz Lower Bands Paired Paging Channels
454.0125-454.0375 / 459.0125-459.0375
454.3375-454.3625 / 459.3375-459.3625
454.0375-454.0625 / 459.0375-459.0625
454.3625-454.3875 / 459.3625-459.3875
454.0625-454.0875 / 459.0625-459.0875
454.3875-454.4125 / 459.3875-459.4125
454.0875-454.1125 / 459.0875-459.1125
454.4125-454.4375 / 459.4125-459.4375
454.1125-454.1375 / 459.1125-459.1375
454.4375-454.4625 / 459.4375-459.4625
454.1375-454.1625 / 459.1375-459.1625
454.4625-454.4875 / 459.4625-459.4875
454.1625-454.1875 / 459.1625-459.1875
454.4875-454.5125 / 459.4875-459-5125
454.1875-454.2125 / 459.1875-459.2125
454.5125-454.5375 / 459.5125-459.5375
454.2125-454.2375 / 459.2125-459.2375
454.5375-454.5625 / 459.5375-459.5625
454.2375-454.2625 / 459.2375-459.2625
454.5625-454.5875 / 459.5625-459.5875
454.2625-454.2875 / 459.2625-459.2875
454.5875-454.6125 / 459.5875-459.6125
454.2875-454.3125 / 459.2875-459.3125
454.6125-454.6375 / 459.6125-459.6375
454.3125-454.3375 / 459.3125-459.3375
454.6375-454.6625 / 459.6375-459.6625
929-931 MHz Upper Bands Paging Channels
Block (License Frequency
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