FOR THE
Argued
No. 01-1085
Petitioner
v.
Federal
Communications Commission and
Respondents
State of
Intervenors
On Petition for
Review of an Order of the
Federal
Communications Commission
William F. Maher
Jr. argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Lawrence E. Sarjeant, Linda Kent, John W.
Hunter, Julie E. Rones, and Stephen Goodman.
James M. Carr,
Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for
respondents. With him on the briefs were
John A. Rogovin, Deputy General Counsel, and John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate
General Counsel.
Michael D. Hays
argued the cause for
Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge,
Opinion for the
Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.
I
ICN was
established by the
Section 254(h)(1)
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires a "telecommunications
carrier" to provide services at discounted rates to schools, libraries,
and rural health care providers. 47
U.S.C. § 254(h)(1). Such a carrier is
entitled to receive from the FCC, in an amount equal to the aggregate discount
it gives to those entities, either a reimbursement or an offset against the
carrier's obligation to participate in or contribute to the universal service
fund.
In 1998, ICN
petitioned the FCC for a declaration that it qualifies as a
"telecommunications carrier" under the Act, and hence is eligible to
receive direct reimbursement for providing services at discounted rates. In 1999, citing its decision in an earlier
case, the Commission held that the term "telecommunications carrier"
includes only carriers that offer telecommunications on a "common
carrier" basis. Federal-State Joint
Bd. on Universal Serv., Declaratory Ruling, 14 F.C.C.R. 3040, 3040 (1999)
[hereinafter 1999 Declaratory Ruling] (citing Federal-State Joint Bd. on
Universal Serv., Report & Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 9177-78 (1997)). To define "common carrier," the FCC
turned to the two-pronged test it had previously applied under the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., a test derived from the
common law as interpreted in this circuit's case law. Under that test, common carrier status turns
on:
(1) whether the carrier "holds himself out to serve indifferently
all potential users"; and (2)
whether the carrier allows "customers to transmit intelligence of their
own design and choosing."[2]
The FCC ruled that ICN fails to satisfy the first prong
because the network does not hold itself out to serve all potential users, but
rather is limited by
In
On remand, the
FCC reversed its 1999 ruling. The Commission
held that ICN is a common carrier, and hence a telecommunications carrier for
purposes of § 254(h)(1). In so holding,
the Commission concluded that "a carrier offering its services only to a
legally defined class of users may still be a common carrier if it holds itself
out indiscriminately to serve all within that class." Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv.,
Order on Remand, 16 F.C.C.R. 571, 573 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Order]. Finding that ICN does not discriminate among
entities within its legally defined user classes, the FCC held that ICN passes
the first prong of the common carrier test.
See id. at 574-75. It also found
ICN to satisfy the second prong, because it "allows customers to transmit
intelligence of their own design and choosing."
USTA petitions
for review of the Commission's order, contending that ICN fails both prongs of
the common carrier test. We discuss
those contentions in Part III below. In
Part II, we first consider whether USTA has standing to bring this case.
II
USTA is a trade
association representing local exchange carriers. Its members provide voice, data, and video
services over wireline and wireless networks throughout the
As a trade
association, USTA has standing to sue on behalf of its members if "its members
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests it seeks
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit." Fund Democracy,
LLC v. SEC, 278 F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
(1) that the plaintiff have suffered an "injury in
fact"--an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury must be
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result
of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Bennett v. Spear, 520
USTA contends
that the FCC's order injures its members by making ICN eligible for a subsidy
that permits it to offer lower prices for the same telecommunications services.[4] We have repeatedly recognized that parties
"suffer constitutional injury in fact when agencies ... allow increased
competition" against them.
Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir.
1998); see, e.g., Wabash Valley Power
Ass'n v. FERC, 268 F.3d 1005, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2001); MD Pharm., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,
133 F.3d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And we
have likewise recognized that regulatory decisions that permit subsidization of
some participants in a market can have the requisite injurious impact on those
participants' competitors. See Exxon
Co.,
Nor is the injury
to USTA's members "conjectural or hypothetical." The affidavit of one of USTA's members, an
independent local exchange carrier, avers that the member has tried to sell its
services to a school that currently takes similar services from ICN, but has
been unsuccessful because ICN's subsidy enables it to charge substantially
lower rates. Whipple Aff. pp 5-6. The affidavit of another USTA member states
that it lost a customer to ICN because the subsidy enabled ICN to charge lower
rates for similar services. Kilburg Aff.
pp 5, 7. And an affidavit from USTA,
summarizing information it gathered from a survey of its members, avers that
other members have had like experiences--either losing business to ICN or being
unable to compete for new customers because of ICN's subsidy. Flerl Aff. pp 4-5.
These affidavits
show that USTA's members are ready, willing, and able to compete with ICN in
providing telecommunications to schools and libraries, and that ICN's subsidy
prevents them from doing so on an equal basis.
That showing is sufficient to establish that the association's members
have suffered cognizable injury in fact.
See Dynatlantic Corp. v. Department of Defense, 115 F.3d 1012, 1016
(D.C. Cir. 1997). And it is also
sufficient to satisfy the remaining two requirements of constitutional
standing: The competitive injury
suffered by USTA's members is fairly traceable to the FCC's decision to render
ICN eligible for the subsidy, and that injury would likely be redressed by a
favorable decision of this court vacating the FCC's order. See High Plains Wireless, L.P. v. FCC, 276
F.3d 599, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Exxon,
182 F.3d at 43; Liquid Carbonic, 29 F.3d
at 701. We therefore conclude that USTA
has constitutional standing to seek judicial review of the order on behalf of
its members.
III
USTA contends
that ICN cannot satisfy either prong of the common carrier test, and that the
FCC therefore erred in finding ICN eligible for reimbursement from universal
service funds. The association also
argues that the FCC's order is not entitled to a deferential standard of review
because it rests on an interpretation of this circuit's
At bottom, the
FCC's order rests not on judicial precedent but on its interpretation of the
term "telecommunications carrier" in the Telecommunications Act of
1996. The Commission interprets the term
as the equivalent of "common carrier" under the Communications Act of
1934, a term which was itself previously defined by a two-pronged test derived
from the common law as construed by this circuit. USTA does not dispute the FCC's decision to
interpret "telecommunications carrier" as "common carrier,"
or its decision to define the latter through the two-pronged test. Indeed, we have previously upheld the FCC's
approach as a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statutory term. See
In deciding that
ICN satisfies the requirements of the common carrier test, the FCC further
elaborated upon the meaning of "common carrier," and then applied its
version of the two-pronged test to the facts of ICN's situation. Where a statute is "ambiguous with
respect to [a] specific issue," the only question for this court is
whether the agency's interpretation "is based on a permissible
construction of the statute."
Chevron, 467
In the following
sections, we apply this deferential standard of review to the two challenges
that USTA levels against the FCC's order.
A
USTA's first
contention is that, because
In response to
this argument below, the FCC determined that "legal restrictions on
eligibility to use a carrier's services do not necessarily preclude common
carrier status," and that this proposition is consistent with NARUC
I. 2000 Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 573. We agree.
As we said in
In NARUC I, this
court held that mobile radio operators known as Specialized Mobile Radio
Systems (SMRS) were not foreclosed from common carrier status--even though
"SMRS offer a service that may be of practical use to only a fraction of
the population," and even though an FCC order "limit[ed] possible
subscribers to SMRS services to eligibles" under three specific sections
of the FCC's regulations. NARUC I, 525
F.2d at 642 (emphasis added). "The
key factor," we said, "is that the operator offer indiscriminate
service to whatever public its service may legally and practically be of
use."
USTA counters,
however, that the list of authorized ICN users is so much more restricted than
was the list of SMRS eligibles that ICN's list "cannot be considered the
public" and ICN cannot qualify as a common carrier. Pet'r
Like the list of
authorized ICN users, the list of eligible SMRS subscribers in NARUC I was legally
circumscribed. The FCC limited SMRS subscribers
to "eligibles under Sections 89, 91 and 93 of the Regulations." NARUC I, 525 F.3d at 642. Those included local governments, police and
fire departments, motor carriers, taxicab companies, and other specified
commercial and noncommercial entities in need (primarily) of dispatch
services. See id. at 634, 639, 642-43.[6] Although we do not have enough information to
count the number of eligible SMRS subscribers, the SMRS list is not any more
readily characterizable as "the public" than is the list of those
eligible to use ICN. See NARUC I, 525
F.2d at 634 (characterizing class of eligible SMRS subscribers as "a
limited group of users"). In any
event, it is certainly not arbitrary for the FCC to regard the two situations
as comparable.
USTA also argues
that ICN cannot qualify as a common carrier because
First, the quoted
phrase concerned the operators' voluntary decision to engage in price
discrimination; NARUC II was not a case
in which either discrimination or exclusion was mandated by law. Second, the phrase served at most as dictum
in the opinion, since NARUC II was also not a case in which price
discrimination effectively excluded all commercial users. Finally, the portion of NARUC II cited by the
petitioner is not the opinion of "this Court," but rather the opinion
of Judge Wilkey alone.[7] Although we have subsequently approved some
of the views expressed by Judge Wilkey in NARUC II, see Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we have never held that a
carrier is barred from common carrier status unless it is authorized to serve
commercial users. Indeed, given NARUC
I's declaration that the key factor in determining common carriage is whether
the carrier offers "indiscriminate service to whatever public its service
may legally and prac-tically be of use," 525 F.2d at 642 (emphasis added),
we have no warrant for concluding that the exclusion of commercial users from
ICN's network compels the Commission to disqualify it as a common carrier.
USTA further
purports to discern significant inconsistencies between the FCC's order and the
Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689
(1979). Succeeding on that argument,
however, is an uphill struggle in light of our statement in Iowa that Midwest
Video, like NARUC I, "can be read as approving the general rule that a
carrier offering its services only to a legally defined class of users may
still be a common carrier." 218
F.3d at 759. Nonetheless, USTA contends
that Midwest Video supports its claim that ICN fails the first prong of the
common carrier test because ICN's class of authorized users both is too small
and excludes profit-making ventures.
Midwest Video,
however, said nothing about either of these issues. Indeed, to the extent the case is relevant at
all, it is by implication only and in that respect supports the FCC. In Midwest Video, the Supreme Court
considered FCC regulations requiring cable television systems to allocate
channels for educational, government, public, and leased access users. The regulations mandated that the public and
leased access channels be open to all users, but that the educational channel
be dedicated to "local educational authorities" and the government
channel be dedicated to "local government." 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a)(2), (3) (1977). The Supreme Court held that the access rules
effectively "relegated cable systems, pro tanto, to common-carrier
status"--an action the Court held to be be-yond the authority of the
Commission. 440
On its face,
Midwest Video is substantially more helpful to the FCC than to USTA. As we noted in Iowa, the Midwest Video Court
found that the FCC's regulations had effectively transformed the cable systems
into common carriers, notwithstanding that "use of the educational and
government access channels was limited respectively to 'local educational
authorities' and the 'local government' " and that a "private
organization could not air an educational program on the educational access
channel because it would not come within the class of users authorized by
law." 218 F.3d at 758. Thus, like the Iowa Code, the FCC regulations
at issue in Midwest Video narrowly defined the class of authorized users for
each channel and barred profit-making enterprises from using the government and
educational channels. Undaunted by these
similarities, USTA contends that the Supreme Court did not analyze the
regulations on a channel-by-channel basis, but instead considered them as a
unit that included not only the nonprofit channels but also the public and
leased access channels that were available to the general public. Nothing in the Midwest Video opinion, however,
suggests that the Court relied on the existence of the public channels to reach
its conclusion about common carriage.
Instead, the Court focused on the fact that the regulations required the
cable systems to offer use of the allocated channels to all who qualified for
them on a nondiscriminatory basis, and deprived the systems of the power to
select individual users or to control the programming of those who
qualified. See
Finally, USTA
argues that to affirm the FCC's decision here would be to accept that a carrier
may be designated as "common" even if it has only a single authorized
user. That is hardly the case, and it is
certainly not this case. Regardless of
whether the FCC could label a single-user network as a common carrier without
being arbitrary and capricious, the Commission's determination that ICN--with
its far broader customer base--qualifies as a common carrier constitutes a
reasonable application of the test the Commission has adopted to define that
term.
B
USTA's second
contention is that ICN cannot satisfy the second prong of the common carrier
test because it does not allow customers to "transmit intelligence of
their own design and choosing."
1999 Declaratory Ruling, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3050. This prong of the test is intended to confine
common carrier status to operators that do not regulate the content of their customers'
communications. Although USTA concedes
that "ICN does not specify the individual words or messages sent over the
network," Pet'r Br. at 17, it argues that Iowa nonetheless restricts
users' communications because its regulations require them to adopt policies
acknowledging that: (1) "[t]he use
of the network must be consistent with the written mission of the authorized
user," and (2) "[t]he network ... cannot be used for a profit-making
venture."
The FCC rejected
this argument in its order, concluding that these restrictions are
"intended to acknowledge the statutorily-prescribed customer base, rather
than to limit the 'intelligence' [customers] may transmit over the
network." 2000 Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
at 575. "The effect of this limitation,"
the FCC continued, is merely "to restrict the use of the ICN to the
primary purpose for which the network exists."
These
considerations persuade us that the FCC reasonably concluded that ICN meets the
second prong of the common carrier test. As we held in Part III.A,
USTA once again
turns to Midwest Video for support in its attack on the FCC's order, but again
that case offers only further support for the Commission's decision. USTA points out that, when the Supreme Court
ruled that the cable access regulations imposed common carrier obligations on
cable operators, it stated that "[o]perators are prohibited from
determining or influencing the content of access programming"--a
prohibition USTA claims is breached by the Iowa regulations recounted
above.
In sum, we find
that the FCC reasonably concluded that ICN does permit its customers to
"transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing." As the FCC held, the regulations highlighted
by USTA do not control the content of communications, but rather merely
"acknowledge the statutorily-prescribed customer base." 2000 Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 575.
IV
In ruling that
ICN is a "telecommunications carrier" eligible for subsidies under § 254(h)(1),
the FCC reasonably interpreted the language of its governing statute, and
reasonably construed and applied the test it had previously adopted to give
meaning to that language. Accordingly,
USTA's petition for review is
Denied.
[1]
[2] 1999 Declaratory Ruling, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3050 (quoting Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and citing National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("NARUC I"), and National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("NARUC II")); see Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Order on Remand, 16 F.C.C.R. 571, 573, 576 (2000) (noting common-law origins of test).
[3] The
FCC also held that ICN further fails the first prong because it does not hold
itself out to serve even that select group "indifferently," but
instead treats each of the subcategories of ICN users according to different
terms fixed by the legislature. 1999
Declaratory Ruling, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3051;
see supra note 1 (describing subcategories). In light of the FCC's subsequent characterization
of this holding on appeal, we concluded in
[4] USTA also maintains that its members suffer injury because, if ICN is improperly reimbursed for providing discounted telecommunications, insufficient universal service funds will be left to reimburse USTA members. Because we find that USTA's "competitive injury" theory satisfies the requirements of standing, we do not address this alternative theory.
[5] In NARUC I, we eventually upheld the FCC's determination that it could treat SMRS as non-common carriers because there was no evidence that they would indifferently serve all eligible customers. See id. at 643-44.
[6] Parts 89, 91, and 93 of the FCC's regulations listed specific types of eligible subscribers for three categories of private radio service: "Public Safety," "Industrial," and "Land Transportation." See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 89.251 (1975) (local government); id. § 89.301 (police); id. §§ 89.501-89.519 (special emergency users); id. § 89.551 (state guards); id. § 91.301 (petroleum radio service); id. § 91.351 (forest products radio service); id. § 93.251 (motor carriers); id. § 93.351 (railroads); id. § 93.506 (contract road service vehicles); id. § 98.401 (taxicabs).
[7] See NARUC II, 533 F.3d at 621 (Lumbard, J., concurring) (deeming it "unnecessary to reach" common carriage question); id. at 634 (Skelly Wright, J., dissenting) (accepting only "arguendo" that cable operators were common carriers).