WPC  2a B'K Z CG TimesTimes New RomanTimes New Roman Italic6G;XP3|a""i~'^:DPddDDDdp4D48dddddddddd88pppX|pDL|pp||D8D\dDXdXdXDdd88d8ddddDL8ddddX`(`lD4l\DDD4DDDDDDdDd8XXXXXX|X|X|X|XD8D8D8D8ddddddddddXdbdddpdXXXXXlX~|X|X|X|XdddldldD8DdDDDdplld|8|P|D|D|8dvddddDDDpLpLpLpl|T|8|\ddddddl|X|X|Xd|DdpL|Dd~4ddC$CWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNHxxH\dDXddddd8@d<@d<DDXXdDDxddxHxxHvppDXd<"dxtldpxxd"i~'^5>I\\>>>\g0>03\\\\\\\\\\33gggQyyrg>Frgygrr>3>T\>Q\Q\Q>\\33\3\\\\>F3\\\\QX%Xc>0cT>>>0>>>>>>\>\3QQQQQwyQrQrQrQrQ>3>3>3>3\\\\\\\\\\Q\Z\\\g\QQQyQyQycyQtrQrQrQrQ\\\c\c\>3>\>>>\gcc\r3rIr>r>r3\l\\\\y>y>y>gFgFgFgcrMr3rT\\\\\\crQrQrQ\r>\gFr>\t0\\=!=WxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNBnnBT\>Q\\\\\3;\7;\7>>QQ\??n\\nBnnBmgg>Q\7"yyyy\njc\gnn\CddoddCdYds]xUvdYYCCCCx~oxoY~NYdYC8YooYdYxsdxdd~YYxoxxx~CdxYxxxxCCdddddddxCsdYC\   pxtll\tll@\@\`LHP LaserJet 5Sii PostScriptHPLAS5SI.PRSXN\  P\m#lXP2D Z5 D 0 #XN\  PynXP#!Aӊ-  -@Њ#Xw PE37|XP#XXN\  PXP#XN\  PXP#AӊЫXN\  PXP(hH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularXXN\  PXP(hH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX&G\  P&P\ `&2KK^ 3|x20XBKK/r7jC:,ynXj\  P6G;XP2a=5,u&a\  P6G;&Pk(N1+,N\  P6G;P2a=5,u&a\  P6G;&P"i~'^+2;II{r222IR&2&)IIIIIIIIII))RRRAjaaj[Rjj28j[jjRjaR[jjjj[2)2CI2AIAIA2II))I)rIIII28)IIjIIAFFO2&OC222&222222I2I)jAjAjAjAjA_aA[A[A[A[A2)2)2)2)jIjIjIjIjIjIjIjIjIjIjAjIjHjIjIjIRIjAjAjAaAaAaOaAj\[A[A[A[AjIjIjIjOjIjOjI2)2I222IgROOjI[)[;[2[2[)jIWjIjIjIjIja2a2a2R8R8R8RO[>[)[CjIjIjIjIjIjIjjO[A[A[AjI[2jIR8[2jI\&II11WggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggggxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxN5XX5CI2AIIIII)/ooI,/ooIo,22AAI22XIIXo5XX5WxxRR2AI{,"aaaaooIoXUOIRXXI"i~'^5>I\\>>>\g0>03\\\\\\\\\\33gggQyyrg>Frgygrr>3>T\>jaaj[Rjj28j[jjRjaR[jjjj[X%Xc>0cT>>>0>>>>>>\>\3QQQQQwyQrQrQrQrQ>3>3>3>3\\\\\\\\\\Q\Z\\\g\QQQyQyQycyQtrQrQrQrQ\\\c\c\>3>\>>>\gcc\r3rIr>r>r3\l\\\\y>y>y>gFgFgFgcrMr3rT\\\\\\crQrQrQ\r>\gFr>\t0\\=!=WxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNBnnBT\>Q\\\\\3;\7;\7>>QQ\??n\\nBnnBmgg>Q\7"yyyy\njc\gnn\2KbZ"i~'^5>M\\>>>\}0>03\\\\\\\\\\>>}}}\rryrr>Qygyrr\grrggF3FM\>\\Q\Q3\\33Q3\\\\FF3\QyQQFI3Ic>0cM>>>0>>>>>>\>\3r\r\r\r\r\yyQrQrQrQrQ>3>3>3>3y\\\\\\\\\gQr\\\\gQ\r\r\r\r\yQyQycyQnrQrQrQrQ\\\c\c\>3>\>>>\\ccyQg3gBg>g;g3y\jy\y\\\yrFrFrF\F\F\FccgBg3gM\\\\\\ygcgFgFgF\g>y\\Fg>g\n0\\=(=WddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddNBnnB_\F\\\\\\3;\7;\7>>gg\??n\\nBnnBb\\>g\7"yyyy\njc\}nn\7jC:,ynXj\  P6G;XP2a=5,u&a\  P6G;&Pk(N1+,N\  P6G;P2a=5,u&a\  P6G;&P\0_=5,&_*f9 xr G;&Xn FileHelv " P&Filename:/ P) PCurrent D2 Pstaticpath"$ PFile Info:%"& PL"  S3#&G\  Pu&P#U United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ` Argued November 19, 1997 Decided December 23, 1997 6No. 971432  S3l Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies, et al.,  S3E3Petitioners ă Ov.  S 3{ Federal Communications Commission and  United States of America,  S 30Respondents ă  SX3AT&T Corporation, et al.,  S03+1Intervenors ă On Petition for Review of an Order of the [Federal Communications Commission  Sh3 [xMark L. Evans argued the cause for petitioners, with whom Michael K. Kellogg, Sean A. Lev,  SB3James R. Young, Michael E. Glover, and Edward Shakin were on the briefs.  S3 ZxJohn E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued  S3 Pw" the cause for respondents, with whom Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department  S3 Pw"of Justice, William E. Kennard, General Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Federal Communications  S3 Pw"Commission, Christopher J. Wright, Deputy General Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Laurel R.  S\3 Pw"y Bergold, Counsel, Catherine G. O'Sullivan and Nancy C. Garrison, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, were on the brief.  S3 7xAnthony C. Epstein argued the cause for intervenors MCI Telecommunications Corporation, et al.,  S3 Pw"with whom Mark C. Rosenblum, David W. Carpenter, Peter D. Keisler, Leon M. Kestenbaum, Charles  S3 Pw"C. Hunter, Catherine M. Hannan, and Richard S. Whitt were on the brief. Jay C. Keithley entered an appearance.  Q$ 3 xJames D. Ellis, Robert M. Lynch, Patricia Diaz Dennis, David F. Brown, Randall E. Cape,  S 3 Pw"Patricia L.C. Mahoney, Martin E. Grambow, Durward D. Dupre and Mary W. Marks were on the statement in lieu of brief, filed on behalf of intervenors SBC Communications Inc., et al.  S#3xBefore: Edwards, Chief Judge, Tatel, Circuit Judge and Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.  S8%3xOpinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.  S&3 xEdwards, Chief Judge: This case arises from a challenge to an Order of the Federal  Pw"KCommunications Commission ("Commission") construing a poorly drafted section of the  Pw" Telecommunications Act of 1996, enacted as 42 U.S.C.  272. Under the statute, there are two potentially"(0*0*0*,"  Pw"contradictory edicts: first,  272(a) states that, normally, a Bell Operating Company ("BOC") may not  Pw"provide origination of most communications services between Local Access and Transport Areas  Pw" ("interLATA services") except through a separate affiliate; second,  272(e)(4) states that a BOC "may  Pw" provide any interLATA ... facilities or services to its interLATA affiliate if such services or facilities are  Pw"5 made available to all carriers at the same rates." At first blush, the second provision appears to give back  S83 Pw"what the first section takes away, i.e., a BOC's ability to provide interLATA origination services in a  Pw"iphysically integrated network with its local exchange services. To avoid such an anomalous result, the  S3 Pw"Commission interpreted  272(e)(4) to mean that a BOC may provide any inter-LATA services "it is  S3 Pw"y otherwise authorized to provide," so long as it provides them on a non-discriminatory basis. Second Order  S3 Pw"on Reconsideration, Implementation of the NonAccounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the  Sx3Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 12 FCC Rcd. 8653, 8675 (1997).  xPetitioners, the BOCs, argue that the plain meaning of  272(e)(4) precludes the Commission's  Pw"Ginterpretation, because the literal meaning of the words "may provide any" operates as an unrestricted  Pw" affirmative grant of authority for them to deliver integrated interLATA services. This argument confuses  Pw""plain meaning" with literalism. The meaning of a statutory provision is its use in the context of the  Pw" statute as a whole. Here, the language of  272(e)(4) cannot yield the purported plain meaning advanced  Pw"Xby Petitioners, because that meaning would produce marked inconsistencies with  272(a) and so would  Pw"8violate the context of the statute. Because we find the statute ambiguous and the Commission's interpretation reasonable, we deny the petition for review.  S3-I. Backgroundă  &xThe Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act") superseded the consent decree, or "Modification of  Pw"Final Judgment," that governed the telecommunications industry after the break-up of the AT&T  Pw"F monopoly and the emergence of the regional BOCs. The Act aimed to foster competition at all levels of  Pw"the industry, including local exchange and interLATA services. In the jargon of the Act, a LATA is  Pw"bigger than a local exchange and smaller than a region. This case concerns interLATA services, that is,  Pw"long distance service between any two LATAs, originating within the BOC's service region. InterLATA services represent a significant and sought-after segment of the telecommunications market.  'xSection 271 of the Act gives the basic framework for BOC provision of interLATA services; a  Pw"jBOC may not deliver interLATA services not authorized therein. 42 U.S.C.  271(a). The section  Pw"%permits a BOC or its affiliate to provide interLATA services originating inside the states in which the  Pw"consent decree authorized the BOC to provide wireline services ("in-region states") only with express  Pw"Commission approval.  272(b)(1). The approval depends upon several factors, including the  Pw"6requirements of  272. Commission approval is not required for services originating outside the states  Pw" in which the consent decree authorized the BOC to provide wireline service,  272(b)(2), or for so-called incidental interLATA services,  272(b)(3).  ZxThe section in question in this case, 42 U.S.C.  272, creates a separate affiliate requirement for  Pw"specified BOC activities. It begins with the heading "In General," under which it specifies that a BOC  Pw"may not provide certain services "unless it provides [the services] through one or more [separate]  Pw"Zaffiliates."  272(a)(1). One of those services requiring provision through a separate affiliate is  Pw""[o]rigination of inter-LATA communications services," with three minor exceptions.  272(a)(2)(B).  Pw" The exceptions include incidental interLATA services and interLATA services that originate outside the  Pw"area in which the BOC was authorized to provide wireline services under the consent decree.   Pw"272(a)(2)(B)(ii). The result is that  272(a) permits a BOC to provide inregion interLATA origination  Pw" services only so long as it provides them "through" a separate affiliate. The requirements of separateness,"(0*0*0*,"  Pw"which include independent operations and management, as well as arm's length dealings, are set out in  Pw" 272(b). The separate affiliate requirement ceases to apply four years after the Act goes into force.  272(f)(2).  IxThe interpretive difficulty seen in this case arises because of a subsection headed "Fulfillment of  Pw"XCertain Requests,"  272(e). This subsection first lays out several non-discrimination requirements for  Pw"a BOC: a BOC must respond to non-affiliate service requests in the same time it does to affiliates,   Pw"6272(e)(1); must provide the same facilities to all,  272(e)(2); and must charge an affiliate at least as much as a non-affiliate,  272(e)(3). The last portion of the subsection states that a BOC  'Xxmay provide any interLATA or intraLATA facilities or services to its interLATA affiliate  'if such services or facilities are made available to all carriers at the same rates and on the same terms and conditions, and so long as the costs are appropriately allocated.  Xx(#  272(e)(4).  xThe language of  272(e)(3) indicating that a BOC may provide "any" interLATA services to its  Pw"affiliate so long as it meets the non-discrimination requirement arguably differs from the requirement of  Pw"  272(a) that a BOC may only originate in-region interLATA service through a separate affiliate. In other  Pw"words, the literal language of  272(e)(4), read alone, seems to grant a BOC the right to engage in direct  Pw"provision of "any" interLATA services. So construed,  272(e)(4) would permit a physically integrated interLATA-local exchange system.  xIn its First Report and Order, the Commission concluded that  272(e)(4) was not intended to  S@3 Pw"W undercut  272(a)(2), but merely required non-discrimination for any interLATA services that a BOC was  S3 Pw"otherwise authorized to provide. First Report and Order, Implementation of the NonAccounting  S3 Pw"Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 11 FCC Rcd.  Pw" 21905, 22032 (1996). Petitioners challenged the Commission's interpretation before this court, arguing  Pw" that the plain meaning of  272(e)(4) expressly permitted physically integrated interLATA services. At  Pw"the Commission's request, the court remanded for the Commission to consider the plain meaning  SV3 Pw"argumentadvanced by the BOCs. Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC, No. 971067, 1997 WL 307161  Pw"(D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 1997). On remand, the Commission acknowledged the tension between  272(e)(4)  Pw"and  272(a)(2), but rejected the BOCs' plain meaning argument, and reconfirmed its ruling in a detailed  S3 Pw" exposition. See 12 FCC Rcd. at 8665. The BOCs now challenge the Commission's interpretation of the statute as unlawful.  Sj384II. Analysisă  S 3A. Chevron Step One  S!3 xChevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), governs review  S"3 Pw"of agency interpretation of a statute which the agency administers. Under the first step of Chevron, the  Pw"reviewing court "must first exhaust the 'traditional tools of statutory construction' to determine whether  SX$3 Pw"&Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue." National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.  S2%3 Pw"Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). The traditional  S &3 Pw"tools include examination of the statute's text, legislative history, and structure, see Southern California  S&3 Pw"Edison Co. v. FERC, 116 F.3d 507, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1997); as well as its purpose, see First Nat'l Bank  S'3 Pw"Z& Trust v. National Credit Union, 90 F.3d 525, 52930 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This inquiry using the  Pw"5 traditional tools of construction may be characterized as a search for the plain meaning of the statute. If"(0*0*0*,"  Pw"h this search yields a clear result, then Congress has expressed its intention as to the question, and deference  S3 Pw"Xis not appropriate. See Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1990). If, however, "the  S3 Pw"statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, Congress has  S3not spoken clearly, and a permissible agency interpretation of the statute merits judicial deference. Id.  S>3 xThe first traditional tool of statutory construction focuses on the language of the statute. See  S3 Pw" Bailey v. U.S., 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995). Petitioners argue that the language of  272(e)(4), according  Pw"to which a BOC "may provide any interLATA or intraLATA facilities or services to its inter-LATA  Pw"jaffiliate" if the BOC does so non-discriminatorily, amounts to an express textual grant of authority  Pw"sufficient to illustrate congressional intent. They therefore would have us decide that the plain meaning  Sz3 Pw"of the statute precludes Chevron deference. However, textual analysis is a language game played on a  Pw"7field known as "context." The literal language of a provision taken out of context cannot provide  Pw"%conclusive proof of congressional intent, any more than a word can have meaning without context to  S 3 Pw" illuminate its use. In short, "the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context." Bailey,  Pw"116 S. Ct. at 506 (citations omitted). Although Petitioners rely on the expansive character of the word  Pw""any," the Supreme Court has specifically held that in context the word "any" may be construed in a  S 3 Pw"non-expansive fashion. See O'Connor v. U.S., 479 U.S. 27, 31 (1986) (Scalia, J.) (statutory context showed that unmodified phrase "any taxes" included only taxes of Republic of Panama).  xContext serves an especially important role in textual analysis of a statute when Congress has not  Pw"expressed itself as univocally as might be wished. Where, as here, we are charged with understanding  Pw"the relationship between two different provisions within the same statute, we must analyze the language  Pw" of each to make sense of the whole. A comparison between the words of  272(e)(4) and those of (a)(2)  Pw"reveals several ambiguities. Those ambiguities lead us to the conclusion that the words of  272(e)(4) do not, on their own, provide a plain meaning that captures Congress' intent.  xThe gravest problem with Petitioners' plain meaning argument is that if the words of  272(e)(4)  Pw"Xare read as an independent, affirmative grant of authority, they vitiate  272(a)(2). Section 272(a)(2)  Pw" permits a BOC to provide in-region interLATA origination services only through a separate affiliate. Yet,  Pw" 272(e)(4) acknowledges no limitation on provision of interLATA services except non-discrimination.  Pw"%Thus, at the level of literal language there exists a potential contradiction between the two provisions sufficient to preclude the possibility that the plain meaning is the one urged by Petitioners.  xPetitioners attempt to resolve the apparent inconsistency in the statute by claiming that  272(a)(2)  S3 Pw"y permits provision of interLATA services by a BOC through a separate affiliate, while  272(e)(4) permits  S3 Pw"Iprovision of all interLATA services to an affiliate, and then requires that if a BOC does provide  Pw"interLATA services to an affiliate, it must make the services available to all other carriers on the same  Pw"terms as a condition of its provision of services. This interpretation fails to convince on its own terms,  Pw"!and certainly does not suffice to constitute the plain meaning of the statute. On Petitioners' interpretation,  Pw"  272(e)(4) grants nothing that  272(a)(2) does not already grant, but merely adds a non-discrimination  Pw"provision. The non-discrimination provision, for its part, would appear to have no application, because  Pw"h under  272(a)(2) a BOC may only provide in-region interLATA origination services through an affiliate,  Pw"znot to anyone else. If Congress had intended what Petitioners now claim,  272(e)(4) would have been unnecessary.  lxFurthermore, the inconsistency between  272(a)(1), which permits provision of interLATA  Pw"Yservices "through" an affiliate, and  272(e)(4), which speaks of services delivered "to" an affiliate,  Pw"Xconstitutes an independent source of ambiguity in the statute. It is simply unclear why Congress would  Pw"have used a different preposition in each of the two provisions to describe what would presumably be an"(0*0*0*,"  Pw"Gidentical business relationship. A further source of ambiguity lies in the statute's use of the words "any  Pw" ... services" in  272(e)(4). The statute provides no guidance as to whether this term comprehends simply  Pw"the list of services set down at  272(a)(2) as requiring a BOC affiliate, or some larger list. These two  Pw"Gambiguities each stand in the way of Petitioners' claim that the statute's plain textual meaning permits  Pw"provision of inter-LATA services on an unrestricted basis. They contribute to our conclusion that this opaquely drafted statute cannot be said to possess the plain meaning urged upon us.  xThe Petitioners claim that the history, structure, and underlying policy purpose of the statute  Pw" similarly yield the purported plain meaning they support, but this is not so. The formal legislative history  Pw"%is silent on the meaning of  272(e)(4), which was introduced as part of the Managers' Amendment to  Sp3 Pw"!the Act. 141 Cong. Rec. S8574 (daily ed. June 16, 1995). Petitioners advance two letters written by their  Pw"zlobbyists before the reporting of an unpassed predecessor bill in a previous Congress, J.A. 391, 394, but  Pw"7these unofficial, self-serving tokens carry little or no weight and are in any case inconclusive. The  Pw"Gstructure of  272 is also inconclusive. Although placement of a provision may indicate congressional  S 3 Pw"intent, see Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 506, the fact that  272(e)(2), (3), and (4) all loosely relate to non-discrimination does not offer any support to Petitioners' reading.  xFinally, the policy basis of  272 cannot be said to support Petitioners for the simple reason that  Pw"h Petitioners and the Commission advance opposing plausible theories of the intended policy of the statute,  Pw"each of which corresponds to its proponent's respective preferred reading. Petitioners argue that the  Pw"relevant portions of the statute seek to deregulate interLATA services expeditiously in order to take  Pw" advantage of economies that will derive from physically integrated inter-LATA services. The Commission  Pw" maintains to the contrary that the purpose of  272(a)(2) is to prevent the BOCs from gaining an unfair  Pw"4!competitive advantage in the interLATA market by exploiting those very same economies to the detriment  Pw"of potential competitors. Because Petitioners do not provide any independent evidence to show that  Pw"Congress favored the policy they advance as the basis for the statute, they cannot rely on that supposed policy to establish the plain meaning of the statute. Petitioners' plain meaning arguments accordingly fail.  S3B. Chevron Step Two  xHaving concluded that the statute is ambiguous, we turn next to the Commission's interpretation.  S,3 Pw" Pursuant to the second step of Chevron, we will defer to the Commission's interpretation if it is reasonable  S3 Pw"iand consistent with the statutory purpose and legislative history. See Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d  Pw"277, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (agency interpretation must be "reasonable and consistent with the statutory  S3 Pw"purpose"); Cleveland, Ohio v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 68 F.3d 1361, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1995)  Pw"j(agency interpretation must be "reasonable and consistent with the statutory scheme and legislative  Pw"h history"). We will not uphold an interpretation "that diverges from any realistic meaning of the statute."  SB3 Pw"F Massachusetts v. Dep't of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We note that step two of Chevron  S 3 Pw"requires us to evaluate the same data that we also evaluate under Chevron step one, but using different  Pw" criteria. Under step one we consider text, history, and purpose to determine whether these convey a plain  S!3 Pw"meaning that requires a certain interpretation; under step two we consider text, history, and purpose to  S"3 Pw" determine whether these permit the interpretation chosen by the agency. Cf. id. (step two inquiry "depends on the nature and extent of the ambiguity" identified in step one).  xWe also find in the statute an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the Commission. This  Pw"result is critical to our analysis, for it is only legislative intent to delegate such authority that entitles an  Pw"agency to advance its own statutory construction for review under the deferential second prong of  S'3 Pw"Chevron. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84344. "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,  Pw"there is an express delegation of authority.... Sometimes the legislative dele-gation to an agency on a"(0*0*0*,"  Pw"particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own  Pw"construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an  S3 Pw"agency." Id. The requisite legislative intent may be inferred when, as here, resolution of an interpretive  S3 Pw" question turns on the reconciliation of competing statutory purposes.  See id. at 865; City of Kansas City,  Sd3 Pw"HMo. v. HUD, 923 F.2d 188, 19192 (D.C. Cir. 1991). By declining itself to strike an exact balance  Pw" between the commands of  272(a)(2) and  272(e)(4), Congress implicitly delegated to the Commission the authority to accommodate the interests at stake through its own interpretation of the statute.  xThe Commission's interpretation here is reasonable and consistent with the statute's legislative  Pw" history and purpose. According to the Commission,  272(e)(4) attaches a non-discrimination requirement  Sv3 Pw"to a BOC's provision of inter-LATA services that it is otherwise authorized to provide. The language  Pw" stating that a BOC "may provide any ... interLATA services" if it does so in a non-discriminatory manner  Pw"therefore means that a BOC may provide interLATA service only if it provides the service non-discriminatorily.  xThis reading of  272(e)(4) infers the existence of a qualifying phrase not expressed within the  Pw"language of the provision. However, the inference is reasonable because it gives meaning and vitality to  Pw"F the provision. As noted above, if  272(e)(4) were an independent grant of authority, it would contradict  Pw"F  272(a)(2). It is reasonable for the Commission to read  272(e)(4) as a non-discrimination requirement  Pw"#!in order to avoid this contradiction. As for vitality,  272(e)(4) applies both to interLATA and intraLATA  Pw"services, so that even if a BOC may provide the interLATA services authorized by  272(a) only to  Pw"iaffiliates, the non-discrimination provision would still apply to intraLATA services that the BOC may  Pw" provide to other customers. What is more, after the sunset of  272(a)(2), BOCs will be permitted to offer  Pw"all interLATA services to other customers, but a BOC may still choose to maintain its affiliate even  Pw"though not required by law to do so. When such conditions obtain,  272(e)(4) will still apply to the  Pw"XBOCs and will require them to provide services non-discriminatorily. Thus, even if  272(e)(4) has no  Pw"vitality when applied to interLATA services at present, the provision will possess vitality in the near future.  xAs observed above, the legislative history of the statute is inconclusive. The Commission's  Pw" interpretation is therefore not inconsistent with it. Finally, the Commission's interpretation of the statute  Pw"y is consistent with what may well be the policy purpose of the statute: preventing the BOCs from entering the interLATA origination market except through affiliates until the sunset of  272(a)(2).  HxBecause the Commission's interpretation of the ambiguous statute is reasonable and consistent with the statute's history and purpose, we must defer to its judgment.  S@3,III. Conclusionă xFor all of the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are hereby denied.  S"3`(#!So ordered.#(Qp