Howard M. Liberman argued the cause for appellant, with whom Gerald Stevens-Kittner was on the
brief.
Gregory M. Christopher, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for
appellees, with whom William E. Kennard, General Counsel, and Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate
General Counsel, were on the brief. Roberta L. Cook, Counsel, entered an appearance.
Stanley S. Neustadt and Wayne Coy, Jr. were on the brief for intervenor University Foundation,
California State University at Chico.
Before: Wald, Ginsburg, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.
Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: The State of Oregon, acting through the State Board of Higher
Education for the benefit of Southern Oregon State College, appeals a decision of the Federal
Communications Commission rejecting as untimely its application for a new noncommercial FM
license and denying its application for a waiver of the cut-off rules for competing applications.
Because the Commission did not provide clear notice of the cut-off date for competing applications, we
reverse the order of the FCC and remand this matter to the Commission.
In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), the Supreme Court held that the FCC
must conduct a comparative hearing whenever there are before it mutually exclusive applications for a
broadcast license. The FCC has promulgated various regulations governing the processing of such
applications and establishing certain filing deadlines. "The purpose of these rules is to attract all
competitive applications for a particular [license] within a fixed and reasonably short time frame,
allowing the Commission to satisfy its Ashbacker obligations with a single, fairly prompt comparative
hearing." McElroy Electronics Corp. v. FCC, 86 F.3d 248, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
The licensing process for a new noncommercial FM station begins when the Commission
receives the first application therefor. If the Commission accepts an application for filing, then the
agency must issue a public notice (known as the "A" cut-off list) naming the applicant(s) accepted for
filing and announcing a date not less than 30 days after the publication of the notice by which all
mutually exclusive applications and petitions seeking to deny the listed application(s) must be filed. 47
C.F.R. 73.3573(e). Any competing applications filed before the "A" list cut-off date are noted in a
"B" cut-off list. The "B" cut-off list contains the deadline for the filing of all petitions to deny "B" list
application(s). Id. When the "B" cut-off deadline has passed, the "A" and "B" list applications are set
down for a single comparative hearing.
In this case, the process got underway in June 1988 when the University Foundation,
California State University at Chico submitted to the FCC an application for a noncommercial FM
radio station in Redding, California. On November 29, 1989 the FCC sent the Foundation a letter
indicating that its application was deficient because it lacked certain engineering information. The
letter stated: "Further action on the subject application will be withheld for a period of 30 days from
the date of this letter to give you an opportunity to cure these deficiencies." The Commission duly
sent Oregon a copy of this letter. On December 6, 1989 the FCC released an "A" cut-off list setting
January 10, 1990 as the cut-off date for applications competing with that of the Foundation. On
December 28, 1989 the Foundation submitted the engineering information the FCC had requested in its
letter of November 29. On the same day, the Commission released another "A" cut-off list setting
February 1, 1990 as the deadline for applications competing with that of the Foundation.
On January 2, 1990 the Foundation sent a letter to the FCC asking that its application be
deleted from the cut-off list issued on December 28, 1989. The Foundation did not send a copy of this
letter to Oregon, in apparent violation of the Commission's regulations governing ex parte
communications. See 47 C.F.R. 1.1202(b); 1.1208(a). On January 12 the Commission issued an
erratum stating that the Foundation's application "was listed inadvertently on [the "A" list], released
December 28, 1989 and is hereby deleted."
Although it was aware of the January 10 cut-off date in the "A" list published on December 6,
Oregon did not file its own application for the Redding station until January 29, 1990. The State
asserts that it believed the Commission had published the December 6 list in error because only one
week earlier, in the November 29 deficiency letter to the Foundation, the agency had indicated that it
would not act upon the Foundation's application for 30 days. Nonetheless, Oregon claims, after the
February 1 cut-off date was published it made diligent efforts to determine which cut-off date was
valid. The State continued to monitor Commission notices; consulted the Commission's
Facility/Application Information Report, which indicated that the February 1 deadline applied;
attempted to contact Commission staff directly but was unsuccessful because of the holiday season;
and received assurances from the FCC staff indirectly, via Senator Packwood's office, that the
Commission would accept applications until February 1.
On January 15, 1990 Oregon sent a letter to the Secretary of the Commission expressing its
concern that by issuing the erratum of January 12 deleting the Foundation's application from the
December 28 "A" list, the agency intended to adhere to January 10 as the cut-off date. The State
explained that it was in the process of preparing a competing application to be filed on or before
February 1, which it believed to be the applicable cut-off date.
Oregon went on to submit its application on January 29, together with a request for a waiver.
On June 21 the Chief of the Audio Services Division, Mass Media Bureau, rejected the State's request
for a waiver and returned the application as untimely filed. Oregon then filed an Application for
Review by the Commission, in which it argued that the staff exercising delegated authority had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying its application as untimely.
The Commission denied review, noting that Oregon had "actual knowledge" that the
Foundation's application was pending before the agency yet "for reasons known only to Oregon" did
not submit its own application until after the Foundation's application was accepted for filing. The
Commission rejected the State's argument that it had reasonably relied upon the FAIR Report, that it
had reasonably believed the November 29 deficiency letter precluded the Commission from placing the
Foundation's application upon an "A" list in less than 30 days, and that it could have filed its
application by January 10 if only it had been served with a copy of the Foundation's January 2 letter to
the Commission, as required by the agency's rules for ex parte communications. The FCC opined that
this case was analogous to Florida Inst. of Technology v. FCC, 952 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1992), in
which we held that the FCC had provided adequate notice even though it had issued two inconsistent
"A" lists.
The Commission also denied the State's request for a waiver. The Commission held that this
case did not present "extraordinary circumstances" and that the State had not exercised reasonable
diligence or demonstrated that its delay in filing was due to a circumstance beyond its control. The
Commission subsequently denied the State's motion for reconsideration (over a single dissenting vote),
adding that Oregon should not have been confused about the true cut-off date because, under the FCC's
regulations, "the December 28 cut-off notice was without legal effect," and "[i]t is a well-settled rule
that an agency's failure to follow its own regulations is fatal to the deviant action," quoting Florida
Inst., 952 F.2d at 553. Oregon then appealed to this court.
Oregon makes two arguments on appeal. The first is that, because the Commission failed to
provide adequate notice of the cut-off date, it was arbitrary and capricious to deny the State's
application as untimely filed. The second is that it was arbitrary and capricious for the FCC to deny
the State's application for a waiver of the cut-off rule. Because we conclude that the Commission's
rejection of Oregon's application as untimely was arbitrary and capricious, we will not address whether
the FCC should have granted the petitioner's waiver request.
The FCC enforces its cut-off rules strictly in order to provide a prompt comparative hearing
and to ensure that applicants are treated fairly and consistently. Id at 550. We have approved the
FCC's policy of strict enforcement but only "so long as "the quid pro quo ... is explicit notice of all
applicability requirements.' " Id. (quoting Salzer v. FCC, 778 F.2d 569, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). As
we have explained before, "The dismissal of an application is a sufficiently grave sanction to trigger
[the] duty to provide clear notice." Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir.
1987). Accordingly, we have held that the FCC acts arbitrarily and capriciously "when it reject[s] an
application as untimely based on an ambiguous cut-off provision, not clarified by FCC interpretations,
if the applicant made a reasonable effort to comply." Florida Inst., 952 F.2d at 550.
Oregon argues that the FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting its application
because the agency failed to give prospective applicants for the Redding station clear notice of the
cut-off date for competing applications. Oregon claims that it reasonably believed that the second "A"
list was correct because the Commission's letter of November 29 had indicated that the agency would
take no action on the Foundation's application for 30 days; the FAIR Report stated that the cut-off
date was indeed February 1; and the second "A" list was issued before the first-announced cut-off
date--all of which suggests that the Commission was covering an invalid premature notice with a valid
one.
The Commission, relying upon our subsequent decision in Florida Institute, responds that the
duplicative cut-off list could not have created any ambiguity. The Commission contends that because
the first "A" list was never retracted, the second "A" list could have no legal effect and therefore could
not have misled Oregon.
The Commission's reliance upon Florida Institute is misplaced. In that case one applicant filed
its application after the FCC had issued an "A" list and before the cut-off date for mutually exclusive
applications. Under the applicable regulations, the Commission should then have issued a "B" list
including this second application and a cut-off date for petitions to deny, but it failed to do so. Two
years after it had issued the first "A" list, the Commission mistakenly issued a new "A" list containing
the second application and announcing a new cut-off date. The Florida Institute of Technology filed its
own mutually exclusive application before the cut-off date, but the FCC rejected the application as
untimely. The Institute argued that its application was timely because the second "A" list supplanted
the first with a new cut-off date, thereby beginning the filing process anew. We rejected this
argument, saying: "The new "A' cut-off date could not supplant the earlier one because the September
1986 notice was without legal effect: "[i]t is a well-settled rule that an agency's failure to follow its
own regulations is fatal to the deviant action.' " Id. at 553 (quoting Way of Life Television Network,
Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
The facts here are significantly different. In Florida Institute, the second "A" list was
published not before but long after the original cut-off date. The Institute did not and could not argue
that the FCC failed to give clear and adequate notice of the filing deadline; indeed, the Institute could
have determined that the second "A" list was issued in error simply by examining the public record.
The Institute's primary argument on appeal was instead that the second "A" list created a new window
period for the filing of mutually exclusive applications. We rejected this attempt by the Institute to
turn a clerical error into a windfall of "rights it would not otherwise enjoy." Id.
Here, in contrast, Oregon argues that the Commission failed to give clear notice of the
deadline: First the FCC said the cut-off date was January 10; then, well before that date, it said the
deadline was February 1. Unlike the petitioner in Florida Institute, Oregon was faced with
overlapping filing periods, and therefore never had one complete filing period during which the
deadline was clear. Although an FCC regulation provides that an application should be placed on only
one "A" list, it was quite possible, and certainly within the Commission's power to declare, that it had
issued the first "A" list in error. Oregon's confusion was therefore understandable; not only had the
second "A" list been issued well before the original filing deadline, but the FAIR reports indicated that
the second "A" list was applicable, and--although the Foundation, unbeknowst to Oregon, had brought
the error to the FCC's attention in its letter of January 2--the agency did not move to correct its error
until after the first deadline had passed. Thus, although the FCC originally gave clear notice of the
January 10 cut-off, its subsequent actions so muddied the waters that a prospective applicant could not
be confident what the cut-off date was. Of course, the State could in these uncertain circumstances
have hastened to apply by the original cut-off date, but its failure to do so does not relieve the
Commission of its obligation in the first instance to provide the public with clear notice of the cut-off
date. And absent clear notice, it was arbitrary and capricious for the agency to reject Oregon's
application.
The FCC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by rejecting Oregon's application as untimely without having provided clear notice of the filing deadline. Therefore, we vacate the Commission's order dismissing Oregon's application and remand this case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
So ordered.