

# **PUBLIC NOTICE**

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 1919 M STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554 News Media Information: (202) 418-0500 Fax-On-Demand: (202) 418-2830 Internet: http://www.fcc.gov ftp.fcc.gov

> **DA 98-2386** November 24, 1998

# PHASE II 220 MHz SERVICE SPECTRUM AUCTION SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 8, 1999; APPLICATION FILING DEADLINE SET FOR MAY 10, 1999

## COMMENT SOUGHT ON RESERVE PRICES OR MINIMUM OPENING BIDS AND OTHER AUCTION PROCEDURES

## Report No. AUC-99-24-A (Auction No. 24)

By this Public Notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau ("Bureau") announces an auction of 225 Phase II 220 MHz Service licenses set to begin on June 8, 1999 (Auction No. 24).<sup>1</sup> A list of licenses is included as an Attachment. In addition, future public notices could include additional information about available spectrum in conjunction with Auction No. 24. Future public notices will include further details regarding application filing and payment deadlines, a seminar for potential bidders, and other pertinent information. In this Public Notice, we seek comment on procedural issues relating to Auction No. 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For the rules associated with the Phase II 220 MHz service auction, *see* In the Matter of Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Provide for the Use of the 220-222 MHz Band by the Private Land Mobile Radio Service, Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act -- Competitive Bidding, PR Docket No. 89-552, RM 8506, GN Docket No. 93-252, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Third Report and Order and Fifth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, 12 FCC Rcd 10943, 11046, ¶ 221 (1997) (*"220 MHz Third Report and Order"*); In the Matter of Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Provide for the Use of the 220-222 MHz Band by the Private Land Mobile Radio Service, Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act -- Competitive Bidding, PR Docket No. 89-552, GN Docket No. 93-252, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration*, 13 FCC Rcd 11745 (1998) (*"220 MHz Reconsideration Order"*).

#### Key dates:

- Short Form Application (FCC Form 175)
- Upfront Payments (via wire transfer) •
- Auction Start

I. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses are subject to auction (*i.e.*, because the Commission has accepted mutually exclusive applications for those licenses), unless the Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in the public interest.<sup>2</sup> Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each auction.<sup>3</sup> The Bureau was directed to seek comment on the methodology to be employed in establishing each of these mechanisms. Among other factors the Bureau should consider are the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors that reasonably could have an impact on valuation of the spectrum being auctioned. The Commission concluded that the Bureau should have the discretion to employ either or both of these mechanisms for future auctions.<sup>4</sup>

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which *no bids* are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid scenario, the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the amount later in the auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the reserve price to be the same amount.

In anticipation of this auction and in light of the Balanced Budget Act, the Bureau proposes to

May 10, 1999; 5:30 p.m. ET May 24, 1999; 6:00 p.m. ET June 8, 1999

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Section 3002(a), Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) ("Budget Act"); 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F). The Commission's authority to establish a reserve price or minimum opening bid is set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(c) and (d).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules -- Competitive Bidding Procedures, Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, WT Docket No. 97-82, ET Docket No. 94-32, FCC 97-413, Third Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 454-455, ¶ 141 (1998) ("Part 1 Third Report and Order").

establish minimum opening bids for the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, and retain discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. The Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized in other auctions,<sup>5</sup> is an effective bidding tool. A minimum opening bid, rather than a reserve price, will help to regulate the pace of the auction and provides flexibility.

Specifically, for Auction No. 24, the Commission proposes the following for minimum opening bids:

1. EAG Licenses	\$0.0125 * 0.15 MHz * License Population (rounded up to the nearest dollar.)
2. EA Licenses	\$500 per license

Comment is sought on this proposal. If commenters believe that the formula proposed above for minimum opening bids will result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or is not a reasonable amount, or should instead operate as a reserve price, they should explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas. In establishing the formula for minimum opening bids, we particularly seek comment on such factors as, among other things, the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of the Phase II 220 MHz Service spectrum. Alternatively, comment is sought on whether, consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

II. Other Auction Procedures

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to "ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this subsection, an adequate period is allowed. . . before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction procedures. . ."<sup>6</sup> Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with the specific provisions that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing delegated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, DA 97-2147, *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 16354 (1997); Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses, Auction Notice and Filing Requirements for 908 Licenses Consisting of Economic Area (EA), Economic Area Grouping (EAG), and Nationwide Licenses, Scheduled for September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening Bids and Other Procedural Issues, *Public Notice*, DA 98-1010 (rel. May 29, 1998) (*"220 MHz Auction Public Notice"*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Budget Act, § 3002(a)(E)(i).

authority,<sup>7</sup> to seek comment on a variety of auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction.<sup>8</sup> We therefore seek comment on the following issues.

a. Auction Sequence and License Groupings

Because it is most administratively appropriate, and allows bidders to take advantage of any synergies that exist among licenses, we propose to award these 225 Phase II 220 MHz Service licenses in a single, simultaneous multiple-round auction.<sup>9</sup> We seek comment on this proposal.

#### b. Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each Bidder

The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking into account such factors as the population in each geographic license area, and the value of similar spectrum.<sup>10</sup> With these guidelines in mind, we propose for the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction the following upfront payments:

1. EAG Licenses	\$0.01 * 0.15 MHz * License Population (rounded up to the nearest dollar.)
2. EA Licenses	\$500 per license

We seek comment on this proposal. For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder will determine the initial maximum eligibility (as measured in bidding units) for each bidder. Upfront payments will not be attributed to specific licenses, but instead will be translated into bidding units to define a bidder's initial maximum eligibility, which cannot be increased during the auction. Thus, in calculating the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules—Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, FCC 97-60, Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5677, ¶ 16 (1997) ("Part 1 Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule Making") ("We also clarify that pursuant to Section 0.131 of our rules, the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, has delegated authority to implement all of the Commission's rules pertaining to auctions procedures.")

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 448,  $\P$  124. The Commission directed the Bureau to seek comment on specific mechanisms related to day-to-day auction conduct including, for example, the structure of bidding rounds and stages, establishment of minimum opening bids or reserve prices, minimum accepted bids, initial maximum eligibility for each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of the auction, activity rule waivers, criteria for determining reductions in eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and bid removal, stopping rules, and information relating to auction delay, suspension or cancellation. *Id.*  $\P$  125.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See, e.g., Phase II 220 MHz Service Second Report and Order at ¶ 309.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See Part 1 Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98, ¶ 16 (1997).

upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine the <u>maximum</u> number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering that number of bidding units. We seek comment on this proposal.

c. Structure of Bidding Rounds, Activity Requirements, and Criteria for Determining Reductions in Eligibility

We propose to divide the auction into three stages: Stage One, Stage Two and Stage Three. The auction will start in Stage One. We propose that the auction will generally advance to the next stage (*i.e.*, from Stage One to Stage Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new high bids, is below ten percent for three consecutive rounds of bidding in each Stage. However, we further propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder activity including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the percentages of licenses on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in revenue. We seek comment on these proposals.

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a percentage of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of the auction rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the next round or use an activity rule waiver.

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we propose that, in each round of Stage One of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on licenses encompassing at least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (5/4). In each round of the second stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on at least 90 percent of its current bidding eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the calculated by multiplying the current round activity by tenninths (10/9). In each round of Stage Three, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 98 percent of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity by fifty forty-ninths (50/49). We seek comment on these proposals.

#### d. Minimum Accepted Bids

Once there is a standing high bid on a license, a bid increment will be applied to that license to establish a minimum acceptable bid for the following round. For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we propose to use a smoothing methodology to calculate bid increments. This methodology will be designed to vary the increment for a given license between a maximum and minimum value based on the bidding activity on that license. A similar methodology was used in

previous auctions, including the original Phase II 220 MHz Service auction<sup>11</sup> and LMDS auction.<sup>12</sup> The Bureau proposes initial values for the maximum of 0.2 or 20% of the license value, and a minimum of 0.1 or 10% of the license value.

The Bureau retains the discretion to change these values if circumstances so dictate, such as raising the minimum increment toward the end of the auction to enable bids to reach their final values more quickly. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the Automated Auction System. Under its discretion the Bureau may also implement an absolute dollar floor for the bid increment to further facilitate a timely close of the auction. The Bureau further seeks comment on the advantages and disadvantages of using the discretion to adjust the minimum bid increment without prior notice. As an alternative approach, the Bureau seeks comment on the advantages and disadvantages in the minimum bid increment gradually over a number of rounds as opposed to single large changes in the minimum bid increment. The Bureau also retains the discretion to use alternate methodologies for the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction if circumstances warrant. We seek comment on these proposals.

#### e. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply a waiver (known as an "automatic waiver") at the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required unless: (1) there are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its bidding eligibility, rather than use an activity rule waiver, must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the bidding period by using the reduce eligibility function in the software. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as described above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.

A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means to keep the auction open without

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See 220 MHz Auction Public Notice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See "Auction of Local Multipoint Distribution Licenses," Public Notice, DA 98-230 (rel. Feb. 6, 1998).

placing a bid. If a bidder submits a proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding software) during a bidding period in which no bids are submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no new valid bids will not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction be provided with five activity rule waivers that may be used in any round during the course of the auction as set forth above. We seek comment on this proposal.

f. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we propose the following bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder may effectively "unsubmit" any bid placed within that round. A bidder removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal payments.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However, in the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids from previous rounds using the withdraw bid function. A high bidder that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions.<sup>13</sup> We seek comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.

In the *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, the Commission recently explained that allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons, including to delay the close of the auction for strategic purposes. The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent strategic delay of the close of the auction or other abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.<sup>14</sup>

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction to withdrawals in no more than two rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes. The two rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high bids that may be withdrawn

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g); 1.2109.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Part 1 Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 460, ¶ 150.

in either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the Commission's rules. We seek comment on this proposal.

### g. Stopping Rule

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, the Bureau proposes to employ a simultaneous stopping approach. The Bureau has discretion "to establish stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction within a reasonable time."<sup>15</sup> A simultaneous stopping rule means that all licenses remain open until the first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive waivers or withdrawals are received. After the first such round, bidding closes simultaneously on all licenses. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.

The Bureau seeks comment on a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be used unilaterally or only in stage three of the auction.

We propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to keep an auction open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining activity rule waiver.

Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to declare that the auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds ("special stopping rule"). If the Bureau invokes this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least one of the preceding specified number of rounds. The Bureau proposes to exercise this option only in certain circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is proceeding very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time. Before exercising this option, the Bureau is likely to attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, moving the auction into the next stage (where bidders would be required to maintain a higher level of bidding activity), increasing the number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still a high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(e).

### h. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

For the Phase II 220 MHz Service auction, we propose that, by public notice or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive bidding.<sup>16</sup> In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to: resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current round; resume the auction starting from some previous round; or cancel the auction in its entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend the auction. We emphasize that exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.

## III. Conclusion

Comments are due on or before December 16, 1998, and reply comments are due on or before December 23, 1998. To file formally, parties must submit an original and four copies to the Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Communications Commission, 445 Twelfth Street, S.W., TW-A325, Washington, D.C. 20554. In addition, parties must submit one copy to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Room 5202, 2025 M Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room 239, 1919 M Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554.

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact Christina Clearwater, Ruby Hough, or Bob Reagle, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, at (202) 418-0660.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(i).

Market No.	Block	License Name	License No.	Population*	Upfront Payment **	Minimum Opening Bid ***	Status ****
		Economic Area Licenses (100 KHz)					
BEA001	Α	Bangor, ME	QABEA001A	533,135	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA001	В	Bangor, ME	QABEA001B	533,135	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA001	C	Bangor, ME	QABEA001C	533,135	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA001	D	Bangor, ME	QABEA001D	533,135	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA001	E	Bangor, ME	QABEA001E	533,135	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA002	A	Portland, ME	QABEA002A	694,793	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA002	c	Portland, ME	QABEA002A	694,793	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA002	A	Burlington, VT-NY	QABEA002C	568,377	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA004	В		QABEA004A QABEA004B	568,377	\$500.00		1
	C	Burlington, VT-NY			-		1
BEA004 BEA004	D	Burlington, VT-NY	QABEA004C	568,377	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
		Burlington, VT-NY	QABEA004D	568,377	\$500.00	\$500.00	
BEA005	A	Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY	QABEA005A	1,147,154	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA005	C	Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY	QABEA005C	1,147,154	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA006	С	Syracuse, NY-PA	QABEA006C	1,934,632	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA006	D	Syracuse, NY-PA	QABEA006D	1,934,632	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA007	A	Rochester, NY-PA	QABEA007A	1,457,846	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA007	D	Rochester, NY-PA	QABEA007D	1,457,846	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA008	С	Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY-PA	QABEA008C	1,529,735	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA009	С	State College, PA	QABEA009C	798,826	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA011	A	Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA	QABEA011A	1,026,459	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA013	В	Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV-PA	QABEA013B	7,454,633	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA013	С	Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV-PA	QABEA013C	7,454,633	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA014	D	Salisbury, MD-DE-VA	QABEA014D	290,800	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA016	Α	Staunton, VA-WV	QABEA016A	301,626	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA016	В	Staunton, VA-WV	QABEA016B	301,626	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA016	С	Staunton, VA-WV	QABEA016C	301,626	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA016	D	Staunton, VA-WV	QABEA016D	301,626	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA017	D	Roanoke, VA-NC-WV	QABEA017D	760,378	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA036	В	Dothan, AL-FL-GA	QABEA036B	307,026	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA036	С	Dothan, AL-FL-GA	QABEA036C	307,026	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA036	D	Dothan, AL-FL-GA	QABEA036D	307,026	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA036	Е	Dothan, AL-FL-GA	QABEA036E	307,026	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA037	А	Albany, GA	QABEA037A	415,342	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA037	В	Albany, GA	QABEA037B	415,342	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA037	D	Albany, GA	QABEA037D	415,342	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA037	Е	Albany, GA	QABEA037E	415,342	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA038		Macon, GA	QABEA038A	686,336	\$500.00		1
BEA038		Macon, GA	QABEA038B	686,336	\$500.00	-	1
BEA039		Columbus, GA-AL	QABEA039A	449,582	\$500.00		1
BEA039	C	Columbus, GA-AL	QABEA039C	449,582	\$500.00		1
BEA039	D	Columbus, GA-AL	QABEA039D	449,582	\$500.00		1
BEA042		Asheville, NC	QABEA042B	371,635	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA042		Asheville, NC	QABEA042D	371,635	\$500.00	-	1
BEA042 BEA043		Chattanooga, TN-GA	QABEA042D QABEA043A	635,535	\$500.00		1
BEA043		Knoxville, TN	QABEA043A QABEA044A	840,395	\$500.00		1
BEA044 BEA044							
		Knoxville, TN	QABEA044D	840,395	\$500.00		1
BEA045		Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA	QABEA045A	524,270	\$500.00	-	1
BEA045		Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA	QABEA045B	524,270	\$500.00		1
BEA045		Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA	QABEA045C	524,270	\$500.00		1
BEA045		Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA	QABEA045D	524,270	\$500.00		1
BEA045	E	Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA	QABEA045E	524,270	\$500.00	\$500.00	1

Market					Upfront	Minimum	
No.	Block	License Name	License No.	Population*	Payment **	Opening Bid ***	Status ****
BEA046	С	Hickory-Morganton, NC-TN	QABEA046C	445,736	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA046	D	Hickory-Morganton, NC-TN	QABEA046D	445,736	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA048	В	Charleston, WV-KY-OH	QABEA048B	1,196,043	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA051	В	Columbus, OH	QABEA051B	2,100,613	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA052	А	Wheeling, WV-OH	QABEA052A	346,375	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA052	В	Wheeling, WV-OH	QABEA052B	346,375	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA052	С	Wheeling, WV-OH	QABEA052C	346,375	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA053	A	Pittsburgh, PA-WV	QABEA053A	3,003,172	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA053	С	Pittsburgh, PA-WV	QABEA053C	3,003,172	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA053	E	Pittsburgh, PA-WV	QABEA053E	3003172	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA054	В	Erie, PA	QABEA054B	512,673	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA056	A	Toledo, OH	QABEA056A	1,278,722	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA056	В	Toledo, OH	QABEA056B	1,278,722	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA058	А	Northern Michigan, MI	QABEA058A	230,066	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA058	В	Northern Michigan, MI	QABEA058B	230,066	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA058	D	Northern Michigan, MI	QABEA058D	230,066	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA058	E	Northern Michigan, MI	QABEA058E	230,066	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA059	A	Green Bay, WI-MI	QABEA059A	624,600	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA059	В	Green Bay, WI-MI	QABEA059B	624,600	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA059	C	Green Bay, WI-MI	QABEA059C	624,600	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA059	D	Green Bay, WI-MI	QABEA059D	624,600	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA059	E	Green Bay, WI-MI	QABEA059E	624,600	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA060	A	Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI	QABEA060A	380,610	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA060	В	Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI	QABEA060B	380,610	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA060	D	Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI	QABEA060D	380,610	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA061	A	Traverse City, MI	QABEA061A	238,720	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA061	В	Traverse City, MI	QABEA061B	238,720	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA061	D	Traverse City, MI	QABEA061D	238,720	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA063	В	Milwaukee-Racine, WI	QABEA063B	2,119,557	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA067	E	Indianapolis, IN-IL	QABEA067E	2753182	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA072	В	Paducah, KY-IL	QABEA072B	211,179	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA073	В	Memphis, TN-AR-MS-KY	QABEA073B	1,687,817	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA074	В	Huntsville, AL-TN	QABEA074B	885,020	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA075	D	Tupelo, MS-AL-TN	QABEA075D	577,246	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA076	D	Greenville, MS	QABEA076D	257,239	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA077	С	Jackson, MS-AL-LA	QABEA077C	1,328,647	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA077	D	Jackson, MS-AL-LA	QABEA077D	1,328,647	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA078	В	Birmingham, AL	QABEA078B	1,450,463	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA079	A	Montgomery, AL	QABEA079A	440,228	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA079	E	Montgomery, AL	QABEA079E	440,228	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA080	E	Mobile, AL	QABEA080E	607,965	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA081	D	Pensacola, FL	QABEA081D	515,942	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA081	E	Pensacola, FL	QABEA081E	515,942	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA084	C	Baton Rouge, LA-MS	QABEA084C	656,284	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA085	E	Lafayette, LA	QABEA085E	554,665	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA088	C	Shreveport-Bossier City, LA-AR	QABEA088C	555,385	\$500.00	\$500.00	
BEA088	D	Shreveport-Bossier City, LA-AR	QABEA088D	555,385	\$500.00	\$500.00	1

Market No.	Block	License Name	License No.	Population*	Upfront Payment **	Minimum Opening Bid ***	Status ****
BEA089	Α	Monroe, LA	QABEA089A	326,897	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA089	В	Monroe, LA	QABEA089B	326,897	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA089	С	Monroe, LA	QABEA089C	326,897	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA089	D	Monroe, LA	QABEA089D	326,897	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA089	Е	Monroe, LA	QABEA089E	326,897	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA091	В	Fort Smith, AR-OK	QABEA091B	286,113	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA091	С	Fort Smith, AR-OK	QABEA091C	286,113	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA091	D	Fort Smith, AR-OK	QABEA091D	286,113	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA091	Е	Fort Smith, AR-OK	QABEA091E	286,113	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA092	А	Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO-OK	QABEA092A	285,955	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA092	В	Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO-OK	QABEA092B	285,955	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA092	D	Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO-OK	QABEA092D	285,955	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA093	В	Joplin, MO-KS-OK	QABEA093B	233,725	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA093	С	Joplin, MO-KS-OK	QABEA093C	233,725	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA093	D	Joplin, MO-KS-OK	QABEA093D	233,725	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA093	Е	Joplin, MO-KS-OK	QABEA093E	233,725	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA094	А	Springfield, MO	QABEA094A	712,422	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA094	В	Springfield, MO	QABEA094B	712,422	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA094	С	Springfield, MO	QABEA094C	712,422	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA094	Е	Springfield, MO	QABEA094E	712,422	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA098	В	Columbia, MO	QABEA098B	321,564	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA098	Е	Columbia, MO	QABEA098E	321,564	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA099	В	Kansas City, MO-KS	QABEA099B	2,224,907	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA099	Е	Kansas City, MO-KS	QABEA099E	2224907	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA100	D	Des Moines, IA-IL-MO	QABEA100D	1,604,609	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA103	А	Cedar Rapids, IA	QABEA103A	341,001	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA103	В	Cedar Rapids, IA	QABEA103B	341,001	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA103	D	Cedar Rapids, IA	QABEA103D	341,001	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA104	А	Madison, WI-IA-IL	QABEA104A	837,209	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA104	D	Madison, WI-IA-IL	QABEA104D	837,209	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA105	А	La Crosse, WI-MN	QABEA105A	220,502	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA105	С	La Crosse, WI-MN	QABEA105C	220,502	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA105	D	La Crosse, WI-MN	QABEA105D	220,502	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA105	Е	La Crosse, WI-MN	QABEA105E	220,502	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA108	А	Wausau, WI	QABEA108A	451,533	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA108	В	Wausau, WI	QABEA108B	451,533	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA108	С	Wausau, WI	QABEA108C	451,533	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA108	D	Wausau, WI	QABEA108D	451,533	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA108	Е	Wausau, WI	QABEA108E	451,533	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA109	Α	Duluth-Superior, MN-WI	QABEA109A	340,675	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA109	В	Duluth-Superior, MN-WI	QABEA109B	340,675	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA109	С	Duluth-Superior, MN-WI	QABEA109C	340,675	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA109	D	Duluth-Superior, MN-WI	QABEA109D	340,675	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA110	А	Grand Forks, ND-MN	QABEA110A	240,827	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA110	В	Grand Forks, ND-MN	QABEA110B	240,827	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA110	С	Grand Forks, ND-MN	QABEA110C	240,827	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA110	D	Grand Forks, ND-MN	QABEA110D	240,827	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA111	А	Minot, ND	QABEA111A	116,054	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA111	В	Minot, ND	QABEA111B	116,054	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA111	С	Minot, ND	QABEA111C	116,054	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA111	D	Minot, ND	QABEA111D	116,054	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA111	Е	Minot, ND	QABEA111E	116,054	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA112	А	Bismarck, ND-MT-SD	QABEA112A	172,204	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA112	В	Bismarck, ND-MT-SD	QABEA112B	172,204	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA112	С	Bismarck, ND-MT-SD	QABEA112C	172,204	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA112	D	Bismarck, ND-MT-SD	QABEA112D	172,204	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA113	A	Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN	QABEA113A	347,670	\$500.00	\$500.00	1

Market No.	Block	License Name	License No.	Population*	Upfront Payment **	Minimum Opening Bid ***	Status ****
BEA113	В	Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN	QABEA113B	347,670	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA113	С	Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN	QABEA113C	347,670	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA113	D	Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN	QABEA113D	347,670	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA114	Α	Aberdeen, SD	QABEA114A	84,696	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA114	В	Aberdeen, SD	QABEA114B	84,696	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA114	С	Aberdeen, SD	QABEA114C	84,696	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA114	D	Aberdeen, SD	QABEA114D	84,696	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA115	Α	Rapid City, SD-MT-ND-NE	QABEA115A	199,782	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA115	В	Rapid City, SD-MT-ND-NE	QABEA115B	199,782	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA115	С	Rapid City, SD-MT-ND-NE	QABEA115C	199,782	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA115	D	Rapid City, SD-MT-ND-NE	QABEA115D	199,782	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA120	А	Grand Island, NE	QABEA120A	277,509	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA120	В	Grand Island, NE	QABEA120B	277,509	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA120	С	Grand Island, NE	QABEA120C	277,509	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA120	D	Grand Island, NE	QABEA120D	277,509	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA121	А	North Platte, NE-CO	QABEA121A	60,432	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA121	В	North Platte, NE-CO	QABEA121B	60,432	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA121	С	North Platte, NE-CO	QABEA121C	60,432	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA121	D	North Platte, NE-CO	QABEA121D	60,432	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA122	D	Wichita, KS-OK	QABEA122D	1,094,213	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA123	С	Topeka, KS	QABEA123C	444,800	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA123	Е	Topeka, KS	QABEA123E	444,800	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA124	С	Tulsa, OK-KS	QABEA124C	1,259,636	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA124	E	Tulsa, OK-KS	QABEA124E	1259636	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA125	E	Oklahoma City, OK	QABEA125E	1550725	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA126	A	Western Oklahoma, OK	QABEA126A	144,847	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA126	В	Western Oklahoma, OK	QABEA126B	144,847	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA126	C	Western Oklahoma, OK	QABEA126C	144,847	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA126	D	Western Oklahoma, OK	QABEA126D	144,847	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA126	E	Western Oklahoma, OK	QABEA126E	144,847	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA129	E	San Angelo, TX	QABEA129E	189093	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA130	E	Austin-San Marcos, TX	QABEA130E	922,307	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA132	E	Corpus Christi, TX	QABEA132E	500805	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA133	E	McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX	QABEA133E	701888	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA134	E	San Antonio, TX	QABEA133E	1741991	\$500.00	\$500.00	2
BEA135	D	Odessa-Midland, TX	QABEA135D	382,517	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA135	E	Odessa-Midland, TX	QABEA135E	382517	\$500.00		2
BEA136	B	Hobbs, NM-TX	QABEA135E	185,128	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA136	C	Hobbs, NM-TX	QABEA136B	185,128	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA136	D	,		185,128	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA130	C	Hobbs, NM-TX	QABEA136D	357,092			1
BEA137	D	Lubbock, TX	QABEA137C QABEA137D	357,092	\$500.00 \$500.00	\$500.00 \$500.00	1
		Lubbock, TX					1
BEA137	E	Lubbock, TX	QABEA137E	357,092	\$500.00	\$500.00	
BEA138	<u>C</u>	Amarillo, TX-NM	QABEA138C	448,258	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA138	D	Amarillo, TX-NM	QABEA138D	448,258	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA142	A	Scottsbluff, NE-WY	QABEA142A	91,975	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA142	B		QABEA142B	91,975	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA142	C	Scottsbluff, NE-WY	QABEA142C	91,975	\$500.00		1
BEA142	D	Scottsbluff, NE-WY	QABEA142D	91,975	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA160	E	Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA-AZ		15,891,818	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA168	D	Pendleton, OR-WA	QABEA168D	176,129	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA173	A	Guam and Northern Mariana Islands	QABEA173A	176,497	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA173	В	Guam and Northern Mariana Islands	QABEA173B	176,497	\$500.00	\$500.00	
BEA173	С	Guam and Northern Mariana Islands	QABEA173C	176,497	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA173	D	Guam and Northern Mariana Islands	QABEA173D	176,497	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
BEA173	Е	Guam and Northern Mariana Islands	QABEA173E	176,497	\$500.00	\$500.00	1
<b>BEA175</b>	А	American Samoa	QABEA175A	46,773	\$500.00	\$500.00	1

					Upfront	Minimum			
Market No.	Block	License Name	License No.	Population*	Payment **	Opening Bid ***	Status ***		
3EA175	В	American Samoa	QABEA175B	46,773	\$500.00	\$500.00	1		
BEA175	С	American Samoa	QABEA175C	46,773	\$500.00	\$500.00	1		
BEA175	D	American Samoa	QABEA175D	46,773	\$500.00	\$500.00	1		
BEA175	Е	American Samoa	QABEA175D	46,773	\$500.00	\$500.00	1		
		EA Total	216	146,977,018	\$108,000.00	\$108,000.00			
		Economic Area Group Licenses (150 KHz)							
EAG001	F	Northeast	QAEAG001F	41,567,654	\$62,352.00	\$77,940.00	1		
EAG001	G	Northeast	QAEAG001G	41,567,654	\$62,352.00	\$77,940.00	1		
EAG002	F	Mid-Atlantic	QAEAG002F	42,547,218	\$63,821.00		1		
EAG002	I	Mid-Atlantic	QAEAG002I	42,547,218	\$63,821.00	\$79,777.00	1		
EAG003	F	Southeast	QAEAG003F	44,516,919	\$66,776.00	\$83,470.00	1		
EAG003	G	Southeast	QAEAG003G	44,516,919	\$66,776.00	\$83,470.00	1		
EAG004	F	Great Lakes	QAEAG004F	41,560,906	\$62,342.00	\$77,927.00	1		
EAG004	Н	Great Lakes	QAEAG004H	41,560,906	\$62,342.00	\$77,927.00	1		
EAG004	I	Great Lakes	QAEAG004I	41,560,906	\$62,342.00	\$77,927.00	1		
		EAG Total	9	668,424,413	\$782,924.00	\$926,155.00			
	1	Grand Total	225	815,401,431	\$890,924.00	\$1,034,155.00			
	NOTES:								
		When identifying an individual license, only one frequency block suffix may be used (e.g., "A", "B", "C", etc.) This							
		icense number must be used on the FCC Form 159 in FCC Code 2 Block when making down payments and final payments. <b>DO NOT</b> specify individual licenses in the FCC Form 159 accompanying upfront payments.							
	F - J								
	* All p			accompanying u	0 1 2				
		opulation figures are from the 4/1/90 U.S. Cens		. , ,	pfront payment	S.			
	**			. , ,	pfront payment	S.			
	** Upi	opulation figures are from the 4/1/90 U.S. Cens		. , ,	pfront payment	S.			
	•	ront Payments:		. , ,	pfront payment	S.			
	EA Li		sus, U.S. Depart	ment of Commer	pfront payment	S.			
	EA Li EAG I	i <b>ront Payments</b> : censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Liceneses:License Population * Block size (in M	sus, U.S. Depart	ment of Commer	pfront payment	S.			
	EA Li EAG I	ront Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license	sus, U.S. Depart	ment of Commer	pfront payment	S.			
	EA Lio EAG I	iront Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Liceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids:	sus, U.S. Depart	ment of Commer	pfront payment	S.			
	EA Lio EAG I *** <b>Mi</b> EA Lio	iront Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Liceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license	sus, U.S. Depart IHz) * \$0.01 (roo	ment of Commer	pfront payment ce, Bureau of ti earest dollar)	S.			
	EA Lio EAG I *** <b>Mi</b> EA Lio	iront Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Liceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids:	sus, U.S. Depart IHz) * \$0.01 (roo	ment of Commer	pfront payment ce, Bureau of ti earest dollar)	S.			
	EA Lic EAG I *** <b>Mi</b> EA Lic EAG I	iront Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Liceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license	sus, U.S. Depart IHz) * \$0.01 (roo	ment of Commer	pfront payment ce, Bureau of ti earest dollar)	S.			
	EA Liu EAG I EA Liu EA Liu EAG I	front Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license .iceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license .icenses:EAG Population * Block Size (in MHz) tatus: renses in which there was no winning bidder at	sus, U.S. Depart IHz) * \$0.01 (rot * \$0.0125 * (rot	unded <b>up</b> to the n	earest dollar)	s. ne Census.			
	EA Lid EAG I •*** <b>Mi</b> EA Lid EAG I •**** <b>S</b> 1. Lic licens	iront Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Liceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Licenses:EAG Population * Block Size (in MHz) tatus: venses in which there was no winning bidder at es where the winning bidder is in default.	sus, U.S. Depart IHz) * \$0.01 (rol * \$0.0125 * (rol the close of the	unded <b>up</b> to the n	earest dollar)	s. ne Census.			
	EA Lid EAG I •*** <b>Mi</b> EA Lid EAG I •**** <b>S</b> 1. Lic licens	front Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license .iceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license .icenses:EAG Population * Block Size (in MHz) tatus: renses in which there was no winning bidder at	sus, U.S. Depart IHz) * \$0.01 (rol * \$0.0125 * (rol the close of the	unded <b>up</b> to the n	earest dollar)	s. ne Census.			
	EA Lid EAG I •*** <b>Mi</b> EA Lid EAG I •**** <b>S</b> 1. Lic licens	iront Payments: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Liceneses:License Population * Block size (in M nimum Opening Bids: censes: Set at \$500.00 per license Licenses:EAG Population * Block Size (in MHz) tatus: venses in which there was no winning bidder at es where the winning bidder is in default.	sus, U.S. Depart IHz) * \$0.01 (rol * \$0.0125 * (rol the close of the	unded <b>up</b> to the n	earest dollar)	s. ne Census.			