WPC& 2a BKf Z CG Times3|c'|Xw PE37XP",tB^ f ^;C]ddCCCdCCCCddddddddddCCY~~vCN~sk~CCCddCYdYdYCdd88d8ddddJN8ddddYYdYd4dddddCddddddddd8YYYYYY~Y~Y~Y~YC8C8C8C8ddddddddddYdddddsdXdXXXddx|X~d~d|XdddddddC8ddddCdoddd|8|H~d|8|8dtddddHHdlLlLlLkd|H|8~ddddddddXXXd~ddkd~ddxCddCCCWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNdddCYQQddddddFddddFCChhd44ddxxdddvooChdF"dhd9dCCxCddoddCdYds]xUvdYYCCCCx~oxoY~NYdYC8YooYdYxsdxdd~YYxoxxx~CdxYxxxxCCdddddddxCsdYC\   pxtll\tll@\@\`LHP LaserJet 5SiHPLAS5SI.PRSXw PE37\<$cXP2 [ f c CG TimesCG Times BoldX01Í ÍX81Í Í|x",tB^ f ^;C]ddCCCdCCCCddddddddddCCdxN`xoCCCddCdoYoYFdo8Co8odooYNCodddYdddd4dddddCddddddddo8dddddYYYYYN8N8N8N8oddddooooddpddddxodddXXddXddXdddddooL8doddNopddo8PdN8ppoddXXdpLoNpLodPDdopoopodXYXodoodddCddCCCWxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxNdddCdUUddddddFddddFCCssd44ddxxddd~ooCsdF"dsd9dCCxCddoddCdYds`xUvdddCCCCxoxoYNYYYN8YooYdYxxdxddYYxoxxxNdxYxxxxCCdddddddxCxdYC\   pxtll\tll@\@\`L2%XS F[8wC;,|Xw PE37XPD7zC;, EXz_ pi7Xx/c81, c PE37PDy.f81, f_ pi7"i~'K2^18MSS888S8888SSSSSSSSSS88Jxir{icx{8Aui{x`xoYi{xxxl888SS8JSJSJ8SS..S.SSSS>A.SSxSSJJSJS+SSSSS8SSSSSSSSS.xJxJxJxJxJorJiJiJiJiJ8.8.8.8.{SxSxSxSxS{S{S{S{SxSxJ{SxSxSxS{S`SxIxSxIqIqIrSrS{dgIiSiSgIxSxSxSxSxS{S{S8.SSSS8Sz]SSuSg/g candidate debates are subject to scrutiny under this  d; Court's public forum doctrine. Having first arisen in  d;z the context of streets and parks, the doctrine should  d; not be extended in a mechanical way to the different  d; context of television broadcasting. Broad rights of  d; access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as  d; a general rule, to the editorial discretion that"h)0*0*0*_("  Q; broadcasters must exercise to fulfill their journalistic  Q;\ purpose and statutory obligations. For two reasons,  Q;? however, candidate debates present the narrow  Q; exception to the rule. First, unlike AETC's other  Q; broadcasts, the debate was by design a forum for  Q;candidates' political speech. Consistent with the long  Q;" tradition of such debates, AETC's implicit  Q; representation was that the views expressed were  Q; those of the candidates, not its own. The debate's  Q; very purpose was to allow the expression of those  Q; views with minimal intrusion by the broadcaster.  Q; Second, candidate debates are of exceptional  Q; significance in the electoral process. Deliberation on  Q; candidates' positions and qualifications is integral to  Q; our system of government, and electoral speech may  Q; have its most profound and widespread impact when  Q;M it is disseminated through televised debates. Thus,  Q; the special characteristics of candidate debates  Q;k support the conclusion that the AETC debate was a  Q; forum of some type. The question of what type must  Q;N be answered by reference to this Court's public forum precedents. Pp. 4-9.  Q;l  (b) For the Court's purposes, it will suffice to  Q; employ the categories of speech fora already  Q; established in the case law. The Court has identified  Q; three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the  Q; public forum created by government designation, and  Q;M the nonpublic forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal  Q;{ Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 802.  Q;/ Traditional public fora are defined by the objective  Q; characteristics of the property, such as whether, 'by  Q; long tradition or by government fiat,' the property  Q; has been 'devoted to assembly and debate.' Perry  Q;M Ed. Assn., 460 U. S., at 45. The government can  Q; exclude a speaker from a traditional public forum  Q;N only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a  Q; compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to  Q;] achieve that interest. Cornelius, supra, at 800.  Q; Designated public fora are created by purposeful  Q; governmental action opening a nontraditional public  Q; forum for expressive use by the general public or by  Q;=a particular class of speakers. E.g., International Soc.  Q;> for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U. S.  Q;\ 672, 678 (ISKCON). If the government excludes a  Q;/ speaker who falls within the class to which such a  Q;0 forum is made generally available, its action is  Q; subject to strict scrutiny. E.g., Cornelius, supra, at  Q;> 802. Property that is not a traditional public forum  Q; or a designated public forum is either a nonpublic  Q; forum or not a forum at all. ISKCON, supra, at  Q; 678-679. Access to a nonpublic forum can be  Q;restricted if the restrictions are reasonable and are not  Q;] an effort to suppress expression merely becauseHh)0*0*0*_($0*_(_(0*0*H  @ public officials oppose the speaker's views. Cornelius, supra, at 800. Pp. 9-10.   (c) The AETC debate was a nonpublic forum. The  0 parties agree that it was not a traditional public   forum, and it was not a designated public forum  ^ under this Court's precedents. Those cases   demonstrate, inter alia, that the government does not   create a designated public forum when it does no   more than reserve eligibility for access to a forum to   a particular class of speakers, whose members must   then, as individuals, 'obtain permission,' Cornelius,  \ 473 U. S., at 804, to use it. Contrary to the Eighth   Circuit's assertion, AETC did not make its debate  generally available to candidates for the congressional  0 seat at issue. Instead, it reserved eligibility for   participation to candidates for that seat (as opposed to  some other seat), and then made   candidate-by-candidate determinations as to which of  the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.   Such 'selective access,' unsupported by evidence of   a purposeful designation for public use, does not  M create a public forum, but indicates that the debate was a nonpublic forum. Id., at 805. Pp. 10-14.  N  (d) AETC's decision to exclude Forbes was a   reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic  discretion consistent with the First Amendment. The  k record demonstrates beyond dispute that Forbes was  excluded not because of his viewpoint, but because he   had not generated appreciable public interest. There  d; is no serious argument that AETC did not act in good faith in this case. Pp. 14-16. 93 F. 3d 497, reversed.  yP - d;  $ed   $ed KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the  d;M Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and  d;O'CONNOR, SCALIA, THOMAS, and BREYER,  d;yJJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting  d;opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.  d;Z ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED  d; STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT  d; JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the  yO%-Court. $ed   $ed   d;|  A state-owned public television broadcaster  d; sponsored a candidate debate from which it excluded  d; an independent candidate with little popular support. "(0*0*0*'"  Q; The issue before us is whether, by reason of its state  Q; ownership, the station had a constitutional obligation  Q;> to allow every candidate access to the debate. We  Q; conclude that, unlike most other public television  Q; programs, the candidate debate was subject to  Q; constitutional constraints applicable to nonpublic fora  Q;1 under our forum precedents. Even so, the  Q; broadcaster's decision to exclude the candidate was a  Q; reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion. 'I )   Q;  Petitioner, the Arkansas Educational Television  Q;M Commission (AETC), is an Arkansas state agency  Q;P owning and operating a network of five  Q; noncommercial television stations (Arkansas  Q; Educational Television Network or AETN). The  Q; eight members of AETC are appointed by the  Q; Governor for 8-year terms and are removable only  Q;> for good cause. Ark. Code Ann. 6-3-102(a)(1),  Q; (b)(1) (Supp. 1997), 25-16-804(b)(1) (1996). AETC  Q;z members are barred from holding any other state or  Q; federal office, with the exception of teaching  Q; positions. Ark. Code Ann. 6-3-102(a)(3) (Supp.  Q;\ 1997). To insulate its programming decisions from  Q;l political pressure, AETC employs an Executive  Q; Director and professional staff who exercise broad  Q; editorial discretion in planning the network's  Q; programming. AETC has also adopted the Statement  Q;O of Principles of Editorial Integrity in Public  Q; Broadcasting, which counsel adherence to 'generally  Q; accepted broadcasting industry standards, so that the  Q; programming service is free from pressure from  Q; political or financial supporters.' App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a.  Q;  In the spring of 1992, AETC staff began planning a  Q;series of debates between candidates for federal office  Q;M in the November 1992 elections. AETC decided to  Q; televise a total of five debates, scheduling one for the  Q; Senate election and one for each of the four  Q; congressional elections in Arkansas. Working in  Q; close consultation with Bill Simmons, Arkansas  Q; Bureau Chief for the Associated Press, AETC staff  Q; developed a debate format allowing about 53 minutes  Q;N during each 1- hour debate for questions to and  Q;@ answers by the candidates. Given the time  Q;M constraint, the staff and Simmons 'decided to limit  Q; participation in the debates to the major party  Q; candidates or any other candidate who had strong  Q; popular support.' Record, Affidavit of Bill Simmons  5. Hh)0*0*0*_($i)rQ5R)0*0*HԌ d; On June 17, 1992, AETC invited the Republican and  d;m Democratic candidates for Arkansas' Third  d; Congressional District to participate in the AETC  d; debate for that seat. Two months later, after  d; obtaining the 2,000 signatures required by Arkansas  d; law, see Ark. Code Ann. 7-7-103(c)(1) (1993),  d;m respondent Ralph Forbes was certified as an  d; independent candidate qualified to appear on the  d; ballot for the seat. Forbes was a perennial candidate  d;=who had sought, without success, a number of elected  d; offices in Arkansas. On August 24, 1992, he wrote  d;z to AETC requesting permission to participate in the  d; debate for his district, scheduled for October 22,  d;> 1992. On September 4, AETC Executive Director  d;/ Susan Howarth denied Forbes' request, explaining  d; that AETC had 'made a bona fide journalistic  d;k judgement that our viewers would be best served by  d; limiting the debate' to the candidates already invited. App. 61.  d;!  On October 19, 1992, Forbes filed suit against  d;k AETC, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as  d;z well as damages. Forbes claimed he was entitled to  d; participate in the debate under both the First  d; Amendment and 47 U. S. C. 315, which affords  d; political candidates a limited right of access to  d;M television air time. Forbes requested a preliminary  d;Linjunction mandating his inclusion in the debate. The  d;M District Court denied the request, as did the United  d; States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The  d;] District Court later dismissed Forbes' action for failure to state a claim.  d;k  Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed the  d; dismissal of Forbes' statutory claim, holding that he  d; had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  d; The court reversed, however, the dismissal of  d; Forbes' First Amendment claim. Observing that  d;\ AETC is a state actor, the court held Forbes had 'a  d;| qualified right of access created by AETN's  d;\ sponsorship of a debate, and that AETN must have  d;N [had] a legitimate reason to exclude him strong  d;? enough to survive First Amendment scrutiny.'  d; Forbes v. Arkansas Ed. Television Network  d; Foundation, 22 F. 3d 1423, 1428 (CA8), cert.  d; denied, 513 U. S. 995 (1994), 514 U. S. 1110  d; (1995). Because AETC had not yet filed an answer  d; to Forbes' complaint, it had not given any reason for  d; excluding him from the debate, and the Court of Appeals remanded the action for further proceedings.  d;  On remand, the District Court found as a matter of  d;z law that the debate was a nonpublic forum, and the  d; issue became whether Forbes' views were the reason"h)0*0*0*_("  Q; for his exclusion. At trial, AETC professional staff  Q; testified Forbes was excluded because he lacked any  Q;campaign organization, had not generated appreciable  Q;l voter support, and was not regarded as a serious  Q; candidate by the press covering the election. The  Q;z jury made express findings that AETC's decision to  Q;\ exclude Forbes had not been influenced by political  Q; pressure or disagreement with his views. The District Court entered judgment for AETC.  Q;  The Court of Appeals again reversed. The court  Q;] acknowledged that AETC's decision to exclude  Q; Forbes 'was made in good faith' and was 'exactly the  Q;{ kind of journalistic judgment routinely made by  Q; newspeople.' 93 F. 3d 497, 505 (CA8 1996). The  Q; court asserted, nevertheless, that AETC had 'opened  Q; its facilities to a particular group--candidates running  Q; for the Third District Congressional seat.' Id., at  Q;504. AETC's action, the court held, made the debate  Q;] a public forum, to which all candidates 'legally  Q;\ qualified to appear on the ballot' had a presumptive  Q;M right of access. Ibid. Applying strict scrutiny, the  Q; court determined that AETC's assessment of Forbes'  Q; 'political viability' was neither a 'compelling nor [a]  Q; narrowly tailored' reason for excluding him from the debate. Id., at 504-505.  Q;  A conflict with the decision of the United States  Q;.Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Chandler  Q;v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Comm'n, 917  Q; F. 2d 486 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 816  Q; (1991), together with the manifest importance of the  Q; case, led us to grant certiorari. 520 U. S. ___ (1997). We now reverse. %II )   Q;  Forbes has long since abandoned his statutory claims  Q; under 47 U. S. C. 315, and so the issue is whether  Q; his exclusion from the debate was consistent with the  Q; First Amendment. The Court of Appeals held it was  Q;1 not, applying our public forum precedents.  Q; Appearing as amicus curiae in support of petitioners,  Q;^ the Solicitor General argues that our forum  Q; precedents should be of little relevance in the context  Q;z of television broadcasting. At the outset, then, it is  Q; instructive to ask whether public forum principles apply to the case at all.  Q;l  Having first arisen in the context of streets and  Q;! parks, the public forum doctrine should not be  Q;M extended in a mechanical way to the very different  Q; context of public television broadcasting. In the case  Q;M of streets and parks, the open access and viewpointHh)0*0*0*_($0* | |S0*0*H   neutrality commanded by the doctrine is 'compatible   with the intended purpose of the property.' PerryHh)0*0*0*_($0* | |S0*0*H   Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.   S. 37, 49 (1983). So too was the requirement of   viewpoint neutrality compatible with the university's   funding of student publications in Rosenberger v.  > Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819   (1995). In the case of television broadcasting,   however, broad rights of access for outside speakers   would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the  k discretion that stations and their editorial staff must  ? exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.  z  Congress has rejected the argument that 'broadcast   facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all  | persons wishing to talk about public issues.'   Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic  N National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 105 (1973).   Instead, television broadcasters enjoy the 'widest   journalistic freedom' consistent with their public  0 responsibilities. Id., at 110; FCC v. League of  M Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 378 (1984).  k Among the broadcaster's responsibilities is the duty   to schedule programming that serves the 'public   interest, convenience, and necessity.' 47 U. S. C.    309(a). Public and private broadcasters alike are not  ] only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise   substantial editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their programming.    As a general rule, the nature of editorial discretion   counsels against subjecting broadcasters to claims of   viewpoint discrimination. Programming decisions  would be particularly vulnerable to claims of this type  > because even principled exclusions rooted in sound  \ journalistic judgment can often be characterized as   viewpoint-based. To comply with their obligation to  l air programming that serves the public interest,  l broadcasters must often choose among speakers  # expressing different viewpoints. 'That   editors--newspaper or broadcast--can and do abuse   this power is beyond doubt,' Columbia Broadcasting   System, Inc., 412 U. S., at 124; but '[c]alculated  M risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher  values.' Id., at 125. Much like a university selecting  ! a commencement speaker, a public institution   selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public   school prescribing its curriculum, a broadcaster by its  m nature will facilitate the expression of some  \ viewpoints instead of others. Were the judiciary to  " require, and so to define and approve, pre-  O established criteria for access, it would risk  implicating the courts in judgments that should be left to the exercise of journalistic discretion.    When a public broadcaster exercises editorial   discretion in the selection and presentation of its   programming, it engages in speech activity. Cf.   Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S.   622, 636 (1994) ('Through 'original programming or   by exercising editorial discretion over which stations   or programs to include in its repertoire,' cable   programmers and operators 'see[k] to communicate   messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide   variety of formats' ') (quoting Los Angeles v.   Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U. S. 488, 494   (1986)). Although programming decisions often   involve the compilation of the speech of third parties,  z the decisions nonetheless constitute communicative  > acts. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian   and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557,  ] 570 (1995) (a speaker need not 'generate, as an   original matter, each item featured in the communication').    Claims of access under our public forum precedents   could obstruct the legitimate purposes of television   broadcasters. Were the doctrine given sweeping   application in this context, courts 'would be required   to oversee far more of the day-to-day operations of   broadcasters' conduct, deciding such questions as   whether a particular individual or group has had   sufficient opportunity to present its viewpoint and   whether a particular viewpoint has already been   sufficiently aired.' Columbia Broadcasting System,  k Inc., supra, at 127. 'The result would be a further   erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters,'   transferring 'control over the treatment of public   issues from the licensees who are accountable for   broadcast performance to private individuals' who   bring suit under our forum precedents. 412 U. S., at   124. In effect, we would 'exchange 'public trustee'   broadcasting, with all its limitations, for a system of self-appointed editorial commentators.' Id., at 125.    In the absence of any congressional command to   '[r]egimen[t] broadcasters' in this manner, id., at   127, we are disinclined to do so through doctrines of  O our own design. This is not to say the First  k Amendment would bar the legislative imposition of  ! neutral rules for access to public broadcasting.   Instead, we say that, in most cases, the First   Amendment of its own force does not compel public   broadcasters to allow third parties access to their programming.    Although public broadcasting as a general matter  N does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum  ! doctrine, candidate debates present the narrowHh)0*0*0*_($0*}0*0*H  \ exception to the rule. For two reasons, a candidate   debate like the one at issue here is different from   other programming. First, unlike AETC's other   broadcasts, the debate was by design a forum for  > political speech by the candidates. Consistent with  > the long tradition of candidate debates, the implicit  z representation of the broadcaster was that the views   expressed were those of the candidates, not its own.  l The very purpose of the debate was to allow the  0 candidates to express their views with minimal  { intrusion by the broadcaster. In this respect the  ] debate differed even from a political talk show,   whose host can express partisan views and then limit the discussion to those ideas.    Second, in our tradition, candidate debates are of  exceptional significance in the electoral process. '[I]t  \ is of particular importance that candidates have the   opportunity to make their views known so that the   electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates'  M personal qualities and their positions on vital public   issues before choosing among them on election day.'   CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 396 (1981)  z (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberation on  0 the positions and qualifications of candidates is  \ integral to our system of government, and electoral  M speech may have its most profound and widespread   impact when it is disseminated through televised   debates. A majority of the population cites television   as its primary source of election information, and  > debates are regarded as the 'only occasion during a   campaign when the attention of a large portion of the  .American public is focused on the election, as well as   the only campaign information format which   potentially offers sufficient time to explore issues and   policies in depth in a neutral forum.' Congressional   Research Service, Campaign Debates in Presidential General Elections, summ. (June 15, 1993).    As we later discuss, in many cases it is not feasible   for the broadcaster to allow unlimited access to a   candidate debate. Yet the requirement of neutrality   remains; a broadcaster cannot grant or deny access to  \ a candidate debate on the basis of whether it agrees   with a candidate's views. Viewpoint discrimination  { in this context would present not a '[c]alculated   ris[k],' Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra,  > at 125, but an inevitability of skewing the electoral dialogue.  {  The special characteristics of candidate debates  k support the conclusion that the AETC debate was a   forum of some type. The question of what type must   be answered by reference to our public forum"h)0*0*0*_(" precedents, to which we now turn. III  h  k  Forbes argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that  the debate was a public forum to which he had a First   Amendment right of access. Under our precedents,  / however, the debate was a nonpublic forum, from  which AETC could exclude Forbes in the reasonable,  | viewpoint-neutral exercise of its journalistic discretion. A  !  h For our purposes, it will suffice to employ the   categories of speech fora already established and   discussed in our cases. '[T]he Court [has] identified   three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the   public forum created by government designation, and   the nonpublic forum.' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal  ? Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 802   (1985). Traditional public fora are defined by the   objective characteristics of the property, such as  M whether, 'by long tradition or by government fiat,'  0 the property has been 'devoted to assembly and   debate.' Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U. S., at 45. The   government can exclude a speaker from a traditional  public forum 'only when the exclusion is necessary to   serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is   narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.' Cornelius, supra, at 800.  >  Designated public fora, in contrast, are created by  k purposeful governmental action. 'The government   does not create a [designated] public forum by   inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only  by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum   for public discourse.' 473 U. S., at 802; accord,  International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.   Lee, 505 U. S. 672, 678 (1992) (ISKCON)  > (designated public forum is 'property that the State   has opened for expressive activity by all or part of   the public'). Hence 'the Court has looked to the   policy and practice of the government to ascertain  O whether it intended to designate a place not   traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public   forum.' Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 802. If the   government excludes a speaker who falls within the   class to which a designated public forum is made  N generally available, its action is subject to strict   scrutiny. Ibid.; United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S.  } 720, 726-727 (1990) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).    Other government properties are either nonpublicHh)0*0*0*_($0*X0*0*H  M fora or not fora at all. ISKCON, supra, at 678-679.   The government can restrict access to a nonpublic   forum 'as long as the restrictions are reasonable and   [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely  z because public officials oppose the speaker's view.'   Cornelius, supra, at 800 (internal quotation marks omitted).    In summary, traditional public fora are open for   expressive activity regardless of the government's   intent. The objective characteristics of these  > properties require the government to accommodate   private speakers. The government is free to open   additional properties for expressive use by the general   public or by a particular class of speakers, thereby   creating designated public fora. Where the property   is not a traditional public forum and the government  k has not chosen to create a designated public forum,   the property is either a nonpublic forum or not a forum at all.  B  P    The parties agree the AETC debate was not a   traditional public forum. The Court has rejected the   view that traditional public forum status extends   beyond its historic confines, see ISKCON, supra, at   680-681; and even had a more expansive conception   of traditional public fora been adopted, see, e.g., 473   U. S., at 698-699 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in   judgments), the almost unfettered access of a   traditional public forum would be incompatible with   the programming dictates a television broadcaster   must follow. See supra, at 5-7. The issue, then, is   whether the debate was a designated public forum or a nonpublic forum.  k  Under our precedents, the AETC debate was not a  k designated public forum. To create a forum of this  ! type, the government must intend to make the  k property 'generally available,' Widmar v. Vincent,   454 U. S. 263, 264 (1981), to a class of speakers.  M Accord, Cornelius, supra, at 802. In Widmar, for  example, a state university created a public forum for  / registered student groups by implementing a policy  \ that expressly made its meeting facilities 'generally   open' to such groups. 454 U. S., at 267; accord,  ! Perry, supra, at 45 (designated public forum is 'generally open').  k  A designated public forum is not created when the   government allows selective access for individual   speakers rather than general access for a class of   speakers. In Perry, for example, the Court held a"h)0*0*0*_("  0 school district's internal mail system was not a   designated public forum even though selected   speakers were able to gain access to it. The basis for   the holding in Perry was explained by the Court in Cornelius:  z Xr'In contrast to the general access policy in Widmar,  z school board policy did not grant general access to  z the school mail system. The practice was to  z require permission from the individual school  z # principal before access to the system to  z communicate with teachers was granted.' 473 U. S., at 803.(#  . And in Cornelius itself, the Court held the Combined   Federal Campaign (CFC) charity drive was not a  designated public forum because '[t]he Government's  k consistent policy ha[d] been to limit participation in   the CFC to ' appropriate' [i.e., charitable rather than   political] voluntary agencies and to require agencies   seeking admission to obtain permission from federal and local Campaign officials.' Id., at 804.    These cases illustrate the distinction between   'general access,' id., at 803, which indicates the   property is a designated public forum, and 'selective   access,' id., at 805, which indicates the property is a   nonpublic forum. On one hand, the government   creates a designated public forum when it makes its  ] property generally available to a certain class of   speakers, as the university made its facilities   generally available to student groups in Widmar. On   the other hand, the government does not create a  k designated public forum when it does no more than   reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a   particular class of speakers, whose members must   then, as individuals, 'obtain permission,' 473 U. S.,  " at 804, to use it. For instance, the Federal   Government did not create a designated public forum  @ in Cornelius when it reserved eligibility for   participation in the CFC drive to charitable agencies,   and then made individual, non-ministerial judgments  as to which of the eligible agencies would participate. Ibid.  ]  The Cornelius distinction between general and   selective access furthers First Amendment interests.   By recognizing the distinction, we encourage the  / government to open its property to some expressive  } activity in cases where, if faced with an   all-or-nothing choice, it might not open the property   at all. That this distinction turns on governmental  { intent does not render it unprotective of speech.   Rather, it reflects the reality that, with the exception   of traditional public fora, the government retains the  choice of whether to designate its property as a forumHh)0*0*0*_($0*.0*0*H for specified classes of speakers.  k  Here, the debate did not have an open-microphone   format. Contrary to the assertion of the Court of   Appeals, AETC did not make its debate generally  O available to candidates for Arkansas' Third  ? Congressional District seat. Instead, just as the   Federal Government in Cornelius reserved eligibility  0 for participation in the CFC program to certain   classes of voluntary agencies, AETC reserved   eligibility for participation in the debate to candidates   for the Third Congressional District seat (as opposed   to some other seat). At that point, just as the   Government in Cornelius made agency-by-agency  / determinations as to which of the eligible agencies  @ would participate in the CFC, AETC made   candidate-by-candidate determinations as to which of  the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.   'Such selective access, unsupported by evidence of a   purposeful designation for public use, does not create   a public forum.' Cornelius, supra, at 805. Thus the debate was a nonpublic forum.  ^  In addition to being a misapplication of our   precedents, the Court of Appeals' holding would   result in less speech, not more. In ruling that the   debate was a public forum open to all ballot-qualified   candidates, 93 F. 3d, at 504, the Court of Appeals   would place a severe burden upon public broadcasters   who air candidates' views. In each of the 1988,  M 1992, and 1996 Presidential elections, for example,   no fewer than 22 candidates appeared on the ballot in  at least one State. See Twentieth Century Fund Task   Force on Presidential Debates, Let America Decide   148 (1995); Federal Election Commission, Federal   Elections 92, p. 9 (1993); Federal Election  k Commission, Federal Elections 96, p. 11 (1997). In   the 1996 congressional elections, it was common for  ! 6 to 11 candidates to qualify for the ballot for a   particular seat. See 1996 Election Results, 54  / Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 3250-3257   (1996). In the 1993 New Jersey gubernatorial   election, to illustrate further, sample ballot mailings  included the written statements of 19 candidates. See  M N. Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1993, section 1, p. 26, col.   5. On logistical grounds alone, a public television  editor might, with reason, decide that the inclusion of   all ballot-qualified candidates would 'actually  ] undermine the educational value and quality of debates.' Let America Decide, supra, at 148.   Were it faced with the prospect of cacophony, on the   one hand, and First Amendment liability, on the  / other, a public television broadcaster might choose"h)0*0*0*_("   not to air candidates' views at all. A broadcaster   might decide ' 'the safe course is to avoid  / controversy,' ... and by so doing diminish the free   flow of information and ideas.' Turner Broadcasting   System, Inc., 512 U. S., at 656 (quoting Miami   Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241,  o 257 (1974)). In this circumstance, a   '[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably '   dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public   debate.' ' Ibid. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279 (1964)).    These concerns are more than speculative. As a   direct result of the Court of Appeals' decision in this   case, the Nebraska Educational Television Network  > canceled a scheduled debate between candidates in   Nebraska's 1996 United States Senate race. See   Lincoln Journal Star, Aug. 24, 1996, p. 1A, col. 6.   A First Amendment jurisprudence yielding these results does not promote speech but represses it. C  h    The debate's status as a nonpublic forum, however,  z did not give AETC unfettered power to exclude any   candidate it wished. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR has  observed, nonpublic forum status 'does not mean that   the government can restrict speech in whatever way   it likes.' ISKCON, 505 U. S., at 687. To be  [consistent with the First Amendment, the exclusion of   a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based   on the speaker's viewpoint and must otherwise be   reasonable in light of the purpose of the property. Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 800.  >  In this case, the jury found Forbes' exclusion was  \ not based on 'objections or opposition to his views.'  { App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The record provides   ample support for this finding, demonstrating as well  that AETC's decision to exclude him was reasonable.  M AETC Executive Director Susan Howarth testified   Forbes' views had 'absolutely' no role in the decision   to exclude him from the debate. App. 142. She  further testified Forbes was excluded because (1) 'the  0 Arkansas voters did not consider him a serious  \ candidate'; (2) 'the news organizations also did not  consider him a serious candidate'; (3) 'the Associated   Press and a national election result reporting service   did not plan to run his name in results on election  ] night'; (4) Forbes 'apparently had little, if any,   financial support, failing to report campaign finances   to the Secretary of State's office or to the Federal  N Election Commission'; and (5) 'there [was] no  \ 'Forbes for Congress' campaign headquarters otherHh)0*0*0*_($0*c#c#0*0*H   than his house.' Id., at 126-127. Forbes himself   described his campaign organization as 'bedlam' and   the media coverage of his campaign as 'zilch.' Id.,  z at 91, 96. It is, in short, beyond dispute that Forbes   was excluded not because of his viewpoint but  ] because he had generated no appreciable public   interest. Cf. Perry, 460 U. S., at 49 (exclusion from  nonpublic forum 'based on the status' rather than the   views of the speaker is permissible) (emphasis in original).  z  There is no substance to Forbes' suggestion that he  > was excluded because his views were unpopular or   out of the mainstream. His own objective lack of   support, not his platform, was the criterion. Indeed,  z the very premise of Forbes' contention is mistaken.  \ A candidate with unconventional views might well   enjoy broad support by virtue of a compelling   personality or an exemplary campaign organization.   By the same token, a candidate with a traditional   platform might enjoy little support due to an inept campaign or any number of other reasons.  N  Nor did AETC exclude Forbes in an attempted   manipulation of the political process. The evidence  l provided powerful support for the jury's express   finding that AETC's exclusion of Forbes was not the   result of 'political pressure from anyone inside or   outside [AETC].' App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a. There   is no serious argument that AETC did not act in good  > faith in this case. AETC excluded Forbes because  ! the voters lacked interest in his candidacy, not because AETC itself did.  k  The broadcaster's decision to exclude Forbes was a  reasonable, viewpoint- neutral exercise of journalistic  discretion consistent with the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed.  yO -   $ec   $ec  JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE   SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG join,  yO!-dissenting. $ec   $ec     The Court has decided that a state-owned television   network has no 'constitutional obligation to allow   every candidate access to' political debates that it   sponsors. Ante, at 1. I do not challenge that   decision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals   should nevertheless be affirmed. The official action   that led to the exclusion of respondent Forbes from a  ! debate with the two major-party candidates for  \ election to one of Arkansas' four seats in Congress"h)0*0*0*_("   does not adhere to well-settled constitutional   principles. The ad hoc decision of the staff of the   Arkansas Educational Television Commission  > (AETC) raises precisely the concerns addressed by   'the many decisions of this Court over the last 30  > years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of   First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a  { license, without narrow, objective, and definite  | standards to guide the licensing authority, is  .unconstitutional.' Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 150- 151 (1969).    In its discussion of the facts, the Court barely   mentions the standardless character of the decision to   exclude Forbes from the debate. In its discussion of   the law, the Court understates the constitutional  importance of the distinction between state ownership   and private ownership of broadcast facilities. I shall   therefore first add a few words about the record in  | this case and the history of regulation of the   broadcast media, before explaining why I believe the judgment should be affirmed. I  h    Two months before Forbes was officially certified as  k an independent candidate qualified to appear on the   ballot under Arkansas law, [*1] the AETC staff had  \ already concluded that he 'should not be invited' to   participate in the televised debates because he was  k 'not a serious candidate as determined by the voters   of Arkansas.' [*2] He had, however, been a serious   contender for the Republican nomination for   Lieutenant Governor in 1986 and again in 1990.  LAlthough he was defeated in a run-off election, in the   three-way primary race conducted in 1990--just two   years before the AETC staff decision--he had   received 46.88% of the statewide vote and had   carried 15 of the 16 counties within the Third   Congressional District by absolute majorities.   Nevertheless, the staff concluded that Forbes did not   have 'strong popular support.' Record, Affidavit of Bill Simmons  5. [*3]    Given the fact that the Republican winner in the   Third Congressional District race in 1992 received  \ only 50.22% of the vote and the Democrat received  ! 47.20%, [*4] it would have been necessary for   Forbes, who had made a strong showing in recent   Republican primaries, to divert only a handful of   votes from the Republican candidate to cause his  defeat. Thus, even though the AETC staff may have   correctly concluded that Forbes was 'not a serious   candidate,' their decision to exclude him from theHh)0*0*0*_($0*9M9M$0*0*H   debate may have determined the outcome of the election in the Third District.  ]  If a comparable decision were made today by a  ] privately owned network, it would be subject to  > scrutiny under the Federal Election Campaign Act   [*5] unless the network used 'pre-established   objective criteria to determine which candidates may  ] participate in [the] debate.' 11 CFR 110.13(c)  (1997). No such criteria governed AETC's refusal to  / permit Forbes to participate in the debate. Indeed,   whether that refusal was based on a judgment about  ] 'newsworthiness'--as AETC has argued in this   Court--or a judgment about 'political viability'--as it  { argued in the Court of Appeals--the facts in the   record presumably would have provided an adequate   basis either for a decision to include Forbes in the   Third District debate or a decision to exclude him,  and might even have required a cancellation of two of the other debates. [*6]    The apparent flexibility of AETC's purported   standard suggests the extent to which the staff had   nearly limitless discretion to exclude Forbes from the   debate based on ad hoc justifications. Thus, the   Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the staff's   appraisal of 'political viability' was 'so subjective, so   arguable, so susceptible of variation in individual   opinion, as to provide no secure basis for the exercise  { of governmental power consistent with the First   Amendment.' Forbes v. Arkansas Educational   Television Communication Network Foundation, 93 F. 3d 497, 505 (CA8 1996).  II  P    AETC is a state agency whose actions 'are fairly   attributable to the State and subject to the Fourteenth  k Amendment, unlike the actions of privately owned  broadcast licensees.' Forbes v. Arkansas Educational   Television Communication Network Foundation, 22   F. 3d 1423, 1428 (CA8), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 995   (1994), 514 U. S. 1110 (1995). The AETC staff   members therefore 'were not ordinary journalists:  > they were employees of government.' 93 F. 3d, at  \ 505. The Court implicitly acknowledges these facts   by subjecting the decision to exclude Forbes to  ] constitutional analysis. Yet the Court seriously   underestimates the importance of the difference   between private and public ownership of broadcast  { facilities, despite the fact that Congress and this Court have repeatedly recognized that difference.  @  In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v."h) 0*0*0*_("  0 Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94   (1973), the Court held that a licensee is neither a   common carrier, id., at 107-109, nor a public forum   that must accommodate ' 'the right of every  M individual to speak, write, or publish,' ' id., at 101   (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.   S. 367, 388 (1969)). Speaking for a plurality, Chief   Justice Burger expressed the opinion that the First   Amendment imposes no constraint on the private  > network's journalistic freedom. He supported that   view by noting that when Congress confronted the   advent of radio in the 1920's, it 'was faced with a  N fundamental choice between total Government  Lownership and control of the new medium--the choice  z of most other countries--or some other alternative.'  \ 412 U. S., at 116. [*7] Congress chose a system of   private broadcasters licensed and regulated by the   Government, partly because of our traditional respect   for private enterprise, but more importantly because  0 public ownership created unacceptable risks of   governmental censorship and use of the media for   propaganda. 'Congress appears to have concluded ...  m that of these two choices--private or official   censorship--Government censorship would be the  N most pervasive, the most self-serving, the most   difficult to restrain and hence the one most to be avoided.' Id., at 105. [*8]  . While noncommercial, educational stations generally   have exercised the same journalistic independence as   commercial networks, in 1981 Congress enacted a   statute forbidding stations that received a federal   subsidy from engaging in 'editorializing.' [*9]   Relying primarily on cases involving the rights of   commercial entities, a bare majority of this Court  ! held the restriction invalid. FCC v. League of   Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364 (1984).  Responding to the dissenting view that 'the interest in  O keeping the Federal Government out of the   propaganda arena' justified the restriction, id., at 415   (STEVENS, J.), the majority emphasized the broad  | coverage of the statute and concluded that it  \ 'impermissibly sweeps within its prohibition a wide  M range of speech by wholly private stations on topics   that ... have nothing whatever to do with federal,   state, or local government.' Id., at 395. The Court   noted that Congress had considered and rejected a   ban that would have applied only to stations operated   by state or local governmental entities, and reserved  .decision on the constitutionality of such a limited ban. See id., at 394, n. 24.  \  The League of Women Voters case implicated the   right of 'wholly private stations' to express their ownHh) 0*0*0*_($0* w wN0*0*H   views on a wide range of topics that 'have nothingHh) 0*0*0*_($0* w wN0*0*H   whatever to do with ... government.' Id., at 395.   The case before us today involves only the right of a  k state-owned network to regulate speech that plays a   central role in democratic government. Because   AETC is owned by the State, deference to its interest  in making ad hoc decisions about the political content  ] of its programs necessarily increases the risk of   government censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of privately owned broadcasters does not. d III  P  z  The Court recognizes that the debates sponsored by  k AETC were 'by design a forum for political speech  l by the candidates.' Ante, at 8. The Court also   acknowledges the central importance of candidate   debates in the electoral process. See ibid. Thus,  M there is no need to review our cases expounding on  \ the public forum doctrine to conclude that the First   Amendment will not tolerate a state agency's  / arbitrary exclusion from a debate forum based, for   example, on an expectation that the speaker might be   critical of the Governor, or might hold unpopular  > views about abortion or the death penalty. Indeed, the Court so holds today. [*10]  ?  It seems equally clear, however, that the First   Amendment will not tolerate arbitrary definitions of   the scope of the forum. We have recognized that  \ '[o]nce it has opened a limited forum, ... the State   must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.'   Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,   515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995). It follows, of course,  .that a State's failure to set any meaningful boundaries   at all cannot insulate the State's action from First   Amendment challenge. The dispositive issue in this  .case, then, is not whether AETC created a designated   public forum or a nonpublic forum, as the Court  Lconcludes, but whether AETC defined the contours of   the debate forum with sufficient specificity to justify the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate.    AETC asks that we reject Forbes' constitutional  l claim on the basis of entirely subjective, ad hoc  k judgments about the dimensions of its forum. [*11]  jThe First Amendment demands more, however, when   a state government effectively wields the power to   eliminate a political candidate from all consideration   by the voters. All stations must act as editors, see  ^ ante, at 5-6, and when state-owned stations  \ participate in the broadcasting arena, their editorial  M decisions may impact the constitutional interests of  individual speakers. [*12] A state-owned broadcaster   need not plan, sponsor, and conduct political debates,"h) 0*0*0*_("   however. When it chooses to do so, the First   Amendment imposes important limitations on its control over access to the debate forum.    AETC's control was comparable to that of a local  government official authorized to issue permits to use   public facilities for expressive activities. In cases  k concerning access to a traditional public forum, we   have found an analogy between the power to issue   permits and the censorial power to impose a prior  N restraint on speech. Thus, in our review of an  ordinance requiring a permit to participate in a parade  > on city streets, we explained that the ordinance, as   written, 'fell squarely within the ambit of the many   decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding  =that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment  \ freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without   narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the   licensing authority, is unconstitutional.' Shuttlesworth, 394 U. S., at 150-151.    We recently reaffirmed this approach when  z considering the constitutionality of an assembly and   parade ordinance that authorized a county official to  exercise discretion in setting the amount of the permit   fee. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,  \ 505 U. S. 123 (1992), relying on Shuttlesworth and  k similar cases, [*13] we described the breadth of the administrator's discretion thusly:  z r'There are no articulated standards either in the  z ordinance or in the county's established practice.  z ] The administrator is not required to rely on any  z " objective factors. He need not provide any  z explanation for his decision, and that decision is  z z unreviewable. Nothing in the law or its application  z > prevents the official from encouraging some views  z and discouraging others through the arbitrary  z @ application of fees. The First Amendment  z \ prohibits the vesting of such unbridled discretion in  z a government official.' 505 U. S., at 133 (footnotes omitted).(#    Perhaps the discretion of the AETC staff in  z controlling access to the 1992 candidate debates was  \ not quite as unbridled as that of the Forsyth County   administrator. Nevertheless, it was surely broad  { enough to raise the concerns that controlled our   decision in that case. No written criteria cabined the  N discretion of the AETC staff. Their subjective   judgment about a candidate's 'viability' or  .'newsworthiness' allowed them wide latitude either to   permit or to exclude a third participant in any debate.   [ $e( * $e( 14] Moreover, in exercising that judgment they   were free to rely on factors that arguably shouldHh) 0*0*0*_($0*  x0*0*H   favor inclusion as justifications for exclusion. Thus,  > the fact that Forbes had little financial support was  k considered as evidence of his lack of viability when  N that factor might have provided an independent  \ reason for allowing him to share a free forum with wealthier candidates. [ $e, * $e, 15]    The televised debate forum at issue in this case may   not squarely fit within our public forum analysis,   [ $e. * $e. 16] but its importance cannot be denied. Given the   special character of political speech, particularly  during campaigns for elected office, the debate forum   implicates constitutional concerns of the highest   order, as the majority acknowledges. Ante, at 8.   Indeed, the planning and management of political   debates by state-owned broadcasters raise serious   constitutional concerns that are seldom replicated  .when state-owned television networks engage in other   types of programming. [*17] We have recognized  ] that 'speech concerning public affairs is ... the   essence of self-government.' Garrison v. Louisiana,  k 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). The First Amendment   therefore 'has its fullest and most urgent application   precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political   office.' Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265,   272 (1971). Surely the Constitution demands at least   as much from the Government when it takes action  that necessarily impacts democratic elections as when local officials issue parade permits.  0  The reasons that support the need for narrow,   objective, and definite standards to guide licensing  N decisions apply directly to the wholly subjective  > access decisions made by the staff of AETC. [*18]  P The importance of avoiding arbitrary or   viewpoint-based exclusions from political debates   militates strongly in favor of requiring the controlling  M state agency to use (and adhere to) pre-established,  z objective criteria to determine who among qualified  > candidates may participate. When the demand for   speaking facilities exceeds supply, the State must  l 'ration or allocate the scarce resources on some  k acceptable neutral principle.' Rosenberger, 515 U.   S., at 835. A constitutional duty to use objective   standards--i.e., 'neutral principles'--for determining  > whether and when to adjust a debate format would   impose only a modest requirement that would fall far   short of a duty to grant every multiple- party request.   [*19] Such standards would also have the benefit of   providing the public with some assurance that   state-owned broadcasters cannot select debate participants on arbitrary grounds. [*20]    Like the Court, I do not endorse the view of the"h) 0*0*0*_("   Court of Appeals that all candidates who qualify for   a position on the ballot are necessarily entitled to  " access to any state-sponsored debate. I am  ^ convinced, however, that the constitutional   imperatives that motivated our decisions in cases like  ? Shuttlesworth command that access to political   debates planned and managed by state-owned entities   be governed by pre-established, objective criteria.   Requiring government employees to set out objective   criteria by which they choose which candidates will   benefit from the significant media exposure that  M results from state-sponsored political debates would   alleviate some of the risk inherent in allowing   government agencies--rather than private entities--to stage candidate debates.    Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  p } XXpp*1. See Ark. Code Ann. 7-7-103(c)(1) (1992).(#p  p Xpp*2. Record, Letter to Carole Adornetto from  p Amy Oliver Barnes dated June 19, 1992,  p A attached as Exh. 2 to Affidavit of Amy Oliver Barnes.(#p  p | Xpp*3. Simmons, a journalist working with the  p ^ AETC staff on the debates, stated that '[a]t  p ` the time this decision [to invite only  p ^ candidates with strong popular support] was  p | made ... , there were no third party or non-  p " party candidates to evaluate as to the likely  p extent of their popular support.' Record,  p m Affidavit of Bill Simmons  5. Presumably  p } Simmons meant that there was no other  p ballot-qualified candidate, because an AETC  p staff member, Amy Oliver, represented that  p there was consideration about whether to  p invite Forbes before he qualified as a  p } candidate. See text accompanying$e=Xpp n. 2, infra.(#p Xpp $e? * $e? 4. See App. 172.(#p  p 1 Xpp $eA * $eA 5. See 2 U. S. C. 441b(a); see also Perot  p v. FEC, 97 F. 3d 553, 556 (CADC 1996),  p O cert. denied sub nom. Hagelin v. FEC, 520 U. S. ___ (1997).(#p  p Xpp $eC * $eC 6. Although the contest between the  p ^ major-party candidates in the Third District  p _ was a relatively close one, in two of the  p other three districts in which bothHh) 0*0*0*_($0*  \0*0*H    major-party candidates had been invited to   debate, it was clear that one of them had   virtually no chance of winning the election.   Democrat Blanche Lambert's resounding   @ victory over Republican Terry Hayes in the   First Congressional District illustrates this   1 point: Lambert received 69.8% of the vote   m compared with Hays' 30.2%. R. Scammon   & A. McGillivray, America Votes 20: A    Handbook of Contemporary American   " Election Statistics 99 (1993). Similarly, in   $ the Second District, Democrat Ray   B Thornton, the incumbent, defeated   2 Republican Dennis Scott and won with   74.2% of the vote. Ibid. Note that Scott   _ raised only $6,000, which was less than   Forbes raised; nevertheless, Scott was   invited to participate in a debate while Forbes was not. See App. 133-134, 175.   Xx $eE * $eE 7. Interestingly, many countries that   o formerly relied upon state control of   broadcast entities appear to be moving in the   o direction of deregulation and private    ownership of such entities. See, e.g.,    Bughin & Griekspoor, A New Era for   European TV, 3 McKinsey Q. 90, 92-93    (1997) ('Most of Western Europe's public   television broadcasters began to lose their   @ grip on the market in the mid-1980s. Only    Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland continue to    operate state television monopolies ... . In   Europe as a whole (including Eastern   Europe, where television remains largely   A state controlled), the number of private   o broadcasters holding market-leading    positions nearly doubled in the first half of   this decade.'); Rohwedder, Central Europe's   Broadcasters Square Off, Wall Street Journal   Europe 4 (May 15, 1995) ('Central Europe's   government-run television channels,   " unchallenged media masters in the days of   communist control, are coming under   " increasingly aggressive attack from upstart   n private broadcasters '); Lange & Woldt,   B European Interest in the American   ^ Experience in Self- Regulation, 13 Cardozo   Arts & Ent. L. J. 657, 658 (1995) ('Over   the last ten years, in Germany and many   other European countries, public   B broadcasting has been weakened by    competition from private television channels').  p ^ Xpp*8. The Court considered then-Secretary of  p ^ Commerce Herbert Hoover's statement to a  p O House committee expressing concern about government involvement in broadcasting:(#p  p Xpp' 'We can not allow any single person or  p } group to place themselves in [a] position  p  where they can censor the material which  p  shall be broadcasted to the public, nor do I  p ^ believe that the Government should ever be  p  placed in the position of censoring this  p 2 material.' ' 412 U. S., at 104 (quoting  p Hearings on H. R. 7357 before the House  p Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1924)).(#p  p Xpp*9. Public Broadcasting Amendments of  p 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730,  p amending 399 of the Public Broadcasting  p  Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U. S. C. 390 et seq.(#p  p Xpp*10. The Court correctly rejects the extreme  p position that the First Amendment simply  p has no application to a candidate's claim that  p 1 he or she should be permitted to participate  p 1 in a televised debate. See Brief for FCC et  p  al. as Amici Curiae 14 ('The First  p | Amendment does not constrain the editorial  p choices of state-entity public broadcasters  p licensed to operate p ^ p(#(#p(#(#Xpp under the Communications Act'); see also  p ^ Brief for State of California et al. as Amici  p Curiae 4 ('In its role as speaker, rather than  p  mere forum provider, the state actor is not  p  restricted by speaker-inclusive and viewpoint-neutral rules').(#p Xpp*11. See supra, at 3-4.(#p Xpp*12. See n. 17, infra.(#p  p ` Xpp*13. After citing Shuttlesworth, we  p 1 explained: 'The reasoning is simple: If the  p 1 permit scheme 'involves appraisal of facts,  p the exercise of judgment, and the formation  p of an opinion,' Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310  p # U. S. 296, 305 (1940), by the licensing  p 1 authority, 'the danger of censorship and of  p aabridgment of our precious First  p Amendment freedoms is too great' to be  p permitted, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.  p Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 553 (1975).' 505 U. S., at 131 (citations omitted).(#p Hh) 0*0*0*_($0*  20*0*HԌ   Xx*14. It is particularly troubling that AETC   excluded the only independent candidate but   P invited all the major-party candidates to   participate in the planned debates, regardless   of their chances of electoral success. See n.$eaXx   } 6, supra. As this Court has recognized,    'political figures outside the two major   _ parties have been fertile sources of new   A ideas and new programs; many of their   challenges to the status quo have in time   pmade their way into the political   mainstream.' Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460   O U. S. 780, 794 (1983) (citing Illinois Bd. of   Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 186 (1979)).   Xx*15. Lack of substantial financial support   apparently was not a factor in the decision to   invite a major-party candidate with even less   financial support than Forbes. See n. 6, supra.   o Xx*16. Indeed, a plurality of the Court   P recently has expressed reluctance about    applying public forum analysis to new and   changing contexts. See Denver Area Ed.   Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.   FCC, 518 U. S. 727, 741, 749 (1996)   (plurality opinion) ('[I]t is not at all clear   } that the public forum doctrine should be   imported wholesale into the area of common carriage regulation').   Xx*17. The Court observes that 'in most cases,   @ the First Amendment of its own force does   Xnot compel public broadcasters to allow third   parties access$ebXx to their programming.' Ante, at 7. A  k rule, such as the one promulgated by the FEC, that   requires the use of pre-established, objective criteria   to identify the candidates who may participate leaves   all other programming decisions unaffected. This is   not to say that all other programming decisions made   by state-owned television networks are immune from  attack on constitutional grounds. As long as the State   is not itself a 'speaker,' its decisions, like  > employment decisions by state agencies and unlike  m decisions by private actors, must respect the   commands of the First Amendment. It is decades of  \ settled jurisprudence that require judicial review of  \ state action that is challenged on First Amendment   grounds. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S.   263 (1981); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995). "h) 0*0*0*_("Ԍ p Xpp*18. Ironically, it is the standardless  p " character of the decision to exclude Forbes  p that provides the basis for the Court's  p conclusion that the debates were a nonpublic  p  forum rather than a limited public forum.  p On page 11 of its opinion, ante, the Court  p | explains that '[a] designated public forum is  p not created when the government allows  p # selective access for individual speakers  p _ rather than general access for a class of  p m speakers.' If, as AETC claims, it did invite  p either the entire class of 'viable' candidates,  p $ or the entire class of 'newsworthy'  p 1 candidates, under the Court's reasoning, it created a designated public forum.(#p  p 1 Xpp*19. The Court expresses concern that as a  p direct result of the Court of Appeals'  p holding that all ballot-qualified candidates  p m have a right to participate in every debate, a  p state-owned network cancelled a 1996  p Nebraska debate. Ante, at 14. If the  p Nebraska station had realized that it could  p $ have satisfied its First Amendment  p Cobligations simply by setting out  p participation standards before the debate,  p A however, it seems quite unlikely that it  p } would have chosen instead to cancel the debate.(#p  p B Xpp*20. The fact that AETC and other  p state-owned networks have adopted policy  p  statements emphasizing the importance of  p  shielding programming decisions from  p ^ political influence, see ante, at 2, confirms  p the significance of the risk that would be  p  minimized by the adoption of objective criteria.(#p