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If you need the complete document, download the WordPerfect version or Adobe Acrobat version, if available. ***************************************************************** Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) Applications for Consent to the ) Transfer of Control of Licenses and ) Section 214 Authorizations from ) ) Southern New England Telecommunications ) CC Docket No. 98-25 Corporation, ) Transferor ) ) To ) ) SBC Communications, Inc., ) Transferee ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopted: October 15, 1998 Released: October 23, 1998 By the Commission: Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth concurring and issuing a statement. Table of Contents Paragraph I. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 A. The Applicants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 B. The Merger Transaction and the Application to Transfer Licenses 6 III. Legal Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 IV. Analysis of Potential Public Interest Harms . . . . . 14 A. Analysis of Potential Harm to the Development of Competition 14 B. Other Public Interest Issues Involving SBC's Acquisition of the SNET Licenses and Authorizations . . . . . . . 26 V. Analysis of Potential Public Interest Benefits. . . . . . 44 VI. Additional Procedural Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 VII. Conclusion of Analysis and Conditions of Approval . . 50 VIII. Ordering Clauses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 I. INTRODUCTION 1. SBC Communications (SBC) and Southern New England Telecommunications Corporation (SNET) (collectively, the Applicants) have applied for our consent to a proposed transfer of control of certain wireless (radio) licenses and wireline authorizations from SNET to SBC as a part of a merger of the two companies. Based on the record and on certain commitments and representations made by the Applicants, which are discussed below, we find that the Applicants have demonstrated that the proposed transfers serve the public interest. Accordingly, conditioned on fulfillment of those commitments and representations, we grant the applications of SBC and SNET for transfer of control. II. BACKGROUND A. The Applicants 2. SBC Communications Inc. (SBC). SBC, one of the seven original Regional Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), became the primary incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, and Missouri as part of the divestiture of local telephone operations by the American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T) pursuant to the Modification of Final Judgment. In April, 1997, SBC acquired Pacific Bell, another of the original BOCs, which is the primary incumbent LEC in California and Nevada. SBC also owns substantial wireless telephony operations, which "at the end of 1997 . . . provided local wireless services to 5,493,000 customers throughout its wireless markets," including Washington, D.C., Chicago, Illinois, and Boston, Massachusetts, in addition to many of those areas where SBC is the incumbent LEC. SBC also has investments in telecommunications businesses in selected international markets including Mexico, France, South Africa, Chile, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Israel and Taiwan." SBC states that it has no operations in Connecticut. 3. Southern New England Telecommunications Corporation (SNET). SNET is the primary incumbent LEC for most of Connecticut. SNET's principal businesses are: (1) its incumbent LEC local operations (called the Telco), which serve 2.3 million access lines covering most of Connecticut; (2) its retail affiliate, SNET America, Inc. (SAI), which provides long distance service to over 900,000 customers and sells local exchange and exchange access services it acquires from the Telco on the same terms and conditions as competitive LECs are able to acquire such services from the Telco; and (3) its wireless telecommunications operations, which operate in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and parts of Massachusetts. None of its wireless operations overlap with those of SBC. 4. In June 1997, the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (DPUC) approved a plan whereby SNET would establish separate wholesale and retail operations. Under the plan, SAI will be the retail arm, providing services to end users, while Telco will be the incumbent LEC and wholesale provider of "network services and functionality to retail providers," including SAI. Telco will cease to provide retail services to end-user customers and, as a part of the DPUC plan, customers will choose their LEC via a balloting process, which is scheduled to begin on January 4, 1999, and to be completed by May 1999. 5. SNET also has a subsidiary, SNET Personal Vision (SPV or Personal Vision), that is currently building a statewide hybrid-fiber-coaxial cable network to compete with the incumbent cable systems. SPV is operating under the trade name SNET Americast pursuant to a statewide franchise that was granted in September 1996 and that expires at the end of September 2007. SPV currently has approximately 18,600 subscribers in a number of towns throughout the state. B. The Merger Transaction and Merger Reviews 6. Applicants state that, on January 4, 1998, they agreed to a plan of merger under which SNET would become a wholly-owned "first tier" subsidiary of SBC. Under the merger plan, SNET shareholders are to receive 1.7568 shares of SBC stock for every share of SNET stock. In addition, the merger plan provides that SNET's headquarters will remain in Connecticut, and that SNET will continue to operate under the SNET name. 1. Federal Review 7. On February 20, 1998, the Applicants filed with the Commission an application to transfer licenses and authorizations from SNET to SBC. The Commission issued a Public Notice on February 27. Five parties filed comments and petitions to deny; the applicants filed an opposition to the petitions; and one party filed a reply to that opposition. 8. According to filings SNET made with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) reviewed, but did not challenge, the proposed merger. 2. State Review 9. On February 20, 1998, the Applicants filed a request that the DPUC approve the proposed merger. After holding public hearings, issuing a draft decision on August 5, 1998, and receiving written exceptions and oral arguments, the DPUC issued its final decision on September 2, 1998. In the course of the proceedings, the Applicants made several commitments, including commitments to: increase the number of SNET employees, maintain SNET's headquarters in Connecticut, continue SNET's charitable contributions, conduct a trial of Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) service in Connecticut, contribute $1,000,000 to institutions of higher learning in the state, and begin joint planning prior to the closing of the merger of the operational support systems (OSS) used by competitors to order facilities and services. The DPUC accepted those commitments, and further found that SBC had the necessary financial and management qualifications to acquire SNET. 10. Service quality was an issue that received particular attention in the DPUC proceedings. The Connecticut Office of Attorney General (AG), citing a petition filed by the California Office of Ratepayer Advocate with the California Public Service Commission, questioned SBC's marketing practices in California, and criticized SBC's intention to market secondary lines and vertical services more aggressively. The Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel (OCC) argued that SBC's commitments to maintain service quality "lack enforceability," and that SBC would have the incentive and ability to permit service to deteriorate to those customers with the "fewest competitive options." It further argued that SBC should therefore be required to comply with more disaggregated service standards than those currently applicable to SNET. The DPUC agreed that consumers should benefit from the merger and, in order to effectively monitor the benefits, ordered SBC to provide in the future, geographically disaggregated annual reports of actual dollar investment and new products and services. The DPUC further concluded, however, that most of the suggested service-quality concerns were premature, and that proposed conditions were unnecessary. More specifically, the DPUC concluded that "the ability of the Telco . . . to provide safe, adequate and reliable telephone service and manner of operation will not be adversely affected by the Merger," and noted that SNET already provides service quality reports on a wire center basis. Finally, the DPUC concluded that retail service quality concerns will also be addressed by the Telco's expected withdrawal from the retail market (because retail competition will permit customers to switch carriers if they are unsatisfied with the quality of service). In this regard, the DPUC noted that the Telco will be subjected to service quality standards for resale and unbundled elements and financial remedies for failure to meet those standards. 11. The DPUC proceedings also focused on the future status of the SPV cable system. The AG argued that SBC was not a suitable owner of SPV because of SBC's past behavior and its failure to explain "how it will efficiently provide cable service." The DPUC found that the Applicants' "noncommittal approach" was of concern, and accordingly conditioned its approval of the merger on SBC's continued compliance with the terms and conditions of SPV's franchise agreement, including the "current level of capital investment, staffing, marketing, research and facility deployment proposed and accepted by the Department," for at least 24 months. Notwithstanding this condition, the DPUC acknowledged SBC's concerns about the continued viability of the current SPV platform, and ordered SBC to conduct a feasibility study (with a report due to the DPUC on April 2, 1999), and specifically recognized SPV's continued ability to petition to DPUC to modify the SPV Franchise Agreement. Finally, the DPUC conditioned its approval of the merger on SBC's commitment to expediting the deployment of real time interactivity and switched connectivity as agreed to by SPV. 12. In the course of the proceedings, the DPUC considered a number of other possible conditions, and imposed several concerning Internet access for schools and libraries, cellular service to neighborhood block watch organizations, and promotion of Lifeline service. The DPUC also considered, but rejected, requests by the AG and the OCC for: (1) rate reductions commensurate with the anticipated cost savings and synergies created by the merger and (2) conditions requiring compliance with the competitive checklist in Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. III. LEGAL STANDARDS 13. As we explained in the recent WorldCom-MCI Order, before the Commission can approve the transfer of control of authorizations and licenses in connection with a proposed merger, Sections 214(a) and 310(d) require the Commission to find that the proposed transfers serve the public interest. The legal standards of Sections 214(a) and 310(d), which we must apply to the transfers before us, require us to weigh the potential public interest harms against the potential public interest benefits and to ensure that, on balance, the merger serves the public interest which, at a minimum, requires that it does not interfere with the objectives of the Communications Act. This analysis necessarily includes an evaluation of the possible competitive effects of the transfer, and the applicants bear the burden of proving that the transaction, on balance, serves the public interest. Where necessary, the Commission can attach conditions to the transfer of authorizations or licenses in order to ensure that the public interest is served by the transaction. Finally, when assessing the potential public interest effects of this transaction between SBC and SNET, we limit our analysis to those issues that have been raised by the parties to the proceeding and those additional issues that may significantly affect the public interest. We do not address potential issues that are not raised in the record and that do not appear likely to generate public interest harms or benefits. IV. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST HARMS A. Analysis of Potentially Harmful Competitive Effects 14. MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI), Omnipoint Communications, Inc. (Omnipoint), and Connecticut Telephone and Communications Systems, Inc. (Conn. Tel.) argue that the merger will adversely affect competition in markets currently served by SNET by eliminating a significant source of potential competition. These parties allege that, but for the merger, SBC would enter one or more of those markets and would have a significant impact on future competition in those markets. MCI and Conn. Tel. also allege that the merger will harm competition in domestic long distance markets in Connecticut because it will enhance SNET's ability to engage in a predatory price squeeze against long distance competitors. Finally, MCI argues that the proposed merger unacceptably reduces the number of large incumbent LECs, thereby inhibiting the development of competition in local markets. For these reasons, Omnipoint asks us to deny the Applicants' request to transfer licenses and authorizations, while MCI and Conn. Tel. ask us to impose conditions to "ensure that local competition will be able to develop in Connecticut and in the SBC territories . . . ." 15. As the Commission explained in the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Order, and as we recently affirmed in the WorldCom-MCI Order and the AT&T-TCG Order, we begin our analysis of potential anticompetitive effects by defining the relevant product and geographic markets. We then identify the market participants in those relevant markets, particularly those firms that are most likely to have substantial future competitive significance. After completing these steps, we consider whether the merger is likely to result in either unilateral or coordinated effects that enhance or maintain market power in the relevant markets. Finally, we also consider whether the merger will impair the Commission's ability to implement and enforce the Communications Act's provisions opening markets and constraining market power as competition develops. 16. Relevant Service Markets. The parties opposing the merger on competitive grounds raise issues concerning the future state of competition in markets for three general groups of services -- local exchange and exchange access services, domestic long distance services, and wireless services. In the MCI-WorldCom Order, we recently concluded that the markets for local exchange and exchange access services and for domestic long-distance services are in fact each comprised of at least two separate relevant product markets -- one market for residential and small business customers (the "mass market"), and the other for medium-sized and large business customers (the "larger business market"). We see no reason to alter those conclusions here. For the reasons given below, we need not decide here whether the market for wireless services needs to be further subdivided into separate relevant markets for mass market and larger business customers. 17. Relevant Geographic Markets. All of the allegations concerning the possible competitive effects of proposed merger focus on local, domestic long distance, and wireless services in Connecticut. There are no allegations in the record concerning the elimination of SNET as a competitor in current SBC markets, and we see no reason to conclude that SNET possesses any assets, capabilities, or incentives that would distinguish it from many other telecommunications firms as a likely or potential entrant in those markets. Accordingly, we limit our analysis of the effects of the merger on local and wireless services to the current SNET markets in Connecticut. In assessing the effect of the merger on long distance services, we consider the effects both in Connecticut and in SBC's current region. 18. Local Exchange and Exchange Access Services Sold to Mass Market Customers. The market for local exchange and exchange access services in Connecticut is plainly dominated by SNET. Applicants themselves acknowledge that competitors currently are providing local exchange and exchange access services to no more than two-to-three percent of customers generally in Connecticut, and it appears likely that SNET has an even greater share of the mass market customers. Thus, a merger that would eliminate a significant potential competitor from Connecticut would raise significant public interest concerns. There is no evidence in the record, however, that SBC is one of the firms most likely to have substantial future competitive significance in the Connecticut market in the absence of a merger or acquisition, much less that it is among a limited number of such significant competitors. 19. Applicants assert that SBC had no plans to enter local markets in Connecticut as a competitor to SNET, and there is no evidence in the record that would cause us to question that assertion. It may well be that the most likely entrants into any incumbent LEC's territory will include one or more incumbent LECs from other territories. In this particular case, however, there is no evidence in the record that SBC was particularly likely to enter Connecticut on its own. Although SBC possesses significant financial resources and expertise, it does not appear to have substantial telecommunications assets or brand name reputation in Connecticut. Moreover, even if SBC has some brand name reputation through its Cellular One wireless operations in areas adjacent to SNET's territory, it appears no more strongly positioned to enter the local residential and small business market in Connecticut than is any other wireless carrier that operates in Connecticut or adjacent areas. Based on these facts, we conclude that SBC is not among the firms that are likely to have the greatest future competitive significance in the Connecticut market for local exchange and exchange access services, and accordingly, the merger of SBC and SNET should not eliminate one of among a limited number of most significant participants from the Connecticut market. 20. Local Exchange and Exchange Access Services Sold to Larger Business Customers. Just as SNET dominates the market for local exchange and exchange access services sold to residential and smaller business customers, it also clearly dominates the market in Connecticut with respect to larger business customers. As we found in the AT&T-TCG Order, however, incumbent LECs are facing increasing competition in these business markets, and "numerous new entrants are rapidly entering this market, especially in central business districts in urban areas . . . ." There is no evidence in the record, and parties opposing the merger have offered no evidence, upon which we could conclude that SBC has any significant capabilities or incentives to compete in the relevant local business market in Connecticut that are not shared by many of these other entrants in local business markets throughout the country, including Connecticut. Accordingly, we conclude that the proposed merger between SBC and SNET is unlikely to adversely affect the development of competition in this market. 21. Effect of a Reduction in the Number of Large LECs on Local Exchange and Exchange Access Markets. MCI argues that the proposed merger would reduce the number of "significant LECs," and that this, in turn, will reduce the Commission's ability to constrain market power and implement the 1996 Act's measures promoting competition. In the Bell Atlantic- NYNEX Order, the Commission explained that consolidation among major incumbent LECs may hinder the development of competition and harm the public interest. We remain concerned about the consolidation among large LECs as a general matter, and we will closely review mergers involving large LECs on a case-by-case basis. Here, we conclude that the proposed merger between SBC and SNET is unlikely to affect the public interest adversely in this manner. First, SBC and SNET are not truly comparable companies. SNET is substantially smaller than the "first tier" LECs -- the BOCs and GTE -- and has long been subject to different regulatory treatment. Second, the DPUC clearly expects, and SBC has committed, that it will continue with the experimentation and different approach to opening its market, through the split between retail and wholesale operations, that SNET has pioneered. Finally, we are not persuaded that this merger will materially increase the incentive or ability of SBC, SNET, or any other incumbent LEC to resist the implementation and enforcement of the market-opening process. 22. Domestic Long Distance Services in Connecticut and SBC's Current In-Region States. As mentioned above, MCI and Conn. Tel. contend that the proposed merger will harm long distance competition by making SBC the incumbent LEC in both Connecticut and in SBC's current region. Neither party alleges that the elimination of SNET as a long distance provider in SBC's current region, however, will materially affect competition in those markets, and we see no reason to draw such a conclusion. Although SNET did have some customers in SBC service territories, it has exited those markets in order to comply with the provisions of the Communications Act should the merger be approved. Its share of the market for long-distance services in SBC's territories was negligible. Furthermore, based on the number of long distance providers competing today and the amount of transport capacity that is currently available, or is likely to become available in the near future, it appears that barriers to entry in these markets are quite low. We thus conclude that it is unlikely that SNET's exit as a provider of long-distance services in SBC's service territories will result in any adverse effect on competition. 23. MCI and Conn. Tel. further argue that the merger will enable the merged entity to engage more effectively in predatory price squeezes. They argue that the merger will enable more effective price squeezes because: (1) the merged entity would be the incumbent LEC at both ends of more long distance calls than is the case today; and (2) SBC has greater financial resources than SNET, which will permit SNET to incur more easily the costs of a price squeeze. Applicants respond that the Commission has rejected the very same argument in several orders, and for several reasons each time. In particular, Applicants argue that: (a) the merger would not change their incentives to engage in a price squeeze; (b) there are a number of statutory and regulatory barriers to price squeezes; and (c) MCI does not even attempt to argue that a price squeeze could harm competition by driving a long distance company from the market. 24. MCI made the identical argument in opposing the merger of Bell Atlantic and NYNEX. In the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Order, the Commission concluded that this concern did not justify blocking the merger, and MCI does not challenge the Commission's analysis in this proceeding. More importantly, MCI's argument is significantly less persuasive in this proceeding than it was in the proceeding that led to the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Order because the merger of SBC and SNET will result in a significantly smaller increase in the percentage of calls that both originate and terminate in SBC's region than did the merger of Bell Atlantic and NYNEX. Therefore, we conclude that the price squeeze issue provides even less of a reason to be concerned about the merger of SBC and SNET than it did with respect to Bell Atlantic and NYNEX. Accordingly, we conclude that MCI and Conn. Tel. have not presented evidence from which one could conclude that the merger may harm the public interest via a price squeeze in long distance markets and, as a result, that SBC has met its burden of proof on this issue. 25. Wireless Markets Served by SNET. Although SBC and SNET do not currently hold any spectrum in the same markets, Omnipoint contends that, but for the proposed merger, SBC is a "likely potential entrant into SNET's Connecticut . . . wireless markets." Omnipoint does not explain how SBC would enter SNET's markets other than by acquiring a firm with existing spectrum in SNET's wireless service areas, however. Should more spectrum be made available, the proposed merger will not result in fewer market participants since other firms will be able to acquire the new spectrum. Moreover, we are not aware of any reason that the proposed merger could reduce the number or competitive significance of wireless firms in any market. In fact, as discussed below, it appears that the transaction could actually improve market performance in the relevant market for wireless telecommunications services by permitting the Applicants to offer a larger calling area that can better match the calling areas offered by other wireless service providers. B. Other Public Interest Issues Involving SBC's Acquisition of the SNET Licenses and Authorizations 1. Prior Anticompetitive Conduct 26. As part of our public interest analysis under Section 310(d), we are required to determine whether SBC has the necessary "citizenship, character, financial, technical and other qualifications." In the Bell Atlantic-NYNEX Order, the Commission, applying prior Commission policy statements, determined that it would consider certain forms of adjudicated, non- Commission-related misconduct as pertinent to an applicant's fitness to hold licenses. Such misconduct might include: (a) felony convictions, (b) fraudulent representations to governmental units, and (c) violations of antitrust or other laws protecting competition. 27. Omnipoint argues that the fact that SBC was found liable for violating the antitrust laws in 1995 by discriminating against a competing provider of telephone directories "raise[s] serious licensee qualifications which have not been considered with respect to radio licenses owned or controlled by SBC." Applicants respond, first, by noting that the Commission, in the SBC-PacTel Order, found that the conduct at issue in the antitrust case was largely confined to Texas and had not recurred. More importantly, Omnipoint does not dispute, and there is no evidence in the record to contravene, the Applicants' assertion that SBC has operated and is currently operating PacTel and the rest of its communications businesses in a sufficiently responsible manner. In other words, we are not aware of any reason to conclude that SBC may not have the necessary "citizenship, character, financial, technical and other qualifications" to hold either the licenses and authorizations formerly held by PacTel or those that it holds with respect to the rest of its current operations. Given SBC's evident fitness to hold its current licenses, we are convinced that SBC has the requisite qualifications to hold the licenses and authorizations currently held by SNET. 2. Current Competitive Disputes 28. Omnipoint's Allegations. Omnipoint argues that SBC is currently engaged in anticompetitive practices that are "undermining Omnipoint's ability to compete with SBC's cellular affiliates in various wireless markets . . . ." More specifically, Omnipoint alleges: (1) that SBC refuses to provide Omnipoint with "the billing and collection services necessary to support a national [calling party pays] service"; and (2) that SBC, unlike SNET, has made unreasonable demands concerning collocation arrangements for its cellular towers located in New England. 29. Omnipoint's first allegation -- that SBC is not providing the support necessary for a calling party pays service -- concerns a subject that is currently pending before the Commission. The Commission has regularly declined to consider in merger proceedings matters that are the subject of other proceedings before the Commission because the public interest would be better served by addressing the matter in the broader proceeding of general applicability. We find no reason to depart from Commission precedent in this case. 30. Omnipoint's second allegation -- that SBC, unlike SNET, is acting unreasonably with respect to collocation on cellular towers -- also fails to create a material question of fact as to SBC's fitness to hold wireless licenses. First, Connecticut has a statute that requires "tower sharing," which may explain any differences in treatment experienced by Omnipoint. In any event, we see no reason to conclude that SBC will not comply with the statute to the same extent shown by SNET. Omnipoint also argues that SBC's conduct violates Commission rules adopted in the CMRS Safeguards Order. While it appears that those rules are inapplicable here since Omnipoint is complaining about the actions of SBC's affiliate in New England instead of in places where SBC is the incumbent LEC, we take seriously allegations of unreasonable or anticompetitive conduct. In this case, however, there is no evidence in the record that SBC is acting unreasonably or anticompetitively, much less that such conduct would be more likely to occur in Connecticut if we grant the requested applications. 31. Allegations that SBC Resists Opening Local Markets to Competition. Inner City Press/Community on the Move & Inner City Public Interest Law Project (Inner City Press) alleges that SBC "has been the most resistant [of the BOCs] to opening up its local monopolies to competition" and that "SBC would foreseeably impose its anti-consumer, anti-competitive policies and practices in all the markets served by SNET." Conn. Tel. also argues that SBC has resisted measures designed to permit competition, and it proposes several conditions that it argues should be imposed on the merger. These are significant allegations and, but for the particular circumstances in this case, we would need to carefully consider whether the allegations were substantiated. If so, allegations of this sort could lead us to be concerned that the proposed merger would inhibit or delay the development of competition in markets currently served by SNET. 32. We need not consider whether the allegations that SBC has been the most resistant BOC to opening its markets to competition and would impose "anti-consumer, anti-competitive policies and practices" are substantiated in this case because we believe that Connecticut has gone a long way toward opening local markets to competition. Through the efforts of the DPUC and SNET, the state of Connecticut has implemented an innovative and promising approach to opening local markets to competition, namely the restructuring of the incumbent LEC into separate wholesale and retail operations, with the wholesale company (the Telco) ceasing to compete for the business of providing service to end-user customers. The DPUC clearly expects that SBC will continue with this arrangement, as evidenced by its reliance on the Telco's withdrawal from the retail market when it declined to impose certain reporting requirements on SBC as a result of the merger. Moreover, SBC has clearly stated in the record in this proceeding that it "will continue to implement the division of SNET into separate wholesale and retail units following the merger . . . ." This restructuring is intended, among other things, to make it easier to detect any discrimination against unaffiliated retail providers seeking to compete with SNET's retail affiliate. Based on SBC's representation that it will continue with the market-opening experiment in Connecticut, we conclude that Applicants have demonstrated that the proposed merger is unlikely to adversely affect the development of competition in markets currently served by SNET. 33. Conn. Tel.'s Allegations Regarding SNET's Conduct. Conn. Tel. alleges that SNET -- the company being purchased in this merger -- has engaged in several types of anticompetitive conduct, including: (1) refusing to permit resale of its voice mail services or to permit Conn. Tel's customers to purchase voice mail services from SNET; (2) refusing to permit resale of its centrex services to end user customers and requiring Conn. Tel.'s customers to pay early termination fees for dropping SNET service; and (3) failing to provide competitors with access to technologically-advanced interfaces with SNET's operational support systems. Based on these allegations, Conn. Tel. argues that the Commission "should take advantage of the opportunity presented by this proceeding to open the local market in Connecticut to competition." Conn. Tel. does not allege, however, that SBC would continue these practices, much less make the problems worse if it were to acquire SNET. Accordingly, we conclude that these allegations concerning SNET's past conduct do not materially weigh against Applicants' proof that the proposed merger serves the public interest. 34. Allegations Raised by Metrocall and the Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA). Metrocall and PCIA allege that SBC has charged "paging providers for the facilities used to transport SBC-originated traffic to paging networks, and has failed to pay paging providers for terminating SBC's traffic." They argue that the Commission should not approve the merger until SBC ceases such anticompetitive practices. In addition, Metrocall has filed a complaint with the Commission against SBC, but not SNET, concerning this practice. Applicants respond that SBC's treatment of its interconnection arrangements with paging companies "is the product of a legitimate difference of opinion . . . [,] has nothing to do with the proposed merger, and the Commission has numerous other proceedings already pending before it [concerning the issue]." Furthermore, Applicants have voluntarily committed to maintain SNET's current treatment of traffic destined to paging companies, which is not the subject of a pending complaint, during the pendency of the complaint against SBC. Given this commitment, we find that the proposed merger will not result in an adverse change of circumstances for paging companies and, accordingly, we find that SBC's treatment of paging traffic does not provide a basis for concluding that the proposed merger does not serve the public interest. 3. Acquisition of Long Distance Customers in SBC's Region 35. As mentioned above, through its SNET America subsidiary, SNET has been providing domestic interLATA (long distance) services for several years. In addition to serving approximately forty percent of the access lines in Connecticut, SNET has some customers in other states, "typically branch offices of companies with primary office locations in Connecticut." SNET also issues calling cards to its local customers and to SNET America long distance customers, and sells prepaid phone cards. These cards can be used to originate long distance calls in current SBC service territories and, at the time of the Applications, SAI was often the provider in such cases. 36. Section 271 of the Communications Act requires BOCs to obtain approval from the Commission before providing long distance services originating within their "in-region" territories. By its terms, Section 271 does not apply to SNET's service area since that area was not served by a BOC at the time the 1996 Act was enacted. Therefore, we find that, to the extent SBC provides long-distance services to customers in Connecticut after consummation of the merger, it will not be providing in-region long-distance services in violation of Section 271 as Inner City Press alleges. SBC has not yet obtained permission, however, to provide long distance services within any of the seven "in-region" states it currently serves. Therefore, in order to comply with Section 271, SNET and its subsidiaries must cease originating long distance traffic in SBC's current seven-state region if the merger is approved. 37. SNET has taken several steps to ensure that it will not originate long distance traffic in SBC's seven-state region. SNET states that all 1+ customers [in those states] have now moved to an alternative interexchange carrier of their choice. Therefore, SNET no longer has any relationship with former 1+ customers located in the SBC states or those customers' chosen carrier(s). SNET has not received any compensation, nor will there be any future compensation from the carrier(s) who now serve SNET's former customers in the SBC states. SNET also states that all of the relevant commissions in SBC's in-region states, at SNET's request, have cancelled SNET America's certificates to provide service and the related tariffs. SNET further states that it will no longer carry the calls originating in SBC's region through customers' use of calling cards it provides to customers and the prepaid calling cards its sells to customers. As a result of the measures taken by SNET, other long distance companies will be carrying traffic originating in SBC's current region. These measures appear to be the same procedures followed by SBC with respect to calling cards provided to its own out-of-region long distance customers. We do emphasize, however, that it is the responsibility of SBC after the merger to ensure that SNET is in compliance with any relevant statutory provisions and Commission orders, including any interpretations of those provisions that the Commission promulgates in the future. 4. Acquisition of SNET's International Authorizations 38. Two SNET subsidiaries hold Section 214 authorizations to provide U.S. international services. SAI and SNET Diversified Group, Inc. are authorized to provide international switched and private line services by reselling the switched and private line services of other authorized U.S. international common carriers. SNET Diversified also is authorized to provide its international switched services by reselling international private lines, interconnected to the public switched network at one or both ends of the private line, between the United States and Commission-approved foreign points. This practice of routing switched traffic over international private lines has been referred to as "International Simple Resale (ISR)." The potential use of ISR by SNET Diversified as a means to terminate U.S.-inbound switched traffic in SBC in-region states is the subject of a voluntary commitment by SBC and SNET. 39. SBC and SNET have agreed that any arrangements which SNET Diversified may negotiate with foreign carriers to use ISR to route U.S.-inbound switched traffic to SBC's in- region states via SNET Diversified private lines will be subject to prior Commission approval under the procedures of Section 43.51(e), pending the outcome of the Commission's biennial review of its International Settlements Policy ("ISP") and associated filing requirements. In the ISP Reform proceeding, we noted that commenting parties in other proceedings have expressed concern regarding whether U.S. international carriers may negotiate arrangements with foreign carriers to accept "groomed" traffic, i.e., traffic that terminates in particular geographic regions. We requested comment in the ISP Reform Notice whether agreements by U.S. carriers to accept "groomed" U.S.-inbound traffic present a potential for anticompetitive effects, particularly with respect to arrangements between foreign carriers with market power and domestic incumbent local exchange carriers. We therefore accept the SBC/SNET voluntary commitment to afford the Commission prior approval of any arrangements that SNET Diversified may negotiate with foreign carriers to route U.S.-inbound switched traffic into SBC's in-region states via SNET Diversified private lines pending the adoption of final rules in the ISP Reform proceeding. 40. We also note that, as a result of the merger, SAI and SNET Diversified would become affiliated, as that term is defined in Section 63.18(h)(1)(i) of the rules, with three foreign carriers: VTR Inversiones (Chile); Telkom South Africa Ltd. (South Africa); and Diax Holding AG (Switzerland). These affiliations raise the issue of whether it is necessary to impose our international "dominant carrier" safeguards on SAI and SNET Diversified in their provision of service on any of these affiliated routes. In general, the Commission imposes its international dominant carrier safeguards on a U.S. carrier's provision of service on a particular route where an affiliated foreign carrier has sufficient market power to affect competition adversely in the U.S. market. A U.S. carrier will presumptively be classified as non-dominant on an affiliated route if the carrier demonstrates that the foreign affiliate lacks 50 percent market share in the international transport and the local access markets on the foreign end of the route. 41. Applicants have submitted information to demonstrate that SAI and SNET Diversified warrant continued regulation as non-dominant international carriers on their affiliated routes. According to the Applicants, VTRI, through its subsidiaries, provides local, long distance, and cable television services in Chile. Diax is a new full-service Swiss telecommunications carrier. Applicants represent that VTRI and Diax each lack 50 percent market share in the international transport and local access markets in Chile and Switzerland, respectively. There is no evidence in the record and we are aware of no information that suggests these statements are not credible. We therefore conclude that it is not necessary to impose our international dominant carrier safeguards on SAI's and SNET Diversified's provision of service on these routes. With respect to South Africa, SBC states that it does not seek in this transfer of control proceeding to obtain the authority, currently held by SAI and SNET Diversified, to resell private line service between the United States and South Africa. We therefore cancel the Section 214 authority granted SAI and SNET Diversified to resell private line service between the United States and South Africa. We also find that, because these carriers now will be authorized to serve the U.S.-South Africa route solely by reselling the switched services of unaffiliated U.S. facilities-based carriers, they warrant continued regulation as non- dominant international carriers in their provision of service on this route. We do remind the Applicants, however, that SAI and SNET Diversified are required by our rules and decisions to file quarterly traffic reports of their switched resale service on the U.S.-South Africa route. 5. Service Quality Issues 42. Inner City Press argues that the proposed merger will not preserve and enhance universal service and indicates that this is because the merger may adversely affect service quality. To support this allegation, Inner City Press points to press reports that claims have been made by other companies to the effect that consumers in California were made worse off by SBC's merger with PacTel. In response, SBC has submitted evidence in this proceeding that service quality has actually improved in California since the merger with PacTel, including documentation of increased investment in advanced technologies, deployment of new services, improved response times, and compliance with the performance standards of the California Public Utilities Commission. Moreover, the DPUC considered, and rejected, allegations that service quality is likely to decline in Connecticut as a result of the merger. One significant reason the DPUC gave for its belief that service quality would not decline is that the Telco will be withdrawing from the retail market and that there will be a balloting process whereby all of the current SNET retail customers will be asked to choose from a number of local service providers. We note that SBC has stated on the record that it will continue to implement the division of SNET into separate wholesale and retail units following the merger. 43. Based on the absence of credible evidence in the record indicating that service quality is likely to decline in Connecticut, and particularly on the DPUC's comfort with its own ability to ensure that service quality is not adversely affected, we conclude that the proposed merger is unlikely to affect adversely the public interest in high quality telephone service. We agree with the DPUC that consumers are more likely to be able to enjoy high quality telephone service when they can choose to purchase services from another carrier if they are unhappy with the service they receive. We are also encouraged by the efforts of the parties in Connecticut to explore different ways to promote competition in local markets, and we share the DPUC's optimism that competition may develop more quickly in an environment where all retail providers access the incumbent LEC's network through the same transparent processes. Should service quality become a problem with respect to any interstate services, however, we will not hesitate to act in an appropriate manner to ensure that the problem is resolved quickly and effectively. V. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST BENEFITS 44. Applicants assert that "this merger is likely to produce a number of merger- specific, procompetitive, and other public interest, benefits which support approval of the proposed transfers of control." First, Applicants argue that the wireless operations of the combined firm will be able to offer "a considerably larger calling scope, through the combination of areas served separately by SBC and SNET," and that this will enable the combined firm to offer the kinds of toll-free and "home rate" calling plans offered by competitors such as AT&T, Sprint, Omnipoint, and Nextel. Second, Applicants argue that the merger will enhance SNET's purchasing, marketing, research, and technical design capabilities for its local exchange and wireless network and retail operations. Applicants also argue that many of the measures needed to comply with the market-opening provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 involve substantial economies of scale and, as a result, that the merger will help SNET to open its markets. For example, the development of OSS that are required to provide unbundled elements and wholesale services to competitors clearly involve large sunk cost investments. Finally, Applicants claim that SBC's current and future long distance operations will benefit from SNET's experience and expertise in successfully providing long distance services in Connecticut. MCI responds that the Applicants have only articulated one benefit -- that the merger will give SNET access to greater resources -- which MCI argues will be used in a manner that is not consistent with the public interest. 45. We disagree with MCI and find that Applicants have demonstrated that the proposed merger is likely to produce at least some tangible public interest benefits. We find that the merger will provide Applicants with an increased wireless calling area that may result in improved wireless competition in the relevant markets. We also note that the DPUC concluded that SNET's access to improved research capabilities "would be a major benefit of the merger," and that "Connecticut consumers are likely to see the benefits of ADSL technology more quickly as a result of SNET's merger with SBC." We need not ascertain the exact magnitude of the benefits of the proposed merger because "where, as here, potential harms are unlikely, Applicants' demonstration of potential benefits need not be as certain." VI. ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL MATTERS 46. Request for a Hearing. In its petition, Inner City Press appears to request that the Commission schedule a hearing as an alternative to dismissing the Application. As we recently explained, however, if there are no substantial and material questions of fact presented by the record and a grant of the application would be in the public interest, we must grant the transfer of control application and deny any petitions to deny and requests for evidentiary hearing. A party seeking to compel the Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing must satisfy the two-part test established by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Gencom Inc. v. FCC. Under this test, a party seeking an evidentiary hearing must: (1) submit a petition to deny containing "specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that . . . a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest];" and (2) present to the Commission a "substantial and material question of fact." In addition, the allegations set forth by the petitioning party must be supported by an affidavit and "be specific evidentiary facts, not 'ultimate conclusory facts or more general allegations . . . . '" 47. Initially, we note that Inner City Press's allegations are not supported by "an affidavit of a person or persons with personal knowledge thereof." as required by Section 309. Moreover, the evidentiary support provided by Inner City Press consists nearly entirely of second- hand recitations of publicly-reported allegations of anticompetitive conduct by SBC in recent years. We find that such weakly-supported allegations do not provide any meaningful basis to conclude that there is a material question of fact. In any event, the allegations made by Inner City Press do not reflect disputes over material facts, but rather, focus on the relevance of particular facts in our public interest determination. As we concluded in the WorldCom-MCI Order, however, these types of issues "'manifestly do not' require a live hearing." The record before us has provided sufficient evidence for us to determine, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, that the Applicants' request serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 48. Other Determinations Requested by the Applicants. Applicants request that, pursuant to Section 212 of the Communications Act and Part 62 of the Commission's rules, the Commission find and declare that, upon consummation of the amended Agreement, all of SBC's post-merger carrier subsidiaries will be "commonly owned carriers" as that term is defined in the Commission's Rules. Because this request is reasonable and unopposed, we grant the request and make the requested finding. 49. The Applicants make additional procedural requests that are reasonable and unopposed. Accordingly, we grant them. First, pursuant to Section 21.39 of our Rules, we state that the transfer of control sought in the Application includes authority for SBC to acquire control of: (1) any authorization issued to SNET's subsidiaries and affiliates during the Commission's consideration of the transfer of control applications and the period required for consummation of the transaction following approval; (2) construction permits held by such licensees that mature into licenses after the closing and that may not have been included in the transfer of control applications; and (3) applications that will have been filed by such licensees and that are pending at the time of consummation of the proposed transfer of control. Second, pursuant to Sections 22.123(a), 25.116(b)(3), 90.164(b), and 101.29(c)(4) of our Rules, we grant applicants a blanket exemption from any applicable cut-off rules that would otherwise apply to subsidiaries or affiliates filing amendments to pending Part 22, Part 25, Part 90, or Part 101 applications or other applications to reflect the consummation of the proposed transfer of control. Finally, pursuant to Sections 1.2111, 24.839, and 101.55(d) of our Rules, we find that no trafficking or unjust enrichment is involved in the transfer of control of licenses for facilities in the Personal Communications Services which were obtained through competitive bidding in the last three years. VII. CONCLUSION OF ANALYSIS AND CONDITIONS OF APPROVAL 50. After considering all of the issues raised by commenters and parties opposing Applicants' requests, we conclude that the proposed merger between SBC and SNET is unlikely to produce any meaningful public interest harms. We also find that it is likely to produce at least some tangible public interest benefits. Accordingly, subject to the conditions in the following paragraph, we grant Applicant's requests that licenses and authorizations currently held by SNET be transferred to SBC in connection with their merger. 51. As discussed in the preceding sections of this order, our approval of the requested transfers of licenses and authorizations has been based, in part, on certain commitments and representations made by Applicants and our understanding that certain actions have been taken, or will be taken in the future. As a result, our approval of the applications before us is conditioned upon these commitments and representations. The conditions of our approval include: (1) Applicants' complete and continued fulfillment of the measures described above that are designed to ensure that this merger does not result in SBC providing interLATA services in its current region in violation of Section 271 of the Communications Act; (2) Applicants' maintenance of SNET's current treatment of Metrocall and other pagers pending resolution of Metrocall's complaint against SBC; (3) Applicants' commitment not to implement any arrangements that SNET Diversified may negotiate with foreign carriers to route U.S.-inbound switched traffic into SBC's in-region states via SNET Diversified private lines unless and until the Commission approves these arrangements during the period of time pending the adoption of final rules in the ISP Reform proceeding; and (4) Applicants' continued good faith implementation of the restructuring of local exchange operations in Connecticut in accordance with the requirements of the DPUC. VIII. ORDERING CLAUSES 52. Accordingly, having reviewed the applications and the record in this matter, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Sections 4(i) and (j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, 310(d), that the applications filed by SBC Communications, Inc. and Southern New England Telecommunications Corporation (SNET) in the above-captioned proceeding ARE GRANTED. 53. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Sections 4(i) and (j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, 310(d), that the above grant shall include authority for SBC Communications to acquire control of: a) any authorization issued to SNET's subsidiaries and affiliates during the Commission's consideration of the transfer of control applications and the period required for consummation of the transaction following approval; b) construction permits held by licensees involved in this transfer that mature into licenses after closing and that may have been omitted from the transfer of control applications; and c) applications that will have been filed by such licensees and that are pending at the time of consummation of the proposed transfer of control. 54. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all references to SBC Communications and SNET in this Order shall also refer to their respective officers, directors and employees, as well as to any affiliated companies, and their officers, directors and employees. 55. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as a condition of this grant, SBC and SNET shall comply with the conditions set forth in Section VII of this order. 56. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Sections 4(i) and (j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, 310(d), that the "Petition to Deny of Omnipoint Communications, Inc." IS DENIED. 57. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Sections 4(i) and (j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, 310(d), that the "Petition to Deny" filed by Inner City Press/Community on the Move & Inner City Public Interest Law Project IS DENIED. 58. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Sections 4(i) and (j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, 310(d), that the "Petition to Deny" filed by Metrocall , Inc. IS DENIED. 59. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Sections 4(i) and (j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, and 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j), 214(a), 214(c), 309, 310(d), that the "Petition of the Personal Communications Industry Association to Deny or Defer Action" IS DENIED. 60. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Memorandum Opinion and Order SHALL BE EFFECTIVE upon release in accordance with 47 C.F.R.  1.103. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Magalie Roman Salas Secretary