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Comcast Cable Petition For Effective Competition, Blaine, MN

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Released: April 24, 2013

Federal Communications Commission

DA 13-863

Before the

Federal Communications Commission

Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of

Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, on behalf
of its subsidiaries and affiliates
CSR 8008-E
Petition for Determination of Effective
Competition in Six Blaine, Minnesota Franchise


Adopted: April 24, 2013

Released: April 24, 2013

By the Senior Deputy Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau:



Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, on behalf of its subsidiaries and affiliates
(“Comcast”), has filed with the Commission a petition pursuant to Sections 76.7 and 76.907 of the
Commission’s rules for a determination that Comcast is subject to effective competition in six Blaine,
Minnesota, franchise areas. The areas are north of Minneapolis-St. Paul and are hereinafter referred to as
the “Communities.”1 Comcast alleges that its cable system serving the Communities is subject to
effective competition pursuant to Section 623(l)(1)(B) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended
(“Communications Act”),2 and the Commission’s implementing rules,3 and is therefore exempt from
cable rate regulation in the Communities because of the competing service provided by two direct
broadcast satellite (“DBS”) providers, DIRECTV, Inc. (“DIRECTV”), and DISH Network (“DISH”).
The petition is opposed as to all six Communities by the North Metro Telecommunications Commission
(“North Metro”), the regulator of cable rates in the Communities.4

1 The Communities and their associated Community Unit Identification (“CUID”) Numbers are Blaine (MN 0370),
Centerville (MN 0371), Circle Pines (MN 0372), Ham Lake (MN 0374), Lino Lakes (MN 0376), and Spring Lake
Park (MN 0377 and MN 0378). In its Response to Surreply (“Response,” dated June 9, 2009), Comcast withdrew
its request for a finding of effective competition in a seventh community, Lexington (MN 0375). See Response at 5.
2 See 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B).
3 47 C.F.R. § 76.905(b)(2).
4 Opposition of the North Metro Telecommunications Commission to Comcast’s Petition for Special Relief
(“Opposition,” dated Oct. 3, 2008) at 1 n.1. Comcast then filed its Reply to Opposition (“Reply,” dated Nov. 17,
2008). Several additional pleadings were filed: North Metro’s Surreply to Comcast’s Reply to Opposition
(“Surreply,” dated April 27, 2009), Comcast’s Response, North Metro’s Reply to Comcast’s Response to Surreply
(“Reply II,” dated Sept. 10, 2009), and Comcast’s Response to Reply to Comcast’s Response to Surreply
(“Response II,” dated Sept. 30, 2009). Comcast filed a Supplement (“Supplement,” dated Oct. 9, 2012) with updated
household data from the 2010 U.S. Census and updated DBS subscriber data and North Metro filed an Opposition to
the Supplement (“Opposition to Supplement,” dated Jan. 14, 2013). Comcast then filed a Response to the
Opposition to Supplement (“Response III,” dated Feb. 7, 2013). North Metro’s Opposition and Comcast’s Reply
were accompanied by motions (each consented to by the non-filing party) asking for extensions of time in which to
file them. The later pleadings noted in footnote 4 were accompanied by motions that they be accepted despite being
in excess of those normally authorized by our rules. Such motions are not routinely granted. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.46(a),
76.7(d). This proceeding, however, became unusually complex, with each party proposing alternative calculations

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In the absence of a demonstration to the contrary, cable systems are presumed not to be
subject to effective competition,5 as that term is defined by Section 623(l) of the Communications Act and
Section 76.905 of the Commission’s rules.6 The cable operator bears the burden of rebutting the
presumption that effective competition does not exist with evidence that effective competition is present
within the relevant franchise area.7 For the reasons set forth below, we grant the petition based on our
finding that Comcast is subject to effective competition in the Communities.



North Metro sought discovery against Comcast, specifically concerning MBC’s
allocation methodology, which is material to five-digit zip code based showings of DBS subscriber
numbers.8 Comcast objected that effective competition proceedings do not include discovery,9 which is
generally correct.10 In addition, in its Reply Comcast later submitted DBS subscriber numbers based on
nine-digit zip code data, which technically rendered North Metro’s discovery requests moot.
Accordingly, we need not rule on North Metro’s request that we sanction Comcast for refusing its
discovery requests.11
In addition, North Metro argues that because of the duration of this proceeding, and
because North Metro has been forced to perform multiple studies to rebut Comcast’s evidence, the burden
of proof in effective competition cases has been effectively shifted from cable operators to franchise
authorities, contrary to Commission rule.12 We disagree. There is no indication that Comcast was
operating outside of established effective competition precedent by first submitting five-digit data and
later submitting nine-digit data. North Metro had proposed that nine-digit data be used but chose not to
produce it. Thus, it was not improper for Comcast to produce that data in its Reply. North Metro took
the opportunity to comment on that data in two further pleadings. Complex and detailed statistical
disputes often are time-consuming and last several rounds without either party being at fault. Throughout
this proceeding, the burden of proof has remained where sections 76.906 and 76.907(b) of our rules put it,
on the cable operator.
Finally, North Metro objects to Comcast’s submission of a Supplement in this
proceeding, which includes updated household figures from the 2010 Census and updated DBS figures,
arguing that the submission of such a Supplement is procedurally improper and that if Comcast wishes to
submit new data it should withdraw its original Petition and re-file a new petition for special relief.13

(...continued from previous page)
of DBS subscribers and households for several Communities. The extra time and pleadings made possible the
revelation of new facts and claims that were material and could not have been discovered in the usual time periods
and rounds of pleadings. Accordingly, we grant the motions for extensions of time and the allowance of pleadings
in excess of those normally authorized by our rules.
5 47 C.F.R. § 76.906.
6 See 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 76.905(b).
7 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.906-.907(b).
8 Opposition at 3-4.
9 Id. at Exh. 7.
10 Cablevision of Rockland/Ramapo Inc., 22 FCC Rcd 11487, 11496-97, ¶ 24 (2007); Adelphia Cable Commun., 22
FCC Rcd 4412, 4413-14, ¶ 4 (2007).
11 Opposition at 10.
12 Reply II at iii.
13 See Opposition to Supplement at 5-8. North Metro also makes substantive objections to the data contained in the
Supplement that parallel its objections discussed infra regarding the pre-Supplement data. See id. at 8-10.

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Comcast responds that the Supplement represents only a “factual update” of the record and NMTC would
not be prejudiced by the Commission’s consideration of updated data, and that forcing Comcast to
withdraw the Petition and re-file with the new data would unfairly “penalize Comcast for voluntarily
updating a Petition.”14 In any event, Comcast states that it has no issue with the Commission deciding
this case based on either the Supplement data or pre-Supplement data.15 Because we find, for the reasons
stated below, that the pre-Supplement data is sufficient for us to resolve this proceeding, we do not rely
on the Supplement’s data as a basis for our decision and it is not necessary for us to determine whether it
is procedurally proper for us to consider the data provided in the Supplement.



Section 623(l)(1)(B) of the Communications Act provides that a cable operator is subject
to effective competition if the franchise area is (a) served by at least two unaffiliated multi-channel video
programming distributors (“MVPDs”), each of which offers comparable video programming to at least 50
percent of the households in the franchise area; and (b) the number of households subscribing to
programming services offered by MVPDs other than the largest MVPD exceeds 15 percent of the
households in the franchise area.16 This test is referred to as the “competing provider” test.
The first part of this test has three elements: the franchise area must be “served by” at
least two unaffiliated MVPDs who offer “comparable programming” to at least “50 percent” of the
households in the franchise area.17 It is undisputed that the Communities are “served by” both DBS
providers, DIRECTV and DISH, and that these two MVPD providers are unaffiliated with Comcast or
with each other. A franchise area is considered “served by” an MVPD if that MVPD’s service is both
technically and actually available in the franchise area. DBS service is presumed to be technically
available due to its nationwide satellite footprint, and presumed to be actually available if households in
the franchise area are made reasonably aware of the service's availability.18 The Commission has held
that a party may use evidence of penetration rates in the franchise area (the second part of the competing
provider test discussed below) coupled with the ubiquity of DBS services to show that consumers are
reasonably aware of the availability of DBS service.19 The “comparable programming” element is met if
a competing MVPD provider offers at least 12 channels of video programming, including at least one
channel of nonbroadcast service programming20 and is supported in this petition with copies of channel
lineups for both DIRECTV and DISH.21 Also undisputed is Comcast’s assertion that both DIRECTV and
DISH offer service to at least “50 percent” of the households in the Communities because of their national
satellite footprint.22 Accordingly, we find that the first part of the competing provider test is satisfied.
The second part of the competing provider test, Section 623(l)(1)(B)(ii) of the
Communications Act, requires that the number of households subscribing to MVPDs, other than the
largest MVPD, exceeds 15 percent of the households in a franchise area. Comcast asserts that it is the

14 Response III at 1-2.
15 Id. at 2.
16 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.905(b)(2).
17 47 C.F.R. § 76.905(b)(2)(i).
18 See Petition at 3.
19 Mediacom Illinois LLC, 21 FCC Rcd 1175, 1176, ¶ 3 (2006).
20 See 47 C.F.R. § 76.905(g). See also Petition at 4.
21 See Petition at Exh. 2.
22 See id. at 2-3.

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largest MVPD in the Communities,23 an assertion that North Metro does not dispute. We see no reason to
doubt Comcast’s assertion, and so we accept it. The second part of the competing provider test thus
requires Comcast to calculate DBS subscribership. The numerator of this statutory ratio is the number of
DBS subscribers in each Community and the denominator is the number of households there.
Comcast began calculating numerators by purchasing a subscriber tracking report from
the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association (“SBCA”) that stated the number of DBS
subscribers in each five-digit zip code that lay wholly or partly within a Community.24 To account for
five-digit zip codes that were partly inside and partly outside a Community (“partial zip codes”), Comcast
retained Media Business Corporation (“MBC”). MBC has an allocation methodology to calculate the
percent of DBS subscribers in a partial zip code who reside within a community.25 The Commission has
relied upon MBC’s allocation factors as sufficiently accurate to calculate effective competition
percentages in numerous previous decisions.26 By multiplying SBCA’s number by MBC’s allocation
factor, Comcast estimated the number of DBS subscribers in each partial zip code in a Community. By
adding those estimates to all the DBS subscribers in zip codes entirely within the same Community,
Comcast estimated the number of DBS subscribers in the Community, which is the numerator of the
statutory ratio.27 To determine the denominator of the statutory ratio for each Community, which is the
number of households there, Comcast took household numbers from the 2000 U.S. Census.28 All these
numbers, if accepted, establish that the statutory ratio in each of the six Communities exceeds 15 percent.
North Metro argues that section 76.7(a)(4) of our rules requires that Comcast show that
rate deregulation in the Communities “would serve the public interest,”29 and North Metro argues further
that Comcast has failed to make such a showing other than by the mostly numerical evidence described in
the preceding paragraphs.30 According to North Metro, deregulation of Comcast’s rates for basic service
is contrary to the public interest because DBS service does not restrain cable prices and, until “robust”31
and “real”32 competition for Comcast appears in the Communities, it should not be freed from local
regulation of rates and other matters such as uniform pricing.33
We reject these objections for the same reasons we have rejected them in several past
decisions.34 In brief, the words “public interest” are contained in section 76.7(a)(4), which sets forth the

23 See id. at 5.
24 Id. at 4-5 & Exh. 5.
25 Id. at 4-6.
26 See, e.g., Subsidiaries of Cablevision Systems Corp., 23 FCC Rcd 14141, 14146-47, ¶ 20 (2008) (“Cablevision”);
Comcast Cable Commun., LLC, 22 FCC Rcd 18424, 18425-26, ¶ 5 (2007); Comcast Cable Commun., LLC, 20 FCC
Rcd 20438, 20440, ¶ 8 (2005).
27 Petition at Exh. 6 (cols. H & I).
28 Id. at 6-7 & Exh. 7.
29 47 C.F.R. § 76.7(a)(4).
30 Opposition at 2, 10-13.
31 Id. at 4.
32 Id. at 13.
33 Id. at 10-13.
34 See, e.g., Comcast Cable Commun., Inc., Memorandum Opinion & Order DA 11-429 at ¶ 14 (rel. March 4,
2011), available at 2011 WL 765080; Comcast Cable Commun., LLC, Memorandum Opinion & Order DA 10-1787
at ¶¶ 12-14 (rel. Sept. 21, 2010), Erratum on other grounds (rel. Sept. 27, 2010) (“Comcast”); Comcast Cable

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general pleading requirements applicable to numerous Commission proceedings, including effective
competition determinations. We note that Congress provided the Commission with expressly crafted
tests for determining effective competition that do not instruct the Commission to take into account the
public interest in determining the existence or non-existence of effective competition. None of North
Metro’s suggested public interest issues are mentioned in the pertinent statutory provisions or the rules as
implemented by the Commission. There is no statutory basis to delay basic rate deregulation in a
franchise area until the arrival of perfect competition there and the resolution of all issues between a cable
operator and a franchise authority to the latter’s satisfaction. Accordingly, we reject North Metro’s
policy-based objections to Comcast’s evidence concerning the second part of the competing provider test.
North Metro’s Opposition alleged many numerical flaws in Comcast’s initial calculation
of DBS subscribers in the Communities, and especially in MBC’s allocation methodology for partial zip
codes.35 Comcast responded by calculating new numbers of DBS subscribers, based on “Zip+4” or nine-
digit zip codes.36 Nine-digit zip codes are very small and the ones on the edge of a franchise area closely
match its boundaries. If the correct nine-digit zip codes are chosen, there is no obvious need for an
allocation methodology or factor. We will address Comcast’s calculations of DBS subscribers that were
based on nine-digit zip code data rather than its initial five-digit calculations because the nine-digit-based
data is more precise.37
North Metro alleges several flaws in Comcast’s nine-digit-based DBS subscriber
numbers. First, North Metro objects that Comcast has not shown that the nine-digit zip codes that it
attributes to a Community and that lie on the edge of a Community do not contain DBS subscribers
outside the Community.38 We cannot give significance to this objection. Nine-digit zip codes are so
small that a typical one has no DBS subscribers or only one or two (compared to 2,000 to 4,000 DBS
subscribers in the five-digit zip codes involved in this case).39 The areas in a nine-digit zip code that fall
outside a Community are statistically insignificant. It is improbable in the extreme that areas in a nine-
digit zip code that fall outside a Community would alter the applicable percentages below the statutory
requirement of 15 percent or more, especially given the subscribership percentages shown in Attachment
A, all of which are substantially above 15 percent.
Second, North Metro disputes Comcast’s calculation that there are 312 DBS subscribers
in Circle Pines.40 North Metro, based on its own list of nine-digit zip codes for Circle Pines, estimates
that there are only 293.41 The disagreement is about whether eleven nine-digit zip codes are within Circle

(...continued from previous page)
Commun. LLC, Memorandum Opinion & Order DA 10-1723 at ¶ 11 (rel. Sept. 10, 2010); see also CoxCom, Inc., 22
FCC Rcd 4522, 4524, ¶¶ 4-5 (2007).
35 Opposition at 3 & Exh. 2 (Declaration of Richard D. Treich, consultant to North Metro, dated Oct. 2, 2008
(“Treich I”) at ¶¶ 6-18).
36 Reply at 5 & Exh. D.
37 Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership, Memorandum Opinion & Order DA 11-494 at ¶ 17
& n.39 (rel. March 16, 2011), available at 2011 WL 901296; Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse
22 FCC Rcd 4417, 4221, ¶ 11 (2007) (“in the absence of error, ZIP+4 data will rebut an estimate
premised on five digit ZIP code data”).
38 Surreply at 12-13.
39 Compare Reply at Exh. D with Petition at Exh. 6.
40 Reply at Exh. D.
41 Reply II at 6. This number was apparently developed from information gleaned from the government of Anoka
County, Minnesota, the U.S. Postal Service, SBCA, and a company named GeoLytics. Reply II at Exh. A
(Declaration of Richard D. Treich, dated July 27, 2009) (“Treich III”) at ¶ 7.

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Pines. Comcast has produced convincing evidence from several sources that the zip codes in question are
within Circle Pines,42 and North Metro does not dispute this evidence. Accordingly, we find that there are
312 DBS subscribers in Circle Pines for purposes of this proceeding. Even if we applied North Metro’s
figure of 293 DBS subscribers, it does not matter which of the DBS subscriber numbers is more accurate.
Both produce a statutory ratio in excess of 15 percent.43
North Metro objects that Comcast took the denominator of its statutory ratio (the number
of households in each Community) from the 2000 Census. North Metro argues that we should use the
more recent household numbers prepared by the Metropolitan Council, which is the planning agency for
the region in which the Communities lie.44 Because of the “rapid residential development” in some
Communities, North Metro argues, household numbers from 2000, when placed in a ratio under DBS
subscriber numbers from 2008, overstate DBS subscribership.45 North Metro did not provide the
Metropolitan Council’s household numbers. Comcast did provide them, however.46
After careful consideration, we reject the Metropolitan Council’s household numbers for
several reasons. Section 632(l)(1)(B)(ii) of the Communications Act47 requires that we measure
“households,” a term for which the Census Bureau has adopted a detailed definition.48 We presume that
Congress intended that we use the Census Bureau’s definition of household.49 There is no evidence in the
record, however, that the Metropolitan Council uses that definition of household. Therefore, it is possible
that the Metropolitan Council counts as a household something that we consider not to be a household.
Second, it is unclear how the Metropolitan Council arrives at its count of households (however defined).
We do not know whether the Metropolitan Council starts with the 2000 Census number and then modifies
it on some basis, or whether it conducts its own actual count at some time after 2000, or whether it uses
some other method to arrive at its number.
We have long accepted the most recent Census count of households, even if it is several
years old, as the measure of households in a community.50 Comcast has submitted such numbers. We are
ready to accept more recent household numbers that are shown to be at least as reliable as Census data,51

42 Response II at 2 & Atts. B, C & E.
43 312 ÷ 1697 = 18.39%; 293 ÷ 1697 = 17.27%.
44 Opposition at 6; Treich I at ¶ 18.
45 Opposition at 5. Comcast notes that North Metro’s preferred household numbers actually show a decrease in the
number of households in Lexington (which has been withdrawn) and in the Community of Spring Lake Park. Reply
at 2 n.6.
46 Reply at Exh. B.
47 47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(B)(ii).
48 U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts (“A household includes all the persons who occupy a housing
unit”) (visited Sept. 27, 2010).
49 Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992: Rate
Regulation: Buy-Through Prohibition
, 9 FCC Rcd 4316, 4324, ¶ 17 (1994) (“As used in the Cable Act, we presume
that Congress did not intend ‘households’ to have a different meaning than in the 1990 Census”), reversed in part on
other grounds
, Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1112 (1996).
50 See, e.g., Cablevision, 23 FCC Rcd at 14143-44, ¶ 10; Comcast Cable Commun., LLC, 23 FCC Rcd 10939, 10942
n.30, ¶ 13 (2008) & authorities cited therein.
51 See, e.g., Comcast, supra note 28, at ¶ 11; Time Warner Cable, Inc., 25 FCC Rcd 5457, 5463, ¶ 21 & n. 55

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but North Metro has not submitted such numbers.52 Given the above-stated uncertainties about the
Metropolitan Council’s household numbers, they are not as reliable as household numbers from the
Census. Accordingly, we accept the household numbers for the Communities that Comcast took from the
2000 Census.
North Metro alleges that the collective effect of its many specific criticisms of Comcast’s
evidence is that Comcast significantly overstates DBS subscribership in the Communities (and that the
overstatement in one originally filed community, Lexington, prompted Comcast to withdraw it).53 All
these flaws, North Metro claims, make it impossible for the Commission to trust showings of effective
competition based on five-digit zip code data and MBC’s methodology.54 Comcast disputes North
Metro’s allegations and stands by MBC’s allocation methodology.55
North Metro’s detailed criticisms are noteworthy, and we have denied hundreds of cable
operators’ purported showings of competing provider effective competition that are based on obviously
incorrect evidence involving five-digit zip codes.56 North Metro’s criticisms are not decisive in this case,
however, for several reasons. First, we use DBS subscriber numbers based on nine-digit zip codes, so any
flaws in MBC’s methodology for five-digit zip codes are irrelevant to this decision. Second, if two
possible criticisms of Comcast’s evidence are correct – that MBC erred in omitting some zip codes from
franchise areas57 and that some communities’ household numbers have decreased since the 2000 Census58
– any such errors would understate DBS subscribership, thus hurting Comcast’s case. No unfairness to
North Metro or any franchise authority results from such errors.
Third, most of North Metro’s detailed criticisms of Comcast’s data concern Lexington,
the community that Comcast withdrew.59 North Metro provides few details about the remaining
Communities, however.60 Finally, whether we use Comcast’s DBS subscribers based on five-digit data
and MBC’s allegedly erroneous allocation factor, or just nine-digit zip code data, DBS subscribership still
exceeds the statutory minimum in the six Communities. We want petitioning cable operators’ evidence to
be as accurate as is reasonably practical, but we recognize that Section 623(l)(1)(B)(ii) of the
Communications Act does not require that cable operators establish DBS subscribership with perfect

52 North Metro, in its Opposition at 10 n.35, cites TCI Cablevision, Inc., 10 FCC Rcd 2925, 2927, ¶ 9 (1995), for the
proposition that where a cable operator and a franchise authority submit different numbers, the burden is on the
operator to show its numbers are more accurate. That case is distinguishable from the present one, however. In that
case, each party submitted a household number not from the Census. Here, Comcast takes its household numbers
from the Census, which we have long held are presumptively reliable. See id. (“where both the cable operator and
the franchising authority submit household numbers more current than the most recent available census data, it is
the cable operator's burden to demonstrate that its more current household numbers are more accurate”) (italics
53 Opposition at 8 & Treich I at ¶¶ 7-16; Surreply at 7-9 & Exh. A (Declaration of Richard A. Treich, dated Feb. 18
2009) (“Treich II”), at ¶ 6; Treich III at ¶ 8.
54 Opposition at 3, 8-10; Surreply at 10-15.
55 Reply at 4-5 & Exh. C (Declaration of K. Pinna Gallant, MBC Senior Vice President, dated Nov. 14, 2007).
56 See, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership, 23 FCC Rcd 18355, 18357, ¶ 10 (2008);
Time Warner Cable Inc., 23 FCC Rcd 12069, 12072, ¶ 10, reconsideration denied, 23 FCC Rcd 16483 (2008); Time
Warner Cable Inc.,
23 FCC Rcd 12201, 12203, ¶ 8 (2008).
57 Treich I at ¶ 16.
58 Reply at 2 n.6.
59 Treich II at ¶¶ 8-12. Comcast disputes these criticisms. Response I at 2-5.
60 North Metro did provide more specific objections to the community of Circle Pines, but as discussed above, we
find that Comcast produced sufficient evidence to refute those objections. See discussion supra ¶ 17.

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precision. The statute requires only that the petitioner establish that DBS subscribership exceeds 15
percent. Comcast has established that.61
For each of the Communities, we accept Comcast’s estimates of DBS subscribers that are
based on nine-digit zip code data, and we accept 2000 Census numbers of households. This data is
displayed in Attachment A hereto and shows that subscribership of MVPDs other than the largest MVPD
exceeds 15 percent in each Community. Therefore, the second part of the competing provider test is
satisfied for each of the Communities.



Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Comcast has submitted sufficient evidence
demonstrating that both parts of the competing provider test are satisfied and Comcast is subject to
effective competition in the Communities listed on Attachment A.





that the petition for a determination of effective
competition filed in the captioned proceeding by Comcast Cable Communications, LLC,




that the certification to regulate basic cable service rates
granted to any of the Communities set forth on Attachment A


This action is taken pursuant to delegated authority pursuant to Section 0.283 of the
Commission’s rules.62
Steven A. Broeckaert
Senior Deputy Chief, Policy Division, Media Bureau

61 See Implementation of Section of the Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992: Rate
, 8 FCC Rcd 5631, 5670, ¶ 42 (1993) (Commission procedure “will ensure . . . that there is sufficient data
upon which to base a meaningful decision”), on reconsideration, 9 FCC Rcd 4316 (1994), reversed in part on other
grounds, Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC
, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1112
62 47 C.F.R. § 0.283.

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CSR 8008-E



2000 Census

Estimated DBS






MN 0370
MN 0371
Circle Pines
MN 0372
Ham Lake
MN 0374
Lino Lakes
MN 0376
Spring Lake Park
MN 0377
MN 0378

*CPR = Percent of competitive DBS penetration rate.

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