October 16, 1997

A little over a year ago, we conducted an auction for the "C-block" PCS licenses. Like our other auctions, this auction was carefully conceived to operate on market-based principles, allowing licenses to be obtained by those who valued them most at prices to be set by free market mechanisms. It was also crafted to fulfill a Congressional mandate to bring "designated entities" -- especially small businesses, often owned by women and minorities -- into the marketplace. And it did.

I supported our commitment to market-driven auctions and to designated entities. I reaffirm that commitment today.

Our auction was conducted properly, our rules were clear, and numerous licensees stand ready to meet their payment obligations fully and on time. And, while it is truly unfortunate that a handful of bidders overbid and/or overleveraged, it is clearly not our responsibility to prevent them from failing in the marketplace, or from going into bankruptcy. It is our responsibility to manage the spectrum, including the auction process, with fairness and integrity.

Although I sincerely regret that some licensees now find themselves unable to meet their commitments, I remain unpersuaded that the FCC should alter the outcome of the auction by providing bidders vastly more favorable terms than those to which they previously agreed. To grant overly generous accommodations to certain C-block licensees, after the auction, would be to forsake the marketplace and return to the government picking winners and losers. I do not think that this should be our spectrum policy for the future.

Such a result also would be unfair to those C-block licensees that counted on us to enforce our rules; unfair to disappointed C-block bidders who dropped out of the auction when the licenses they desired became too expensive; unfair to licensees in other spectrum blocks who are offering competing services; and unfair to the U.S. taxpayer.

I do support, however, modest options that would facilitate the return and reauctioning of spectrum in a timely and fair manner. The menu of options we offer to all C-block licensees today provides an appropriate balance.

Clear Rules; A Fair Auction

Everyone participating in the C-block auction was subject to the same rules. The auction was run fairly. Even now there are no serious complaints about our conduct of the auction or the clarity of our rules.

Our rules were designed, as Congress intended, to create opportunities for small businesses. Eligibility to bid was limited, and favorable payment terms were available. While we offered licensees the opportunity to pay for the licenses in installments, we were not a lender in the traditional sense: the payment terms were available to all small businesses without regard to their credit-worthiness or soundness of their business plans. First and foremost, we acted as a licensing agency and, as our rules clearly specified, the licenses were granted conditionally.

Each license was conditioned upon timely payments according to a predetermined payment schedule, with the caveat that the license would automatically cancel if the payments were not made. The conditional interest granted is clearly noted on the face of the license itself, and in the relevant Commission rules and orders. (Indeed, the conditional nature of the license and the attendant penalties and loss of downpayment are duly acknowledged in at least one large bidder's public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.)

The Problem

The C-block auction resulted in licenses being won by a handful of large players -- each with license bids in excess of a billion dollars -- and a multitude of smaller players. Several of the largest winners paid well in excess of prices comparable to those paid by the A and B block licensees. Compounding the problem, some of these same large players have highly leveraged capital structures with debt/equity ratios as high as 10-1, tying their future to conducting a successful public offering. In contrast to the larger players, the majority of the C-block winners have smaller holdings, paid considerably less per pop for their licenses and/or had more prudent capitalization. For the most part, the smaller licensees do not appear to be in financial trouble.

Last spring, a handful of the largest winners requested relief from their obligations -- essentially to keep their licenses on more favorable terms than those they voluntarily agreed to just sixteen months ago. They were outnumbered by many smaller licensees who have not sought relief and who are ready to build out their markets.

Nonetheless, as the campaign for significant modifications won some support at the Commission, other licensees echoed the call, reflecting a natural desire to pay less should the Commission be willing to rewrite the terms of the agreement. That chorus transcended the C-block and has now spilled over into other radio services. Interest payments were temporarily suspended as of March 31, 1997, pending Commission consideration of what, if any, measures should be taken to assist financially troubled licensees.

Other interested parties include many small companies -- some of which failed to win any licenses and dissolved -- who feel the prices were unreasonably driven up by certain bidders during the auction. Many of the investors in these companies and in those C-block licensees currently meeting their obligations believe fairness dictates that defaulting parties forego their licenses, that the licenses be reauctioned, and that everyone have a fair chance to acquire the licenses in a subsequent auction.

Marketplace Disruption

We must, however, consider certain countervailing factors. The financial markets became unsettled subsequent to our suspension of C-block installment payments. Licensees with sound business plans have been enveloped by the cloud of marketplace uncertainty, and the flow of capital needed for continued build-out has been impeded. C-block licensees, to varying degrees, have plans on hold, as the financial community awaits the outcome of this proceeding.

The Commission must take action now to get the C-block licensees back to business. While there has been a wide range of proposals offered and considered, the one thing that almost all parties have agreed upon is that final resolution is needed immediately to enable rapid build-out and to foster competition.

A Menu of Options

We adopt a menu of options that is likely to help many of the troubled licensees, without jeopardizing the principles of fairness and integrity that are essential to market-driven auctions. In developing these options, the majority of Commissioners have discarded proposals that would have fundamentally changed auction outcomes or created incentives for licensees to alter otherwise achievable business plans. In addition, we have avoided giving anyone a "thumb on the scales" in a subsequent auction.

Specifically, we are continuing the deferral of installment payments until March 31, 1998, making the total suspension period a full year. This resumption date ensures that all C-block licensees and prospective financial backers will have sufficient time to complete their deals. Some will also benefit from the access to foreign equity that is permitted, beginning January 1, 1998, under the recent WTO Agreement. (This is all the relief that was initially sought by one bidder that is now urging us to adopt a very substantial restructuring.)

All C-block licensees who do not choose one of the three following options will be expected to resume payments under their existing agreements. I hope and anticipate that the vast majority of successful bidders will proceed in this fashion.

The three options are:

First, under the amnesty option, licensees may forfeit all of their licenses and their downpayments. In return, the Commission will (in coordination with the Department of Justice) approve forgiveness of their outstanding debt and cancellation of the additional penalties, including a deficiency payment (representing the difference between the net bid price and the price obtained in a subsequent auction), that otherwise would be due. The licenses will then be reauctioned.

Second, under the disaggregation option, licensees may return half of their spectrum in a given market or markets in exchange for a corresponding reduction of debt. This is consistent with our existing disaggregation rules, facilitates new spectrum-based competition in the marketplace, and better enables the cash flows of the licensees to service the significantly reduced debt. We will re-auction licenses for the 15-megahertz spectrum blocks that are returned under the same designated entity terms as apply to all other C-block licenses. Several of the largest licensees have endorsed this option.

Third, under the prepayment option, licensees may apply 70 percent of their downpayments from licenses they now choose to abandon and 100 percent of their downpayments for licenses they now choose to keep to pay for as many licenses at the original auction price as they can afford. This is a buy-out, not a bail-out. Again, returned spectrum will be re-auctioned under the same terms as apply to all other C-block licenses.

Rejected Options

We carefully considered and discarded other options. For example, our dissenting colleague would have offered vastly more generous buy-out options. His actions suggest that the prospect of a large licensee filing for bankruptcy must be avoided at all costs. I cannot agree.

Substantial Discounts: Under the approach advocated by the Chairman, the debt owed by the licensees would be drastically discounted -- a 40% haircut to the American taxpayer -- well below the prices that other, subsequently disappointed, bidders were clearly willing to pay. This would be replacing a market-based outcome with an FCC-directed outcome. I agree with the Chairman's prior statements that the market -- not the FCC -- should pick the winners and losers.

In my view, the price bid is the price bid. Bidders were not offered a cash versus credit price. The notes do not provide for prepayment discounts. If the FCC wanted to induce licensees to prepay, we would have included a prepayment schedule in our notes and rules. To the contrary, the favorable financing terms offered -- at an interest rate reflecting the cost of capital to the U.S. government -- were designed, in part, to induce designated entities to hold their licenses for a full ten years. This was consistent with Congress's stated goals to bring small business, including women and minorities, into the market -- on a sustained basis. Therefore a licensee would be unjustly enriched if it received the full ten-year benefit of attractive financing without the burden of holding the license for the full term.

Use of All Downpayments: I also disagree with the Chairman that the C-block licensees should be permitted to "spend" 100 percent of their deposits from licenses they no longer want, to pay for licenses they do want. These funds have been paid to the U.S. Treasury and are not the licensees' to redeploy as they wish. That policy was clearly stated in our rules and documentation. Indeed, the Chairman reiterated that view in an April 30, 1997 speech to the Federal Communications Bar Association:

Some say that the C-block licensees will not pay the total of their commitments to installment payments. If that is true, they will not hold the licenses any longer. But still the taxpayers will have received all the installment payments to that date, and we will reauction the licenses . . .

A buyer of an option to purchase a piece of property is not entitled to apply the price of that option to the purchase price of another property. If licensees were able to use 100 percent of their deposits to cherry-pick which licenses they want to keep and which they want to return, they would recoup in full what they paid and there would be no deterrent in future auctions against bidding excessively. Such a result surely would poison a market-based auction.

Moreover, we have repeatedly refused to allow defaulting licensees to recoup their downpayment -- not just in the C-block auction, but in other auctions. Again, the purpose is to ensure the integrity of the auction.

Nonetheless, to accommodate some of the troubled licensees, the majority has agreed to allow them to apply up to 70 percent of the downpayments on licenses returned and 100 percent of the downpayment on licenses kept toward payment for selected licenses. The remaining 30 percent of the downpayment on returned licenses equates to the 3% of bid price default penalty specified in our rules.

The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau has routinely assessed such penalties, including loss of downpayment, on defaulting bidders.⁽¹⁾ It also has assessed similar penalties against defaulting auction winners in other spectrum bands. While the amount at stake for the largest C-block licensees is not insignificant, surely it cannot be the policy of the FCC that we grant generous breaks to the largest bidders while we strictly apply our rules -- including the penalty provisions -- to the smaller bidders.

Transferable Bidding Credit: Finally, the Chairman would have allowed licensees to return all licenses and then apply 100% of their downpayments as a transferable bidding credit in a subsequent auction. This option, too, was carefully considered and discarded as being grossly unfair to losing C-block bidders, and to those bidders who already have built out their systems and cannot risk returning their licenses. It would have put a "thumb on the scales" in the subsequent auction in favor of the defaulting bidders. Those who bid up the original auction would now be rewarded by receiving full use of their downpayments toward the same licenses, at presumably significantly lower prices with "use it or lose it" dollars, or to cash out through another bidder. No wonder this concept found few policy adherents.

Other Misconceptions

Declining value of the licenses: Clearly, it would be better if C-block licensees did not file for bankruptcy. As a former communications lender, I am painfully aware of the problems and timeframes associated with bankruptcy proceedings. Nonetheless, I do not share the view that the C-block spectrum is a declining value asset, or that, if the licenses were tied up in protracted litigation, they would ultimately yield a small fraction of today's worth. Our PCS service rules are extremely flexible, allowing licensees to provide both fixed and mobile services. With changing technology constantly creating new services, there is every likelihood that demand for this spectrum will be there whenever the licenses are reauctioned.

Forestalled Competition: Nor do I believe that C-block licensees must build their systems now or consumers will suffer from lack of competition in mobile communications. Even if buildout of a substantial portion of the C-block licenses was delayed, consumers still have the benefit of competition from the A and B blocks, wide area SMR, and the PCS D, E, and F blocks, in addition to the two cellular licenses in each market. Consumers in many markets already enjoy a substantial reduction in rates as a result of PCS competition.⁽²⁾ Moreover, licensees are obligated to have built their systems only by the fifth year. Thus, even if bankruptcy were avoided, there is no guarantee that service would commence immediately.

I reject the argument that, if we do not provide extraordinary relief to the largest C-block licensees, other C-block licensees will be stymied by lack of roaming opportunities for their customers. The marketplace recognizes the problem, and has been working on a solution. Equipment manufacturers are helping to forge agreements that will enable the PCS equipment to roam nationwide, and new handsets operate on both cellular and PCS frequencies. I am confident that wireless telephone competition will not come to a grinding halt if there is a delay in the buildout of some of these licenses.

Conclusion

The FCC's primary responsibilities are to write fair rules, run fair auctions, and issue licenses to successful bidders. We have an obligation of fairness and impartiality to those who bid but chose not to overbid or overleverage. And we owe it to the C-block licensees who seek no special treatment but just want to get about their business to avoid changing the rules in any fundamental way that is detrimental to their business plans.

I believe the approach we adopt today fairly balances the competing interests. Restoring regulatory certainty to the marketplace promotes investment, competition, and service to the American public. Even though the approach we adopt today is the product of negotiation and compromise, and does not reflect the first-choice preferences of any individual Commissioner, I am satisfied that under present circumstances adoption of this order is the course of action that best serves the public interest.

1. For example, in May, one C-block bidder, BDPCS, Inc., was assessed a $67.7 million penalty, which totals 7% of the face amount of its bids of approximately $873 million. See BDPCS, Inc., Order, 12 FCC Rcd 6606 (WTB, 1997). Another C-block bidder, C.H. PCS, was assessed an initial penalty for over $6.4 million. C.H. PCS Inc., Order, 11 FCC Rcd 22430 (WTB, 1996).

2. The Yankee Group identifies over 40 markets that now have three wireless competitors and 10 markets with four competitors. It observes that pricing in competitive markets with at least one new PCS operator averages 18 percent lower than in markets with no PCS competitors. Yankee Watch Mobile Flash -- Competition Begins to Have an Impact on Wireless Pricing (April 18, 1997).